Eden The Making Of A Statesman

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EDEN

THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Also by Alan Campbell- Johnson
GROWING OPINIONS (Edited)

PEACE OFFERING

VISCOUNT HALIFAX

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

EDEN

THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

By ALAN CAMPBELL-JOHNSON
C.I.E., O.B.E.

IVES WASHBURN, INC.

New York

COPYRIGHT, 1939, 1955, BY ALAN CAMPBELL-JOHNSON

All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce
this book, or parts thereof, in any form, except
for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review.

Permission to quote from the following works is gratefully
acknowledged:

The Second World War by Sir Winston S. Churchill, copyright,
1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1953, by Houghton Mifflin Company.

Letter from Grosvenor Square by John Gilbert Winant, copy-
right, 1947, by Houghton Mifflin Company, and by permission of
Mr. D. H. Maxwell Stimson, sole surviving Executor of J. G.
Winant Estate.

Old Men Forget by Duff Cooper, copyright, 1954, by E. P.
Dutton & Co., Inc.

Roosevelt and Hopkins by Robert E. Sherwood, copyright, 1950,
by Harper & Brothers.

My Three Years -with Eisenhower by Captain Harry C. Butcher,
copyright, 1946, by Simon & Schuster, Inc.

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

THIS book is not in any sense a substitute for the final
verdicts, pious memorials, or intimate revelations of
history; it is not intended to be. The primary purpose of
writing about a living statesman is to try to satisfy public inter-
est in his future from a study of his past, and to select the
present point or points in his career where such an appraisal
can be usefully made.

Within these legitimate terms of reference and from my
study of the political development and prospects of Anthony
Eden, I began to prepare, a year or so ago, a fresh appreciation
of his life and work. I first set myself this task in 1938, follow-
ing upon Eden's dramatic resignation from the Chamberlain
Government. I was working at the time for Sir Archibald
Sinclair, now Lord Thurso, and then Leader of the Parlia-
mentary Liberal Party. From this central vantage point I was
closely interested in the national and international repercus-
sions of this event perhaps the most highly charged personal
decision taken by a British statesman between the wars. While
Eden's Party loyalties were undisturbed, his attitude to the
appeasement policy of the day transcended Party considera-
tions. Sinclair and Eden in the field of foreign affairs, which
dominated the political scene, were thus brought ideologically
close together, and my own interest in the Conservative Eden
flowed quite naturally from my Liberal activities and studies.
In a most illuminating article on Eden written for the Strand
magazine early in 1939, Winston Churchill himself politically
isolated wrote, "He is the only representative of the mutilated
generation who has achieved a first-class political position and
has held high and dominant office with significance and dis-
tinction. His career and its interruption are therefore of par-

VI PREFACE

ticular interest to the increasingly large public who concern
themselves with national affairs."

Seventeen years have since elapsed of blood, toil, tears
and sweat, of total victory in coalition, of Opposition and dis-
enchantment, of cold war and prodigious diplomatic effort. As
with the interruption of his career in 1938, so now with its
consummation in 1955, the purpose of this book remains sub-
stantially the same to try to knit together the main events
in a life still large with promise for the British people and the
world.

He is the twelfth man to attain the premiership in the
twentieth century, and only the third to do so in the past fifteen
years. At fifty-seven he reaches 10 Downing Street close to the
average age of his august predecessors; Asquith and Baldwin
were both fifty-six, and Lord Salisbury fifty-five, when they
formed their first administrations. Balfour became Prime Min-
ister at fifty-four, and Lloyd George at fifty-three. Churchill
and Attlee, who have monopolised the stage for so long, both
had to wait until their sixties before supreme office came their
way.

Although the residual power of the office grows or contracts
according to the personality of the particular Prime Minister,
it is in general safe to say that the race only goes to men who
have the stuff of leadership in them. Eden has reached the sum-
mits on his own merits, but also under the protecting shadow
of one of the greatest men in British history. How will he
handle the Churchillian inheritance? Will there be a devolution
of power? Will the specialist in foreign affairs, the diplomatic
virtuoso, have the capacity to grow with his greatest job? Will
he master the complex and threatening industrial and economic
situations confronting him? The answers to these and many
other crucial questions still lie ahead of him and of us.

It is difficult for me to give adequate acknowledgment to
many friends in politics, journalism and the Civil Service who,
wittingly or otherwise, have at various times thrown light for

PREFACE Vll

me on some facet of Anthony Eden's career. They have all
helped to build up for me impressions which themselves illu-
minate events.

I would, however, like to pay particular tribute to Mr.
Jossleyn Hennessy for invaluable help covering the period of
Eden's recent term of office as Foreign Secretary. I also wish
to thank Mr. T. F. Lindsay for his guidance through the war
and immediate post-war period, and Mr. Mackenzie Harvey
for advice in regard to the earlier periods and the treatment I
had previously accorded to them.

For the period of the war, Sir Winston Churchill's monu-
mental six-volume work The Second World War is, and is
likely to remain, the supreme primary source. The picture
given there of Eden's role in the higher direction of the war is
already part of his claim on history. I am grateful to the author
and his publishers for permission to include various direct
quotations from Sir Winston's books in this narrative. No
amount of paraphrase or indirect reference could do justice to
them.

I am also indebted for permission to quote from Roosevelt
and Hopkins, by Robert E. Sherwood; Letter from Gros-
venor Square, by John G. Winant; Old Men Forget, by Duff
Cooper; and My Three Years with Eisenhower by Captain
Harry C. Butcher, U.S.N.R.

ALAN CAMPBELL-JOHNSON
Westminster, April, 1955

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

1 OTHER EDENS 1

2 FROM WINDLESTONE TO WAR 7

3 B.A., M.P. 12

4 MAIDEN SPEECHES 18

5 RED-LETTER DAYS 23

6 LOCARNO LIMITED 31

7 AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 42

8 DEBTS AND SETTLEMENTS 55

9 EXPERIMENTS IN OPPOSITION 65

10 NATIONAL MINISTRIES 71

11 PROGRESS IN LOST CAUSES 79

12 LORD PRIVY SEAL AT LARGE 88

13 MURDER IN MARSEILLES 95

14 GRAND TOURS 103

15 ABYSSINIA TEST CASE 113

16 WATCH ON THE RHINE 125

17 PLATFORM SANCTIONS 135

18 DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS 144

19 RESIGNATION 154

20 REASONS WHY 164

21 FROM MUNICH TO WAR 171

22 WAR MINISTER 181

23 CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN INSTRUMENT 188

24 GRAND ALLIES 199

ix

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

1 OTHER EDENS 1

2 FROM WINDLESTONE TO WAR 7

3 B.A., M.P. 12

4 MAIDEN SPEECHES 18

5 RED-LETTER DAYS 23

6 LOCARNO LIMITED 31

7 AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 42

8 DEBTS AND SETTLEMENTS 55

9 EXPERIMENTS IN OPPOSITION 65

10 NATIONAL MINISTRIES 71

11 PROGRESS IN LOST CAUSES 79

12 LORD PRIVY SEAL AT LARGE 88

13 MURDER IN MARSEILLES 95

14 GRAND TOURS 103

15 ABYSSINIA TEST CASE 113

16 WATCH ON THE RHINE 125

17 PLATFORM SANCTIONS 135

18 DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS 144

19 RESIGNATION 154

20 REASONS WHY 164

21 FROM MUNICH TO WAR 171

22 WAR MINISTER 181

23 CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN INSTRUMENT 188

24 GRAND ALLIES 199

ix

X CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

25 DILEMMAS OF VICTORY 210

26 OUT OF OFFICE 220

27 OPPOSITION 228

28 TURN OF THE TIDE 235

29 DIPLOMACY AT LARGE 242

30 DARKNESS AND LIGHT 252

31 GENEVA AND S.E.A.T.O. 260

32 SALVAGE AND SETTLEMENT 270

33 ASCENT OF THE SUMMIT 281
EPILOGUE 293
INDEX 296

ILLUSTRATIONS
following page 114

SIR ANTHONY EDEN
LEAGUE DIPLOMATS
DIVIDED COUNSELLORS
GRAND ALLY

TRANSATLANTIC CONFERENCE
LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION
EDEN AND SON
FOREIGN SECRETARY AGAIN
MEMORIES OF POTSDAM
BONN ACCORD
WEDDING GROUP
UNITED NATIONS
WORLD REVIEW
GENEVA CONFERENCE
LONDON AGREEMENT
THE PRIME MINISTER

EDEN

THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

CHAPTER 1

OTHER EDENS

WINDLESTONE HALL, near Bishop Auckland, In
County Durham, has been the home of the Edens
for almost four hundred years. The house itself as
an early topographer remarks, "is seated on an easy inclination
of the hill, with an eastern aspect." The old hall, that went
back to the seventeenth century, is gone: it was rebuilt in the
thirties of the last century by Sir Robert Johnson Eden, who
laid out the new building "on a handsome plan, with extensive
offices, and plantations." It is this house which Anthony Eden's
grandfather saw when he rode over one moonlight night to view
the property to which he had suddenly succeeded. Sir Timothy
Eden Anthony's elder brother paints the scene for us: "On
the brow of the hill a long, low, porticoed house stood empty
in the moonlight. A park, crossed by a silver chain of ponds
and splashed here and there with inky shadows on its grey
grass, swept up to a sunk fence where a close-cropped lawn
fell away from the house to meet it. Behind the dull ochre mass
of the building a further hill stretched upwards yet to a crest of
wind-torn beeches."

As early as 1413 we find record of a Robert Eden in the
Ferryhill district where once roamed the famous braun (or
boar) of Brancepath, which, according to the legend, was
valiantly slain by Hodge of Ferry. Surtees, the county historian,
referring to the Preston estate of the Edens, two miles south of
Stockton-on-Tees, calls it "the cradle of the Edens," and it may
be that this was their original home.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the
Edens* lands and connections spread out in the County Pala-
tine. In 1 672 Charles II created the Eden baronetcy. One of

l

2 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

the most eminent members of the family was William, third son
of the third baronet, himself to become the first Lord Auckland.
With Auckland, who was born in 1742, the family's interests
and influence widen and they identify themselves with political
and social problems at the national level. An Eden tradition in
the field of foreign affairs and social reform is established.
At the age of twenty he was an Under-Secretary of State.
Thereafter his duties brought him into direct contact with the
American Revolution and reform of the East India Company,
As the confidant and special envoy of Pitt he successfully
completed "difficult and intricate" negotiations which cul-
minated in the great commercial treaty with France.

Although relations between the two men ultimately became
somewhat strained it was reputed that Pitt was at one time in
love with Auckland's eldest daughter. In diplomatic skill and
outlook Auckland's career set a precedent for Anthony Eden's.
A portrait of Auckland also shows that there is an inheritance
of good looks in the Eden family. He comes down to us in his
prime as a man of slim physique and regular features, strong
but not aggressive the epitome of the well-moulded man of
fashion.

The services and influence of the House of Eden were not
confined to the first Lord Auckland brothers, nephews, sons,
and daughters all helped to add lustre to the name. His eldest
brother, the third baronet, Sir John Eden, was M.P. for Dur-
ham in two Parliaments; the second, Sir Robert Eden, became
Governor of Maryland, which brought with it a baronetcy;
while his marriage to Caroline Calvert conferred on all his de-
scendants the peculiar status of Counts and Countesses of the
Holy Roman Empire.

Lord Auckland was a pioneer of the cause of penal reform,
and his nephew, Sir Frederick Morton Eden was author of
The State of the Poor, one of the great classics of economic
literature, a pioneer work subjecting the poverty in his midst
to the disciplines of fact-finding and profound problem
analysis.

OTHER EDENS 3

While idealism is a strong feature of the Eden tradition, a
capacity to translate faith into works is equally in evidence. The
quiet detached scholar advocating at the end of the eighteenth
century widespread development of friendly societies to alle-
viate distress, was to put his theories to the test by founding,
and subsequently becoming chairman of, the Globe Insurance
Company.

In the career of the first Lord Auckland's second son, who in
due course had an earldom conferred upon him, the family's
stake in public service was maintained and even extended.
Once again the journey to politics was made by way of Christ
Church and the bar, but following on his father's breach with
Pitt and the Tories he imbibed Whig ideas, becoming a leading
spokesman of Whig opposition to the reactionary Liverpool
administration. He was in turn President of the Board of Trade
in Grey's famous Reform Cabinet, First Lord of the Admiralty
and then Bentinck's successor as Governor General of India.
One prominent contemporary summed up Auckland as being
"with the sole exception of Lord John Russell, by far the ablest
member of his party, his terms most statesmanlike, and his
government of India particularly just."

Two of Auckland's sisters accompanied him to India, and
while he administered they entertained. One of them (Emily
Eden) described the day-to-day life in a diary of more than
usual wit, charm, and literary style; the MS. was dedicated to
her nephew, Lord William Godolphin Osborne, and published
in 1866, nearly twenty years after the Indian grand tour she
describes. "You and I," she writes, "are now almost the only
survivors of that large party that in 1838 left Government
House for the Upper Provinces. . . . Now that India has fallen
under the curse of railroads and that life and property will soon
become as insecure there as they are here, the splendour of a
Governor-General's Progress is at an end. The Koobut will be-
come a Railway Station; the Taj, will, of course, under the
sway of an Agra Company (Limited, except for destruction),
be bought up for a monster hotel, and the Governor-General

4 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

will dwindle down into a first-class passenger with a carpet-
bag." Miss Eden lived on, delicate and formidable, to see
Victorian progress sweep aside the world of her youth. The
journey from Whig to Radical, from Holland House to Man-
chester, was one she did not undertake; but in this travel book,
and in two delightful novels, she provides what is virtually an
indispensable picture of a dead dynasty. Miss Eden's first novel,
The Semi-detached House, was published in 1859 and was an
immediate best-seller. The second, The Semi-attached Couple,
was actually written in 1834, twenty years after Pride and
Prejudice, with a plot based largely on it.

In 1928 Anthony Eden contributed an introduction to a
special edition of The Semi-detached House, in which he refers
to Emily's social position, her virtues and limitations and diffi-
dently offers to the public a little book which he hopes may
bring to readers some of the pleasant ease which it describes.
In an appreciation of Eden when he first became Foreign Sec-
retary, the New York Times praised him for displaying in his
preface, "A sure literary touch." The Semi-detached House,
Anthony Eden concludes, "cannot be acclaimed as a work of
genius. Its writing formed the pastime of a woman of fashion
when fashion was the world. Emily Eden clever, well-read, a
good letter-writer, and a witty conversationalist found her
books a pleasant exercise. Those who read her books again
may enjoy with her the leisured ease of the age of which she
wrote, and may spend with her a passing hour among those
whose lives were cast in pleasant places. If they lived in glass
houses, have we the right to cast a stone?"

In 1873, after the usual genealogical adventures, the baron-
etcy came down to William Eden, who had been the second of
a family of eleven, and it must have seemed that the House of
Eden was well preserved against extinction. But of all these
eleven children it was only Sir William who perpetuated the
succession, the others either dying young or without issue.

Sir William's marriage to Lady Sybil Grey was in every sense
of the term a brilliant match. The Greys and Edens, colleagues

OTHER EDENS 5

in the political struggle for Reform, were now to be more
closely linked. On the Eden side there were already affinities
with such historic houses as the Widdingtons, Sheffields, Veres,
Kenes and Fairfaxes. Through the Greys the circle was wid-
ened to include the Mowbrays, Howards and Nevilles. This
brief catalogue of Anthony Eden's ancestry reveals a formid-
able inheritance. In the person of his father there was almost
too generous an endowment. Sir William's very superfluity of
gifts and variety of character must have been more than a little
overwhelming to the children, who were subjected to sudden
alternations of hurricane and halcyon temperament that even
Sir William's adult friends found trying. The handsome,
wealthy sportsman and aesthete, he was in himself passionate,
wilful, obstinate, erratic, and of almost morbid sensitivity of
eye and ear. The sight of red flowers in a garden, the yelping of
a dog, the smell of whisky or tobacco were excruciatingly pain-
ful to him, as were the voices of children, and he often ex-
presses in his letters sentiments quite Herodian in their ferocity.
But if he was eccentric in some things, he was equally talented
in others. For instance there is no question of the excellence
and seriousness of his painting. He was an accomplished artist
whose works justly found a place in the exhibitions of the New
English Art Club, the most progressive of the art societies of
that time. His water-colours in particular show an extreme deli-
cacy of feeling. It is perhaps not surprising that in as far as his
reactions to people betray a similar nicety his circle of in-
timates, never large, became over the years more and more
restricted.

Sir William, however, was much more than the hypersensi-
tive artist. He was a practical man of affairs, running a large
estate. He was also a fine sportsman: indeed it is said that there
was not a better man to hounds in the north of England. He
was three times master of the local hunt, and his shooting par-
ties were famous, not least for the host's occasional storms of
temper.

One might well feel proud in later life of a parent who had

6 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

stood up to WMstler; but to Ms children he must have remained
incomprehensible and distant in spirit. It is true he taught his
children many things, and well; but it was, one suspects, by
numbers in the manner of the gymnastics instructor.

Lady Eden looks out at us from the canvas of Herkomer and
from the water-colour by her husband. The Whistler portrait
the object of the famous dispute between Sir William and the
artist was tragically destroyed. In her poise and grace and in
the serenity of her expression one is tempted to read greater
depths of character than is usually attributable to the lovely sit-
ters to fashionable artists. It is easy to appreciate why she was
acknowledged as one of the outstanding beauties of her time.
Lady Eden's father, Sir William Grey, who had been in turn
Lt.-Governor of Bengal and Governor of Jamaica, was grand-
son of the first Earl Grey, brother of the statesman of the Re-
form Bill. Lady Eden provided the steadiness and tranquillity
of temperament without which life at Windlestone would have
been an unnerving and wholly unpredictable experience for the
children.

Such was Eden's inheritance, formidable, almost overpower-
ing. To belong to these ruling houses and in particular to be
connected with the Whig dynasties, was to succeed to a sense of
values admirably summed up by the historian Keith Feiling. He
is referring specifically to the Holland House Whigs, but the
words apply with equal force to the Edens of Windlestone:
"If," he writes, "their standard of birth was in any sense a vice,
it was then a vice which lost half its grossness. It might token
selfishness, individual desire, a wish for power. But it announced
also that the only justified and prudential power was rule over
free men; that the very criterion of enduring aristocracy was
that it was open, and not closed; that man was born free, al-
though only his proved and attested leaders should break his
chains."

CHAPTER 2

FROM WINDLESTONE TO WAR

ROBERT ANTHONY EDEN was born at Windlestone on
12th June, 1897. It is recorded that it was the hottest
day the year had known, with a sun-temperature of over
a hundred and twenty degrees. At the time Sir William and
Lady Eden had akeady two sons: John, who was nearly nine,
and Timothy Calvert, aged four, as well as a daughter Elfrida
Marjorie, who was ten. A younger brother, Nicholas, was bom
in 1900. The eldest son, John, as a lieutenant in the 12th Lan-
cers, went out to France in the very beginning of the War at
the age of twenty-six and was killed on 17th October, 1914.
Timothy Calvert, the author of the brilliant little monograph
on Ms father, thus succeeded to the baronetcy on Sir William's
death in 1915. When war broke out he was interned in Ger-
many at Ruhleben for two years, but returned to England in
1916, and as a lieutenant in the Yorkshire Light Infantry
fought on the Western Front from 1917 to 1919. William
Nicholas, the fourth son, served as a midshipman in the Navy,
and was killed at the battle of Jutland when still only sixteen
years of age.

Lady Eden's recollections of Anthony's childhood are un-
fortunately brief. "He was always the quiet one. They say that
famous men are often the most mischievous as boys, but An-
thony was never that. He never gave me a moment's trouble.
He was, and he remains, the kindest of sons. He wasn't keen
about games, though he became a fair rider, I remember, and
a fair shot. But he never became the horseman his father was."

Lady Eden has recorded that even in very early days An-
thony had a leaning towards politics, that he would debate
freely and keep himself informed of current affairs even at Ms

7

8 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

preparatory school. On train journeys he would recall the polit-
ical events connected with towns the train passed through, the
chief elections, and the names of the candidates.

But politics was not at first the most obvious career. Anthony
had inherited much of his father's talent or something more
than talent for painting, and it is not impossible that, but for
the First World War which deepened and matured his charac-
ter, he might have found his means of self-expression most
aptly in art. His work is said to have been promising enough to
suggest he might have made his name as-an artist. Although he
soon gave first place to politics, his interest in art has remained.
It was well known even in Oxford days, and has resulted in a
private collection of modern pictures chosen with discrimina-
tion and an eye to future trends an artist's collection rather
than a collector's.

His education was in the hands of a governess until 1906,
when at the age of nine he was sent to Sandroyd School, near
Cobham, in Surrey. Sandroyd is an orthodox entrance to the
privileges of Eton and Christ Church, and has played its part in
introducing various foreign rulers to British private education.

Eden duly went up to Eton in 1911 to Ernest Lee Church-
ill's House, famous in the days of Mitchell, the great cricket
coach, for its athletic distinctions. The Hop Garden, as it is
called, lies at the very centre of Eton at the head of Common
Lane and opposite the New Schools. With Eden Minor in the
Middle Fourth in 1914 was Henry Segrave, later to become
famous for his speed records and even as early as 1916 in the
Department of Military Aeronautics. L. N. Kindersley, too,
was a school friend, son of Sir Robert the economic authority,
who, with so many others of that young society, met an un-
timely death in France. Out of those twenty-eight members of
the Fourth no fewer than nine gave their lives to their country
in the war, and almost all saw active service.

Eden's generation belonged to an Eton that was still the pri-
mary and unchallenged source of the nation's rulers. But radi-
cal and even revolutionary forces were undermining the social

FROM WINDLESTONE TO WAR 9

order on which Eton's supremacy had been so firmly based.
Such books as MacNaughton's Fifty Years of Eton and Lub-
bock's Shades of Eton recall the vanished world of Eden's
school days, so soon to be swept away by total war and mass
democracy.

At Eton, Anthony's career was exemplary and promising
without being brilliant. He emerges conspicuously in no ex-
traordinary distinction or unusual escapade. He seems not to
have attracted much attention, and there are no legends around
his name. It appears he took a special interest in Divinity; at
least he won the Brinkman divinity prize, but this of itself
should not be taken to point to a nature more serious and
scholarly than the average. Nor probably was this distinction
so highly regarded by his contemporaries as his athletic prow-
ess. He was a good all-rounder at games. He gained his House
colours for football; he was a keen cricketer and a promising
oarsman. It is said that only the outbreak of war in 1914,
which in common with so many of his contemporaries cut
short his school days, prevented him from winning his rowing
colours.

As soon as he was eighteen, Anthony duly joined up and
was attached to the King's Royal Rifle Corps in September,
1915. He was gazetted temporary lieutenant and found himself
on the Western Front in the spring of 1916 by which time
operations had become stabilised to the point of strategic stag-
nation. Along the whole front battles large and small devel-
oped, deadly but essentially futile.

"He's a cheery old card," grunted Harry to Jack
As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack.
But he did for them both by his plan of attack.

The impact of war on Eden was to bring his qualities of
leadership and administration quickly to the fore. He became
an adjutant at the age of nineteen, achieving thereby the record
of being the youngest one in the Army. On 5th June, 1917,

10 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Lieutenant R. A. Eden was gazetted as having been awarded
the Military Cross.

From Ypres he was transferred for a time to the Somme, and
as a result, it has since been pointed out, there were opposing
each other the two men who were later to be in closer and more
momentous contact and conflict: Anthony Eden and Adolf
Hitler.

The experience of all the horror and death must have hard-
ened his sensibilities and eaten into his mind. No doubt it
underlies the intense sincerity of his various pleas for peace in
our time. For him they were never the recitation of a formula
with their spiritual origin in Staff Headquarters. Although he
has very rarely given direct expression to it, his is the front-line
point of view. Once in a great debate on Disarmament he was
sufficiently stirred to break away from his natural war-time
reticence and anonymity. "It is," he declared, "not only that
those who have seen war dislike it, but those particularly who
saw the last months or the last weeks of the last war had a
vision of what the next war might be expected to be. I remem-
ber an evening," he went on, "in the very last weeks of the war,
in the last stages of our advance, when we had stopped for the
night at brigade headquarters in some farmhouse. The night
was quiet and there was no shell-fire, as was usual at the end of
the war, but quite suddenly it began literally to rain bombs for
anything from ten minutes to a quarter of an hour. I do not
know how many bombs fell in that time, but something be-
tween thirty and forty, I suppose. It seemed to us to be hun-
dreds. I do not know what the explanation was, but perhaps it
was that the enemy aeroplanes had failed to find their objective
and were emptying out their bombs before crossing the line on
their way back. Whatever the explanation, what rests in my
mind is not only my own personal terror, which was quite inex-
pressible, because bombing is more demoralising in its effects
than the worst shell-fire, but the comment made when it was
over by somebody who said, "There now, you have had your
first taste of the next war!' "

FROM WINDLESTONE TO WAR 11

It was chiefly his precocious organising talent that distin-
guished him and led to Ms promotion after his experience of
fighting on the Somme to Lord Plumer's staff. He rose to the
rank of captain at the age of twenty, and was actually posted
brigade-major on his brigade's staff.

The war ended, and left him at the age of twenty-one suc-
cessful as a soldier, with administrative ability plainly revealed,
but with no plan for civilian life. His father had died, and his
brother Timothy had succeeded to the baronetcy and the life of
country leisure that this was considered to entail. It was left to
Anthony to carve out a career for himself; the family that had
given two sons to the country had survived it with a diminished
fortune.

CHAPTER 3

B.A., M.P.

IT WAS Lady Eden, apparently, who suggested to Anthony
that he should go up to Oxford and make up for the lost
years of warfare. "I think/' she is reported to have said,
"that I can claim to have brought about Anthony's entry into
politics after the war. I suggested that he should go to Oxford
when he left the army. He hesitated first when I mentioned it.
'What, go back to school, Mother?' I remember him saying
with an amazed expression. But he went."

The Oxford he entered in October, 1919, was new, strange
and without precedent. The usual young undergraduates were
there, of course, though in diminished numbers, but the rest of
the students were young men back from the war, older not only
in years but also older from their war experience. These "vet-
erans" had to conform to the adolescent conventions of a
secluded university after playing their parts on an international
stage. From the life of the trenches they had now to turn to
scholarship and to the minutiae of a curriculum. For the most
part they found it difficult to settle down; but Anthony Eden
was one of those who entered on their studies with all the en-
ergy and determination that the war had demanded of them.
He did not try to make contacts with the young undergradu-
ates, but set himself to study and to repeat at the university the
success he had won on the battlefield. He did not write for any
college paper. And although it has been said that he was al-
ready seriously contemplating politics as a career, he did not
join the Union Debating Society, the usual path for aspiring
politicians, and he made no political speeches. Nor does it
seem that he took any serious interest in games. He joined the
O.U.D.S. but there is no evidence of his taking any active part

12

B.A., M.P. 13

in its proceedings or productions. In some ways he had chosen
in Christ Church the best college for the pursuit of quiet
individualism. For, unlike some of the smaller colleges, the
"House" is always tolerant of the man who asks to be left
alone.

His tutor was R. Paget Dewhurst, and his "school," signifi-
cantly enough, Oriental languages. The choice of such an ex-
otic subject was a further factor in his "splendid isolation" at
the university. For the future, however, it opened horizons of
special knowledge in the event of his pursuing the Foreign
Service or politics or the arts. It is Dewhurst who is credited
with a prophetic insight into the future career of his promising
student. That Eden was already showing signs of intending pol-
itics as a career may perhaps be deduced from the story of
Professor Dewhurst's prophecy that Anthony Eden would be
Foreign Secretary by the age of forty. Certainly at the academic
level Eden merited his tutor's high opinion, for when in due
course Eden took his Final Schools (he was just twenty-five
years old at the time) he gained first-class honours.

Shortly after leaving Oxford the challenge of a General Elec-
tion enabled him to put his political ambitions to the test. It
was a good moment to enter the lists. After four years the seem-
ingly irresistible Coalition Government of Lloyd George had
been sundered by a meeting of Conservatives at the Carlton
Club. The occasion had been dominated by a comparatively
obscure personality, Stanley Baldwin. As a result, the majority
of the Conservatives decided to resume their independence
under Bonar Law's leadership. There was, of course, no hesi-
tation about party, and as a Conservative he felt, no doubt, that
his native county ought rightly to return him to Parliament. So
he seized the opportunity of the general election of November,
1922, to offer himself to the Spennymoor Division of Durham.
He had Liberal and Labour opponents. The former had a pol-
icy, the latter the sympathies of the miners. Captain Eden had
neither; and the accident of his birth in the district a dozen
miles away and twenty-five years before does not seem to have

14 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

impressed the constituents. The Durham Chronicle remarks
kindly that "his prospects of election are not considered prom-
ising/'

The Liberal pointed out that Captain Eden had formerly
declared himself a supporter of the Coalition "the best brains
in the country" now he came forward as the supporter of Mr.
Bonar Law. This perhaps reinforced Mr. Bonar Law's conten-
tion that the time was now ripe for Conservatives to contract
out of their double loyalty.

Captain Eden's principal election speech asserted the indis-
pensability of Conservative Government to the country, and
emphasised the point that Conservatives were not hostile to
trade unionists in spite of the criticisms which were unfortu-
nately so widespread. He declared himself a loyal follower of
Mr. Bonar Law; said that the primary needs of the country
were a revival of trade, "stability of national forces," and the
restoration of vigour and energy to great industries. Private
enterprise had built up our industries; it alone could restore
them. All these things could be done by Mr. Bonar Law's Gov-
ernment. He would give the country security, develop the na-
tional markets, decrease the vast army of the unemployed. As
for himself he hoped to see more capitalists, not fewer. And
as for trade unionists they should remember that they owed
many of their privileges to the Unionist Party. As for the Lib-
erals they were weak in policy, weaker in unity, and weakest
of all in leadership. They were still whales, but whales on dry-
land.

Unconvinced by this assertion of the necessity of Conserva-
tive Government for England, ungrateful for the favours of the
Unionist Party to trade unionism, even unswayed by the pres-
tige of Captain Eden's principal supporter, the Marquess of
Londonderry (the famous coal-owner) , the miners of Spenny-
moor rejected both Conservative and Liberal and returned the
Labour candidate. Indeed, the Labour candidate with 13,766
votes was over 6,000 ahead of Captain Eden, and over 100
ahead of Captain Eden and the Liberal combined.

B.A., M.P.

15

He had begun Ms political career in the usual way by being
defeated. He had no intention of abandoning this career he had
now chosen, and merely waited for the opportunity to present
himself to a more appreciative body of citizens than the subter-
ranean toilers of Spennymoor.

Next year (1923) the opportunity came. In October the
electors of Warwick and Leamington said goodbye to their
Conservative member, Sir Ernest Pollock, who had just been
appointed Master of the Rolls. To step into the shoes of this
very able member was not easy for a young man who had had
no contact with Leamington whatever, and who was only in-
vited in the first place as an unknown substitute for a rejected
local champion.

Sir Ernest suited his constituents very well, but he had failed
them in one respect. He had never provided them with an excit-
ing election. In 1918 when he first won the seat only a quarter
of the electorate had bothered to vote; in 1922 no one came
forward to oppose him. A fog of apathy settled over the con-
stituency.

Suddenly it lifted. "Rumours indicate a rare exciting time,"
reported the Leamington Chronicle. Not only were there to be
three candidates Leamington had never seen a Labour candi-
date in its midst before but two of them were actually related,
by marriage only, it is true; but the situation was an odd one.

To the Conservative candidate, stranger though he was,
Leamington extended a friendly welcome. Captain Eden found
nothing in this large rural division to remind him of the intract-
able Durham miners. This time he was opposed by his sister's
mother-in-law, the Countess of Warwick, who, at the age of
nearly sixty-two, was setting herself the formidable task of
breaking new ground for the Socialists. The Liberal candidate
was George Nicholls, a self-made Peterborough man, who
wisely directed his energies towards the agricultural vote.

Even more interesting to the public than the one link of re-
lationship between the two candidates was the fact that a sec-
ond link was about to be forged. Captain Eden had just become

16 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

engaged to be married to Miss Beatrice Beckett, the daughter
of Sir Gervase Beckett, banker and part-owner of the York-
shire Post, and son-in-law of the Countess of Warwick. The
wedding was to be celebrated in the middle of the campaign,
November 5th.

Although the constituency was already Conservative and
well disposed to the new candidate, Eden was not walking into
a perfectly safe seat. There was plenty of work to do. For one
thing there were two hundred square miles to be covered; and
moreover the electorate had been almost doubled since the last
contest by the addition of about 19,000 women who were now
to exercise their privilege of voting for the first time. Some saw
in this the Countess's chance to rally her own sex in her support.
Women candidates were rare in those days, and women had a
way of demonstrating their solidarity irrespective of their polit-
ical opinions. Others, more worldly wise, saw a much more
likely bait for these susceptible voters in the person of the hand-
some young Conservative candidate. If the contest were to be
one of Solidarity versus Sex Appeal, none could be better
placed than Anthony Eden for the job of attracting the great
majority of women voters who care nothing for political argu-
ment. That is not to say that he did not also stand a good
chance of attracting the politically minded minority as well.

On November 5th, Captain Eden and Miss Beckett were
duly married at St. Margaret's, Westminster. The Archbishop
of York officiated, assisted by the Bishop of Wakefield; Major
the Hon. Evelyn Eden, M.C., was best man. After the recep-
tion the couple left for their, honeymoon, to be spent not in
Warwick Castle as the romantically minded lady voters of the
division had thought almost inevitable, but in Sussex.

The honeymoon lasted two days. No more time could be
spared: polling-day was only a fortnight ahead. Then after six
days more campaigning suddenly the tension relaxed. Parlia-
ment was dissolved; a general election became necessary as a
result of Baldwin's determination to secure a Conservative
mandate for Protection. Polling-day was fixed for December

B.A., M.P. 17

6th, over three weeks away. The candidates were nominated
once again, and the Edens went away for another honeymoon,
this one lasting a week. No doubt by this time all three candi-
dates had had enough of the campaign, the longest in electoral
history. By the end of it Captain Eden estimated he had made
nearly eighty speeches. The delay told in his favour; he had
time to make himself known to the voters and energy enough
to stand the prolonged strain. For Lady Warwick, on the other
hand, the long campaign was crippling. Indeed there was hardly
one feature of the contest for which she might be thankful.
From the beginning she was reproved for having consented to
stand as a Socialist. At best, it was considered tactless of her
to stand in Warwick of all places. She was not even credited
with sincerity; for it was the general opinion that she would
withdraw before polling-day.

The result was duly announced six weeks after the candi-
dates had begun their campaigns. Seventy-five per cent of the
electorate voted. Captain Eden polled 1 6,337 ; George Nicholls,
11,134; Lady Warwick, 4,015; plurality, 5 ,203 . His future and
his political position apparently assured, he came to London,
took a house in Mulberry Walk, Chelsea, and settled down to
the social activities of a political career and to the pursuit of
his artistic interests.

The election itself was indecisive. The Conservatives were
defeated but neither Labour nor Liberals had won. Nonethe-
less, after various constitutional and political expedients had
been considered and rejected the way was clear for the first
Labour Government in British history to take office.

The Protection appeal had been premature but it had served
to rally the Conservatives still not wholly united by the Carlton
Club coup. In spite of the tactical reverse, Baldwin's strategic
purpose for his Party's future had been substantially secured.

CHAPTER 4

MAIDEN SPEECHES

ON THE evening of 19th February, 1924, Lieutenant-
Colonel Sir Samuel Hoare moved the following resolu-
tion on Air Defence:

"That this House, whilst earnestly desiring the further limita-
tion of armaments so far as is consistent with the safety and
integrity of the Empire, affirms the principle laid down by the
late Government and accepted by the Imperial Conference that
Great Britain must maintain a Home Defence Air Force of
sufficient strength to give adequate protection against air attack
by the strongest air force within striking distance of her shores."

The debate arising out of this resolution belongs to a dim
and distant age when disarmament was the declared policy of
His Majesty's first Labour Government. In all the welter of
goodwill only a few voices were raised in warning of the wrath
to come. It was not a good moment for the Parliamentary
beginner to intervene; but the immaculate and seemingly self-
confident Member for Leamington was not dismayed. He had
maintained a decent silence for the first six weeks of the new
session. In choosing this occasion to rise from his place on the
Opposition back bench and claim the unwritten privilege of
priority over the speaker's impartial gaze it may have seemed
to him that he had little to lose. As a young aristocrat with
a good military record there was no prima -facie case for trying
to placate the honourable members of the proletariat. Discre-
tion was the duty of the leaders of the Conservative opposition:
for himself the obvious line was to say what Government and
Opposition would naturally expect him to say in an atmos-
phere of confused working-class idealism. Lieutenant-Colonel
Sir Samuel Hoare had symbolized the sagacity of the staff

18

MAIDEN SPEECHES 19

officer, Major-General Seely the explosiveness of the "brass
hat"; what the Conservative case required now was a brief
sprinkling of subaltern insolence; otherwise Britain's air de-
fence would ascend into the stratosphere and not be easily
restored to earthly influence.

It must be admitted that Captain Eden's first intervention in
Parliament was the reverse of conciliatory. His answer to a
Labour inquiry from what quarter we might expect air attack
was that he did not know; for the question was oS the point.
Surely we should prepare to defend ourselves from any quarter.
He stressed the impossibility of providing air defence at a
moment's notice, and the extreme vulnerability of London
from the air. He hoped the Government would not be tempted
by sentiment and that the minister would act not in accordance
with his principles, but, instead, with the programme he had
inherited from the other Parties.

Captain Eden hurried on to his conclusion. "The Under-
secretary asked what was meant by adequate protection, and
he said he believed preparedness was not a good weapon. That
may be, but unpreparedness is a very much worse weapon, and
it is a double-edged one, likely to hurt us very seriously." The
Under-Secretary had quoted an old military maxim saying that
the resolution, divided as it was into two parts, reminded him
of an ancient military slogan, "Trust in God, but keep your
powder dry." When Eden commented that it was a cynical
motto, Labour members cheered. "I will quote one," he con-
tinued, "which is, that 'Attack is the best form of defence.' "
This, however, was more even than the customary indulgence
and courtesy could stand, and members shouted, "No, no!"
Captain Eden was not to be diverted. "I expected honourable
members opposite would be a little surprised at that doctrine:
I was not suggesting that we should drop our bombs on other
countries but simply that we should have the means at our
disposal to answer any attack by an attack. It is a natural
temptation to honourable members opposite, some of whose
views on defence were f airly well known during the years of

20 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

the war, to adopt the attitude of that very useful animal the
terrier, and roll on their backs and wave their paws in the air
with a pathetic expression. But that is not the line on which
we can hope to insure this country against attack from the
air. I believe and hope that the honourable members opposite
will carry out the programme which they have inherited and
will safeguard these shores, so far as they may, from the
greatest peril of modern war." Whether Captain Eden had
been responsible for any of the debate's "serious argument"
The Times does not say; his maiden effort was not singled
out for special mention. The truth is that in a somewhat
inauspicious debate he had made a somewhat inconspicuous
debut.

The second reading of the Peace Bill arising out of the
Treaty of Lausanne was to provide Anthony Eden with a far
more significant opening, his first major excursion into foreign
affairs.

From the Conservative point of view if the Treaty was good
it was a pity that the precarious Labour Government relying
on Foreign Policy for its success should get the credit for com-
pleting their work; on the other hand if the Treaty was bad
were not the Conservatives the authors of the disaster? Labour
on the other hand could only regard it at best as a step-child.
On the whole there was a temptation that spread beyond con-
trol of Party Whips to bury rather than to praise it.

The Turkey of Kemal was a challenge to post-war British
policy. It called for fresh appraisals of nationalism and of
minorities; of ex-enemies and of dictatorship and democracy
itself.

Eden in his speech showed himself alive to most issues;
speaking as "one who may claim some small first-hand knowl-
edge of the country with which we are dealing," he began by
pointing out that the position since the Armistice had been that
in all the treaties negotiated by Mr. Lloyd George we were the
victors. "We could in a measure dictate our terms to the van-
quished. Further and very little reference has been made to

MAIDEN SPEECHES 21

this point we were able to work, to a great extent at any rate,
in unity with our Allies. At Lausanne the tables were turned
and the position was reversed. In the eyes of the Turks we were
the vanquished, not from the military point of view but because,
rightly or wrongly, they looked on this country as having sym-
pathised with aspirations of their enemies. Consequently they
claimed that the defeat of the Greeks was a moral defeat of
this country also. Further, as we all know, there was very little
unity among the Allies at Lausanne. We had to deal not with
a vanquished enemy but with the representatives of a nation
fresh from a great victory proud, and justly proud of the
achievements of their armies, and knowing full well that they
could only obtain the approval of their countrymen by securing
terms which would redound to the credit of their country.
I suggest that under those conditions it is a matter of the great-
est congratulation to our representatives that an agreement of
any kind was arrived at, and it is a great tribute to the patience,
the tact, the zeal, and the understanding of our representatives
at Lausanne."

He went on to tackle in what can best perhaps be termed
the modern manner the extremely thorny question of the Chris-
tian minorities. "It is urged that there is not sufficient protec-
tion for Christian minorities within the Turkish dominions in
this Bill. That is a very fair criticism," But our representatives
who fought for them were not supported and were consequently
not successful; but as being important in arriving at a conclu-
sion on this subject he called in the experience of history and
asked whether we had not over and over again obtained treaties
with Turkish guarantees for the protection of Christian minori-
ties which originally had seemed to be adequate, but which
when the time of testing came had failed to enlist any actual
defence for those minorities. "It is," he said, stressing a point
of principle which was to have over the years, wider validity
than its Turkish context "possible to exaggerate the value of
these guarantees. We are far more likely to be able to assist
those unfortunate minorities by acting as the friends of the

22 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Turkish nation on the basis of this treaty than by producing
clauses which would only have been granted, if granted at all,
resentfully and in a spirit of bitterness." The Turkish people, in
his opinion, had always been and were still resentful of any
attempt by any other country to claim a prescriptive right over
any portion of their citizens. He pleaded for friendly negotia-
tion as against strict insistence on the letter of the Treaty, and
he concluded with a few words on existing conditions in
Turkey.

This speech was undoubtedly a milestone on Eden's journey
to the Foreign Office. The Prime Minister associated himself
profoundly with what was said by the honourable member
opposite. It was not the letter of the law by which Turkey was
going to be judged. "You can have the clauses beautifully
drafted," said Mr. MacDonald; "clauses with guarantees,
clauses with securities, clauses with commissions, clauses with
consuls and representative officers, and after all they will not
work." The old Turkey was dead, a new Turkey had been
born here was a nation for whose welfare and friendly view
our great Commonwealth of nations could not afford to be
indifferent.

CHAPTER 5

RED-LETTER DAYS

APTAIN EDEN was making progress and taking pains.
1 He had already, ten days before the Lausanne debate,

V 4 intervened effectively on the Air Estimates, asking per-
tinent questions about subsequent employment for the short-
service commissioned officers and about the seconding of
officers from the Army and Navy to the Air Force. "We all
know the difficulties of that system, and that neither the
Admiralty nor the War Office is very fond of it." But he went
on to say the attitude of the departments were minor difficulties
compared with the all-important necessity of securing a more
vital co-ordination between the various arms of the Services.
"That is, I think, the point in which our national defence is
weak. We have all to realise that in the next war co-ordination
will be even more vital than it was in the last war, and unless
I am mistaken it is the Air Force itself that will prove the
pivotal point in this co-ordination."

He had hoped to find the Under-Secretary for Air "a very
Cerberus" in defence of the Estimates, had been somewhat
disappointed, and called on him to "stiffen his back" against
the other Services when he found himself in competition with
them.

Keeping in mind the year 1924, the background Social-
ism's rosy dawn, this plea for co-ordination has about it the
vision of Jules Verne. But in those days he did not merely
confine himself to the cultivation of a prophetic soul, to the
casual brilliance so often associated with the young Tory and
the silver spoon. He was prepared to undergo the rigours of
what Mr. Churchill is alleged to have damned as "mere detail."
Two days after the Lausanne Treaty debate, at approximately

23

24 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

1:00 A.M., we find him in the thick of the fray on the vexed
question of the cost of diplomatic buildings.

The House adjourned on 7th August for the summer recess.
It met again on 30th September; by 9th October the House had
been prorogued, the Labour Government defeated, and the
country in the throes of a General Election.

The question of Anglo-Soviet relations had been increasing
the tension in Parliament and threatening the flimsy Liberal-
Labour alliance. In foreign affairs the Government's policy
had met with success. It had translated the problem of German
reparations into something like feasible finance, while reinforc-
ing the arrangement by obtaining America's collaboration. At
the same time MacDonald achieved a considerable triumph
in his negotiations with Herriot, and persuaded him to with-
draw the French troops from the Ruhr. Anglo-French relations
were in fact clarified and reinforced. MacDonald, who had
taken on the double office of Prime Minister and Foreign
Secretary, gave real momentum to the authority of Geneva.

The attempt to achieve normal relations with Russia was not
in itself a sufficient reason to bring the Government down.
Admittedly the memory of General Wrangel and the first im-
pact with an absolutist ideology dedicated to the overthrow of
Capitalism caused our Conservative public opinion to put its
class-consciousness before its economic self-interest, and ad-
mittedly a Labour Government was ab initio suspect. But it
could, no doubt, have carried the day if it had shown more
resolution in its method of handling the negotiations. And as
Mr. Spender has pointed out: "In the last weeks it had shown
a wavering mind which suggested to the House of Commons,
always sensitive on this point, that it was liable to the control
of influences outside Parliament and unknown to it." Thus in
June the Prime Minister gave an explicit assurance that there
would be no British guarantee of a loan to the Soviet. In August
he stated that the negotiations had broken down over the com-
pensation to owners of nationalised property. Then, immedi-
ately afterwards, he declared that a treaty was in draft which,

RED-LETTER DAYS 25

when certain conditions had been fulfilled, would in fact con-
tain provisions for the loan.

Then came the complex vacillations and ambiguities of the
Campbell case,* which Mr. Clynes has indignantly described in
his autobiogrophy as "the most trumpery excuse ever elevated
to a level of national importance." Nonetheless Sir Patrick
Hastings (the Attorney-General) and Mr. MacDonald involved
themselves in an orgy of pompous tomfoolery and prevarica-
tion and played right into the hands of their experienced
enemies. The Liberals' face-saving amendment calling for an
impartial inquiry into the whole affair was indignantly rejected,
and a purely Parliamentary battle which ought never to have
been provoked, but to have been at all costs assuaged, was
carried to the bitter end of defeat and dissolution. There fol-
lowed one of the most vitriolic and unsatisfactory general elec-
tions in British political history, for in the middle of it the
Daily Mail published the Zinoviev letter. This letter was ad-
dressed to the British Communist Party by the Presidium of
the Communist International a body which had affiliations
with the Soviet Government. It was dated 15th September, and
urged our Communists to "stir up the masses of the British
proletariat to organise and foment mutiny in the army and
navy and rebellion in Ireland and the Colonies." Preparations
were to be made for an outbreak of active strife. Even the
Labour Party itself was numbered among the damned. A close
watch was to be kept over its leaders "because they may easily
be found in the leading-strings of the bourgeoisie."

The date of its appearance in the Daily Mail was Saturday,
25th October five days before polling-day and it created a
national sensation. The Daily Mail asserted that the Foreign
Office had come into possession of the letter, and had sent a
demand for an explanation to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires. The
Soviet Charge d' Affaires (a personal friend of Zinoviev) at
once disowned the letter and called it "a clumsy forgery." If

* The prosecution of a Communist editor which, it was alleged, the Attor-
ney-General had been persuaded to call off for political reasons.

26 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Mr. MacDonald had followed up this denial with one in similar
terms the situation might have been saved. But he maintained
a fatal silence. As Mr. Clynes has asserted, "Mr. MacDonald's
timidity, and his obstinate refusal to denounce this obvious
forgery for what it was lost us the election."

The contest at Leamington this time was a straight fight
between Eden and the indefatigable George Nicholls. Lady
Warwick did not enter the fray again. Eden, in his election
address, did not hesitate to exploit "The Campbell Prosecu-
tion."

Eden, without any ado, ran right into it with the heading
in bold type, "The Campbell Prosecution." "Ladies and gentle-
men," he began, "by refusing to allow an inquiry into its
conduct in connection with the withdrawal of the Campbell
prosecution the Government has courted defeat and forced a
rushed election upon the country. Its refusal to face an inquiry,
however constituted, can be due but to one of two motives;
either to fear of what an inquiry might reveal or to a desire to
precipitate an election rather than face the verdict of Parlia-
ment upon the outcome of recent negotiations with the Bolshe-
vik Government of Russia." His second heading was directed
at Anglo-Soviet treaties, which were denounced as "makeshifts
hurriedly improvised in response to pressure exercised by
extremists in this country. They embody the principle that the
British taxpayer shall guarantee the repayment of a loan to the
Bolshevik Government a Government actuated by motives of
hostility to the British Empire and to all that it stands for." In
view of the Zinoviev letter this sentence alone was probably
sufficient to consolidate his majority.

It is not impossible that the general form of the address was
based on a suggestion from headquarters, for it will be noticed
that nearly every Conservative election address begins with its
reference to the prosecution of the miserable Campbell and to
the dangers of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. It was symptomatic of
the new Conservatism that was to rally round the new leader of
the Party, Stanley Baldwin. Cutting out the flamboyant crusad-

RED-LETTER DAYS 27

ing zeal of Young England, Baldwin sought to resuscitate the
Tory democrat. From the 1924 election onwards Baldwin's
broad-bottomed Conservatism was to prevail as much over the
true blue Tories, who had learnt nothing and forgotten almost
everything, as over the official pink to crimson Socialism. In the
search for the via media the Liberals were refusing to close
their ranks and failing to digest two such overwhelming person-
alities as Asquith and Lloyd George. Baldwin instinctively
looked to the via media. If he had lived in another age he might
well have been rejected from the outset as a time-server. As it
was, events and public sentiment conspired alike to force suc-
cess upon him. The curious thing is, however, that although
Baldwin's tolerant and progressive approach to Conservatism
was calculated to draw and to demand the support of the
younger elements in the Party, Baldwin himself did little to
encourage youth.

The 1924 election was a triumph the Campbell and
Zinoviev bogies worked with shattering effect. Baldwin came
back with the Conservative Party 415 strong, Labour down
from 191 to 152, and the Liberal Party reduced from 155
to 42. The feud between Coalition and Non-Coalition Conserv-
atives died away. Austen Chamberlain became Foreign Secre-
tary, Birkenhead took the India Office, Balfour became Lord
President of the Council, while Winston Churchill returned to
his old Tory allegiance to become Chancellor of the Exchequer.
This was a ministry of many talents, but youth was not served.
To the infinite detriment of our public life Mr. Baldwin pro-
ceeded to fill his under-secretaryships with the aged, the infirm,
and the second-rate. That he did so, however, must not neces-
sarily be attributed to a forgetfulness on his part. His own
career began late: and he may well have felt that an under-
secretaryship for a man of fifty was in fact giving youth its
chance; and secondly, he was a believer in Parliamentary
apprenticeship.

Charles Masterman has described how over the years 1906
to 1918 the obscure back bench member for Bewdley would

28 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

remain in Ms place and listen hour after hour to dull speeches
on unimportant subjects slowly absorbing the technique requi-
site for Parliamentary leadership. He learned also, no doubt,
to assess the potentialities of members and to grow suspicious
of the early brilliance that could not sustain the rigours of party
discipline or committee detail. But in spite of what proved to be
tragic circumspection in 1924, the member for Leamington
had not missed his eye. Eden had consolidated his position*:
increased his plurality by 1,000 and his aggregate by 3,000.
He had apparently gathered in quite a number of Lady War-
wick's Labour votes. Anyway the versatile and confident
speeches of the last session were no flash in the pan. Reward
and responsibility were indicated.

The first step in the ladder of Parliamentary promotion is the
Parliamentary private secretaryship: success largely depends
on personal relations and lobby influence. Eden's guardian
angel at this stage was Godfrey Locker-Lampson, who was
appointed Under-Secretary to the Home Office and so second
in command to Joynson-Hicks. Locker-Lampson was an expe-
rienced politician and a lively personality. His interests and
talents were similar to those of Eden. He was at once journal-
ist and traveller. Eden soon settled down to his new duties; he
was in closer contact with a department. There was greater
scope for the administrative talents but there were, of course,
not so many opportunities for debate. Although his speeches
were rarer, the occasions were more carefully chosen, the
opinions more deeply considered, and the arguments more
closely knit.

It was sound instinct that led him on 25th March, 1925, to
make his first intervention in the new Parliament in an impor-
tant unemployment debate. The quotation from Baldwin he
had used in his election address made it clear that the Party

* Shortly after the election, Eden's eldest son, Simon Gascoign, was born.
The child was christened on 28th February, 1925, at Chelsea Old Church.
Included in the godparents were the Earl of Feversham and the Countess
of Ilchester.

RED-LETTER DAYS 29

would for the future be letting in Protection by the back door,
but the only effect of that was to put more of the limelight than
ever before on to financial and industrial questions as a whole.
The atmosphere was tense. There was the threat of great strikes.
Socialists, embittered by what had all the appearance of electoral
sharp practice, were urging direct measures to short-circuit
laborious constitutional procedure. "All the bitterness/' says
J. A. Spender, "left over from an exceptionally bitter election
was now to run into industrial channels." But the compelling
problem around which the bitterness was bound to surge was
the ever-increasing volume of unemployment. From this time
onwards, until the unrest culminated in the General Strike, the
old condition of the people question was constantly raised
under one heading or another.

Eden's speech was sound and detached. It avoided senti-
ment, but without undue prejudice laid down the principles of
a constructive policy. He confessed to a certain sense of pessi-
mism. "We seem to hear very much the same argument, very
much the same lamentations and very much the same expres-
sion of hope, and yet we seem to have very much the same
number of people out of work."

In his analysis of post-war economic conditions and in his
respectful suggestions to the Government he played upon a
familiar theme: "There are many social reforms we should all
like to see carried through, but it is no use to put the cart before
the horse." To reduce the burdens of direct taxation, and to
assist our industries to keep old markets and find new ones, was
"a case very much of now or never." This speech contained the
seeds of policy that subsequently were to grow into Ottawa and
Empire Free Trade. Thus: "We have lost our balance in this
country. We are over-topped. We are too much industrialised
and too little agricultural for the size of the country." To get
that balance back we want to bring in the Dominions and
Crown Colonies that make up our Empire. The Empire must
be looked upon not as a series of units but as one unit. Once
again, how a rural bias was to be reconciled with preferences

30 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

for a fundamentally agricultural Empire was not explained.
Once again loose Baldwinian phraseology was invoked. How-
ever, it was a competent Party speech, and one calculated to
convey that pure impression of industrial relations so neatly
caught by Max Beerbohm in his caricatures of Mr. Baldwin's
approach to the problem where the Prime Minister is shown
complacently surveying the representatives of Capital and
Labour shaking hands underneath a rainbow!

CHAPTER 6

LOCARNO LIMITED

A THE beginning of July, 1925, Eden interrupted Ms
political activities to undertake a journalistic mission
for the Yorkshire Post. Although his career was now
likely to be first and foremost political, he had not given up his
journalistic interests and pretensions, and he reinforced his
connection by marriage with the Post by regular free-lance
work. He had surveyed the Parliamentary scene for a year
under the pseudonym of "Back Bencher," and also continued
to contribute book reviews and art criticisms. In the summer
of 1925, however, he applied to his father-in-law to be the
Yorkshire Posfs representative to the Imperial Press Confer-
ence which was to be held in Melbourne in the forthcoming
September. He was duly appointed.

For Eden the project was in itself attractive. The desire for
travel which he had gratified while at the University, that had
led him into half the capitals of Europe and as far afield as
Constantinople and Teheran, was strong within him and re-
quired fresh outlets. While politically he had not only a leaning
towards first-hand information but also a real belief in the
potentialities of a vigorous policy of Imperial development, it
was only natural that he should put his ideas to the test by
seeing the Empire for himself. He recorded his impressions in
a series of articles for the Post, which were subsequently, with
suitable additions and corrections, published in book form
under the attractive title of Places in the Sun. This was to be
Eden's one and only full-length literary effort.

In this work, as in all his public life, Eden is obviously
struggling to suppress the outward signs of egotism and substi-
tute for them the appearance of detachment that comes from

31

32 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

persistent fact-finding. It is a useful method politically, as it
tends to give an aura of authority to an opinion which it might
otherwise lack. The importance of Places in the Sun for us is
that it is yet another of Eden's experiments in self-expression,
and that, while valuable as hinting at a new Conservative
approach to Imperialism, it brings to a decorous end Eden's
somewhat casual and unco-ordinated journalistic ambitions.

Eden was back in the House of Commons by the beginning
of December but did not take part in a debate until the day
before the session ended. The occasion was a motion by the
Prime Minister to approve the League of Nation's awards on
the vexed question of the Iraq boundary. A debate in the full
Parliamentary sense of that word it was not, because Labour
members took the unusual course of walking out of the House
to mark their disapproval of a resolution on high policy brought
forward too late for proper consideration or the drafting of any
amendment. The Times did not take a charitable view of their
action, claimed that it was carefully planned and was the out-
come of a purely party dilemma. Labour could not vote against
the motion without impairing the League's authority, and could
not vote for it without approving the Government's "Iraq
policy." Actually the position was not quite so straightforward.
Labour was being asked to approve the "Iraq resolution" under
the shadow of a great rebuff.

The rejection of the Geneva Protocol brought up the whole
question of commitments, and to Labour the Conservative
Government's very support of the League was double-minded
and half-hearted. For in Eden's absence there had been major
developments. Detailed negotiations had produced the historic
Locarno Treaty: a League within a League had been created.
The objective was no longer to try and cover all possible wars
and insure against the distant future, but to render difficult a
particular war between France and Germany in the next few
years. To the upholders of the Geneva Protocol, Locarno was
a great betrayal. It was an impossible compromise between
Collective Security and the Grand Alliance. On the one hand

LOCARNO LIMITED 33

Great Britain refused to confirm liabilities undertaken in the
Covenant in Eastern Europe, wMle on the other hand the prin-
ciple of reciprocity was violated. Great Britain was not to
receive, under Locarno, assistance from Germany or France
if attacked by either of those nations. The limitations of
Locarno had been laid down by Mr. Baldwin as early as
8th October in a speech to the Conservative Party Conference
at Brighton when he declared that it would have to be bilateral
and purely defensive in character, and that any new obligation
undertaken by Britain would have to be pacific and limited to
the frontier between Germany and her western neighbors. In
the same speech he had referred to Iraq and forecast the Gov-
ernment's acquiescence in the League Commissioner's report.

At the beginning of December the League Council, having
decided to become arbitrator between Great Britain and Tur-
key, gave its unanimous award on the status of the Mosul and
of the Straits. It declared that the provisional boundary called
the Brussels Line should become definitively the northern fron-
tier of the British Mandate of Iraq provided that Great Britain
within six months assumed responsibility for Iraq for another
twenty-five years, or less, if Iraq should be judged by the
Council to have been qualified for membership in the League.
Sir Austen Chamberlain took up a conciliatory attitude towards
Turkey, and said he would be glad to enter into conversations
with their Government in the hope that relations between the
two countries might be made easier and safer.

While Sir Austen Chamberlain and the Colonial Secretary
(Mr. Amery) were at Geneva, Mr. Baldwin faced a battery of
questions from both sides of the House, which expressed con-
cern about our Iraq Mandate. He promised to provide an
opportunity for discussing it as soon as Mr. Amery returned,
but it was the form he gave to this opportunity namely, that
of a motion expressing formal approval of the British action
in accepting the League Council's award which gave rise to
Labour's anger and ultimate abstention. They were not placated
by his promise, which he fulfilled, to submit the Treaty in its

34 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

completed form to the House in the coining session. Emaciated
though the debate was through Labour's action, it is important
not only as showing Baldwin's skill in the arts of conciliation,
but as marking a rise in Eden's Parliamentary status, for he was
the first Government spokesman after the Prime Minister,

Keeping in mind the implications of Locarno as against the
Geneva Protocol, Baldwin's speech is a characteristic effort,
deceptive in its simplicity, double-minded in its allegiance. He
defended his motion chiefly for its loyalty to the League. He
pointed out that the undertaking to accept the League award
had been given in the first instance by Lord Curzon at Lau-
sanne. It did not represent a particular policy adopted for this
particular dispute, but was "merely one instance of the applica-
tion of a principle to which all parties have been committed
ever since the Covenant of the League of Nations was included
in the Treaty of Versailles I mean the principle of extending
the use of the League of Nations as an instrument of the peace-
ful settlement of international difference, and strengthening by
our support its authority for that purpose." Then follows a
passage, forgotten now, but which contains within it all the
seeds of subsequent ambiguities from Manchuria to Spain and
Czechoslovakia: "Right honourable members who recently
were sitting opposite" (a perfect Parliamentary thrust this)
"were prepared to give that principle a much wider applica-
tion than we believe to be practicable- They were ready to
enter into a Protocol by which they would have engaged this
country not only to submit all possible disputes of its own to
arbitration but also to go to war with any other country which
did not fulfil a similar obligation, however remote the conflict
might be from any conceivable British interests. We have been
less ambitious, but we have in the Treaty of Locarno applied
the same principle to the settlement of all possible disputes
affecting a particular frontier in which we are profoundly
interested." Baldwin had thus already supplied the explana-
tion of his famous but cryptic utterance that our frontier is the

LOCARNO LIMITED 35

Rhine, ten years before making it. It meant simply limited
liability.

The rest of his speech was mainly concerned with rebutting
charges made in the increasingly hostile Beaverbrook Press.
The feud between Baldwin and the Press Barons was on, and
in so far as Eden looked to the Prime Minister for advance-
ment and salvation, he was not a candidate for honours with
the Daily Mail or Express. Baldwin answered the assertion,
made in these gospels of isolation, that we were pledged to
evacuate Iraq by 1928, by pointing out that the existing Proto-
col provided for the conclusion at its expiry of a fresh agree-
ment which might prolong the Mandate. It was too late to say
that the Mandate was an error of judgment. Once accepted no
mandatory was entitled simply to throw up the Mandate and
leave chaos in place of it. Finally he repeated his wish for
friendship with Turkey, and said he was going to give effect
to it by meeting the Turkish Ambassador the next day. "One
by one," reports The Times, "members rose and underlined
the Prime Minister's points. Captain Eden, who is too rarely
heard, added expert testimony to the difficulties of Iraq, which
included an imported form of government, and he won mani-
fest approval by his suggestion that a high diplomatic envoy
should be sent to Ankara."

During his speech the first to be reported fully in The
Times Eden urged that although it might seem to be a para-
dox yet the very extension of the maximum period of our
Mandate was the best evidence of the likelihood of an early
curtailment of our responsibilities in that country. Once again
he stressed the pervading importance of prestige; "if we were
to scuttle now like flying curs at the sight of our own shadow,
our name would be a gibe in the mouth of every tavern-lounger
from Marrakesh to Singapore. It might take centuries to re-
cover our prestige." He recalled an Eastern proverb which
claimed that bravery consists of ten parts, and that one part
consists in running away and the other nine consist in never
coming in sight of the enemy. Excellent though the advice was,

36 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

our name in the East must not be associated with it. It was all
as Mr. Baldwin's cousin, Rudyard Kipling, would have wished.
He was suitably sceptical of the wisdom of trying to set up
democratic institutions in Eastern countries. With us Democ-
racy was "a plant of natural growth." In the East it was "a
forced growth, an importation, and foreign to the soil." We
had asked a great deal of Iraq: "What I believe even a Western
nation in their position could not have done." In fairness, the
country must be given full time to adapt itself to our democratic
peculiarities. In any case we had an overwhelming duty to
protect the Christian minorities in Iraq. Where was the voice
of Liberalism on this issue? How many Liberal majorities had
been returned to Parliament on a wave of popular indigna-
tion! But if we should stand by Iraq we should also hold out
the hand of friendship and conciliation to Turkey.

After reference to diplomatic representation in Ankara,
which was loudly cheered, he went on to say that there were
only two forces encouraging the Turks to foolish actions. "One
of these is the agents of the Bolshevik Government of Russia,
and the other I have no doubt from different motives is a
section of our own Press. That is indeed, an unholy alliance;
a marriage-bed upon which even the most hardened of us must
blush to look. (Laughter) . Are we to see Bolsheviks perusing
the columns of the Daily Express and noble lords hustling to
Fleet Street in Russian boots? Our Turkish friends should be
assured that that section of the Press did not in any sense
represent the voice of the country" a comment which brought
cheers and no doubt gratitude in the quarters for which it was
intended. Encouraged, he did not mince his words. "The hand
may be the hand of Esau, but the voice is quite undoubtedly the
voice of Jacob; and if anything were to go wrong with Anglo-
Turkish relations the responsibility must rest in a very large
measure upon those organs of the Press which have been carry-
ing out so unscrupulous a propaganda. There are some sacri-
fices which cannot in honour be made even upon the altar of
circulation." Once again cheers; and with his conclusion

LOCARNO LIMITED 37

a plea for goodwill all round Captain Eden had scored quite
an impressive debating success.

To intervene in Mr. Baldwin's conflict with Lord Beaver-
brook was in terms of self-interest perhaps strategy rather than
tactics: but his attack was robust and had the ring of convic-
tion about it. It should perhaps be noted here that if Eden's rise
to power is a dizzy and almost unprecedented advance yet it
was achieved without any assistance from Fleet Street. He pro-
vided neither copy nor articles nor compliments. At no stage
did he see fit to parade his personality. Instead he deliberately
hid his light under Baldwin's bushel. In this debate he gave
the lead to warm support for the Government's Mosul policy
in general and for the Prime Minister in particular. He had
played an important part in silencing rumours of a Conserva-
tive revolt.

Locker-Lampson's transference brought Eden right into the
orbit of foreign affairs. So far he had confined himself to the
Near East; henceforth he was to become a specialist in world
policy. The sphere of his influence and interest widened at a
critical moment in post-war diplomacy.

Locarno had brought Austen Chamberlain honour in the
form of a K.G. and glory from the acclamation of Press and
people. For a few weeks Great Britain, France and Germany
went on a political honeymoon, and gave evidence of a new
design for European living. "Let the dead bury their dead," Sir
Austen had declared, and the world had applauded. It was a
time when the symbols of good faith had intense meaning.
Locarno would have to be developed and confirmed at Geneva.
Everything turned on the form of that development and con-
firmation. After Locarno it had been generally understood that
the next League Council meeting was for the sole purpose of
admitting Germany to a permanent seat on the Council. But
some weeks before the date of the Council meeting rumours
spread that France intended to propose Poland a step that
was calculated to undermine the unique significance of Franco-

38 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

German reconciliation. On the 23rd February, in a speech at
Birmingham, Sir Austen gave substance to the general alarm
by allowing the impression to be conveyed that he had already
arranged with M. Briand to support Poland's claim. There
followed one of those spontaneous surges of public opinion in
Press and Parliament and in public meetings which are an
inherent, if incalculable, factor in our public life. Lord Grey
added his authority and prestige to the general outcry, and in
a speech at Newcastle asserted that neither the British, German,
nor French Governments should tie their hands by any declara-
tions before hand, and urged that if there was to be discussion
of our admitting additional nations to the Permanent Council,
that discussion should take place only after Germany had been
admitted, so that Germany could take part in it.

On the 1st March, Sir Austen tried to allay anxiety by meet-
ing the League of Nations' Parliamentary Committee, which
consisted of members from all parties. He asked for patience
and for latitude; a principle was not at stake, only a method
of negotiation. We could persuade; it was not open to us to
dictate.

As his critics had feared, Sir Austen's "free hand" involved
him when he got to Geneva in the most unfortunate conse-
quence. Sweden stepped in where England feared to tread, and
took the credit of resisting alone the demands of France and
Italy, while Sir Austen's complacence towards these two Pow-
ers helped to defeat Germany's admission to the Council. Sir
Austen returned home to a storm of criticism. All the applause
that had been showered upon him but a few months before
now turned to abuse. He himself was moved to describe the
conference as "a tragedy," and attempted to cover up the fail-
ure by an arrangement with France and Germany that Locarno
should be kept alive even though Germany was still out of the
League. Otherwise, Sir Austen had nothing to say in Parlia-
ment. This silence he would no doubt have maintained had not
the Opposition forced a debate on supply on the 23rd March.
Mr. Lloyd George led off with a powerful philippic, although

LOCARNO LIMITED 39

The Times, with unusual brusqueness, summarised it as "dis-
cursive and disconnected." He concentrated his charge against
the Foreign Secretary by alleging that the negotiations had
failed because they had been preceded by a secret arrangement
to which Sir Austen was a party. In some ways Mr. Lloyd
George overstated his case. In pre-war politics an element of
forensic exaggeration was a virtue in debate; the influence of
Baldwin and the growth of Labour, who were not too good at
indignation in the grand manner, had put a new value on un-
derstatement.

But if Mr. Lloyd George was somewhat excessive in attack,
Sir Austen made the same mistake in defence. "Mr. Chamber-
lain's reply," says that neutral commentary the Annual Regis-
ter, "was remarkable chiefly for the bland way in which he
ignored the precise matter of complaint against him. The Ger-
mans, he admitted, had been misled, but no one was in the least
to blame for misleading them. He was not sorry for what he
had done: rather he claimed credit for having kept Locarno so
truly intact." He rounded his speech off in a paean of self-praise
and self-pity. All the same, the atmosphere as a whole was not
particularly propitious for a Conservative back-bencher to rush
in and defend the Foreign Secretary: but this is precisely what
Anthony Eden did. According to the Annual Register the way
Unionist members (ignoring both their own views previously
expressed and the facts of the situation) rallied to the support
of the Foreign Secretary, taking him at his own valuation and
showering on him compliments for saving the Locarno Agree-
ment and even saving the League of Nations, was the most re-
markable feature of the debate which followed.

For Eden the task was particularly difficult. He had identi-
fied himself with a policy which if it had not yet crystallised
into one of League liability was yet sufficiently modern that it
demanded as in the case of Turkey a new deal for and with
the defeated Powers. He had now to defend what was in fact a
reverse both for Germany and the League. He had been pre-

40 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

ceded by Lord Hugh Cecil, whose Olympian detachment he
could admire but not safely emulate. He assumed a direct real-
istic attitude. The plea was that Great Britain should put her
foot down, but the only logical consequence of such action
would be to secure not simply Germany's entrance into the
League but also the black-balling of any other candidate under
any circumstance whatever. That was a possible course to pur-
sue, but at the same time it was both "arrogant and dictatorial."
We could be grateful for the attitude Sweden had adopted; but
it would bode ill for the League if it provided a precedent. "It is
impossible for this country to go to Geneva with a declared and
immovable edict. It is absolutely contrary to the whole purpose
for which the Council of the League exists. What is the use of
having a Council if everyone issues an edict before they get to
it?"

He then made a skilful thrust at Mr. Lloyd George. "The
last member of this House who had any right to advocate the
policy of putting your foot down was Mr. Lloyd George. He
was always putting his foot down. Did that result in the friend-
ship of France, the confidence of Germany, or in the goodwill
of Turkey? Today in the Near East it is a heritage of the right
honourable gentleman's policy which is making it so difficult
for us to obtain the goodwill of Turkey. He was always putting
his foot down and always trying to take it up again. It is exactly
what you cannot do. And as a result he was always putting his
foot into it." He attacked Mr. MacDonald for his pessimism.
"The League seemed to be doomed, and we were living in an
atmosphere of inspissated gloom."

If Mr. MacDonald was asking too much of the League it is
interesting to note what Eden hoped from it in 1926. "For my
part I never expected in its earliest years the League would be
called upon to give heaven-sent judgments, to formulate impec-
cable decisions. That is to ask too much. What I had hoped of
the League, and do hope still, is that its greatest benefit will be
by the opportunities it will create for statesmen of different
nationalities to meet and exchange those opinions." He then

LOCARNO LIMITED 41

developed what almost amounts to a League philosophy which
has been the keynote of all his subsequent action and popular-
ity. "To expect/ 5 he declared, "the League to change human
nature in a year or two was an extravagant expectation." He
frankly admitted disappointment, which Sir Austen would have
done well to admit as well. The descriptions of some of these
intrigues that took place were "not very palatable reading."
But there was a real lesson to be learned from all this apparent
failure. "You will not change by one instrument or in one day
the passions of nations. It must take time. Far more harm has
been done to the League by people with their heads in the
clouds and their brains in their slippers than by the most in-
veterate enemy the League ever had." Sir Austen had endeav-
oured, whatever the outcome of events at Geneva, to secure
that the work he did at Locarno should not be lost. It was not
lost.

This impressive excursion by Eden into the realms of Parlia-
mentary dialectic and European diplomacy did not fail to make
its impression, but for the next three or four critical months
which included the drama of the General Strike and the disillu-
sion of its aftermath he was content to keep away from the
limelight and apply himself to the detailed duties of Parliamen-
tary private secretary. Eden is attributed with a keen and a
sharp temper which he is alleged to have inherited in the nat-
ural order of things from his tempestuous father. Such an asser-
tion is easier to make than to deny, and quite apart from its
truth or otherwise, constitutes news value. But whatever may
be the outcome of his personal words, a study of Eden's career,
particularly in its early stages when one might well expect it to
be amply seasoned with indignation and indiscretion, shows
clearly that in public affairs his first regard was to seek concilia-
tion and to avoid controversy. For most public men the Gen-
eral Strike demanded harangues; for Eden it coincided with
silence.

CHAPTER 7

AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN

ON THE 28th July, 1926, there appeared the following
sober announcement tucked away at the bottom of the
leader page of The Times: "The Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs has appointed Captain Anthony Eden, M.P.,
to be his Parliamentary Private Secretary in succession to Mr.
L. R. Lumley, M.P.,* who has resigned on proceeding to Aus-
tralia as a member of the British Parliamentary delegation."
From this moment Eden's star was in the ascendant: up to this
moment the Parliamentary tipsters, although impressed by his
elegant appearance and the graceful style of his speeches, had
not marked him for anything bigger than an ultimate under-
secretaryship. He was regarded as an ornament of post-war
Toryism and to that extent fragile. There was distinction
about him rather than brilliance. The truth was that the war
had killed off the heroes of his generation. The competition was
not keen, the ranks were thin, the standard was low. Indeed the
move has about it all that casual inevitability which is an end-
less source of wonder to foreign observers. With Lumley's de-
parture Sir Austen was too busy to look for a successor, so he
went to Locker-Lampson and asked his advice. Locker-Lamp-
son was finding Eden invaluable and had no doubt that he was
the best man for the job. So he decided that he must subordi-
nate his personal requirements to the interests of Sir Austen
and the State and recommend Eden. Eden's position with
Locker-Lampson was, as Locker-Lampson freely admits, the
lowest rung on the ladder; but it had made possible a steep and

* Lumley, who has had a distinguished career, later became Governor of
Bombay, and is now the eleventh Earl of Scarbrough, K.G. He is a close
personal friend of Eden, and acted as godfather to Eden's second son,
Nicholas.

42

AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 43

quick ascent: altogether the Under-Secretary for Foreign Af-
fairs had been a very good friend to the young and inexperi-
enced Member for Leamington. It is always extremely difficult
for a back bencher to catch the Speaker's eye, but the Speaker
is susceptible to the well-timed word from a Minister. On more
than one occasion Locker-Lampson's tactful suggestion made
public what would otherwise have been a well-prepared but un-
delivered oration from Eden.

Locker-Lampson's chief impression of Eden at this time is of
his intense ambition. "He was very ambitious, but in a good
sense and as every young man ought to be." Then again he
found him an extremely keen student of foreign affairs, anxious
to supplement his precocious travel experiences in every way
open to him. Finally he impressed Locker-Lampson from the
beginning as an accomplished Parliamentary debater. It was
his attention to style in the form and substance of his speeches
as well as in his appearance and manner that first opened the
doors of opportunity to Anthony Eden.

Thus at the age of twenty-nine he was safely inside the privi-
leged ling of what the newspapers call "well-informed circles."
He was in a pivotal position to study the mechanism of a for-
eign secretaryship under a Conservative Government and to
analyse foreign affaks through the day-to-day contact with, if
not a great Foreign Secretary, at least a supreme Parliamentar-
ian. For a man of Eden's watchful disposition it opened up a
boundless future: it was just the work to bring his experience
to full maturity.

By a curious irony Eden's appointment coincided with Sir
Austen Chamberlain's preoccupation over an obscure back
bench member of the League of Nations, Abyssinia. Sir Austen
had not fully recovered from the Geneva set-back, and was in-
termittently sniped at during the remainder of the session.
Eden had always stressed peace with Kemalist Turkey, but the
very process of liquidating the dispute involved troublesome
consequences. Before settlement was reached Great Britain

44 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

had Italian backing in her claims against Turkey. A price for
this support was demanded by the restless and apparently irre-
sponsible Benito Mussolini, and was quietly paid by Sir Aus-
ten. An arrangement was made between Great Britain and
Italy mutually to recognise spheres of influence in Abyssinia
and in addition to grant to Italy the "exclusive right" to certain
concessions. The immediate effect of this Anglo-Italian ar-
rangement was to arouse French misgivings, which, as the third
party to the 1906 Agreement, shared Great Britain's and Italy's
special interest in Abyssinia. France demanded satisfaction
from the British Foreign Office, and failing to obtain more than
an ambiguous reply, encouraged Abyssinia to exploit her
League privileges against the Imperialist designs of the British
and Italian Governments.

Questions were asked in the House, and Sir Austen was able
to make the British Government yet again the exponent of all
that is disinterested and laboriously honest. Anglo-Italian
agreement implied no conceivable threat to the integrity of
Abyssinia. "Exclusive" rights were amply defined. No pressure
would be brought on the Abyssinian Government; it would
merely be asked "at the proper time to take into friendly con-
sideration" the proposals made. We welcomed Abyssinia's ac-
tion in bringing her accusations to the League as it would give
the British Government a chance to show the full innocency of
its policy. These formulae no doubt fitted in with Eden's view
of legitimate and honourable procedure. The whole thing was
at best a debating issue a little capital for the Opposition, a
little credit for the Government.

During the second half of 1926 international relations fol-
lowed a comparatively smooth course. At the beginning of Sep-
tember, Sir Austen was in Geneva at the meeting of the League
which admitted Germany, together with Poland, to seats on the
Council, while on the Continent he had conversations with
French and Italian Ministers, and gave encouragement to the
direct-contact diplomacy with which Eden was to be so closely
identified. On 30th September he met Mussolini on board a

AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 45

yacht outside Genoa. The meeting, he told the Press, was in the
first place, of friends, and in the second place, of Foreign
Ministers a degree of intimacy which Eden, to his cost, was
never able to obtain. They had found "without surprise but
with satisfaction" a community of outlook both on the particu-
lar issues between England and Italy and on the large issues of
European politics. On the way home he had a talk with Briand
to go over his talk with Mussolini, and Briand explained what
he had said to Stresemann at Thoiry. The Thoiry conversations
were also part of the general process of informal appeasement,
and although Briand gave no explicit pledge about the evacua-
tion of troops from the Rhineland, the possibility of evacuation
became practical politics from that meeting onwards.

1927 opened in an atmosphere of political exhaustion and
quietude. The fires of controversy in home affairs were spent;
there was a comparative respite in Europe; debate accordingly
gathered round events in the Far East. A Nationalist movement
was making steady progress and creating sporadic disturbance,
which found expression in acute anti-British feeling. On 4th
January, a Chinese mob stormed the British and other foreign
concessions at Hankow, and British residents there and in the
Yangtse valley were gathered into Shanghai for safety. The
Government first of all regarded the riot as nothing more than
an incident, but afterwards was forced to the conclusion that it
was symptomatic of sentiment throughout China and that mili-
tary precautions should be taken to ensure more adequate pro-
tection of British nationals. Forces were dispatched amid an
outburst of popular applause.

In December, 1926, the Government had defined its concili-
atory attitude to Chinese nationalism in a memorandum. Three
days after the troops had left it presented the Southern and
Northern armies with a further statement declaring the meas-
ures Great Britain intended to take without revision of treaties
in order to meet the aspirations of the new China. British con-
cessions at various points were to be transferred to the Chinese.

46 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

On 29th January, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in a speech at Bir-
mingham, gave assurances that the reinforcements were only to
save British life and property, and that Great Britain was only
waiting to give expression to its friendly sentiments towards
China in negotiations with a government which could not
speak for the whole of the country. The Labour Party was
highly suspicious of the Government's policy, and felt that the
combination of the mailed fist and the olive branch was calcu-
lated to provoke rather than allay the danger of a general war.

But Labour was outflanked, for the Conservatives used the
Chinese disturbances to press their case against Soviet Russia.
Russia had played her part in fomenting anti-British agitation
in the Far East, and the occasion was now exploited by a sec-
tion of the Conservative Party to repeat their claim that Anglo-
Soviet relations should be broken off. Notes were published by
the two Governments which did not substantially help the situ-
ation. It was generally felt that matters could not rest as they
were. Labour wanted to improve Anglo-Soviet trade: Tory die-
hards to bring it to an end. In a debate opened by Sir Archibald
Sinclair on 3rd March, Sir Austen tried unsuccessfully to rec-
oncile these incompatible demands and reserved for the Gov-
ernment the right to take further action, but before doing so
"would call the world to witness" how serious the complaints
were and give the Soviet one more chance to conform its con-
duct to the ordinary rules of international life and comity. Ac-
cordingly on 8th March we find Sir Austen in Geneva making
capital for the Government out of the crisis in Anglo-Soviet
relations, and his Parliamentary Secretary in the House scoring
points on the theme of Troops for China and Security for
Britain.

Sir Austen wished to dispel the belief that Great Britain was
attempting to engineer a coalition against the Soviet Govern-
ment. British policy had remained unchanged since Locarno
and was summed up in one word, Peace. We never sought to
promote our own interests by fomenting trouble between other
countries. Eden for his part refused to accept any definition of

AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 47

class distinction which would deprive any citizen of the British
Empire of the full rights of his citizenship. "Citizenship has
nothing to do with either class, creed, or sect. 55 He inveighed
against the Opposition's active interference in the crisis. He
was afraid that, whatever the motive for it might be, "it proved
once more that the only way by which an Opposition can assist
the Government of the day in carrying out its foreign policy in
a time of difficulty is to give it its loyal support within and with-
out this House." This view has, on the whole, been exploited by
Eden's enemies with greater effect than by Eden himself, and it
is a theme to which he has not often made such explicit refer-
ence. His contention was that "while these waning generals
have been at each other's throats, or rather prodding each other
with a rather leisurely bayonet, we have maintained neutrality,
and we are in no sense responsible for the anomaly which has
been bred by these contending armies. In these circumstances
we should look to the lives of our nationals and take the advice
of our representatives on the spot about the necessary meas-
ures."

He ended with a more than usually bitter onslaught on Social-
ism for its militant pacifism. "I suppose we shall see inscribed
on their banners in letters of gold such cries as 'Socialism is
defeatism'; 'Endorse Socialism and leave English women to
their fate! 5 " Such lapses into party jargon are rare, and do not,
it would seem, represent Eden's instinctive approach to contro-
versy. Nevertheless, this somewhat excessive and artificial an-
ger had the effect of putting Labour on the defensive, making it
appear at once indifferent and partisan, and although Mr.
Clynes made an effort to smooth out the debate by asserting
that no Opposition speaker had ever criticised the Government
for their negotiations but only for their military action, his
party called for a division, and were roundly defeated by 303
votes to 124.

On 23rd March, Eden moved his first resolution, on the sub-
ject of Empire Settlement, and cashed-in on the experience he
had gained from his visit to "Places in the Sun." His motion

48 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

was skilfully worded and calculated to eliminate party strife.
The speech he made to this theme was one of his best efforts.
It was well informed but not overloaded with detail, critical but
not cantankerous. It must have advanced considerably his pop-
ularity and prestige in the House.

The Times asserted that in calling attention to the reciprocal
value of Empire, Captain Eden had grasped two great truths:
the first, that producers wherever they may be must have a mar-
ket for their produce; and the second, that settlers must know
the conditions of life at their destination before immigrating.
In the latter part he made a characteristic and significant plea
for Labour backing in identifying immigration with enhanced
living standards.

Eden followed up his highly successful Empire Settlement
speech with a long holiday from Parliamentary duties. During
his absence between March and November British foreign pol-
icy took a more decisive turn away from Geneva and in the
direction of the Conservative Central Office. In the spring the
rupture with Russia was successfully effected through the raid
on the premises of the Soviet trade delegation at Arcos House.
The brusque methods employed and the scanty evidence col-
lected seemed to suggest that the British Government were
trying to deal with the Soviet in the approved style of the
O.G.P.U. In the spring, President Doumergue, accompanied
by M. Briand, paid a state visit. Time was found amid all the
exacting ceremonial for diplomatic parley. The communique
issued afterwards was significant more for the choice than the
substance of its words. In describing Anglo-French relations
the Entente Cordiale was brought out of the drawer.

While Great Britain was narrowing the range of her collabo-
ration, she was finding difficulties in the way of an Anglo-
American naval treaty in particular and of disarmament in
general. The year 1927 is not an especially dramatic one in the
era of lost opportunities, but it is one of the highest importance.
In this year dominant conservatism begins to make a virtue of

AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 49

necessity; and the Labour spokesman who condemned Mr.
Baldwin as the "living embodiment of Mr. Facing-Both-Ways"
was not premature. Lord Robert Cecil, however, was to emerge
a national personality by a resignation in the grand manner.

The specific issue on which Lord Cecil's grievance was based
was the deplorable breakdown of the Anglo-American naval
conversations which had been staggering on throughout the
summer in a welter of weariness and detail. Neither Govern-
ment had in mind to make any concession sufficient to make
any agreement worth while. The farce ended with the heads of
the two delegations, Mr. Bridgeman for Great Britain and Mr.
Gibson for the United States, concurring in the firm opinion
that the failure of the conference would not undermine the
friendship of the two countries and would not inevitably lead
to an arms race between them. Lord Cecil had been Mr.
Bridgman's colleague at the conference and had co-operated
loyally throughout the proceedings. When they were over, how-
ever, he let the nation know without qualification just how
strongly he disapproved of the Government's policy. At the be-
ginning of August he sent in a letter of resignation from the
Cabinet. Mr. Baldwin was away at the time touring Canada
with the Prince of Wales on the occasion of that Dominion's
sixtieth anniversary, so there was no immediate reply to Lord
Cecil. As soon as Mr. Baldwin got back Lord Cecil sent in Ms
resignation again, and insisted on its acceptance. With the let-
ter he enclosed a minute which is one of the most outspoken
indictments of the British Government's foreign policy ever
composed from within the ring of responsibility. There was
some hesitation before the Cabinet allowed it to be published,
and then Mr. Baldwin rushed in with a reply the same evening.
The repercussions from Lord Cecil's actions were felt for a long
time, particularly in Geneva, but they were not sufficient to
shake the Conservatives out of power.

In the meanwhile Sir Austen's critics were not inactive and
roused themselves for a vigorous campaign throughout the

50 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

country. TTie autumn of 1927 was a decisive time in the
chequered history of the League of Nations Union. This body
set itself the large task of "educating public opinion." Although
it used all the methods of a highly organised political party, it
determined to cut across all party values to gather in the sup-
port of all men and women of goodwill who asked only Peace,
Security, and Disarmament through the League of Nations.
Chamberlain had not done enough to forestall this compelling
moral plea. In 1927 the sense of insecurity was not sufficiently
strong to make realism a sufficient antidote to it, but it was his
misfortune that this surge of righteousness should have coin-
cided with Lord Cecil's resignation.

Moreover, Lloyd George, as might be expected, entered the
fray as an ancestral voice prophesying war. Sir Austen replied
that he could not regard Mr. Lloyd George as a true friend of
peace, while Mr. Lloyd George retaliated with the view that if
Europe could not advance beyond Locarno war was inevitable.
The Prime Minister tried to smooth out these ripples with oil
and irrelevance. The great value of the League in his opinion
was that it promoted discussion among the representatives of
European States.

There was a brief respite, but on 16th November the storm
blew up again when Lord Parmoor initiated a debate in the
House of Lords on disarmament, made remarkable by Lord
Cecil's personal account of his resignation. The speech throws
revealing light on the origins of the inherent dualism in Con-
servative foreign policy between the wars the conflict be-
tween the League and Locarno diplomacy, collective security
and limited commitments, and at the personal level between
Cecil and Churchill and the rest of the leadership.

Eden was to be heir to this struggle, but the long drawn-out
persistency with which it has been waged is often overlooked.
A week later the Labour Party followed with a lengthy vote of
censure on the Government, based largely on Lord Cecil's
revelations. From beginning to end his spirit brooded over the
debate.

AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 51

Mr. MacDonald spoke of him giving "one of the most illu-
minating speeches on the mind and action of this Government
that I have ever read." His action was "absolutely unanswer-
able." Sir Austen Chamberlain, in his reply, tried to share out
the blame for Lord Cecil's departure. The debate was leisurely
and orthodox, which means that the Eden of 1927 speaks as
the complacent back bencher who regards Lord Cecil with
something like the disfavour that Mr. Neville Chamberlain re-
gards the Eden of 1938.

Eden has travelled a long journey since that dim November
speech. Lord Cecil's action did not appeal to him. The Opposi-
tion had typified the British delegation to Geneva as military in
character, "but I do not think that any of us would associate
the First Lord of the Admiralty with the clashing of sabres or
Lord Cecil with the jangling of spurs. It would have been diffi-
cult in connexion with any work to find two countenances more
essentially pacific. I believe the First Lord of the Admiralty
went to Geneva with all the benignity of a Father Christmas,
and I believe the Noble Lord, Viscount Cecil, went there with
the ecstasy of a martyr on his way to the stake. The stake in Ms
case was quite unnecessary and entirely self-imposed, but it
does not effect in any way the genuineness of his martyrdom."
If this observation is surprising to those whose memory of Eden
does not go back before 1931, there are one or two more which
throw significant light upon his early attitude to the general
problem of British foreign policy and the League. The Times
reported him in three lines as agreeing that the progress achieved
by the Disarmament Commission had been slow but that they
could not bang and hustle the world into Peace. But there was
considerably more to it than that.

The debate coincided with two considerable crises, one be-
tween Italy and Jugoslavia over Albania, and the other a
boundary and minority tension between Jugoslavia and Bul-
garia. Mr. Noel Buxton, who preceded Eden in the debate,
drew attention to both these questions, and complained that

52 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Italy was sending notes to the Great Powers but not to the
League. In both cases there was an opportunity to bring the
disputes before the Council; in both cases they were being
treated on old-fashioned diplomatic lines. The use of Article
XI should be considered to effect equitable frontier control.
The peaceful settlement of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier dis-
pute of 1925 fresh in the memory, and ever since a famous
League of Nations example was cited. Eden, however, re-
fused to admit these parallels or precedents in the Balkans and
put forward the positive if personal view that on the whole "if
settlements can be achieved by direct negotiations between the
parties without appeal to the Council or to the League, those
settlements are much better than settlements arrived at through
the intervention of the League.

"For my part, I consider that in the Locarno Agreement we
have gone as far as we are entitled to go. The Empire, which
we must never overlook on this question, would not be pre-
pared to pledge its future more extensively." Then to a policy
point which was to have a prophetic relevance to Eden's ap-
proach to world problems in 1954. If there is to be further
progress towards international action it "wiU. have to be by
regional pacts, local Locarnos, made by the nations of the dis-
tricts whose interests are most closely connected." The way to
further European peace was by "a number of small Locarnos."
It was pointless to say that we must have disarmament without
telling us how we were to have security. An agreement to dis-
arm was not enough. The task was to remove suspicions so that
confidence may grow and arms diminish. The policy of 1925
in the long run would prove better and wiser than the policy
of 1924.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about this speech in the
light of his career as it developed shortly afterwards, is its
phraseology. There are no signs in it of a sense that to increase
the range of League commitments and League action might
conceivably be a British interest. Eden falls back on pre-war

AIDE TO SIR AUSTEN 53

language to cover what by implication lie recognises to be post-
war conditions.

1927 ended with the unanimous rejection of Soviet Russia's
proposal for complete and universal disarmament. Mr. Bald-
win would not give leave for it to be discussed in the House,
while Lord Cecil described it as impracticable. On 5th Decem-
ber, Litvinov had an hour's conference with Sir Austen. There
was a frank exchange of view, but nothing could be done to
break the Anglo-Russian deadlock. Litvinov could give no
pledge to confine the activities of the Third International.

1928 opened in a similar atmosphere of niggardly and le-
thargic policy. There seemed to be only persistent caution be-
fore unknown dangers. Foreign affairs were obliterated by
floods in Chelsea and scandals in Hyde Park. Eden's interven-
tions in debate at this time were perfunctory. He spoke once in
February, using the occasion of the debate on the Address for
a ramble that took him from the manufacturers of electrical
machinery, via income-tax, to the dispatch of troops for the Far
East. At the end of the month he returned for about ten min-
utes to his favourite topic of Empire settlement and reproduced
most of the arguments for which he was beginning to establish
a reputation. Once again he pleaded against haphazard immi-
gration: rational and co-ordinated training was an essential
preliminary. But even then there were limitations to the effi-
cacy of State action. "Economic influences outside our control
dominate migration. We cannot turn it on as a tap, though we
can turn it off, but what we can do is to ensure that the stream
when it is running flows into the correct channel."

In 1928 Eden saw American trade as a danger rather than
as an opportunity. "Unless I am very much mistaken the ca-
pacity of the United States to absorb the products produced
within their borders has just about reached saturation point."
It was not open to us to fortify solely by our action the Do-
minion market against this potential onslaught, but the Colo-

54 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

nies were ours to protect. Accordingly "a cardinal factor in the
Conservative creed" must be to do all that lies in our power to
develop our Colonial resources. So a Dominion tariff was noth-
ing other than "a national aspiration which we there see at
work." Eden ended by trusting that the House as a whole would
see its way unanimously to approve the motion. It did, after a
number of members on the Treasury and Opposition benches
had suitably congratulated the proposer and seconder.

The cumulative effect of speeches of this nature was un-
doubtedly helping to give Eden a certain prestige in high
places. The occasions he picked out for his prepared orations,
the sentiments he reiterated, were calculated to appeal to el-
derly Imperialists. Later on it was this particular brand of
Conservative mentality that he was mortally to offend. For the
present he was climbing upon the broad backs of the Diehards.

CHAPTER 8

DEBTS AND SETTLEMENTS

THE LATE twenties were primarily years of drift in
British, foreign affairs. If in 1928 the process was not
arrested at least it was concealed beneath a number of
lavish formulae.

In January, 1928, the Government was firm over Egypt, and
Sir Austen tried to rally support for Ms little experiment in
militant diplomacy. But early in April he was called upon to
make a far more comprehensive gesture, for the British Gov-
ernment received from the American Secretary of State (Mr.
Kellogg) official notification of his famous proposals to outlaw
war. They had already been laid before France. Sir Austen's
first reaction was one of Hi-disguised embarrassment. A peace
proposal emanating from any source deserved sympathetic
consideration, and it was doubly welcome if it came from the
United States; on the other hand he must stress that Franco-
British friendship was an essential element in world peace, and
as he told a German statesman at Locarno, he did not propose
to sacrifice an old friendship in order to gain a new one. This
reservation shows how from the beginning the British Govern-
ment and the Foreign Secretary misread the motives of those
who were sponsoring the Kellogg Pact. It was either acceptable
or unacceptable: it did not mean a re-orientation of alliance, or
even a shifting of national sympathy. It was an attempt to pay
tribute to the conception of peace as a world objective and war
as a world responsibility. The British Government, however,
could not see its way to accept the terms of the Pact without
time or qualification. The Dominions must be consulted, in
case it ran counter to any engagements we had undertaken
with them. Finally we declared our willingness to co-operate

55

56 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

on the understanding that there was no essential difference in
the French and American attitudes to the Pact, and that our
freedom of action in respect of certain areas of the British Em-
pire, commonly called "outlying districts," should in no way be
called to account.

"The welfare and integrity" of these areas constituted "a
special and vital interest." In the light of British and French
suggestions, Mr. Kellogg put forward fresh proposals at the end
of June. Once again the Government was circumspect, but by
1 8th July it plucked up enough courage to hand in a reply. The
Americans had ignored the British request about the outlying
districts; it was accordingly underlined. At the end of July the
British reply was debated on the Foreign Office vote. Sir Aus-
ten hit out. If he was enunciating a British Monroe doctrine it
was exactly comparable to America's original version, and was
a measure of self-defence necessitated by the geographical po-
sition of the Empire. The Treaty might mean everything or
nothing. These consequences depended almost entirely on
America. Great Britain had signed in the hope and expectation
that the American nation would range itself behind the Treaty.

In the course of his speech Sir Austen casually observed that
France and England had settled their differences over naval
tonnage. This was interesting in itself, and general curiosity
was aroused, but immediately afterwards Sir Austen was taken
seriously ill with an attack of bronchial pneumonia and or-
dered to rest for at least two months. Lord Cushendun took his
place. Nothing more was heard about the Anglo-French settle-
ment until the middle of August, when the French blurted out
a sensational story that the two countries had formed a new
entente and were arranging to pool their navies in an emer-
gency. Britain for her part would withdraw any opposition she
had put up to the proposal that France's trained reserves should
be omitted from her land forces for disarmament purposes. In-
dignation was immediate and widespread. It was in this atmos-
phere of suspicion that the British delegation set out on its

DEBTS AND SETTLEMENTS 57

annual pilgrimage to Geneva at the end of August. Lord Cush-
endun was at its head, and Locker-Lampson acted as substitute
for Hilton Young on health questions. As Eden, in view of Sir
Austen's illness, found himself without any special duties he
asked Ms former chief whether he could join up with him. To
this the Under-Secretary readily agreed, and Eden had his first
official experience of League procedure. Among the other ris-
ing hopes of Conservatism also at Geneva was Alfred Duff-
Cooper, who, as one of the junior members of the British
delegation and Financial Secretary of the War Office, was at
this stage rather higher up the ladder of status than Eden.
Locker-Lampson was concerned with the finance of the
League's health services, a branch of its work, which, because
it is not politically controversial, is usually dismissed as being
either technical or subsidiary. Eden must have had ample op-
portunity to study the League in action and to collect over-
whelming evidence of the range of its functions and interests.
Cushendun used his speech to the Assembly as a reply to
false rumours in the French Press. The Agreement with France
was simply to help on the work of the Preparatory Commission
for a disarmament conference. There had been differences be-
tween Great Britain and France, and it was deemed advisable
that these should be cleared away first. Ministers and experts
had thus been engaged in conversations for some months, and
the result was a single text, but it had nothing to do with policy
which had never been raised. The text had been submitted to
the American, Japanese, and Italian Governments for their
views, which explained the delay in publication. The French
Press, however, maintained its previous attitude to the facts.
Almost at once the German delegate, Herr Muller (who was
also Chancellor of the Reich) put the issue to the test by raising
the question of the Rhineland evacuation. He asked M. Briand
whether negotiations could not be opened. Briand's reply was
that Germany would have to make an offer. Lord Cushendun
was approached and associated himself fully with Briand. In
doing so he gave the lie to the sincerity of our laborious efforts

58 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

over years to mediate between Paris and Berlin. In other pro-
ceedings of the Council, too, on Hungarian and Balkan affairs,
the impression was deepened that France and Great Britain
were working according to secret plan. Cushendun once again
protested our innocence in a speech to the Assembly, and the
American and French Press again countered with revelations
which showed the whole design as an Anglo-French threat to
American naval ratios. America replied at the end of Septem-
ber to the Anglo-French plan, rejecting it politely but firmly.

The Opposition fires were fanned by the symptoms of a new
orientation in our policy. The Labour Party saw in it a repeti-
tion of the history of 1906-1914. MacDonald called it diplo-
macy that was neither secret nor open but "tail out of the bag"
diplomacy. Finally on 2nd October the Government published
a White Paper which gave the details of the Anglo-French
negotiations. Lord Cushendun was not cut out for the finesse of
League arbitration, and apart from his handling of the vexed
question of German Reparations at the Assembly, was both
tactless and ineffectual. Eden's first official view of Geneva
must have been a chastening experience.

During the winter months Government and Opposition in
both Houses kept up an intermittent attack. Cushendun did his
best to bury the Naval Pact with military honours, but both
the Labour and Liberal Parties were resolved to have an ex-
humation. The House had not resumed after its vacation for
more than a week before Mr. Lloyd George had moved an
Amendment to the Address. Lloyd George brought up his
heavy guns. All MacDonald could do was to repeat Lloyd
George's questions: Were we committed to France? Was it
only a try on or was it something more? What did our signa-
ture to the Kellogg Pact incur? How were we going to carry
it out? Bad psychology was at the root of our dilemma. Do not
let us babble so much about security. The sinister feature of the
Government's diplomacy was that fundamentally it was a war

DEBTS AND SETTLEMENTS 59

diplomacy. We must take the risks of being at peace rather
than accept the risks of being half-cock at war.

To follow three such orators, each at the top of his debating
form, is a privilege that many members would prefer to waive.
Very wisely Eden avoided the rhetorical flourish and confined
himself to straightforward argument. Mr. MacDonald had
"worked himself up to some measure of indignation" at the
Government's present policy, and refreshed that indignation
with reminiscences of his own recent brief tour to some of the
capitals of Europe. Let us be quite clear what happened. The
British Government was not responsible, according to Eden,
for the original proposal, nor was it an action arising out of the
brain of our Foreign Secretary with a sinister purpose behind
it. The author of it was the chairman of the Draft Commission,
who more than once appealed that those Powers which dis-
agreed about the proposed Draft Convention should attempt
to find a formula outside the confines of the Commission itself.

MacDonald tried to corner this excessively well-informed
young Tory by asking him whether any attempt was made at
Geneva to come to an agreement with America in the same
way. But Eden was not to be led astray. Having established his
point of fact there came the question: Were we right in trying
to find a measure of agreement with the French Government?
Undoubtedly we were. "We therefore reach this point that it
was right to try and reach agreement but that the terms we
achieved were unsatisfactory." It was not a question of com-
paring what we wanted with what we got, but whether the lim-
itation embodied in the Agreement was an improvement on the
condition of affairs which existed before. That was the only
true comparison, and in it America was offered "a measure of
departure" from the terms she had originally rejected. Thus the
Agreement was something which might reasonably form the
basis of future discussion.

Having established his complete command of the details in-
volved, Eden went on to consider the more general aspects of
our policy. As for our relations with France he hoped the criti-

60 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

cisms echoed by Lloyd George would not gain force or author-
ity in this country. The solidarity of Anglo-French relations
must form an inevitable basis for the peace of Europe, not only
today but in the future. Recent events proved that the friend-
ship was not exclusive. On the contrary, he went on in a re-
markable passage, "It is the medium through which alone such
progress as has been made in international relations has been
achieved. Through that medium the agreements of Locarno
were achieved and rapprochement with Germany made pos-
sible. It was through that friendship that Germany was able to
find a place in the Council of the League of Nations itself, but
for the friendly relations which existed between this country
and France the League of Nations would not now be in the
strong position it is at the moment."

In one important particular Eden allowed himself the liberty
of criticising the Government by implication. "I am convinced,"
he declared, "that a greater measure of understanding between
this country and the United States is the most important objec-
tive that the Government of this country could set before us."
He hoped that successive governments, whatever their political
creed, would assiduously pursue good relations with America,
because it is "The most formidable safeguard for world peace
in the years that are to come." Baldwin, with the debt settle-
ment as a symbol of his original sin, was never very successful
with the States. Eden, on the other hand, was always underlin-
ing the necessity of filling in the details of Anglo-American
understanding, and steadily building up the reputation that was
to make him, in terms of American opinion, perhaps the most
popular of all our Foreign Secretaries.

Eden had made the most of a limited opportunity. With the
exception of his shrewd blows at Lloyd George his tone was
conciliatory, and as for Lloyd George there were no doubt ad-
vantages in seeking a vendetta with him. Certainly it was an
easier task to attack than to defend Chamberlain. For Eden's
chief heralded his return to health and duty with a very unfor-
tunate speech in which to general consternation he had seen fit

DEBTS AND SETTLEMENTS 61

to link up reparations with the evacuation from the Rhine.
Only a few days previously Churchill had stated that they were
distinct questions. L.G. thundered against the Government,
pouring out a wealth of resonant rhetoric against our subservi-
ence to France. At Manchester he cried that "the nations of the
world are heading straight for war, not because anyone wants
it, but because no one has the courage to stop the runaway
horses in the chariots of war."

This violence moved Eden to send his first letter to The
Times. "Mr. Lloyd George," he wrote, "enjoys extravagance.
He subsists upon superlatives. At the moment he is actuated by
an animus against the French. Where the British Government
would proceed by negotiation Mr. Lloyd George would pro-
ceed by invective. It was ever his method. It witnessed the nadir
of British influence upon the continent of Europe during the
closing months of the Coalition. We cannot revert to such
methods without once again enduring the humiliation of their
consequences" and so to L.G.'s equine epithets. Eden took
up the metaphor with relish. "Upon the foremost of these phan-
tom chariots of his own imaginings rides an ex-Prime Minister
of Great Britain. He leans forward to lash the leaders with
the thongs of mischief, and to cast squibs of suspicion under
their hoofs."

During the remaining six months of the Government's life
there was little for Eden to do but watch events. So 1929
opened in an atmosphere of political gloom and economic
foreboding, and the activities of members of Parliament were
for the most part confined to manoeuvring for a favourable po-
sition at the forthcoming general election. Mr. Baldwin's
"Safety First" seemed uninspiring to large numbers who looked
for a bold lead in difficult times.

The Conservatives were relying largely on Churchill's last
Budget, but on the whole it was quiet, and to that extent dis-
appointing. It looked as though no life would be given to that
great occasion. Speakers were merely using the House to ad-

62 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

dress their constituents, and debate was, by tacit arrangements
between the parties, becoming perfunctory. The John Blunt of
British Socialism, Philip Snowden intervened. "I was making,"
he writes in his autobiography, "an ordinary speech in criticism
of Mr. Churchill's four years' record as Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer when I made a reference to the Debt Agreements he
had recently concluded with France and Italy." He describes
how he denounced these agreements as being an unfair imposi-
tion on the British taxpayer, the French debt being reduced by
sixty-two per cent and the Italian by eighty-six per cent. Thus
the taxpayer was left with the remission, as these debts were
part of our War Debt. Further, as far as France was concerned,
the remission was to a country that had already repudiated
four-fifths of her National Debt.

He talked about British people who had taken out French
loans during the war practically ruined by France's "bilking"
of her national obligations. He said Labour policy favoured an
all-round cancellation of war debts and reparations, but until
then there must be fair-play for Britain.

"I then made," he says, "an observation which was the cause
of the row that followed. I said that we had never subscribed to
that part of the Balfour Note which laid down that until there
was an all-round cancellation of debts and reparations we
should not take from our debtors more than was sufficient to
pay our debt to America. The Labour Party would hold itself
open if circumstances arose to repudiate that condition of the
Balfour Note." Churchill at once sensed the electoral possibili-
ties in this blunt statement. The Cabinet sat on it the next
morning, and there followed a portentous attack on Labour.
Eden was one of those given a chance to enter the fray. To
Eden, Snowden's attitude to the general problem was "incred-
ible" and "bad enough" while to the Balfour Declaration it was
"very much worse." This declaration, he said, may be termed
the foundation-stone upon which the structure of economic
Europe has been rebuilt since the Armistice. Eden took it upon
himself deeply to regret the consequences of those words. "If

DEBTS AND SETTLEMENTS 63

Mr. Snowden felt such resentment at the terms granted to
France and Italy that Ms ire boiled within him, that was bad
enough but excusable. But when he combines suddenly and
most unexpectedly a John Bull aggressiveness with a Shylock
sinister cynicism, the combination is not one which the country
would approve or which will raise our credit abroad."

Eden's was undoubtedly a naughty speech, and it was soon
shown to be tactically unsound as well. Snowden's plain speak-
ing on the taxpayers' behalf made an immediate appeal. Many
Conservative interests, hard hit by the stabilisation of the franc,
were favourably impressed. On the other hand, MacDonald,
anxious to maintain a good understanding with France, was
alarmed at the deplorable effect of Snowden's words on French
opinion. A generous foreign policy was Labour's clearest ob-
jective. So the conflicting Party policies conspired to subordi-
nate the War Debt issue. Eden did not drop it at once, and
repeated Ms diatribe with some vigour at Leamington. Snow-
den for Ms part stuck to Ms guns, and records it as Ms opimon
that if all Labour candidates had similarly stressed the iniquity
of the debt settlement Labour would have been in with a clear
majority over both Conservatives and Liberals. As it was La-
bour did weU enough, raising their numbers in the House of
Commons to 289, an increase of 137 on the previous Parlia-
ment. The Conservatives dropped 155 seats and returned alto-
gether 260 members, while the Liberals, in spite of a heroic
effort ("We can conquer unemployment"), were unable to get
more than fifty members back. In terms of votes their unem-
ployment manifesto had stronger support than the result sug-
gests; while the Conservatives, who at the last moment had
fallen back on a personality parade of Stanley Baldwin Ms
photograph under the caption "Safety First" could still com-
mand the biggest aggregate.

At tMs election Eden had to face a three-cornered fight, but
he entered it with the utmost vigour. During the six years that
he had represented the constituency he had been assiduous in
furthering its parliamentary interests. He had been careful to

64 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

avoid controversy with the National Farmers' Union, and was
no doubt regarded as reasonably sound on the Preference issue.
The wheels of his Association ran smoothly, and good reports
of Leamington's promising young member were spreading
throughout the constituency. Yet it was in many ways the most
difficult election he had to fight. The Liberal candidate who
succeeded to George Nicholls was a Captain Walter Dingley,
who came from Stratford and described himself as "The Local
and Liberal Candidate"; while Labour was represented by Mr.
G. C. Garton. Dingley put the peace issue first. Our support
for the League in all its activities must be wholehearted and
zealous. Unemployment without specific reference to Lloyd
George came next. Liberalism, too, challenged Eden's preroga-
tive by making a definite appeal to women a suit which the
Labour candidate, Mr. G. C. Garton, somewhat unwisely for-
got to press. Mr. Garton presented his compliments, and in his
election address appeared in pince-nez and an open-neck shirt.
The effect of the "Flapper Vote" was to increase Warwick and
Leamington's electoral register from 44,000 to 62,500.

In the circumstances a new vote, a losing cause, and a
third candidate Eden had every reason to be satisfied with
the result. He was returned with a plurality of 5,460 and a total
of 23,045 votes. Dingley polled 17,585, and Garton, 7,741. In
truth all three candidates had some reason to be pleased with
themselves. The last three-cornered fight had been in 1923,
and both Eden and the Liberal were 6,000 up on their previous
vote; while Labour, which had not fought the constituency
since then, was 3,700 up on Lady Warwick's figure. The 1929
election was as a whole indecisive. The result was in line
with the attitude of the electorate throughout the country. The
nation had given its verdict on what it did not want; what its
positive wishes were it left the legislators to puzzle out for
themselves.

CHAPTER 9

EXPERIMENTS IN OPPOSITION

THE PERIOD of the second Labour Government was
one in which Eden was able to stretch his parliamentary
legs and consolidate his status. After a rather unedify-
ing wrangle over the spoils Arthur Henderson took office as
Foreign Secretary and made a thorough success of Ms job. He
was a man of persistent purpose and steady ideals, a patient if
slow-moving negotiator.

The material for weighty criticism during this period of our
diplomacy was meagre and Eden straight away, on the third
day of the Debate on the Address when Foreign Affairs were
up for consideration, entered into a rearguard action from
which he was not fully to emerge for the next two years. Hen-
derson had referred to a resumption of Anglo-Soviet relations,
provided the subversive activities amply cited by Sir Austen
in a lurid extract from the Pravda were brought to a close
first. All Eden could say was that in a few months* time hon-
ourable members opposite might take a rather different view
of the speech and would do well to restrain their hilarity until
they were satisfied that Mr. Henderson was able to restrain the
Third International. The remainder of the speech was a labori-
ous defence of the Conservative Government's attitude to the
Optional Clause and the Rhineland evacuation on the grounds
that the Socialists, instead of rushing in to fulfil their election
pledges, were simply maintaining the good precedents set by
Sir Austen Chamberlain.

All Eden could add to this somewhat melancholy tirade
before the adjournment were a couple of anxious questions
about the Optional Clause, on which he could get no assur-
ance, and about the strained relations between China and

65

66 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Russia. During the vacation the Socialists met with a number
of spectacular successes. Tact and patience brought agreement
between France, Belgium, and Germany on the future control
of the Rhineland provinces. Snowden by entirely opposite
methods of unqualified brusqueness emerged from the Repara-
tions Conference a national hero, while MacDonald had made
such progress with the Anglo-American naval talks that he
booked his passage to the States to seal the bonds of brotherly
love with President Hoover and, in his own words, "narrow the
Atlantic." In home affairs there was no comparable achieve-
ment, and, as Baldwin aptly pointed out, "the Government had
availed themselves of the parliamentary recess to take a holiday
from Socialism."

The debate on the resumption of diplomatic relations with
Russia produced but few of the fireworks of 1924. The some-
what lukewarm negotiations between M. Dovgalevski and Mr.
Henderson, which had at one stage been brusquely broken off,
gave the Conservatives some grounds for implying that the
Russians were not going to give up their insidious propaganda
and that the Labour Party were not in a position to prevent it.
On the whole Eden overstated his case. Mr. Henderson had
pursued "the worst method of diplomacy that any statesman of
this country could ever follow." He had combined strength of
speech with weakness in action, and "you can do no greater
disservice to your own country's prestige in international affairs
than to pursue that policy."

At a somewhat higher debating level was his reply to a
powerful plea from Norman Angell on behalf of the so-called
Optional Clause and its ratification by Britain as an act of
international re-insurance.

"You cannot mechanise peace. Peace, if it comes, is main-
tained as the result of a feeling growing up among the nations
of the world, and all that you have to do is to provide the instru-
ments of interpretation." If then the Optional Clause was poten-
tially superfluous and dangerous Eden was all the same pre-
pared to throw out a memorable challenge. For "there are

EXPERIMENTS IN OPPOSITION 67

times," he added, "in the lives of nations and peoples when
it Is necessary to take risks, even grave risks, in the cause of
world peace." Several such had arisen since the war. There was
the Covenant. "Sometimes I think some honourable members
have not read the Covenant of the League and do not appre-
ciate the tremendous obligations we have already under it . . ."
Locarno was similarly C4 a grave responsibility." The Foreign
Secretary, as the outcome of election pledges, was "driving like
Jehu, but in this instance he should be a very Agag."

For the next eighteen months * Eden stuck to his Parliamen-
tary duties with a firm resolve. It w T as uphill work. The Labour
Government's foreign policy continued to flourish and Hender-
son was all the while reinforced with brilliant back-bench sup-
port. Once again it was domestic affairs which slid away from
its grasp. From the very beginning the financial situation was
serious. Unemployment increased, revenue fell. Churchill's de-
rating scheme, which had had such a cold reception when the
Conservatives were in power, laid heavy burdens for his suc-
cessor at the Exchequer. The result was that Snowden had to
face a prospective deficit of forty-seven millions in his first
Budget. Additions to income-tax, the tax on beer, super-tax,
and death duties met immediate needs. But his stern financial
orthodoxy earned him few thanks. The Right screamed for
Protection, the Left for public works. Conservative speakers
referred to him as having a mind that went back to 1880, but
for Eden that was several centuries too forward; he thought the
Chancellor of the Exchequer had a medieval mind. He would
have made an admirable minister for the Medici. He could
have applied the thumbscrew, rack and stake ruthlessly and
happily in the cause of "the fiscal bigotry" he maintained.

Eden then went on in the case of this particular Budget
debate to make a very frank admission about the attitude of

* About this time, on 3rd October, 1930, Eden's second son, Nicholas,
was born. The christening took place on 15th November. Among the god-
parents were the present Earl of Scarbrough, whom Eden succeeded as
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Lady Violet
Astor.

68 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

himself and Ms generation to the historic controversy of Free
Trade versus Protection. "Perhaps it is true of the younger
members," he confessed, "certainly the younger members of
our party, that we are merely opportunists in these fiscal mat-
ters. I, personally, am prepared to plead guilty to the charge.
It seems to me that the only useful test which can be applied
in these fiscal controversies which have no academic interest
whatever, is the result which is actually achieved."

In the early part of the year Empire Free Trade developed
into a crusade against Baldwin. Beaverbrook and Rothermere
launched what was virtually their own party, and Conservative
leaders took a serious view of the situation. Baldwin succeeded
in pricking the bubble of revolt by his usual method namely,
one big, devastating speech to his rank and file supporters. This
time, however, he had to make unusually big concessions.
Although he adhered to his pledge that food taxes would not be
made an issue at the next election, he expressed his willingness
to submit the question to the people by the extreme measure of
a referendum. This was enough for Beaverbrook, who at once
returned to the Conservative Central Office with all the com-
placence of a prodigal son. But although this crisis was short
and sharp it was symptomatic of a general restlessness among
Conservatives over Baldwin's leadership. There had been heart-
searchings over the result of the last election; there was the
straightforward psychological need for a scapegoat the easy-
going Baldwin was the natural culprit and victim. All through
the summer the sniping continued. At the end of September he
was moved to issue an official statement that there was no truth
in the report that he was intending soon to retire from the lead-
ership of the Conservative Party.

In a letter to The Times of 2nd October, a good true-blue
Tory, Sir Martin Conway, let the public know that Baldwin's
policy was not inevitably the milk of the word. Mr. Baldwin
and his immediate entourage, he alleged, had made no serious
attempt to keep in touch with the mass of their followers. "We

EXPERIMENTS IN OPPOSITION 69

have been treated like sheep and led or driven according to the
whims of our shepherds. That is why we suffer the pangs of
hunger. We look up and are not fed."

This letter at once provoked what The Times called a
"Hungry Sheep" correspondence. Mr. Duff-Cooper and Mr.
John Buchan leapt to the defence of their leader. Sir Martin
replied the general opinion was that as long as Baldwin re-
mained leader there was no hope of rousing the rank and file to
any enthusiasm. He had been among his constituents and only
one was in favour of Baldwin.

This encouraged Eden to take up the cudgels on Baldwin's
behalf. "How delightful it must have been for Sir Martin Con-
way to find himself so completely in accord with all his con-
stituents but one. Rare unanimity and unhappy exception!"
If the Conservative Party jettisons Mr. Baldwin it will sacrifice
its greatest electoral asset. "But that is not of course the sole
reason why many of us would deeply regret to see Mr. Baldwin
relinquish the leadership of the Conservative Party." For so
long as he was leader "so long will its 'right wing' be unable to
dominate the Party's counsels and narrow its purposes of this
the Trade Disputes Bill was a sufficient example; so long also
will confidence persist that the Conservative Party can remain
truly national both in the source of its strength and in the objec-
tives of its policy. Nor with Mr. Baldwin as its leader will the
Conservative Party ever sink to become the creature of million-
aire newspaper owners or a mere appanage of big business."

Opposition to a Socialist Government or the specialised dis-
cretion of a Parliamentary private secretaryship tended to con-
ceal the key in which Eden's Conservatism was pitched. This
letter was no new or sudden change. At the end of 1929 in a
speech at Caxton Hall to the Unionist Canvassing Corps
a body whose be-all and end-all was how best to interpret and
put across the Party's faith Eden as the chief speaker had
come out boldly for the theory of co-partnership and for the
motto "every worker a capitalist!" The hungry sheep debate

70 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

was continued and duly ended with everyone's righteous-
ness upheld and everyone's conscience cleared.

An interesting Parliamentary sketch of Eden during the
Opposition phase of his career appears in A Hundred Com-
moners, by James Johnston. He laid stress on Eden's good for-
tune; he had got through his apprenticeship while still very
young, and he belonged to the gilded youth. "He is highly
polished, has the bearing and manner of an aristocrat that
gives him distinction in a House where the aristocrat is so much
rarer than in Parliaments of the past." Eden contrasted well
against a background of forceful business men, dull trade union
secretaries, intellectual Labourists and aggressive proletarians.
But Eden was an exceptional aristocrat, "for there are aristo-
crats in the House who do not speak in the style expected from
their class." Although Eden had a fashionable air there was
none of the indifference or indolence that often goes with it.
"He is intensely interested in politics, takes his Parliamentary
duties most seriously, devotes much study to political ques-
tions, and spares no labour to make himself efficient."

The principal impression he conveyed to James Johnston
was that of competence. "He has done what only a few poli-
ticians take the trouble to do he has trained his mind, and
then he has set himself to master whatever subject he has
desired to discuss. He does not create the impression of having
raked together knowledge for some immediate debating pur-
pose. He makes one feel that he has a previous familiarity with
the subject. He thinks for himself and has a measure of intel-
lectual independence."

CHAPTER 10

NATIONAL MINISTRIES

EDEN was to make one more speech before the financial
deluge swept the Labour Government out of office his
last important speech as a back-bench private member
until his resignation statement seven years later. The subject
was Disarmament. The summer of 1931 was a turning point,
not only in the history of this country, but also in the careers of
nearly all our major and minor politicians. Although it brought
Eden out of the realms of Parliamentary promise into those of
international performance., the process of transition was in his
case astonishingly smooth and quiet. In all the welter of invec-
tive and alarm, frustration and victory, Eden somehow emerged
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the National
Government a promotion at once effortless and inevitable.

He arrived, but not just by accident. In the first place, in the
two lean years of the Opposition he had spoken on all aspects
of foreign affairs with steadily increasing power and prestige.
The questions he asked were key questions. They bore relation
to the activity of the Whips. As a Parliamentarian he had
proved himself diligent and well informed. His manner was
pleasing to those in high authority, nicely balanced between
deference and self-assertion, but above all he was, as has been
amply shown, a Baldwin man. No serious rival had arisen
among Eden's Tory contemporaries to challenge his pre-
eminence in foreign affairs and he had backed Baldwin all the
way and without reserve. There seems no reason to doubt
that he had been in genuine agreement with his leader on nearly
every issue of policy, great and small, during all these formative
years. Therefore, his fortunes were bound up with Baldwin's
more than once it had seemed that he was backing a losing

71

72 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

cause, that it was to be hero-worship without a dividend. But
the particular form of crisis from which the National Govern-
ment emerged was particularly adapted to Baldwin's political
technique which was to move slowly and mysteriously in the
performance of Ms wonders.

For some time it was in doubt what form the compromise
would take. Lord Snowden describes the inscrutable and secret
way Mr. MacDonald treated both the colleagues he was leaving
and the colleagues he was to join. King George V was a major
force behind MacDonald's historic decisions. The Royal will
was supposed to have asserted itself roughly along the lines that
as Mr. MacDonald has got us into this mess it is for Mr. Mac-
Donald to get us out of it, and that his resignation was thus
unacceptable and should be slept upon. This nautical frankness
was the outward sign of a profound instinct for public opinion
and common sense solutions. During the critical hours Mr.
MacDonald kept the National Government to himself. He had
a meeting with the Opposition leaders, but Mr. Neville Cham-
berlain, who was there, declared a few days afterwards that he
went to bed that night expecting the next day Mr. Baldwin
would be asked to form a Government. But Baldwin could
afford to be complacent and self-sacrificing. Beyond the general
theme that Party principles must not be sacrificed he made only
one fundamental reservation. He would not form a coalition
with Mr. Lloyd George in it.

We have detected all through this hostility to Lloyd Georgian
Liberalism in Eden he inherited it from Baldwin. Baldwin
was renowned for his friendliness, but he was also a long-term
enemy. After the downfall of the Lloyd George coalition, in
which he had taken such a dramatic part at the Carlton Club
meeting, he is reputed to have emphasised beyond all shadow
of doubt that he would never again serve under Lloyd George.
All through the period of his predominance we find him up
against the Tory of the old coalition days well to his right
in outlook yet beholden to Mr. Lloyd George for election to
Parliament by coupon. It is not only orthodox Liberals who

NATIONAL MINISTRIES 73

have found to their cost that Mr. Lloyd George, when he tam-
pered with the Nonconformist conscience immediately after
the war, did grave damage to it; the Nonconformist Tory, like
Mr. Baldwin, has suffered also. At all events Baldwin saw 7 Mr.
Lloyd George, whether in the role of friend or enemy, as the
real menace to the National Government.

The final crisis arose over the approval of the ten per cent
cut in unemployment benefit, and the Labour Government
resigned. But within twenty-four hours the new Cabinet of the
interim Government, which consisted only of ten senior minis-
ters from all three parties, had been formed. Lord Reading,
more as a gesture in the interests of national prestige than as
a serious intention to return to the front line of politics, took
temporary office as Foreign Secretary. Eden was appointed as
his Under-Secretary, and so, an important point to remember,
was in harness from the very beginning. Among those of the
younger generation who were singled out for junior posts in the
Ministry, were Walter Elliott, Kingsley Wood, Oliver Stanley
and Duff-Cooper. Thus the National Government contained
the elements of perpetuity within itself the future dominance
of the Conservatives was assured.

The first National Government lasted from 25th August to
6th November, 1931. During its seventy-three days of office
this administration of all the talents lived on to see the flood of
economic crisis seep through into the realms of politics. By the
time the dam had been designed and the approval of the people
sought and obtained, the world situation was in fact beyond
control. At the most critical moment in the history of inter-
national relations since the war British foreign policy was tech-
nically and morally paralysed. In the first place, Lord Reading's
only objective was to keep our policy in a state of animated if
lordly suspense until a successor was found; but it was not pos-
sible for him to keep warm a seat on the Treasury Bench, and
Eden with the best will in the world lacked the status to be an
adequate deputy for him in the Commons. The hierarchy of the
Foreign Office is rather more select and exalted than those of

74 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

the other civil service departments, and it is not always realised
that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is ranked
in terms of Foreign Office seniority below the Permanent
Under-Secretary. Thus in terms of control over and reference
to a document the order in 1931 was Reading, Vansittart,
Eden. In the early days of September, 1931, all Eden could do
was to act as rapporteur of grave events.

On 18th September a date in many ways as fatal for the
long-range hopes of the peacemakers as 4th August following
up a report that a portion of the South Manchurian Railway
track had been destroyed by Chinese soldiers from the Petaying
barracks, Japanese troops were mobilised, the barracks attacked
and taken and the aerodrome and arsenal at Mukden seized.
On 23rd September Eden was asked for particulars and sup-
plied the House with the latest information then available.
Cantonese troops were advancing northwards towards the
positions held by the Chinese Government's troops. No hostili-
ties had broken out. "News today indicates a partial withdrawal
of Cantonese forces. The floods in the Yangtse are reported to
be subsiding." The full gravity of the news did not make
immediate impact on members, and there were some facetious
supplementary questions. Eden reported amid the ribaldry that
the Chinese had brought the matter before the League Council.
On the 24th he described how a special meeting of the Council
had been held and an appeal sent to both Governments to
abstain from any action that might aggravate the situation, and
to take positive steps by way of Geneva to appease it. On 30th
September Eden announced that the Japanese had reported the
progressive withdrawal of their troops. The Japanese spokes-
man had also affirmed that Japan had no territorial designs on
Manchuria. Question and answer went on until Mr. MacDon-
ald resolved to clarify the National Government's position by
an appeal to the country. While Eden was rallying his constitu-
ents at Leamington, the Japanese were penetrating the Man-
churian hinterland and heading for Tsitsihar. But Manchuria

NATIONAL MINISTRIES 75

was not an issue which disturbed a single vote at the General
Election. All Eden did in his model Election Address was to
ask for national unity to outlive the crisis. The Socialists had
been unable to meet a situation of their own making. A Gov-
ernment with the "best elements" from each party was alone
large enough for the emergency. With this estimate and appeal
the electors of Warwick and the nation concurred. Eden was
in with a mighty plurality of 29,000 and an aggregate poll of
38,000, and the Government were returned with what almost
amounted to a totalitarian majority of 500. The very magni-
tude of the victory had the effect of at once widening the scope
of Eden's career. Debates in Parliament did not reflect the
urgency of the situation outside it, and the opportunity came
to Eden at once to represent his country at Geneva without his
presence being unduly missed at Westminster.

With the return of the second National Government Lord
Reading felt that he had served his commission, asked to be
relieved of it, and gave way to Sir John Simon, who, apart from
himself, was probably the most eminent Liberal lawyer in the
country. For the purposes of Eden's career this change, to-
gether with the promotion of Mr. Neville Chamberlain from
the Ministry of Health to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer
in the place of Snowden, who had retired with a peerage, were
moves of the highest significance. By the time the National
Government was formed Simon was ready to merge his Liber-
alism into a permanent alliance with a Conservative majority.
By process of trial and error he had come to believe that to
accept someone else's initiative was only one degree less
dangerous than to initiate a policy oneself. Such an outlook
was sooner or later bound to clash with Eden's activist ideas.
At the outset there was no clash: the two men worked in
separate compartments Eden was appointed British Dele-
gate to the ill-fated Disarmament Conference. At the begin-
ning of 1932 Disarmament and Reparations were still the
embodiments of international Peace and Justice. By the end of

76 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

that year both were by the logic of events recognised as will o'
the wisps leading the nation into realms of violence and despair.

The Disarmament Conference began its deliberations on
2nd February and so coincided to the day with the Japanese
bombardment of Shanghai, described as the heaviest artillery
action since 1918. Germany and Russia abstained from the
proceedings; Germany, because she could not get equality of
status, and the Russians, more bluntly, because they could not
get Disarmament on to the agenda. Both Governments claimed
the right to put forward their own proposals apart from the
1930 Convention, which was the basis of the Conference's
work. Other and lesser States one by one followed their exam-
ple. For weeks the Conference sat and listened to an endless
sequence of schemes from delegates, great and small. Pro-
posals were too numerous to be co-ordinated or digested. From
February to the Easter adjournment the Conference was de-
scribed as being in a state of "suspended animation." In April
the American delegate startled his colleagues by submitting a
resolution that provided for qualitative as well as quantitative
disarmament, though what constituted a specifically aggressive
weapon was left to a Technical Commission to unravel. There-
after the Conference was described as "relapsing into commit-
tee work" in which moribund condition it remained until the
end of June. No rally was recorded and hope was steadily
abandoned.

Then followed President Hoover's famous proposal for a
reduction of arms by one-third all round. It is arguable that a
clear and immediate acceptance in principle by Britain might
have galvanised the Conference into constructive action. But
by the middle of July the Hoover plan was, for the purposes of
practical politics, dead. The Conference merely used it as a
pretext to terminate the first part of its work forthwith. On 20th
July, Sir John Simon, his legal skill in full play, presented a
Draft Resolution which set out all the points on which all the
Governments were in approximate agreement. These were so

NATIONAL MINISTRIES 77

few as to exceed the worst fears of the weary delegates. Although
the Resolution was in no way a policy it was adopted; Russia
and Germany voted against it, and Germany withdrew from
the Conference until such time as her status should come up
for consideration.

The autumn was devoted to a Franco-German dispute, with
Mussolini accepting Germany's equality thesis, and Sir John
Simon warning Berlin not to repudiate the military clauses of
the Versailles Treaty. The situation hardened into deadlock.
An attempt to invoke a Four Power Pact came to nothing;
nobody could agree where to meet. Herriot saw MacDonald,
and Mussolini made speeches, but with the steady deterioration
of events in the Far East, the diplomatic inanity and intransi-
gence of Europe became so unbearable that some Government
had to make a move. It came from the Quai d'Orsay it covered
all the ground. As a contribution to peace the French Plan was
both logical and extravagant, but it had the effect of rousing
Sir John Simon to produce counter-proposals, and the year
ended on a note of hope that at least there was some material
for further discussion.

Eden had been allowed to play only a relatively modest part
in Great Britain's tortuous policy. He hurried between Geneva
and Westminster, now examining ratios at the Conference, now
explaining to the League Council why Great Britain would
have to reduce her subscription, now telling Parliament that he
had nothing further to say about the Hoover Plan. In October
it was his dismal duty to report to the Cabinet that the Dis-
armament Conference was damnably near death. How strongly
he worded his memorandum we can only surmise, but there
are grounds for believing that Eden was not impressed with the
view that failure was inevitable. The very complexity of the
issues raised by the Disarmament Conference may well have
given a new stimulus to his undoubted flair for administrative
detail. Cecil was in Geneva most of the time: he had been the
one connecting link between the Socialist and National Govern-
ments, and during the interregnum the de facto British Foreign

78 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Secretary. Then there was the British Delegation to the Dis-
armament Conference, which was representative and in-
fluential.

Eden was surrounded by able men and women to press upon
him the urgency of the issues at stake, the possibilities of mak-
ing the Geneva machine work. He was susceptible to inter-
national influences from which the Cabinet was immune. Eden
did his best to keep the Cabinet fully informed, and on
occasions submitted memoranda which included his personal
recommendations on matters of policy. Simon allowed them
to filter through for discussion without adding any comments
of his own.

CHAPTER 11

PROGRESS IN LOST CAUSES

IN ORDER to show to the world that Disarmament had our
"earnest consideration," the British Government opened its
1933 account with almost an excess of zeal. It submitted an
ambitious "programme of work," which it suggested should be
taken up as soon as the Conference had eliminated a French
plan. Like the latter it was more grandiose in language than
significant in meaning, and offered substantial hope only in as
far as it suggested some revision of Part V of the Versailles
Treaty, which was concerned with German disarmament. But
the French plan had to be discussed first, and on 3rd February
Eden made an Important statement on the theme of that eternal
challenge to European settlement and peaceful change
French security.

France was wanting new securities. Eden asked pertinently
whether in the search for them the French might not fall into
the trap of forgetting existing guarantees. To reiterate a guar-
antee was not necessarily to strengthen it. In the eyes of the
British Government the guarantees already covering France
were "real and substantial." Locarno, in Eden's view, had
marked the close of the chapter of the immediate post-war
period in Europe and had opened a new one, as yet unfinished.
Eden asked that the example of Locarno should be followed
we had signed in the hope that it would be and that other
nations would settle their regional difficulties in the same way.
But as far as Great Britain was concerned, in our League
membership and in our Locarno signature, we had gone as far
as we could go in assuming definite commitments in Europe.
He ended by offering no encouragement that Great Britain

79

80 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

could modify this attitude. To any new obligations the British
people were "unalterably opposed." Although this statement
was meant to be cold comfort, the Geneva statesmen were not
unduly discouraged; indeed, they were pleased with Great
Britain's new spokesman.

But the men in charge of Disarmament during 1933 were
looking after a lost cause. Hindenburg by abandoning Bruening
in his hour of need for the deplorable von Papen had let the
Trojan horse into the Wilhelmstrasse. By March, 1933, the
intrigues of Schleicher and of Papen were blown away like dry
leaves before the hurricane of the Nazi advance. Hitler was
Chancellor and the torches of his storm-troopers in endless
night procession were new symbols of the terrible old doctrines
of blood and fire. Even Geneva had to respond to the demands
of strength. During February Japan was declared in solemn
conclave to be the aggressor in Manchuria. How could the
declaration be brought to life?

For a moment Great Britain was prepared to act alone.
Having tried without success to reach international agreement
over the export of arms to the Far East the British Government
decided to impose an embargo on its own initiative. Simon put
it forward more as a moral gesture than for any practical effect
it might have. But it was strength only in appearance. Geneva
saw it as a move strangely incompatible with our League
obligations; Japan was the aggressor, the ban should apply to
Japan only. The British Government, however, was aware that
no one followed its example, and at the end of March decided
to abandon the embargo and substitute for it "vigorous con-
versations."

Disarmament continued to be the issue which caused the
greatest disillusionment in this country; the vacillations of
Geneva were regarded with greater dismay by the British elec-
torate than the bombings of Shanghai. Throughout the spring
and summer while Eden continued to press for strong action
the Conference got trapped in a jungle of sub-committees. The

PROGRESS IN LOST CAUSES 81

various proposals were examined for their technical implica-
tions and found wanting.

In this atmosphere Disarmament was stifled, but not before a
supreme effort had been made by Great Britain to give the old
objectives a new urgency. Eden had had to straggle on as the
Government's principal representative at the Conference. At
the beginning of March he returned to England to make a
trenchant and disquieting report to the Cabinet. The position of
the Conference he described as being critical.

After earnest consideration the Cabinet decided to reinforce
Eden's efforts by sending over both the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary. On the 1 6th March, MacDonald produced
the famous Draft Convention from an oration of overwhelming
Celtic passion and prolixity. This he followed up by a lightning
visit to Rome and laid before Mussolini the first of the panic
pacts the Four-Power Pact, which, apart from the purposes of
general collaboration, stressed revision of the Peace Treaties.
MacDonald is reported to have found in the Duce's ideas "a
wonderful affinity" to his own.

MacDonald, like Haldane in pre-war days, had a habit of
wrapping himself round in superfluous mystery. As he would
not encourage true reports, false and startling rumours were
allowed to spread. It was notorious that efforts had been made
to bring Hitler and Mussolini to Geneva, but Hitler had refused
on the good grounds that he had only just a few days before
become a Government and needed a little time to consolidate;
as for Mussolini, it was necessary for the Scottish mountain to
go to the new Mahomet. What had Great Britain achieved?
Had we become entangled in an eternal European intrigue, or
made a considered contribution to European appeasement?

On the 24th March MacDonald made a bewildering state-
ment in the House, the length of which was second only to its
obscurity, but in principle it appeared that Mussolini had
handed over a document containing his thoughts on the best
way to achieve peace between the four Western Powers. It was

82 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

to be done by means of a pact to last ten years which was to be
concluded "within the framework" of the League. The mori-
bund Article XIX of the Covenant (with its revision clauses)
was to be reinstalled. MacDonald was not asked to take it or
leave it simply to think it over. This he did, and put forward
his view that, provided the special interests of the smaller Pow-
ers were adequately guarded, the Italian Plan was too big an
opportunity to miss. He would not care to incur the responsi-
bility of setting it aside. We were entering a diplomatic road
which was to lead five years later by inexorable progression to
Munich and total war. On the whole there was a favourable re-
sponse to MacDonald's meanderings, except from Winston
Churchill.

Churchill was the most notable absentee from the National
Government; Baldwin had apparently decided when the parties
had made their selection that if appeasement was to be the
watchword of our policy, Winston was potentially more dan-
gerous in office than out of it. This may or may not have been
a sound estimate, but the Churchill trumpet, which might for
a time at least have been silenced with a Cabinet mute, now
brayed defiance from the back benches. The battle-cries were
India and Arms, and with tremendous and consistent invective
Churchill soon became the Government's most formidable
rebel.

On this occasion he denounced disarmament conferences
which in his view actually did more harm than good, and asked
the House to realise that military preponderance was the Em-
pire's sure foundation. The revolution in Germany that was
accompanying his words he cited as reinforcing his thesis. The
principal effect of MacDonald's intervention in foreign affairs
during the past four years had been to bring Great Britain
nearer to war than ever before. Let him pay proper attention
to urgent domestic tasks and leave foreign affairs to competent
ambassadors and accepted diplomatic channels.

This brought Eden to his feet to engage in a counter attack
which at least serves as a reminder that Eden's views were at

PROGRESS IN LOST CAUSES 83

the outset far from Churchllllan. For Mr. Churchill to assert
that the Prime Minister had been responsible for the deteriora-
tion in international relations during the past four years was a
"mischievous absurdity/ 5 It was an assertion all the more re-
grettable, in that it might obtain abroad a measure of authority
which the House did not give it. He went on to show how the
pre-war diplomacy was not a particularly good precedent for
the successful conduct of international relations: it had led
inexorably to the experience of 1914, which the Government
today were doing all in their power to avoid. In the great
attempt surely it was worth while to give a new method a trial.
The Government was not expecting success at once but "any
gospel is better than a gospel of despair." Mr. Churchill's thesis
had been that it was vital to bring France and Germany closer
together; what better step could be taken to this end than the
Prime Minister's pilgrimage to Rome?

It is reported that Eden's championship of his chief was
warmly applauded by the House, even if members left the de-
bate somewhat mystified by the Pact. Indeed from a Parliamen-
tary and Governmental point of view Eden emerged with far
more prestige and popularity than MacDonald and Simon, who
had had the responsibilities of negotiation.

In June, the Four-Power Pact was signed, but it was still-
born. Its terms of reference were so modified as to lack sub-
stantive meaning. It had all been signed before. It merely coin-
cided with intense diplomatic activity in Geneva during the
summer and autumn culminating in Germany's dramatic with-
drawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League. The
conclusion was inevitable; no pact or patchwork of tentative
arbitration could resist the momentum of the new Germany.
European diplomacy henceforth turned upon the recognition
that Germany was once again a Great Power in the making.

Throughout the summer Eden was engaged in discussion
with the French Premier Daladier. They were searching for a
policy the discovery of which was to coincide with its defeat.
Precious months were wasted.

84 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

In the summer, Arthur Henderson, who had straggled so
valiantly for Disarmament and was undoubtedly successful In
giving the Conference a modicum of dignity and prestige, went
on Ms Disarmament pilgrimage; but although everyone wished
Mm well he was regarded as going beyond his terms of refer-
ence if he suggested that some of the statesmen interested
should get together and work out a joint plan. Hitler was not
yet ready to meet Daladier, Daladier was offended at the sug-
gestion that he should meet Hitler. In September, Eden and
Davis and Daladier were again engaged in exchange of views in
Paris, only this time the talks were not tripartite but in com-
partments, Franco-American, Anglo-French, Anglo-American.
Henderson was in Paris too, but nothing had happened which
made it worth while asking him to join in the discussions. He
was left to keep in touch with the negotiations as best he could.

By October the general situation was critical. Nazi pressure
on Austria was increasing; it was known that Germany was in
fact rearming on a substantial scale. Eden, however, was able
to make some progress with the negotiations, for he was in a
position to indicate with due reservations a more favourable
reaction in Downing Street to French ideas on security. His
talks were important too as indirectly helping to improve
Franco-Italian relations, which ever since the Naval Treaty
negotiations of 1930 had been steadily deteriorating.

So by the time the League Assembly opened there was gen-
eral agreement between France, Italy, Great Britain and the
United States on how disarmament should be carried out. As
far as Germany was concerned it meant another delay in her
access to equality of status. At first it looked as though the Ger-
mans were anxious to go a long way to get agreement. There
were informal but intense negotiations between Paul-Boncour,
Simon, Eden, Suvich and Davis on the one hand, and between
these "allies" and Neurath and Goebbels on the other; but it
soon became evident that real progress was not possible. Noth-
ing that the "allies" offered was sufficient to compensate Goeb-
bels for the possible loss of his anti- Versailles propaganda. Italy

PROGRESS IN LOST CAUSES 85

began significantly enough to act as mediator, recognising
Germany's moral right to any arms which the other Powers
decided to keep for themselves.

By the end of September there was deadlock. Simon and
Eden and the other principal delegates left Geneva, all sol-
emnly referring themselves back to their respective capitals for
further instructions. What did the Germans mean by "samples"?
Nobody knew, and Germany would not tell. At the beginning
of October, Baldwin tried to put things right by addressing
through the Conservative Conference a solemn warning to the
world that the consequences of the failure to achieve Disarma-
ment would mean rain to European civilisation. But the atmos-
phere was poisoned. Events were at last forcing France and
Great Britain into closer collaboration.

In July, the German War Minister had asked permission to
buy twenty-five aeroplanes from us; the request brought a
brusque refusal and an added interest in France's allegations
about German rearmament. Britain and France together were
forced to protest about the German attitude to foreign shipping
countries.

Simon was discouraged. Had he not argued that the Disar-
mament Conference should be continued without postpone-
ment? Had he not used all Ms influence to keep its headquarters
at Geneva? On 14th October he went to the Conference, and
in cold precise terms accused Germany of having shifted her
course in the preceding weeks. There was immense indignation
in Berlin, and before there was time to turn round the news
flashed across the world that Germany had left the Disarma-
ment Conference and followed up this drastic action by giving
notice of her resignation from membership of the League of
Nations. Hitler had struck the first of Ms blows at the Europe
of Versailles.

It was the gravest news bulletin that the wireless had so far
carried, but the British people as a whole took the news calmly.

But what was our attitude to be to Germany from now on-

86 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

wards? We all agreed to condemn her action. To Henderson it
was "premature and unfortunate," to Neville Chamberlain
"hasty and ill-advised" but that was not enough, the Cabinet
resolved that the door should be left ajar. Germany was free to
resume Disarmament discussions whenever she saw fit. The
Prime Minister informed Hitler that he accepted the words
Hitler had used in favour of peace on their face value. This
attitude, however, failed to take the sting out of the Opposition.

A by-election fought on foreign policy at East Fulham, the
result of which we now know made a profound impression on
Baldwin's mind and morale, saw a Conservative majority of
14,500 turned into a Labour majority of 4,800. Labour also
won in the municipal elections throughout the country. The cry
was that the Government were warmongers, and the public, it
seemed, agreed.

What was Eden's attitude? His experience at Geneva cannot
have led him to believe in the prospects of a genuine settlement
with the Nazis. He had felt the full force of Goebbels. To Eden
this man must have been the personification of all that was most
extreme and sinister in National Socialism. The Opposition
might gain points for a while, but how could one arbitrate with
Goebbels when Goebbels by every act and statement rejected
arbitration as a principle of State policy?

Some such considerations must have been at the back of
Eden's mind when in a by-election speech at Skipton he made
a powerful effort to stem the tide of public feeling that was ris-
ing against the Government. "However much we may deplore
Germany's action this is no occasion," he said, "for alarmist
language, still less for the scaremongering which has been in-
dulged in in certain quarters during the last few weeks." The
situation could assuredly be redeemed, but to do so they must
keep their heads and their engagements. A campaign was being
fostered, principally by Lord Beaverbrook, against Locarno,
but Locarno was still "one of the most effective instruments for
Peace in Europe." No doubt this passage was for German con-
sumption; at least it showed a ready understanding of the direc-

PROGRESS IN LOST CAUSES 87

tlon in which Germany was heading. Eden developed the point.
No British Government was "blindly fettered" to Locarno, but
it meant certain precise obligations. "Some people seem to
imagine," he added, "that if they were furnished with some
means of escape from wiiat they are pleased to call the commit-
ments of Locarno they would then be less likely to be involved
in a European war; but the very opposite is, of course, the
truth." We could not avoid another war simply by saying that
in no circumstances would we go to the aid of a power unjustly
attacked. Great Britain is a Great Power with the responsibili-
ties of a Great Power and if we fail to discharge them we shall
invite the disaster which will follow.

CHAPTER 12

LORD PRIVY SEAL AT LARGE

JANUARY 1st, 1934, found Eden the recipient of a for-
midable New Year Honour. He was promoted to the
J free-lance post of Lord Privy Seal one of two offices
wMch Baldwin had kept warm by reserving it to himself and
which lie could accordingly present to anyone for conversion to
any use. The Times Parliamentary Correspondent noted that
"the appointment was received with approval by all sections of
the House. He has made no enemies and many friends." The
truth is that his work at Geneva had brought him an immense
personal prestige in Parliament. Hard on his appointment came
the news of a German note to France reiterating her minimum
demands a short service army of 300,000 men and adequate
"defensive" weapons. These went far beyond our Draft Con-
vention and it was clear that France would reject them out of
hand. The Government came to the conclusion that a new dec-
laration of British policy was urgently needed, so it produced a
Memorandum with its revised views on Disarmament.

This Memorandum was subtle in its compromise. It did not
save Disarmament but it made Eden. On 6th February Sir
John Simon explained the Memorandum, and in doing so an-
nounced that as a means of turning it to the best account the
Lord Privy Seal would as soon as possible visit Paris, Rome
and Berlin in order to explain the British point of view, and to
find out by direct contact the reactions of the other Govern-
ments to the Memorandum.

Eden left for his first grand tour on 1 6th February. He was
entering a bloodstained, infuriated Europe. But a week before,
fifteen people had been killed and over two hundred wounded

88

LORD PRIVY SEAL AT LARGE 89

in the Place de la Concorde. The financial scandals associated
with the name of Stavisky had caused the downfall of two Gov-
ernments. Daladier's handling of the situation had brought
France to the verge of anarchy. In this perilous situation the
French President had called upon the aged Gaston Doumergue,
himself a former President, to provide the semblance of unity
for the immediate requirements of law and order. In Austria the
pocket Dictator Dollf uss had outraged the opinion of the world
by his savage overthrow of the Democratic Republic. For three
days and nights howitzers and machine guns, field guns and
trench mortars fired into the Karl Marx Hof . A conservative
estimate of the slaughter between 12th and 15th February puts
the dead at one thousand and the wounded at five thousand.
Thus did the Heimwehr maintain Its sovereignty. Thus did the
virus of Fascism spread to the dreamy city of Vienna. In this
atmosphere of hatred, revenge and summary execution, Eden
on Disarmament was a voice in the wilderness.

He spent three days in Paris, but the tension was not suffi-
ciently relaxed to admit of a detailed exchange of view with the
responsible ministers. It was agreed that Eden should return to
Paris after his visits to Berlin and Rome, for there were the
perils of further disorder in Austria. Germany was watching
every move in the situation.

Eden arrived in Berlin on 20th February and there were
meetings straight away. First of all Eden, with Sir Eric Phipps,
the British Ambassador in Berlin, met Neurath and Blomberg.
Neither of these men were Nazi Party Members, though both
believed from their specialised standpoints Foreign Office
and Army that National Socialism was an absolute necessity
for Germany. Both were sincere in their admiration of the dic-
tatorship and the dictator. All through Neurath proved himself
a courteous and rational negotiator. On the other hand it must
have been clear to Eden when the interview with Hitler began
that everything was subordinated to the will and temperament
of this incalculable man.

It was the first personal contact Hitler had made with an

90 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

important representative of a Great Power. Eden was thus at
this moment an essential factor in Hitler's prestige. But three
weeks before, German diplomacy had secured its first great
diplomatic success the ten-year military Pact with Pilsudskf s
Poland. Rumour well founded, too asserted that Pilsudski
had given Hitler twenty-four hours to sign that Pact, and that
Polish troops had been massed on the German frontier.

But if the young British Ambassador of Peace knew rather
more about the circumstances of Hitler's first diplomatic ven-
ture than was convenient, he did not allow Ms knowledge to do
anything other than confirm his belief in the sincerity of Hitler's
desire for appeasement. Speaking formally and on behalf of his
Government, Eden had to put before Hitler two unpalatable
proposals: first, that the Germans should have no military air-
craft for two years, and secondly that they should consent to
return to Geneva. Finally Eden had to ask about the proposed
ten years' duration of the Disarmament Convention.

The talks were cordial. Hitler liked Eden's good manners.
This young English statesman had polish, he was suave but he
was keen. He had the essential faculty for success with Hitler;
for he could listen quietly and intelligently, supplying him with
a new theme whenever his ideas seemed to be running dry. It
was impossible to stop Hitler talking; the art was in preventing
him from becoming turgid. The Times reported that "Mr. Eden
and Herr Hitler appear to have got on very well together. They
find common ground in their service in the trenches which ap-
peals particularly to the German Chancellor." On 20th Febru-
ary the impression in Berlin was that the visit had been well
worth while. The rumours were that the meetings might be
prolonged. They were. On 21st February a diplomatic barrier
was broken down when Hitler took lunch at the British Em-
bassy for the first time. Neurath, Hess and Goebbels were there
as well. Yesterday's favourable impressions were maintained.

It was during this lunch that Corporal Hitler and Captain
Eden exchanged their war memoirs to the extent of working
out on the back of a menu the location of their sectors on the

LORD PRIVY SEAL AT LARGE 91

Somme. They discovered that they were opposite each other.
The informal nature of the talks was duly stressed, but they
were prolonged for another day. Finally he saw Germany's
grand old man the President, Hindenburg feeble and re-
signed to the strange events that surged dimly round him. By
August he was dead, and Hitler with a brusque nervousness had
consigned him to Valhalla.

The Germans assured Eden that their demands were modest.
Their air force requirements were purely defensive. They still
wanted a short-term army of 300,000, but were prepared to
control the S.A. and S.S. formations and to establish their non-
military character. The Times gave a hopeful summary of the
visit. The problems did not seem quite so hard, Germany's atti-
tude was clearer. The Memorandum would serve as a basis for
further discussion. Eden had done well.

On 25th February Eden was in Rome. Once again there was
an impressive round of formal festivity, beginning with a dinner
party at the British Embassy which the French and German
Ambassadors attended, and at which the chief Italian guest was
the impassive Baron Alois!. Eden at Geneva in a mere eighteen
months was to encounter him under less favourable auspices.
But Aloisi was a professional diplomatist indignations and
felicitations came alike to him.

On the next day at 5 : 00 P.M. sharp in the flamboyant recep-
tion room at the Palazzo Venezia, Eden had his fatal meeting
with Mussolini himself. Undoubtedly Eden was meeting
Benito Mussolini in one of his most dangerous moods. A re-
orientation of policy was at the back of his mind. The addition
of Hitler to the already overcrowded list of European dictators
was involving the Duce in some fundamental decisions: if
Great Britain had any contribution to make to the store of his
ideas it was advisable for us to send over a Minister of sub-
stantive rank, not some petty fledgling whose status did not
even allow him access to the Cabinet.

For Mussolini had by now realised that the Nazis had come
to stay and even to expand. If a new Roman Empire was to

92 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

grow It would have to grow at someone's expense. The obvious
victims were Germany in Eastern Europe or Great Britain in
the Mediterranean. Should the Duce pit his fragile resources
against the New Germany or the Old England? In the light of
these formidable considerations, which from Marshal de Bono's
book on the Abyssinian War we now know were occupying him
throughout 1934, the presence of Anthony Eden with a tire-
some questionnaire on Disarmament was not calculated to take
the pout from his lips. Eden, too, was annoyed at the blatant
attempt of Italy to hold the balance between France and Ger-
many. That was Great Britain's role.

The main result of the talk with which the newspaper men
had to juggle was that Eden had decided to leave Rome a day
earlier than he had originally arranged. The Times did its best
to explain away the change of plan, and attributed the brevity
of the meeting and visit to their success. It was at pains to con-
fuse the issue by pointing out that Mussolini had "a more flex-
ible mentality" than the other dictators, but as a tribute to bare
fact it was bound also to report after the interview that Eden
"was entertained at dinner tonight by Signor Suvich instead of
Signor Mussolini." The Duce did not even bother to turn up
a more than usually specious diplomatic illness sufficed to ex-
plain Ms absence. Eden, however, actually did stay over to the
28th, had further talks with the Ambassadors, and dined at the
French Embassy. He was also received in private audience by
the Pope and had the chance of meeting his experienced Sec-
retary of State, Cardinal Pacelli.

On 1st March, Eden was back again in Paris, and this time
he was able to see Doumergue and Barthou, although he did
not succeed in wringing any satisfactory concession from them.
France was still unwilling to admit any rearming of Germany
as legal. The Italian scheme, which narrowed the duration of
the Convention from ten years to six years, was perhaps a slight
improvement on the British Memorandum, but when Eden re-
turned to London and at once saw MacDonald, Simon and
Baldwin, there was little for Mm to report but an occasional

LORD PRIVY SEAL AT LARGE 93

anecdote. It would seem that Hitler emerged from the viva voce
with the top marks, but he alone of the candidates was ineli-
gible for a prize.

When the French reply to the British Memorandum came it
was evident that Eden's effort to bridge the gulf had failed. Its
tone was stiff and formal, the exaggerated claims of Germany
to rearm did not in their view constitute a very good argument
for other Powers to disarm. Barthou was waiting for the Ger-
mans to show the mailed fist, which they duly did three days
later. An official German statement showed considerable in-
creases in the expenditure on all three arms of German defence
for the year 1934. The German Ambassador had the excuses
ready; the conversion of the Reichswehr into a short-term army
was an expensive job, as was the cost of "renovating" the Ger-
man Navy. It w^as all as Barthou had prophesied. France's
definitive answer to the British inquiries came through at once.
It was to the effect that there was now nothing to answer. The
German statement made it necessary for France to break off
negotiations, the basis of which Germany had "by its own act
destroyed."

During the next few weeks the Disarmament Committee of
the Cabinet held a number of anxious and lengthy meetings.
The agenda was, first, whether further effort should be made to
reconcile France and Germany, and, second, if not, whether
immediate steps should be taken to look to our defences. Dur-
ing these deliberations Mussolini sent over his Foreign Secre-
tary, Suvich, and Hitler his confidant, the ambitious champagne
merchant, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Suvich came first, and so
successful was he in reinforcing the Cabinet in its resolve not to
join any anti-German bloc that Ribbentrop, when he arrived,
found most of his work done for him. Suvich's easy success was
for Eden something of a rebuff, and it is about this time that
Eden and Simon began to draw apart in their public pro-
nouncements. While Simon was making "friendly inquiries"
into Japanese aggressive intentions, Eden proclaimed the need

94 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

for democracy to unite in defence of its ideals and went out of
Ms way to avoid the storm of criticism which Simon's bland
cynicism had attracted.

The Cabinet' s final decision was to do nothing until the Dis-
armament Conference met again, and when it met to listen but
not to initiate. Simon was once again accused of letting disar-
mament slide and of putting too much trust in the Japanese.
Baldwin's reply was "put your trust in the Government." But
Eden was not so sanguine, and in an address to Conservative
women this time at the Queen's Hall on Disarmament he
freely admitted that his European tour had been a failure. From
Geneva he broadcast "at no time has the outlook been as black
as it is now." To his constituents at Warwick his frank estimate
of the European situation was that "We have in no sense solved
the main difficulties/'

Then in September, Eden was broadcasting from Geneva the
hope that Russia's entry to the League would be successfully
achieved. A week later, with due solemnity, it was. Only Switz-
erland, Portugal and Holland recorded their opposition, but
this impression of slight dissent was obliterated not simply by
the support of Eden, Barthou, Benes and Madariaga who said
what was expected of them, but, significantly enough, by Aloisi
and Colonel Beck as well.

CHAPTER 13

MURDER IN MARSEILLES

A THE end of September, 1934, Eden visited Sweden and
Denmark in order to explain to these oases of democ-
racy the meaning of the new appeasement.* His "hard
work" was especially praised, and Ms success was attributed to
his method of negotiation. "He, like his hosts, is not solemn, but
cheerfully serious when he discusses serious matters." There
were serious matters to discuss, matters not on the agenda.

On the afternoon of 9th October, 1934, M. Barthou received
King Alexander of Jugoslavia at Marseilles. Conversations had
been arranged in order to confirm and develop Jugoslavia's
participation in the French system and in order to prepare the
way for the long awaited rapprochement between France and
Italy. The royal car had scarcely left Marseilles harbour when
a Croat terrorist ran out of the crowd, jumped on the running
board, fired at the King, killing Mm outright, and severely
wounding M. Barthou, who died a few hours afterwards. Once
again the peace of Europe was in the balance, and months of
patient negotiation came to nought. The assassin was proved to
be the member of a large scale terrorist organisation. He was in
possession of a Czech passport visaed in Hungary. These facts
helped to invest the situation with the utmost international
gravity.

Jugoslav-Hungarian friction was of long standing, and had
been intensified by the friendly reception given by Hungary to
Jugoslav exiles from King Alexander's dictatorsMp. There had

* Although the mission was dismissed as having no special political sig-
nificance Eden himself made a great hit in the Scandinavian countries. They
were anxious to claim him as one of their own, and a Swedish genealogist
went so far as to present him with a family tree tracing his descent from
Eric IX, King of Sweden, who died in 1160, and through Margaret, daughter
of Christian I of Denmark, and wife of James in of Scotland.

95

96 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

been numerous frontier incidents, and between March, 1929,
and March, 1934, no less than twenty cases of crimes due to
Hungary had been alleged by Jugoslavia.

None of the principal Powers concerned was prepared to
exploit the crisis to the last extremity. Eden's personal interven-
tion as rapporteur for the League turned the vague underlying
desire for peace into a concrete settlement. The whole episode
can be regarded as setting a precedent and pattern for Eden's
diplomatic techniques in arbitration which were to culminate
twenty years later at Geneva and help in bringing a war to an
end in Indo-China.

The immediate reaction in Jugoslavia was a truce between
the various party factions and the setting up of a strong Re-
gency. Both Italy and Hungary were disconcerted by the crime,
but from the beginning behaved with extreme correctness.
France too was cautious. For behind all the diplomatic pressure
Paris and Rome were bound together by a mutual fear of Ber-
lin. Italy climbed down, and in order to avoid any accusation
of harbouring Croat terrorists, left Hungary to face Jugoslavian
threats alone in the League Council. Relations, which had been
deplorable ever since the War, began to improve during 1933,
and at the beginning of January, 1934, a commercial treaty
between the two nations had actually been signed. But then the
old suspicions began to develop again.

In November, Jugoslavia invoked Article XI in strong terms.
The Hungarians replied at once through Eckhardt, their dele-
gate to the Assembly. He agreed with Jugoslavia that peace was
in danger, but the responsibility for the state of tension lay with
the Jugoslav Government and Press.

In an atmosphere of bitter invective if well prepared prolix-
ity, Anthony Eden's plea was that the discussion should be
limited to the actual subject on the agenda and that all griev-
ances not strictly relevant to it should be excluded. This sane
and matter-of-fact attitude led to his appointment, amid gen-
eral acclamation and without noticeable objection from the
protagonists, as rapporteur. So intense were the discussions of

MURDER IN MARSEILLES 97

detail and policy, right and wrong, that Eden was the self-same
evening in a position to put before colleagues at a further meet-
ing of the Council the draft of a resolution to cover every aspect
of the dispute.

This resolution is in many ways the high-water mark of
League arbitration.

Those who are sceptical of the resources of diplomacy
should ponder over the terms of the settlement. Although Eden
called the Hungarian Government to order he levels no clear-
cut accusation against it, nor does he suggest its acquiescence
in any procedure incompatible with national sovereignty. The
Survey of International Affairs for 1934 stresses the "notable
contrast offered here to the Austro-Hungarian Government's
ultimatum of 23rd July, 1914" the outcome of similar cir-
cumstances "but in which the plaintiff of the day had not only
formulated his own accusation against the defendant, but had
insisted on Ms own representatives taking part in judicial inves-
tigations on the plaintiff's territory." The outcome of Eden's
mediation was a formula "acceptable to Hungary at the same
time comprising other features which commended it to Jugo-
slavia."

Thanks to Mr. Eden's tact and Herr Hitler's shadow, the
resolution was adopted unanimously by the members of the
Council, including the parties concerned. Actually in Budapest
and Belgrade alike the settlement was accorded a sincere wel-
come, and Eden accorded praise in terms usually associated
with military glory.

But this is not all, for at the very time that Eden was recon-
ciling Belgrade with Budapest over Marseilles, he was doing
the same with Berlin and Paris over the Saar. In the historic
Saar plebiscite the decisive initiative at the decisive hour rested
with him.

As the time for the plebiscite drew nearer, uneasiness in
Europe spread. It was one of the problems the Allies had
shelved, not from any deep conviction that time would solve it,

98 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

but because French economic interest and political pretension
were so deeply ingrained as to defy compromise. Hitler identi-
fied the return of the Saar with the removal of the one obstacle
to Franco-German reconciliation. He said so in his broadcast
speech when Germany left the League. The following month
he made a formal request to the French Ambassador for the
return of the territory. He returned to the attack in his speech
to the Reichstag on 30th January, 1934.

For France there were innumerable difficulties. It was alien
to her security to make arrangements outside the framework of
the League, while the behaviour of local Nazis gave grounds for
legitimate concern and caution. The painstaking impartiality of
Mr. Knox, the High Commissioner, was converted by an even
more painstaking German propaganda into a regime of terror.
On the whole the French were not in the mood to make gener-
ous concessions. One of Barthou's last public acts was to stress
in a speech to the Council, France's "exceptional interest" in
and "special responsibilities" for the Saar.

In this atmosphere the British Government was instinctively
cautious and detached. The French attitude might be "entirely
proper" but the contingencies feared were not likely to arise
"they did not therefore propose at present to take any special
action in the matter."

It was from Laval, Barthou's successor, that the first signs
of conciliation from either side came. He asked that the duty of
keeping order should be assigned to international contingents,
and suggested that France would willingly agree not to send
one if Germany would do the same.

The British response was immediate. Eden, as the British
delegate, dismissed all former inhibitions, and stated beyond
doubt that if the Council thought an international force in the
Saar was desirable, the United Kingdom Government would be
prepared to co-operate, "because of their wish to make a posi-
tive contribution to the discharge of the responsibility which all
(hose present shared as members of the League of Nations.'*
Whatever motives may have prompted the British Government

MURDER IN MARSEILLES 99

to this volte-face, whether they were Mr. Knox's forebodings,
Laval's conciliations or Germany's strong right arm, the world
reaction was most formidable. Britain, it seemed, was aware
that isolation was not enough, and a new and forceful leader in
the person of Anthony Eden was to lead the First Crusade for
international order and justice.

Eden's reputation w r as embarrassed by the disclosure that the
British decision had been taken at a full meeting of the Cabinet
some time before, when it unanimously agreed to let Eden
make the proposal if he thought fit. Eden had had an interview
with Knox at Geneva and was so impressed with the urgency of
the situation that he pressed the Government for its final con-
sent. Never before had a contingent of the British army crossed
the Channel to play the role of a police escort, to protect life
and not to destroy it.

For Eden, 1934 closed with high prospects and a soaring
prestige. As for the Saar it had done something to vindicate the
Treaty of Versailles, the work of international commissions
and the potentialities of the new diplomacy.

If Hitler's claim that the Saar was the one outstanding ques-
tion between France and Germany was valid, was it too much
to suggest that the New Year of 1935 would herald Peace and
Goodwill in the West?

But the progress was illusory: there was to be no respite.
From January, 1935, Eden's career was to be caught up in the
tragic progression of events that led to the second world con-
flict in our time. Set against the widening shadow of German
rearmament, the Abyssinian aggression, the Rhineland occupa-
tion and the War in Spain were the three great diplomatic issues
of the immediate future. Although the final outcome has been
firmly defined by Churchill as the "unnecessary war," in all
these particular crises Eden never had a full initiative. He never
commanded a united opinion, a united Cabinet and a complete
authority over foreign affairs at one and the same time. When
public opinion was in fact, and the Cabinet nominally, behind
him, he was either a subordinate or a partner; when the Cabinet

100 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

was In fact behind him over the abandonment of Sanctions,
public opinion wanted him to resign; when he wanted firm
guarantees from Mussolini, the Cabinet forced him to resign.
He arrived too late on the scene to take opinion and authority
by the scruff of the neck and force the world situation into his
own ways of thinking.

The tragedy begins with Laval's effort to follow up Barthou's
work in Eastern Europe and his own success with the Saar, by
a visit to Rome. It was clear that Laval had identified the pres-
tige of himself and of the new Flandin administration with a
Franco-Italian settlement of outstanding questions; it was less
clear how the one outstanding question that really mattered, the
tension on the frontier between Abyssinia and Italian Somali-
land was to be settled. If Mussolini meant to manipulate a war
with Haile Selassie, it was difficult to see how France could
acquiesce short of a complete reorientation of her foreign
policy. A threat to a weak state in Africa was by definition at
Geneva a threat to a weak state in Europe; a threat to a weak
state in Europe was by definition at the Quai d'Orsay $n attack
on the French system of security by re-insurance.

Laval, however, was prepared to take this logical risk for the
substance of a quick, short-term Roman triumph. The strain
put on Franco-Italian relations after the murder of King Alex-
ander, the obvious implication of the Italian Government in
that crime, called for drastic remedy. It would have been satis-
factory to discuss the whole question of appeasement in the
Danube basin and Central Europe. But the Italians were re-
solved to limit the agenda for the present to colonies and
Austria. Had not Mussolini kept the peace of Europe by guar-
anteeing Austrian independence and mobilising a quarter of a
million men on the Brenner Pass when the Nazis murdered
Dollfuss?

On 3rd January, the day before Laval's arrival in Rome, in
view of the sinister secrecy of the Italians, Abyssinia had
appealed to the League under Article XI of the Covenant.

MURDER IN MARSEILLES 101

Efforts were at once made to persuade Abyssinia to suspend
her appeal. Laval was angry; nothing could have been more
Ill-timed than this appeal. His mind was hardening against the
infuriating rigidity of League procedure. Mussolini was angry.
Laval's efforts to adjust France's Libyan frontier were so much
chicanery. The Duce is reported to have said that he was no
collector of deserts. But although Laval's reception was cool
and the final rejoicings artificial, the real business was appar-
ently done at a reception held by the French Ambassador, at
the Farnese Palace.

There were all the outward appearances of success, but very
little was really granted. Mussolini had deferred most of the
problems; he promised more bayonets on the Brenner; but the
Anschluss crisis had already died down. From the French point
of view at the time, the Duce had not gained fnuch, a few miles
of sand near Libya not far from Lake Tchad, the small island
of Dommira opposite Perim making possible the control of the
outlets to the Red Sea towards the Indian Ocean, and finally a
share in the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, the only motor road
from Abyssinia to the Red Sea. "So it came about that the
agreements of Rome hastened the realisation of Mussolini's
imperialistic dream."

Anthony Eden was speaking at Edinburgh in the New Year.
Success bred confidence and confidence bold words. Arising
out of the Franco-Italian agreement he let it be known that
"balance of power is no longer British policy, ours is League

policy Those who scoffed at the Saar have been shaken and

I almost said silenced; but It is impossible that Lord Beaver-
brook and silence could be on more than nodding acquaint-
ance." He ended up with the hope that 1935 would see the
success of disarmament. Laval's success in Rome was followed
by his talks in London and the publication of the communique
foreshadowing a Western Air Pact. It was agreed that Simon
and Eden should go to Berlin to explain and explore the Pact's
possibilities with Hitler who was alleged to be interested.

The disenchantment was not long in coming. The publica-

102 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

tion of the first major British White Paper on Defence without
any accompanying assurance as to the Policy it was supposed
to defend at once caused Hitler to contract a sore throat.

Then the decision was taken by France after anxious debate
and ample excuse, to lengthen army service to two years, a year
before schedule. The technical reason was that France was
entering upon the lean years. Enlistment quotas were bound to
fall between 1935 and 1939. It was necessary to forestall this
inevitable calamity.

Hitler announced the existence of a German Air Force and
inaugurated conscription. Surely this was more than British
complacence could condone. It was not. Actually he had
merely shocked the world by giving public validity to a secret
the world shared.

Notes passed between London and Berlin, assurances were
exchanged and Eden declared that "in the work that lies ahead
of us in the capitals of Europe, our faith in the collective peace
system must play a prominent part." At last it was possible to
announce that the arrangements for the visit to Berlin were to
stand, but that out of deference to French feelings Eden would
cross the Channel in advance of Simon and meet French and
Italian representatives in Paris first.

By the time this courtesy call had been carried out France
and Italy had sent in yet another of their stern protests to Berlin
against the unilateral repudiation of treaties, while Sir John in
a crowded and anxious House made a statement precise but
wholly uncommunicative. Old George Lansbury pleaded that
the peoples of the world asked only for peace and that this was
the most anxious week since August, 1914. Mr. Maxton and
Colonel Gretton, diehards of the Left and Right, who ironically
enough sat next to each other in the Commons, both agreed
from their respective viewpoints that the visit of the Foreign
Secretary and Lord Privy Seal to Berlin was so much waste of
time. All through, Mr. Baldwin's feet were upon the dispatch
box; his eyes were shut. He symbolised benevolent and tired
neutrality.

CHAPTER 14

GRAND TOURS

SIMON and Eden were in Berlin by 24th March, and the
conversations with the Fiihrer took place on the follow-
ing two days. Failure was writ large over the closing
communique issued for the information of the world. Hitler in
one of his more difficult moods had left the British ministers
speechless with a series of direct and sweeping demands. He
held out no hope of reconciliation.

Hitler acted through Ms nerves rather than his brain, and
Simon at once got on his nerves. Eden held little more than a
watching brief, but what he saw must have convinced him that
compromise and good faith flew out of Berlin when Hitler
knocked at the door and received admittance. They met two
Fiihrers, the one blustering, speaking to his guests in his harsh
guttural voice as though to a meeting of a million Nazis, the
other after supper silently sobbing to the strains of the Moon-
light Sonata as rendered in a dimly lit drawing room, by the
incomparable Backhaus.

Eden sat awkwardly tapping his knee during both of these
manifestations. Simon came straight home, and on 28th March
was forced to admit in Parliament that "all the topics men-
tioned in the London communique of 3rd February had been
brought under discussion" and that "considerable divergence
of opinion between the two Governments was revealed by the
conversations." Hitler had refused the Eastern Locarno with
its multilateral guarantees, was not prepared to have anything
to do with Moscow. He could not contemplate Lithuania in
any non-aggression pact. His armament demands were what
the experts had guessed they would be after the conscription
decree. The only definitions that he saw as having any hope

103

104 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

for the future were his acceptance of air parity with France
and Germany, and Ms contentment with a 35 to a 100 ratio
with the British Navy. He then staggered the Ministries by
blandly advising that air parity with Britain had already been
achieved by Germany. It was decided that if it was logical for
Sir John to return at once and let the Cabinet know the worst,
it was equally logical for Anthony Eden to go deeper into this
turbulent Europe.

Thus it fell to the lot of Eden to undertake his first major
voyage of diplomatic discovery between the wars. On the
evening of 26th March he left Berlin in a special eastward
bound train and by the evening of the following day had crossed
the frontiers of the Soviet Union. He was accompanied by
M. Maisky, the astute ambassador to the Court of St. James,
and arrived with him in Moscow on the 28th in time for a
conversation that afternoon with Litvinov and for a reception
in his honour the same evening.

The atmosphere of these Moscow conversations has been
portrayed by Douglas Reed in his study of Europe's neurosis,
Insanity Fair. Reed's position in his capacity as journalist was
as much exploratory as Eden's was at the political level. For
Reed was the first Times representative to get nearer to Red
Russia on his paper's authority than Riga; while as for Eden
no Conservative politician since the Revolution had got nearer
to Moscow than Geneva. History was made on the evening of
the 28th March, 1935, when Maxim Litvinov, the Bolshevist,
proposed the toast of His Britannic Majesty King George V,
and Anthony Eden, of Eton and Christ Church, replied by
raising his glass to Lenin of immortal memory. Litvinov led off
with a quotation from Sir Austen Chamberlain to the effect that
friendship between theU.S.S.R. and Great Britain was essential
for the preservation of peace and he invoked the plan for the
Western Air Pact.

Eden's reply was cordial and confident. With the usual reser-
vation that the visit was exploratory and not executive, he
affirmed that British policy was based on the League, that the

GRAND TOURS 105

essence of the League was Its universal influence and that
accordingly Russia's adherence to it was a great gain to the
League. Peace was everyone's objective. The next day Anthony
Eden was taken into the recesses of the Kremlin to meet Joseph
Stalin. There were present in addition to Stalin and Eden,
Kresinsky, Maisky, Molotov and Litvinov, who acted as inter-
preter, Lord Chilston, British Ambassador in Moscow, and
Strang of the Foreign Office, who took down what was said
during the whole of Eden's tour in what is reputed to be the
fastest of all longhands. The papers noted that the visitors were
deeply impressed by Stalin's knowledge of world affairs.

The same evening The Times describes how a scene "incon-
ceivable not long ago was witnessed at the Moscow Grand
Opera . . , when the Lord Privy Seal of Great Britain was
applauded long and warmly by an entirely proletarian audience
which clapped enthusiastically as God Save the King was
played. Then followed the Internationale!' Eden, Chilston,
members of the British Embassy staff, the Litvinovs and Maisky
were among a big party that sat in front of the former Imperial
box, "while the proletarian audience intently watched a superb
production of the ballet Le Lac des Cygnes"

The key sentence in the long communique issued at the end
of Eden's visit was that "there is at present no conflict of inter-
est between the British and Soviet Governments on any one of
the main issues of international policy." When Eden arrived he
found the traditional hatred lending itself to the belief that
England was the origin of every threat to Russian frontiers; but
according to the Survey of International Affairs, perhaps the
most important result of his visit "was to diminish, if not com-
pletely to dissipate those suspicions of British aims." In simpler
terms it was as Reed puts it, "Russia does not want anything
England has, Germany does."

Reed's last impression of the visit is Moscow station, "where
the drab and silent crowds had gathered again. The Union Jack
and Soviet banners remained affectionately linked. We all
shook hands and boarded the train. Litvinov took leave of Eden

106 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

with the words, *I wish you all success, for your success will be
our success now!' "

The Grand Tour continued. On the evening of 1st April
Eden was in Warsaw not only the geographical but also the
political Clapham Junction of Europe and he stayed there
until the evening of the 3rd. He met the aged and dying Pilsud-
ski, who had hacked the new Poland into shape out of the
chaotic ruin of the war, and the Foreign Minister, Colonel
Beck, on whom were to fall major decisions of peace and war
four years later. When Eden got to Warsaw he found the diplo-
matic atmosphere chilly. Splendid receptions, photographs of
our handsome minister with the glamorous Madame Beck, did
not make up for a noticeable absence of positive results.

At Prague, Eden had a more encouraging encounter. Here
was another father of his people in President Masaryk, and
another dominant controller of foreign affairs in Dr. Benes.
Geography made clearer demands upon them, and Benes was
genuine in his hopes that more would be heard of the Eastern
Locarno at the forthcoming Stresa Conference. For at Stresa
Eden's experiences were to be collated and the Allied Powers
to work out the policy that would convey to Hitler the urgent
need for peace. No doubt Benes, as he waved goodbye to his
guests from the aerodrome, was also genuine in his hope that
Eden would be the British delegate when the time came for
the statesmen to gather in secret yet grandiose conclave on the
tiny island Isola Bella.

But the aeroplane with Eden on board shortly after leaving
Leipzig for Cologne ran into a storm of tropical violence over
the Black Mountains. According to Reed, who was also on
board, it was "a foul trip, the worst I ever made. . . . We flew
into thick cloud and then suddenly snow was beating about us,
and the machine was thrown here and there and let down with
a bump into a deep void and then again rocketed upwards and
given a smack on one wing and a smack on the other, and a
bang on the solar plexus and a kidney punch that sent the tail
spinning round. I knew," he adds, "that we were flying over

GRAND TOURS 107

wooded and mountainous country with no hope of a forced
landing." When they landed at Cologne the flight had to be
abandoned, but by then Eden, already exhausted by the rash
from capital to capital, the endless dispatches and receptions,
had broken down, was ill and ordered by Ms doctors to take
a complete rest from world politics for several weeks.

So Stresa was deprived of the one man who could have given
Its deliberations perspective. Without Eden at Stresa, the
senior statesmen of France and Great Britain, presided over by
Mussolini, lapsed into the old negations, and Eden's visits were
material only for Eden's autobiography. Undoubtedly he had
gathered together unique personal experience. At thirty-seven
he was the most travelled member of the British Government.
He had met more European leaders than the whole Cabinet
lumped together. He has always been reserved over his tours.
One friend recalls visiting him at Ms nursing-home and advising
Mm to keep a record of Ms impressions wMch he said would
be far more interesting to posterity than the failure or success
of fleeting policies. Eden agreed, and added apparently that he
had formed no high opinion of Stalin. "He offered me a ciga-
rette/' said Eden, "with the same sort of smile as he would
employ in sending a man to Ms execution!"

The Conference settled notMng. There was a general impres-
sion that Messrs. Mussolini, Flandin, Laval, MacDonald and
Simon could not have spent so many hours in guarded discus-
sions unless there was sometMng more to it all than the mere
communique* It was noted that among the Foreign Office staff
in attendance was an expert on Abyssinian affairs.

When Simon returned he was at once questioned in Parlia-
ment, and did his best to silence criticism with a sprightly half-
truth. "The Italo-EtMopian dispute was never on the agenda
of the Stresa Conference, and the subject was not discussed
there," was Ms reply. The next day Eden tried to clear up the
confusion caused by this categorical assertion. Reports were
current that Mussolini had been willing to raise the whole
question of Abyssinia and the Parliamentary Opposition was

108 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

able to make much of the point that, if the British delegates
deliberately refrained from mentioning it, Mussolini might well
have grounds for believing that we were in the circumstances
condoning his aggression by our silence.

On 31st May came one of the first signs that Eden's active
internationalism was marking him out for the special invective
of the dictatorial Press. The Tevere, the most Anglophobe of
all Mussolini's papers, began to make offensive references to
Eden's dress sense and to identify Mm as the special enemy of
Italy. It was roused to anger by the rumours of British hostility
to an Italian adventure in Abyssinia. "This," commented The
Times correspondent in Rome, "is the first really serious diverg-
ence in policy between Britain and Italy since Italy became a
united kingdom." The Tevere was the paper which, during the
height of the Abyssinian crisis, picked out one of the militant
full-page advertisements of the British Israelites as a typical
example of Fleet Street's editorial opinion. Eden himself was
soon to be subjected to criticisms of the same apocryphal char-
acter. The British Embassy was soon making a regular trek to
protest to the relevant Italian officials, and receiving equally
regular promises that the matters raised would be duly exam-
ined.

It was clear that by now Italy was well set on winning back
German friendship. However much the two Dictators may have
disliked each other after their first disastrous meeting at Venice,
they had been able sufficiently to set aside personal prejudice in
order to produce a paper plan allowing both Italy and Germany
spheres of interest that would not clash.

Whitehall with almost desperate determination set its official
mind to breaking the axis before the steel hardened. So we
rushed to Stresa in order to denounce and consider Germany's
unilateral repudiation of treaties. Then we hurried back from
Stresa to enter into the Anglo-German naval agreement itself
as gross a violation of the spirit if not the letter of our pledged
word as any since the war.

If the realism of this move pleased the permanent officials,

GRAND TOURS 109

it certainly did not commend itself to Hie great mass of the elec-
torate, and it finally undermined Simon's position as interpreter
of the honesty of Britain's intentions, and put Mm at the head
of those on the list for Cabinet transfer.

Two of Simon's final and characteristic acts as Foreign Sec-
retary 7 were to send Anthony Eden to explain away the Anglo-
German naval treaty to France, and to compensate Mussolini
in East Africa. Naturally enough Eden was not well received
either in Paris or Rome. That he was able to put up a show at
all argues much for the elasticity of his conversational tech-
nique. For on this occasion not only did Eden have to suffer
Laval's peasant irony but also Mussolini's theatrical wrath. It
was one of the unhappiest moments of his diplomatic career.
He w r as taking to Rome considerable concessions. Abyssinia
was to cede to Italy a portion of the Ogaden and to receive from
Great Britain an outlet to the sea at Zeila, in British Somali-
land, together with a corridor, fifty miles long, HnMng the port
to the Abyssinian hinterland. All Great Britain was asking,
if these terms were acceptable, w T as the retention of certain
specified grazing rights. Ogaden w r as the literal casus belli.
It was reasonable to expect that Mussolini might be prepared
to negotiate. He was not.

Between the 24th and 26th June, Eden had seen the Duce
for the last time, and it was a brusque farewell. The terms were
rejected out of hand. Eden, without in any way competing with
his father's temper, did not allow Mussolini to have a monopoly
over wrath. When questioned as to what the British Govern-
ment's reactions would be to a comprehensive military cam-
paign by Italy, he is reported to have said that in that case the
Suez would be no longer available for Italian troopships. An
imaginative journalist has caught the atmosphere in which the
interview was held by attributing to Eden the remark immedi-
ately afterwards that "he treated me as though I had stolen
something!" Mussolini went on with his scorching oratory. At
Cagliari it was, "We have old and new accounts to settle
we will settle them." At Sassari he denounced foreign public

110 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

opinion as a "ridiculous puppet that would be burnt up by the
zeal of the Blackshirts," and as soon as Eden had gone, at Eboli
he spoke of "the revolutionary people of Italy" who had "irrev-
ocably decided" to carry the struggle to its conclusion.

It was to the rumbling of Italian thunder that the long
expected Cabinet reshuffle took place. MacDonald, weary and
ineffective, made way for Baldwin as Prime Minister. Baldwin
thereupon removed Simon from the storm-centre to the com-
parative security of the Home Office, and appointed Sir Samuel
Hoare to take his place. At the same time Anthony Eden,
whom many felt to have staked the higher claim for the Foreign
Secretaryship, was promoted to the Cabinet without portfolio;
but in response to Baldwin's double thinking and shrewd elec-
toral sense he was to be nicknamed "Minister for League of
Nations Affairs." Nobody questioned this decision; the only
criticism was that Eden was not adequately rewarded.

At what, for British Conservatism, was the absurd and child-
ish age of thirty-seven, Anthony Eden was a Cabinet Minister
with a status that had no precedent and opportunities that were
boundless. In some ways his promotion had outstripped his
personal achievement. He filled a need, he was available.

He was becoming the symbol and embodiment of aspirations
not always clearly expressed or understood, of the anxious
millions in the world between the wars. A Spectator profile of
him published a week before the reshuffle made this point by
saying, "In these last three years when with each month the
international situation has worsened and the prospects of dis-
armament have become increasingly remote, and Europe is
once again as it was in 1914, an armed camp, one man has
stood out with courage and consistency for the translation of
ideals of the post-war peace system into realities. ... At thirty-
seven he has won a position for himself abroad and in his own
country that no man of comparable age has achieved in our
time."

Eden's promotion to the Cabinet, then, occasioned no sur-

GRAND TOURS HI

prise while the complexity of the international situation sug-
gested the need for some special reinforcement of the Foreign
Office. That Sir Samuel Hoare and Eden should be called upon
to exercise what almost amounted to parallel authority over our
foreign policy gave widespread satisfaction. There might be
loose ends in the arrangement; but the personal qualities of the
two men, it was felt, would overcome all technical difficulties
and objections.

On 7th June, Hoare made his first speech as Foreign Secre-
tary. It was a calm and well-arranged effort, which gave full
credit to Italy's need for expansion, but it met with no response
from Rome. There is an important footnote in the Survey which
draws attention to the date of this speech, and suggests that
"it should be borne in mind, with reference to the sequel, by
any student of international affairs who is concerned to take
a just view of persons as well as a balanced view of events."
This impartial commentary asserts that, if Sir Samuel Hoare
had cared to make his own apologia at the expense of a col-
league, he might have argued with considerable force that the
diplomatic battle had already been lost for him before he was
asked by Mr. Baldwin to do his bast to win it.* The same con-
sideration applied with equal force to Eden but by the end of
May Eden had been successful in working out the Council
Resolutions which had led Mussolini to accept the semblance
of arbitration and in doing so to convert the Abyssinian dispute
into an avowed international question. This was a real achieve-
ment.

But sniping from various quarters persisted. There were
warnings of the dangers of amateur diplomacy from Parliament
and lack of will from the Press. Perhaps the most effective sortie
against the Government was by Churchill on the dangers of
diarchy. Were Eden and Hoare really in double harness, or
were they spokesmen of rival and incompatible aims? The
Anglo-German Naval Pact which had been cited in the argu-
ment was not in its essentials either anti-Stresa or anti-League,

* Survey of International Affairs, 1935, Vol. II. Page 16L

112 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

was Eden's thesis. As for the visit to Mussolini: "Nothing was
further from the mind of the Government than to go behind
the backs of anyone." According to The Times, "this speech
had a great success."

It was, however, through the League of Nations Union that
there was the greatest impact with public opinion. During the
spring Lord Cecil had been organising his monumental Peace
Ballot. It was an all-embracing questionnaire. It asked for
"Yes" and "No" answers to questions demanding three-hour
essays in reply; but the response was overwhelming; the organ-
isation it entailed and the voluntary help it received made it
the greatest probe into public opinion hitherto attempted.
It preceded opinion survey by sample.

The sponsors of the Peace Ballot were very soon to find their
own Sir Galahad in Anthony Eden, but at no stage during its
national campaigning did he give it the slightest encourage-
ment. Indeed, there are strong grounds for believing that he
shared the view of The Times, and until a very late stage in the
proceedings was actively hostile to it. Perhaps he disliked it
for its attempt to over-simplify what he, above all men, knew to
be a complex issue, and thus for leading the British electorate
into a facile optimism contrary to its own shrewd and cautious
instincts. Whatever motives may have been in Eden's mind,
beyond receiving Cecil and his collaborators in company with
Baldwin and Hoare, and at Hoare's express request, he played
no part in the general rejoicings, and was given a hero-lead he
never sought.

B

CHAPTER 15

ABYSSINIA TEST CASE

Y THE end of July the arbitrators In the Abyssinian dis-
pute had made no appreciable headway. Abyssinia
claimed that it was the Council's duty to unravel the
knots at its forthcoming meeting. Italy made reservations which
were duly accepted, and the Italian representative, Aloisi, duly
took his place at the Council table. There followed three days
of protracted and difficult negotiation, in which Laval and
Eden, working closely together, were the dominating personal-
ities. Their work ended in a compromise embodied in a couple
of League resolutions and a Three-Power declaration.

On 4th August, Eden broadcast from Geneva on the decision
of Great Britain, France and Italy to negotiate direct over the
Abyssinian question. The League, he declared, may not prevent
all wars, but it gives arbitration a good chance. The dispute, he
added, must be settled by 4th September or the consequences
would be serious. The Italian Press at once attacked this speech,
and inferred from it the threat of sanctions.

The Three-Power Conference convened in Paris on 15th
August. Eden arrived on the 13th for talks with Laval and the
Abyssinian representative, Tecle Hawariate. When Aloisi
arrived he had no instructions to formulate his demand nor
would he give any guarantees. Eden and Laval accordingly
decided there was nothing for it but for Great Britain and
France to produce a plan which Rome could either or reject.
This plan was at once sent to Rome. Mussolini's reply arrived
on the 18th, and was in effect a definite refusal even to discuss
the suggestions put forward for consideration. A communique
was issued, and the Conference indefinitely adjourned. With
the summary breakdown of the Paris Conference went the last

113

114 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

hope of a peaceful settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.

What was the policy of Great Britain and France on and
after 4th September? During this crucial fortnight no lead was
given either in Paris or London. There was a Cabinet meeting
in Downing Street on 22nd August, but the hopes raised by the
news that the Prime Minister regarded the situation as suffi-
ciently serious to interrupt his colleagues' holiday were dis-
appointed by the negative results of their deliberations. We
were prepared to do what everyone else was prepared to do;
it was in fact for Estonia and Ecuador to tell us rather than us
to tell Estonia and Ecuador. Collective security had always
roused the British Government to the chivalry of "After you."
Hoare warned us all against rashness. "It was easy," he had
said on the 1st August, and "perhaps tempting to jump into the
arena impetuously, throw down the glove and challenge anyone
who disagreed to fight. Supposing, however, that that attitude
would destroy for years the basis of international co-operation;
supposing the result of that action would cripple the League
for a generation to come/'

The result was that Eden set out for Paris prior to the fateful
meeting of the Council on 4th September with no instructions
and little scope for initiative in so far as he was representative
of a Government that had simply come to no considered con-
clusion on the next move. The Times had a first leader, "Mr.
Eden Sets Out," and described how his mission was regarded
as one requiring "tact, courage and persistence," but as not
being too difficult for his undoubted skill. Hoare was also suit-
ably praised. On the 3rd, Eden dined with Baldwin at Aix
never before had Baldwin been so near to a major European
dispute.

The Italo-Ethiopian dispute was first on the agenda, and
Eden began the proceedings with his promised report on the
breakdown of the Paris talks. "It was a dramatic scene. . . . Mr.
Eden talked cheerfully with M. Litvinov." Then "Mr. Eden
began his report, reading quietly and gravely before a hushed

Kemsley Picture Service

SIR ANTHONY EDEN

DIVIDED COUNSELLORS. 29th September, 1937: Eden and
Neville Chamberlain in anxious conversation after attending a
Cabinet meeting.

Wide World Photo

GRAND ALLY. 10th January, 1941: Eden greets Harry Hopkins,
President Roosevelt's personal representative, on arrival at the
Foreign Office during his first wartime visit to London for talks
which were to culminate in the Atlantic Charter.

:'

Wide World Photo

LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION. 6th May, 1948: Churchill and Eden
leaving Northolt to attend a session of the Council of Europe at
the Hague. *

Wide World Photo

FOREIGN SECRETARY AGAIN. 29th October, 1951: For the first time
in over five years Eden reports for duty at the Foreign Office on the
Conservatives' return to power after the 1951 General Election.
In the background is the plaque in honor of an illustrious prede-
cessor, Earl Grey of Falloden.

B &>

^^^g
O 13 o S <->

PQ O GO W) O

<D g ^r g

jQ <D "^ *^ 9

Kemsley Picture Service

THE PRIME MINISTER. 6th April, 1955: Sir Anthony and Lady Eden
leaving their London residence at Carlton Gardens on the day of
his appointment to the Premiership.

ABYSSINIA TEST CASE 115

and crowded audience."* He spoke in cold precise terms.
M. Laval followed, putting rather more emphasis on concilia-
tion than the Covenant. Aloisi was next, and presented the
Council with a host of new grievances, including the quality of
the regime in Addis Ababa. Eden's appeal to Italy to use
League machinery to settle the dispute was brushed aside. Hie
French advocate, M. Jeze, who most ably represented Abys-
sinia at Geneva, followed. "It was," he declared, "a dangerous
precedent for the League to admit the criticisms of state mem-
bers about their respective internal regimes. Italy was shifting
her ground because the Walwal incident no longer served her
purposes: the issue was whether in the next few days a war of
extermination would be opened."

The next day, when M. Jeze was continuing Ms summary of
the Ethiopian case and denouncing the Italian Memorandum
with the assertion that "the Italian Government, having re-
solved to conquer and destroy Ethiopia, begins by giving
Ethiopia a bad name," Aloisi rose and left the Council room,
and was followed by the second Italian delegate, Jeze at once
asked for prompt action under Articles XV and X of the
Covenant. This dramatic scene took place in the evening, as the
Council did not meet until 7:00 P.M. During the day Eden and
the other delegates had been fully occupied in private discus-
sion. Eden gave a lunch at which his principal guest was
Colonel Beck, and Aloisi had already blandly told the Press
that Italy "put Abyssinia beyond the law."

After intense negotiation a committee of five members was
set up to make a general examination and seek a peaceful
solution of the dispute. Madariaga was made chairman. The
committee held eleven meetings between the 7th and 24th Sep-
tember, and by the 18th had evolved its scheme, but there were
developments actually while the committee was sitting which
virtually rendered decisions out of date before they had been
reached. On 8th September, Count Ciano (Mussolini's son-in-
law), Minister for Press and Propaganda, serving with the

* From The Times, 5th September, 1935.

116 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Italian Air Force in Africa, declared in an address to the
American people that Italy had decided to consider as closed
for ever the period of attempts at pacific collaboration with
Ethiopia. The next day Hitler greeted the newly-appointed
Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and exchanged addresses which
pointedly talked of community of interest between Germany
and Italy.

Then on 10th September came Mussolini's famous mass
mobilisation order, when there was to be a one-day "general
assembly of the forces of the regime." Church bells were to be
rung, sirens hooted, and drums rolled. It was against this atmos-
phere of menace and bluster and on the self-same day that
M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare had a private conversation in
Geneva. "At the time," comments The Survey, "the Laval-
Hoare consultations of 10th September attracted little public
attention, since their purport was not divulged and no hint was
given of their actual importance; whereas the imagination of
the public was caught and captivated by Sir Samuel Hoare's
immediately following pronouncement with its apparent prom-
ise of wholehearted loyalty to the League Covenant on the
British Government* s part/'

Not until 28th December did Laval divulge what took place
on 10th September. Then, speaking in the Chamber of Depu-
ties, he revealed: "I had some conversations at Geneva with
Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden. Conversations about what?
. . . We found ourselves instantaneously in agreement upon
ruling out military sanctions, not adopting any measure of
naval blockade, never contemplating the closure of the Suez
Canal in a word, ruling out everything that might lead to
war." Actually this assertion is not wholly accurate, in as far
as Sir Samuel Hoare did not commit himself to sanctions nor
to the avoidance of sanctions. He kept his hands free; but as
The Survey justly adds, "From the practical point of view, it
makes little difference whether the owner of a hand which has
done no handiwork has allowed a neighbour to tie the passively

ABYSSINIA TEST CASE 117

offending member behind Ms back, or has himself kept It
voluntarily In Ms pocket."

Laval's statement, therefore, Is In substance accurate; for
Anglo-French policy was laid down on 10th September a ln free
discussion on an equal footing/ 5 and was followed by Flandin
after Laval, and by Eden after Hoare "until the bitter end of
an unchecked war of aggression wMch reached its military ter-
mination seven months after the opening of hostilities., in a
complete military victory for the aggressor over Ms victim/ 9
Eden was present, and Eden consented to these decisions.

Sir Samuel Hoare's speech on llth September thrilled the
world. "The League stands," he said, rapping the desk in front
of him like a schoolmaster, "and my country stands with It for
the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and
particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of
unprovoked aggression."

During the month following this speech, wMch by its double
emphasis on collective action begged the very questions It
raised, Eden was busily engaged on committee and with the
endless round of lobby negotiation. But events once again were
moving too fast for him. On 2nd October, the eve of the Italian
invasion, Mussolini spoke to the assembled millions of his
people: "Make the shout of your decision fill the heavens and
gladden the hearts of the soldiers who are waiting in Africa."
When the Hague Council met on 5th October, Eden had no
illusions as to the issues at stake. In a letter to his constituents
he wrote: "The issues of the dispute are such as must pro-
foundly interest every one of us. It is not purely a question of
colonial adventure of no real importance, as has been urged in
some quarters. It is not a question of the imperialist demand
of one Power or another Power in the territory of Abyssinia or
elsewhere. It is not even just a question of peace or war in an
outlying part of the world. The real issue is whether or not the
League of Nations can prove itself an effective instrument in
this dispute, and whether its members are prepared to respect

118 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

and uphold the Covenant. . . . The present dispute is a test
case."

It was this succinct definition of the issue which no doubt was
to put Eden beyond the pale with Conservative backwoodsmen,
Empire Firsters, isolationists and Catholic intellectuals, and
social patrons of the Londonderry and Cliveden vintage and
which also rendered him suspect with the more timorous elders
in the Cabinet, among whom must be included Simon and
Chamberlain, whose support for the League at this time was
wrapped round with every possible saving clause. The Com-
mittee of Six was appointed, and the Council adopted Eden's
urgent resolution that this Committee should "get to work
almost at once tonight." Its finding was ready within ten days,
and it was simply that, "After an examination of the facts
stated above, the Committee has come to the conclusion that
the Italian Government has resorted to war in disregard of its
Covenants under Article XII of the Covenant of the League of
Nations."

On 9th October the Assembly met again, and Benes (the
President) made a long statement on procedure, envisaging the
application of Article XVI, the Sanctions article. The two
following days were devoted to a series of full-dress speeches.
Interests ranging from those of France to those of Haiti were
duly invoked. Eden called for action in the name of humanity.
"Since it is our duty to take action," he declared, "it is essential
that such action should be prompt. That is the League's respon-
sibility a responsibility based on humanity: for we cannot
forget that war is at this moment actually in progress."

The League proceeded under Benes's guidance to unfold
itself and on 1 1th September set up the Co-ordination Commit-
tee which, in its turn, set up a sub-committee better known as
the Committee of Eighteen. Both these appointments took
place on the llth, and on the same evening Eden made a
dramatic broadcast on sanctions, promising to go through with
them, pointing out that the machinery for operating them was

ABYSSINIA TEST CASE 119

ready within a week of the outbreak of war, and ending on a
note of third party etMc: "We have no quarrel with Italy."

Senhor Vasconcellos of Portugal was elected chairman both
of the Co-ordination Committee and the Committee of Eight-
een. Eden was at once rescuing him and his colleagues from
barren juridical wrangles, and putting before them the one issue
which justified their corporate existence. He proposed that the
committee should forthwith recommend that the arms embargo
(which had already virtually ensured Abyssinia's overthrow)
against Abyssinia should be raised and a ban on arms to Italy
be imposed. He urged that the list of arms should be based on
a list compiled by the United States. The next day he proposed,
under the heading of economic measures, a refusal to take
imports from Italy. He submitted that "an embargo by all
members of the League on Italian goods would cut off roughly
seventy per cent of Italy's export trade."

The next resolution he carried was that "the Governments
are invited to put in operation at once such of the measures
recommended as can be enforced without fresh legislation, and
to take all practical steps to secure that the measures recom-
mended are put into operation by 31st October, 1935. Within
ten days of the Assembly's concurrence with the findings of the
League Council, a committee consisting of fifty-two states,
members of the League, had adopted for recommendation to
all the governments with the exception of the two belligerents
and three dissenters five concrete proposals which if put into
effect would mean that the obligations under Article XVI
would have been largely brought into effect. "Notwithstanding
its incompleteness" says The Survey > "this was a remarkable
international achievement."

Eden was during this brief hour the hero of the nation. There
was a feeling in the five continents that Great Britain had pro-
duced a leader who was on more than nodding acquaintance
with international action. As a symbol of gratitude for great
services rendered to the State and to the world the Leamington

120 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Council decided to present Mm with the freedom of the bor-
ough. It was generally believed that he would not be opposed
in the general election which was imminent and which had been
largely provoked by the magnitude of his personal triumphs
following Sir Samuel Hoare's speech.

On 16th October, Viscount Snowden, in a fierce attack on
the Government at a National Liberal Club luncheon, made a
significant exception. "I think it is only fair," added this master
of invective, "to pay a warm personal tribute to Mr. Eden, who
in extremely difficult circumstances has shown great courage
and more than ordinary capacity. He has been hampered by the
lack of cordial support from his colleagues, especially when
dealing with a reluctant French Premier, and the country is
really indebted to him for his conduct of affairs thus far." A few
days later the Egyptian Nile Society added its quota of tribute
to Mr. Eden's great struggle against the aggressor.

Then on 28th October, Eden received the Freedom of Leam-
ington a fitting climax to twelve years' unbroken membership
and unstinted service to his constituency. He used the occasion
for one of his most eloquent and impressive speeches. It was
an appeal to youth and to new ideas. "It is fashionable," he
said, "for politicians to look forward to retirement to pigs,
poultry, and a pot of ale by the hearthside. I promise to allow
myself no such indulgence. ... I am convinced that we are all
moving into an era when nations will strive to understand one
another." On the same night he was speaking in Coventry on
foreign policy. There were 25,000 applications for the three
thousand seats at this meeting. His thesis was that the League
had worked as a body it had created its own momentum
it had not been forced into action by Great Britain. The impres-
sive thing was the virtual unanimity over Sanctions.

The Labour Party had the temerity to put up a candidate
against Eden at Leamington, adopting a blind member of the
Birmingham City Council. It was duly stressed, however, the
next day, when Eden was adopted, that the nomination papers
showed him to be in receipt of "influential Liberal support."

ABYSSINIA TEST CASE 121

His election campaign was little less than a triumphal progress.
Stafford Cripps, by offensive references to "Jubilee ballyhoo,"
and sinister injunctions as to the necessity for economic crisis
to herald the socialist raillenium, succeeded in supplying the
National Government with all the propaganda it needed. Eden
spoke of the disastrous consequences of returning a Socialist
party "containing men like Sir Stafford Cripps." On the one
hand he stressed his belief as always, based on personal expe-
rience that the League would emerge from the crisis stronger
than before, and on the other that there was no security in
piling up armaments.

The election passed off very quietly. Baldwin's solidity gained
the day. The plea of strength without armaments, peace with
honour, was apparently irresistible. The National-Conservative
majority was reduced, but was still invincible. There had been
no Opposition cry beyond the Cassandra warning that the right
policy was being pursued by the wrong men. Low caught the
Opposition dilemma in his cartoon of Baldwin crossing the
Rubicon. "What is the disposition of the enemy?" asks Bald-
win. "Sire," replies a member of his general staff, "the enemy
is all on our side."

The new Government, with roughly the same personnel, was
immediately at pains to give the He to these admittedly timid
suspicions. On llth November the Italian Government had
sent a note to the British Government protesting against the
gross unfairness of imposing sanctions against Italy. On 22nd
November we replied, in tones of self-conscious moral gran-
deur, that we could not discuss the specific questions raised in
the Italian note, pointing out that as we had signed the Cove-
nant we had to accept the consequences.

But the next stage in the Committee of Eighteen's delibera-
tions was the decisive oil sanction, and here came the first signs
that the dualism involved in upholding conciliation and the
Covenant was weakening our resolve. Laval had asked for a
postponement, which according to Hoare made possible a fur-
ther intensive effort to bring about a peaceful settlement. At the

122 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

end of November, Mr. Peterson, the Foreign Office expert on
Abyssinia, was sent over to Paris, not to discuss oil but to find
the formula that would be acceptable at once to the League,
Abyssinia and Italy. After about a fortnight the experts had
reached deadlock.

It was then that Sir Samuel Hoare, passing through Paris on
Ms way to Switzerland for a holiday on doctor's orders, was
inveigled into a series of conversations with Laval which cul-
minated in the notorious and ill-fated Hoare-Laval Peace Plan,
It is only fair to Sir Samuel to point out that he had on more
than one occasion hinted that the door was being left open for
some such project. The British and French Press assiduously
betrayed confidences, and there was somewhere in the French
Foreign Office a persistent leakage.

It was more than Hoare's crime it was Baldwin's blunder.
The political inertia and mental confusion of the Prime Minis-
ter during this crisis were shocking to behold. There is a legend
that the Hoare-Laval Plan arrived on Baldwin's breakfast table
written out in French, which at once led him to the comfort-
able estimate that it had Sam's approval, and that there was no
need for him to wade through it as well. There is poetic licence
in this story, but poetic insight as well. The whole tenor of
Baldwin's behaviour suggests that he had not fully acquainted
himself with the implications of Laval's attitude to Mussolini
at this decisive moment in the Abyssinian conflict. But public
opinion, which as a political force only emerges, it seems, in
spasms of disgust or delight, was outraged, and demanded a
scapegoat. The Government Whips were powerless, the Gov-
ernment press did not dare to say a word for it.

The electorate did not express itself by vociferous protest
meetings, but everyone looked at everyone else, and raised an
eyebrow which conveyed unanimously, "No!" It had voted to
the slogan of a Strong Britain for a Strong League: in both
respects this plan to partition Abyssinia by earnestly persuad-
ing the Emperor and by side-tracking Geneva was a repudia-
tion of strength. The truth is that the preparations for the Plan

ABYSSINIA TEST CASE 123

were defective and the psychology of It was bad. It was
an affront both to the Ideals and to the self-esteem of the British
people.

For Eden the dilemma must have been almost intolerable.
He was the heir to a throne that had just been taken from under
him. Fortunately for the British Government, Mussolini turned
the plan down. If he had accepted it, even as* a basis for nego-
tiations, it is difficult to see how Baldwin could have survived
the challenge. We were spared that indignity, and Baldwin did
survive but with Ms prestige battered. Hoare's personal ex-
planation was full of dignity. If the crisis had been without its
special context, and the memory of his Geneva speech had not
been so near to hand, he might well have ridden the storm.
Baldwin's contribution to the debate was disastrous. The fate
of the entire administration rested upon the status and reputa-
tion of Anthony Eden, the man who everybody now realised
had played so large a part in winning the election, whose record
was beyond reproach.

It was an embarrassing position to be a young hero without
any scope for heroics. The very nature of his popularity was a
danger. Already Eden had influential enemies who were doubly
jealous that the prestige of Conservatism should be at the
mercy of so radical a knight errant. Hoare would have to be
brought back, and Eden would be working with two ex-Foreign
Secretaries in the Cabinet, whose support he could not expect
and whose example he had to avoid. One of the purveyors of
inside information by newsletter discussing Eden's dilemma,
referred to a story that he had threatened the Government with
resignation on the news of the Plan, was then sent for by the
King and that it was only after that interview that he decided
to remain after all.

There is something of human drama in the young Minister,
identified not only with the future of an administration but with
all the brightest prospects for a new international order, travel-
ling up to Sandringham on a bitter December night to meet the

124 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

dying King and to receive confirmation, blessing and perhaps
decisive advice from the most experienced statesman of them
all. So many had kissed hands, taken their seals of office from
him; so many famous names, and causes won, lost or forgotten.
Eden was to be the last of a great company to take office of
state under King George V.

CHAPTER 16

WATCH ON RHINE

A THE end of January, 1936, the nation was paying
homage at the coffin of George V. London was full
of potentates, and Eden was busy with informal nego-
tiations. During these historic days Eden had talks with King
Carol, still under the guidance of Titulescu; King Boris, Flan-
din, Neurath, van Zeeland, de Kanya of Hungary, and Starhem-
berg of Austria- For the most part the future of Germany was
the principal item on the agenda, although officially it was
given out that the conversations were "purely informative, and
limited to a general exchange of views." It was also given out
that Flandin expressed no urgent anxiety about the Rhineland,
while Neurath was equally reassuring.

The stage was set for Eden's first statement as Foreign Secre-
tary in the House of Commons in the debate to take place on
24th February. There were various lengthy forecasts of what
he would say, but when the great day arrived he said very little.
"The much-heralded debate," The Times candidly reported,
"proved somewhat disappointing." If the Opposition was too
shrill and unpractical, Mr. Eden was too general and unexcep-
tional for either side. He said nothing that thrilled his audience,
and on the whole his speech was "of a kind which must be
carefully digested before it can do much good." As the Govern-
ment had no new pronouncement to make there was some sur-
prise that they had chosen to encourage the debate. Although
it was Eden's official debut, it is noted that he was only
applauded with a "rather perfunctory cheer/* The House was
left to guess whether the Government policy was to intensify
international action. Eden on the oil-sanction was non-com-
mittal. It would only be applied, he said, if it would help to

125

126 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN
stop the war. The Government was waiting for the experts'
report before deciding. In reviewing the international situation,
Eden noted many discreditable similarities to 1914. Collective
security was our only hope. Once again he stressed that this
must not and did not mean encirclement.

On 2nd March, Eden, in Geneva, tried to clarify British
policy by declaring formally that His Majesty's Government
were prepared to apply the oil embargo if others would. Flandin
and Laval were reduced to desperate expedients. On 3rd March
Eden was agreeing to Flandin's proposal to give the combatants
a week to stop hostilities. The League should get to work on
the oil sanction immediately. A week sufficed to provide the
pretext to shelve the embarrassing question. On 4th March
Eden left Geneva. On the 5th he reported to the Cabinet, stat-
ing that he understood that Italy would meet the oil embargo
by withdrawing from the League of Nations and from Locamo,
and by denunciation of the Franco-Italian military agreement.

By Saturday, 7th March, Hitler's storm-troops had silently
almost timidly crossed the bridges and re-taken the Rhine-
land. Here was a new and strategically far graver peril immedi-
ate and overwhelming. It was sprung upon the world, as with
most of Hitler's coups, in direct contradiction to solemn,
gratuitous and recent pledges. All Eden's laborious effort to
make Abyssinia the "test case" that would impress the power
politicians in Berlin was, it seemed, of no avail. The power
politicians had not waited to be impressed. So contemptuous
were they of armed democracy that, according to reliable Eng-
lish witnesses, the German infantry were not given a single
cartridge nor the artillery a single shell. The aircraft had had
machine-guns but no ammunition. This humiliating informa-
tion was not officially available at the time.

The first impression was that Hitler had weighed up all the
consequences and accepted the ultimate sanction of war. The
coup was covered by one of Hitler's passionate lectures to the
Reichstag, with all its accompaniment of hoarse yet controlled
hysterics. Intimation of its full meaning was conveyed to Eden

WATCH ON THE RHINE 127

at 11:00 A.M. by the courtly German Ambassador to London,
von Hoesch. Eden's reply to von Hoesch's memorandum was

the British Government would be to take a

serious view.

How much in the dark France Great Britain were as
to the real trend of events can be seen from the fact that only
the night before the coup a big military reception was being
held at the Soviet Embassy in Berln, with nearly all the mili-
tary attaches unaware of the great decisions that were being
taken all around them; while in London, Eden had been seeing
von Hoesch at the Foreign Office to let him know that the
British Government were anxious to conclude a Western air
pact. 515 Confronted with the fait accompli Eden at once invoked
the constitutional remedy of summoning the representatives of
the other Locarno Powers. He then motored down to Chequers
for consultation with Baldwin, whose effective belief in Eden
was counteracted by his persistent reliance on MacDonald and
Halifax, the free-lance Cabinet Ministers. These men did not
differentiate, with Eden's clarity, Germany's grievance from the
method of redressing it.

Sunday was an anxious day. Hitler, in his desire to beat the
Press, was choosing week-ends for Ms biggest news stories. In
doing so he made one miscalculation. He was violating one of
the oldest of British institutions. The news that statesmen are
meeting on a Sunday at once rouses the British people to the
gravity of the situation. On this particular Sunday, Eden saw
the French Ambassador twice, and was with Baldwin again,
who had returned to London. By 9th March the psychological
initiative had been lost. France and Britain kept up the eternal
questions asking each other what the other would do, the one
unwilling to supply the other with the necessary lead.

The evening after King George's funeral, Baldwin had given
a private dinner-party, at which Flandin and Eden were guests.
Flandin had asked about the Rhineland, and Eden's reply was,

* At the moment when the Rhineland was being invaded Hitler was telling
the Reichstag, **We have no territorial demands to make in Europe."

128 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

"What will the French Government do? Until we know that,
we cannot usefully discuss the British attitude." Flandin had
noted down for his Cabinet's agenda that a reply must be given
to Mr. Eden. It was. Flandin had authority to tell the British
Government that France was ready to act if Germany carried
out her intentions. Eden was told of the statement at Geneva.
Once again a leakage at the Quai d'Orsay precipitated the
crisis, for the Wilhelmstrasse knew all about Franco-British
intentions in advance, and without authority. The Nazis were
alarmed; they had banked on the bickerings of Paris and Lon-
don over Abyssinia paralysing the Entente elsewhere. Eden's
activity was dangerous. His paper schemes would have to be
forestalled by action.

When the crisis came Flandin was ready to act. The Locarno
signatories met, and Flandin, backed by Paul-Boncour and
Leger, the powerful Permanent Under-Secretary at the Quai
d'Orsay, urged that Hitler was not strong enough for this ad-
venture. If the Locarno Powers would confirm Hitler's aggres-
sion, France would take care of the sanctions on their behalf.
The delegates were impressed, but advised that in view of the
gravity of the situation they would have to refer back to their
respective Governments. France, in the meanwhile, could not
afford to offend the expressed wish of her Locarno colleagues.
Eden further took the occasion to tell Flandin in Paris that
Locarno was not enough, that only the League Council had
sufficient status to meet the crisis, and that in the interests of
calm deliberation the Council should be taken from Geneva
and brought over to London. To aE these things Flandin
agreed.

So it was that by Monday night Eden had succeeded in steri-
lising Saturday's Rhineland occupation. As far as Power poli-
tics, war and international action were concerned, he was
relying on the League of Nations as on a safety-valve, an in-
strument to gain time and release pressure.

Eden prefaced his journey to Paris by a well-ordered state-

WATCH ON THE RHINE 129

ment to an anxious House of Commons. He gave
points of fact and policy. First, that decisions were to

be deferred until after the League Council's on the

following Friday, secondly, that German action had shaken the
confidence of the nations in the trustworthiness of future Ger-
man promises. Nevertheless, the German proposals were to be
studied. A peace structure might be rebuit on the ruins of
peace. There was no reason to suppose that Germany meant
hostilities; but, lastly, if she did, Britain would once again stand
by France or Belgium. The Times called this an admirable
statement.

On 12th March, the Council of the League of Nations took
up its residence at St. James's Palace and the best London
hotels. Anthony Eden, his prestige at the peak, presided over
its proceedings and destinies. Eden proposed to the delegates
that the German Government should, first, withdraw all but a
symbolical number of troops from the zone; secondly, should
not increase the number; and, thirdly, should undertake not to
fortify the zone at least until the international situation had
been regularised.

The crowds gathered, and the delegates waited anxiously.
When the German reply came it was more or less a negative.
They were not willing to withdraw, but agreed not to concen-
trate on the frontier, provided France and Belgium showed
similar restraint. The German estimate of the number of their
troops was nearly 30,000; the French put it at 90,000. The
probable number was about 60,000, but in this atmosphere of
recrimination and falsehood constructive negotiation became
increasingly difficult. It was pointed out by well-informed ob-
servers in Berlin that it was useless to expect Hitler to with-
draw, as he was on the eve of an election, and a re-garrisoned
Rhineland would be the chief plank on the Nazi platform.

While Eden was giving dinner-parties in honour of the Lo-
carno delegates, and the crisis, if still necessitating intense
diplomatic activity, had become a discreet and almost surrepti-
tious affair between gentlemen, Hitler was encircling Germany

130 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

with a militant mysticism. At Munich he cried: "I go on my
way with the assurance of a somnambulist, the way which
Providence has sent me." Then two big parades at Frankfurt
and Mainz were suddenly called off, and Hitler unexpectedly
left Munich for Berlin.

One reason for this dramatic volte-face was that Eden had
recommended that Germany be invited to make her contribu-
tion to the Locarno talks. As the Powers, by their very proce-
dure, had acquiesced in facts made by Germany alone, it was
difficult to ostracise her from international collaboration.
Eden's invitation was duly confirmed and delivered. Neurath
accepted on two conditions: first, the guarantee of the old
equality thesis, and secondly, Hitler's latest peace proposals as
the basis of immediate negotiations.

There was a period of complete uncertainty; then, after
Eden had exerted formal and informal pressure on Berlin, the
Germans, led by Ribbentrop, arrived. The British public was
seeing Eden's arbitration technique in his most important con-
test and on his home ground. The British public was impressed.
The papers were full of Britain's Architect of Peace. Only one
small item of political news marred the Eden epic. It was re-
ported on 17th March that there was a disturbance in Spain in
which a number of Fascists and Socialists were killing each
other. It aroused no particular comment at the time war and
bloodshed were taken as being a part of Spanish culture.

On 1 8th March, the empty chair at the conference was filled.
Ribbentrop, dapper and self-possessed, had arrived. The same
men were in fact two bodies: the League Council was an en-
larged Locarno Conference. This disposition of diplomatic
forces gave Eden scope for warning Germany without unduly
ruffling her susceptibilities. To the Council he was able to say
frankly that the League must find that a breach of Versailles
had been committed. "It was clear that Hitler did not mean
war. Now was the opportunity to rebuild." The strain of this
double diplomacy was great. Duff-Cooper, at a Conservative

WATCH ON THE RHINE 131

lunch, assured that he was by a an overwhelming

feeling of national confidence.'*

On 19th March, Ribbentrop stated the German case. It was
simply that the Franco-Soviet pact had made Locarno null and
void. The next day Eden was reporting to the House Ms hopes
of a world conference. Germany was invited to lay her claim
before the Hague Court, and asked not to increase the number
of her troops in the zone or to fortify it. Three days later Eden
received Ribbentrop, who had brought over a written reply.
The delegates w r ere playing for time, were negotiating on lines
that were parallel and accordingly did not intersect. On 25th
March, Germany was allowed a glimpse of democratic soli-
darity in the signing of the Anglo-French-American Naval
Treaty.

Eden followed it up the next day with one of Ms most impor-
tant statements to the House on the nature of British foreign
policy. He roused members to an unaccustomed enthusiasm by
the impressive dignity of his words. Loud cheers greeted his
refusal to be "the first British Foreign Secretary to go back on
a British signature." Locarno was "a new label for an old fact,"
for it remained a vital interest of this country that no hostile
forces should cross the French or Belgian frontiers. We were
not arbiters but guarantors of Locarno. But our fundamental
obligation under Locarno was to seek a peaceful solution
which was the reason Eden gave for his disagreement with the
French and Belgian view that sanctions should be imposed
against Germany.

The Times first leader was full of praise. "Mr. Eden's expla-
nation of British policy yesterday was an admirable Parliamen-
tary performance the best, because the most spontaneous, he
has given since he became Foreign Secretary. The argument
was careful, vigorous and cogent; and it was all the stronger for
being deliberately defensive. The reception of the speech by the
House as a whole was proof that he had reassured public opin-
ion." The Times was happy that the Government did not take
a purely "legalistic" view of treaties.

132 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Germany's reaction was typified by the Borsen-Zeitung: "We
hope, Mr. Eden, that we can take you at your word," Officially,
Germany was silent. Hitler was making a "peace appeal" in
one of Krupps* armament factories and in doing so struck an
uncompromising patriotic note. In Italy it was reported that the
speech was received "with the disapproval turned upon all Mr.
Eden's acts and utterances." He was reproached for ignoring
Italy's position as a Locarno signatory, though it would have
seemed that he was doing Mussolini a kindness by leaving him
out. Beck told Eden personally that Poland was happy about
the speech, while the French were "cordial, even warm."

March ended with Eden accepting a D.C.L. from Durham
University and planning a holiday in Morocco which he had
to cancel. April was to be a month of violent and critical activ-
ity beginning with Ribbentrop handing to Eden the German
Peace Plan. It was verbose. In substance it amounted to a four-
month standstill order. In his statement to the House acknowl-
edging the German proposals he declared that they contained
"many indications of future policy, all favourably received,"
but a pause was necessary. During the pause there were to be
staff talks between Britain, France, and Belgium. It was a con-
cession to French prestige, but it could not be a repetition of
1914. The opinion of Parliament and the people was decisive
against any loose uncertain arrangement involving de facto
moral or military commitments.

Eden gave the only assurance open to him. No military ac-
tion would be taken unless Germany invaded France or Bel-
gium. He asked the House to believe that conciliation had not
yet failed. He was sympathetic to Attlee's wise suggestion that
all League Powers should be brought into the staff talks. But
Eden's dilemma was real. Flandin had desired action.

For Flandin the Rhineland crisis was the decisive moment in
post-war Franco-German relations. If France was to give effect
to her legal victory, the Rhineland coup was likely to be the
last occasion on which violation of Versailles could be pun-
ished with comparative safety. If this opportunity was lost,

WATCH ON THE RHINE 133

France would have to consider a new mode of security the
Little Entente would cease to be an insurance and would rap-
Idly become a liability. After March, 1936, this became Flan-
din's thesis, until by October, 1938, we watching the
rape of Czechoslovakia with ill-concealed complacency as an
issue no longer touching French security.

In March, 1936 5 Flandin had weapons to reinforce his thesis
w r hen putting it to Eden and the British Government. The
Abyssinian war was not going according to Geneva's schedule.
If Eden would not help Flandin in the Ruhr, Flandin would not
help Eden in the Suez.

By 8th April, Eden was back in Geneva, angry and impa-
tient at the delays in conciliation. Five weary weeks had passed
since the appeals to the Italian and Abyssinian Governments.
Eden concurred in the suggestion that 14th April should be the
time-limit. Italy's intentions were still a mystery, until a few
hours later it became known that Mussolini was to annihilate
the Ethiopian forces. There had been widespread rumours
about poison-gas. Eden spoke out: "The employment by the
Italian armies of poison-gas raises the question whether any in-
ternational conventions are of any value whatsoever." Finally,
on 10th April, an appeal was sent to Italy and with mocking
correctitude to Abyssinia as weE not to use poison-gas. So
effectively had Laval and the pro-Italian minority in the
League put the brakes on procedure that, as The Times points
out: "Plain speaking by Mr. Eden was needed to obtain even
this gentle reproof of the Italian use of gas." Eden was fighting
a rearguard action. Intense propaganda was needed if the
Committee of Thirteen was to make conciliation a reality for
Abyssinia, while if the German peace proposals were to have
practical meaning they would have to be explained by Hitler
in great detail.

Eden was at work on his famous questionnaire. For a few
days in the middle of April, he and his family were the guests
of Sir Philip Sassoon, who has always been an intimate friend.
As art connoisseurs and travellers Eden and Sassoon have com-

134 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

mon Interests. Eden's holiday coincided with a fresh Italian
Press campaign, which singled out the Foreign Secretary for
special condemnation. Italy was "determined to resist bully-
ing," and disliked Eden's "individual and overbearing policy."
By 17th April, Eden was back in Geneva. French efforts for
peace had broken down, and Eden was represented in the Ital-
ian Press as playing a losing game. Eden's reaction was, two
days later, to take a firm line at Geneva. Speaking in clear,
ringing tones, he said existing sanctions must be maintained
and more economic and financial added. The Protocol of 1925
against the use of poison-gas was our charter against extermi-
nation. We could not afford to pass over this violation of it. We
must stick to the League: the alternative was anarchy.

During May and June events moved, and Eden with them,
to their tragic conclusions. On one day he was telling his con-
stituents that the rapid re-equipment of the three Services was
absolutely imperative, on the next he had to give Parliament
an account of the Emperor of Abyssinia's flight from Addis
Ababa. It will be recalled that no sooner had Eden's question-
naire been put to Hitler than Aloisi startled the world by walk-
ing out of the League Council. The questionnaire was Hitler's
pretext for taking offence, and shelving the embarrassing
search for a Peace Plan. The questions, carefully and cleverly
framed as they were, in their reference to Hitler's proposals, re-
duced themselves to one practical issue: Does Germany intend
to enter into and keep any treaty in future, or are her past re-
pudiations the precedent on which she will act? It was virtually
impossible for Hitler to give a frank reply to this, or even to
admit the need to do so. Peace would have to await a bigger
gesture than Eden's questionnaire before it would re-enter
the deserted halls of Europe.

CHAPTER 17

PLATFORM SANCTIONS

SPEAKING at Windsor In June, Baldwin was praising his
Foreign Secretary as "a man of great ideals and a man of
great courage. He has been accused of throwing over all
he has believed in. He has thrown over nothing."

But a few days before what appeared to be a very powerful
intrigue against Eden had come to a head with a remarkable
speech by Neville Chamberlain at the 1900 Club. The Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer crossed over the frontiers of the Treas-
ury and committed an act of unprovoked aggression on Eden
and the Foreign Office. In what was, for him, an unusually
flamboyant and vigorous phrase^ he associated sanctions with
"midsummer madness.**

Although the "midsummer madness" speech was the out-
come of deep personal conviction, it would seem that it was
also a ballon d'essai on behalf of the Cabinet as a whole. But
whatever the motive underlying it might be, it produced an
almost unanimously favourable press. Only the Yorkshire Post,
naturally, and The Times, surprisingly, were with Eden. Bald-
win himself, when pressed in the House, "made no complaint
of what Mr. Chamberlain had said."

This ambiguity could not be sustained, and the Government
obviously had no intention of sustaining it In May, Sir Austen
Chamberlain, the fiercest critic of the Hoare-Laval proposals,
became the stern opponent of the ineffective sanctions. The
Tory back-benchers applauded him for saying what they all felt
but had lacked the courage to say themselves. Sir Austen may
well have felt that his own change of front would make Eden's
position easier; but nothing could be done to save the Foreign

135

136 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Secretary the ordeal of repudiating the policy by which he had
stood before the world.

On 1 8th June, before a crowded and expectant House Eden
displayed considerable debating skill in conducting Ms stra-
tegic withdrawal. But he spoke in a toneless voice and without
conviction. The knight-errantry was over: his was the speech of
a man stunned into indifference.

The debate which followed was of a greater valour than dis-
cretion. Labour spokesmen fell into the trap of overstating
their case, and it was left to Lloyd George to expose the real
weakness of Eden's position. Eden had spoken of the well-
ordered ranks of the League, but it was Eden who was going to
Geneva to break them. "In all my experience/' he cried, "I
have never heard a British Minister speaking on behalf of the
Government come down to the House of Commons and say
that Britain is beaten, that she cannot go on." Yet that was
what Eden was doing. In some ways it was fortunate that the
brilliance came from Lloyd George a personal onslaught
which diverted attention from the full force of party reactions.

On 1st July at the League Assembly, with the Government's
"infinite regrets," he drank the cup of bitterness to the dregs.

Eden never did anything to placate the Press that was likely
to be hostile to him. There was already a large number of
imaginative journalists eagerly prophesying his early downfall.
It was good news value to identify the hated League of Nations
with a hated personality. As far back as April the Daily Mail
was forecasting Eden's removal in favour of Halifax. Another
paper did its best to send him to Hollywood, circulating ru-
mours of a lucrative film contract. A big director had appar-
ently "discovered" him, and had sensed a great future for Mm
as Clive Brook's double! But not only at home was the destruc-
tive element at work. The strategic significance and political
prestige of Geneva was passing. Its moral authority was
mocked.

In the middle of July, Eden took a well-deserved rest from

PLATFORM SANCTIONS 137

the hateful sequence of crisis and disillusion. But even his hoi-
day was suspect. Rumours had been spread about that he had
been forced to take it because of Hitler's failure to deliver a
reply to the questionnaire. It was felt that he do so if

Eden was out of the way! But no sooner had Eden left Geneva,
Parliament and the Foreign Office to their own resources than
the ever-increasing tension in Spain turned from a few spas-
modic clashes into a civil war.

The session had ended in July with a broad survey from
Eden. There were minor successes to report: the Montreux
Conference, which re-militarised the Dardanelles, was in
Eden's estimate a valuable example to Europe of how peaceful
and legal methods could lead to a settlement more favourable
all round than unilateral repudiations. Freedom of passage
through the straits in peace time and the international charac-
ter of the Black Sea had been maintained, while a sentimental
link between Turkey and Great Britain was forged by Turkey's
offer to take care of the British war graves in GaMpoli.

In August he signed an important treaty with Egypt, over the
details of which he had exercised a close supervision. It allowed
Britain to station troops in Egypt to fulfil an Anglo-Egyptian
alliance for the joint defence of the Suez Canal. It was to sur-
vive as the cornerstone of Britain's Middle East defence struc-
ture under conditions both of hot and cold war for eighteen of
its twenty years* term. Then under circumstances never envis-
aged when the original treaty was made, it fell to Eden's lot to
make the final settlement withdrawing the British garrison from
the Canal and confirming Egypt's full sovereignty. This link
between Eden of 1938 and of 1 954 is a short reminder of how
long he has been responsible for the direction of British for-
eign policy. At 57 he was in fact the most experienced Foreign
Minister in the world. It was a generous and statesmanlike
solution to a number of political and administrative misunder-
standings, which had been rankling both in Cairo and London
over a period of sixteen years.

During the second part of 1936 Eden did something to re-

138 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

store Ms damaged prestige. In fact, hie was only marking time,
but to the progressives it seemed he was in readiness for a fresh
advance. In the first place the arrival of M. Blum and the Popu-
lar Front opened up to Eden new opportunities of collabora-
tion with France. It should be noted that Eden and Blum soon
found that they had other than purely political affinities. It is
recorded that at a time of grave crisis in the Spanish situation,
when the ministers were behind locked doors and supposed to
be in anxious deliberation, they were in fact carefully dissecting
the varied qualities of a Proust novel. For Blum and Eden alike
Proust was a formative intellectual influence.

The Laval-Flandin period had involved constant pressure
from both sides to achieve even the semblance of unity. Blum
had hardly time to look round before the Spanish conflict was
creating a wholly new frontier and security problem for
France. Out of this dilemma Eden and Blum brought forth
Non-intervention in Spain. This was an astute diplomatic re-
sponse to a complex and protracted crisis although in one
respect the British position failed to allow for sufficient tactical
manoeuvre. In all the deliberations of the Non-intervention
Committee the British Government alone was officially com-
mitted to a policy of Non-Intervention in advance. We lacked
an essential bargaining weapon during the weary weeks of the
committee's deliberations. Maisky, Grandi and Ribbentrop
could always add the sanction that unless their views were
given full weight they would have to consult their Govern-
ments. It was known that the British Government had been
consulted and had given its word already. Moreover, the ob-
jectives of Non-intervention were hardly forceful enough to
resist the ideological nature of the conflict. Although springing
primarily from Spanish causes, the war was soon inextricably
bound up with the Fascist and Communist aims. Mussolini and
Hitler saw in it an admirable opportunity to strengthen their
strategic position in the world, and Spain became a factor in
their growing friendship. In July, Hitler concluded a pact with
Schuschnigg, Germany recognising the <4 full sovereignty" of

PLATFORM SANCTIONS 139

Austria In no way the of

1934 among Italy, Austria and Hungary. This
made possible a relaxation of on the Brenner, but Hit-

ler went farther, and turned Ms moral approval of the Duce's
Abyssinian adventure into positive recognition of the conquest.
Spain, to begin with, allowed a new field of enterprise for
what was soon to be known as the Berlin-Rome axis. In July,
Eden and Blum made a last attempt to revive the ghost of
Locarno by issuing an immediate invitation to the German and
Italian Governments to take part in a proposed meeting of all
five Locarno Powers. The objective was to destroy divisions in
Europe and attain a general settlement. But the gesture was no
recompense for the prospect of remunerative aggression
cheaply. Eden's resolve to isolate the Spanish conflict could not
match the Dictators 5 determination to make it international
Fifth columns and volunteers dominated the scene.

For Eden there was in a steadily deteriorating situation little
to do but to clarify British policy, both as an immediate warn-
ing to the Dictators and for their future reference. Between
September and December he delivered a series of major
speeches, all of them attempts to reach the essentials of our
moral and military commitments.

To the League Assembly on 25th September he proclaimed
League reform and gave detailed suggestions. "Machinery
should be devised as early as possible to improve the working
of the first paragraph of Article XI of the Covenant/' In other
words the article that deals with war or the threat of war should
not automatically be a matter of concern to the whole League.
The Council had been hampered by the rule of unanimity.
Should it not in future have more freedom to make recom-
mendations without necessarily having the consent of the par-
ties? The danger in delay was properly stressed.

Germany, said Eden in an impressive debate on the address
on 5th November, was invited to co-operate in an effort to
secure an increase in the volume of world trade on the lines

140 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

indicated in the recent Three-Power Currency Declaration; but
"we could not accept the doctrine proclaimed in Germany of
our responsibility for her economic difficulties." It was not in
accordance with the facts. We had lent Germany since the war
almost as much as we had received from her by way of repara-
tions. Mussolini had made his famous distinction between the
Mediterranean as via for Great Britain and vita for Italy. Eden's
reply was that it was no "short cut" for us, but "a main arterial
road a vital interest, in a full sense of the word, to the British
Commonwealth of Nations."

On 14th November, Hitler issued a note denouncing the
Navigation Clauses of Versailles, and Eden was forced once
more to intensify the general sense of irritation and alarm by
"taking a serious view" of the action and offering no remedy
for it.

In this context Eden's great speech at Leamington on 20th
November served a double purpose of restoring British pres-
tige in Europe, and Conservative prestige in Britain. One of its
most interesting features is its style and the immediate contrast
provided thereby with the formlessness of Baldwin's ideas and
expression. Here was a younger Conservative who, even if he
lacked the political resource to carry out his policy, yet all the
same knew under precise headings just what he wanted. The
Leamington speech gave the appearance of order to a foreign
policy that was lapsing into chaos from the mere desire of the
Cabinet to sit rather than to sit and think. Indeed, Eden's guid-
ing principle was a plea for diplomacy based on "deep think-
ing."

Eden first of all concerned himself with the rival forms of
government which it seemed were gnawing at sanity in inter-
national relationships. It was our duty to recall the objectives
we had before us during the last war. They were: "Freedom
and democracy at home. Peace abroad. Such should still be our
objectives today." We are opposed to the formation of blocs.
This was the basis of a communique agreed to between Beck
and Eden following a recent visit to England by the Polish

PLATFORM SANCTIONS 141

Foreign Minister. "We mean we do not want to divide the
world into democracies and dictatorships," It would be a trag-
edy if the League of Nations were to become the home of any
ideology except the ideology of peace. "All that we in this
country require and expect is that the rule of law should govern
international relations and not the rule of war." In spite of de-
fections the League was still the best system yet devised. It was
now less effective than a universal league, "but the fact that we
know that we cannot do everything is no excuse for doing noth-
ing." We must, however, in present conditions, be doubly
strong in order to be just.

The nine-days' wonder of the abdication intervened be-
tween this occasion and Eden's Bradford speech. The emer-
gence of Mrs. Simpson temporarily swamped international
perplexities. King, Country, and Cabinet were involved in the
biggest human drama of the age. The influence of Mrs. Simp-
son on foreign affairs had been negligible. Some of the "set"
condemned by the Archbishop of Canterbury for their influ-
ence on the King were also to be found gravitating towards the
lavish hospitality of Ribbentrop, the new Nazi Ambassador.
But it was Hitler's misfortune that Ribbentrop was altogether
too stupid to understand the subtleties of British political influ-
ence.

As for the abdication crisis itself, it showed the world the
essential resiliency of our constitution, and rescued Baldwin
from the consequences of his own indolence and lack of grip in
other departments of public life. Eden's speech at Bradford
reflects a reinforced confidence and represents what may be re-
garded as the central core of Ms political outlook the cross-
bench mind seeking the bi-partisan approach to foreign affairs,
the Baldwinian approach to public relations. 'Time was when
the broad lines of this country's foreign policy were not the
subject of party controversy. I believe that today we are mak-
ing progress towards a return to such conditions, despite
differences of emphasis and detail. An impartial observer must
have been impressed by the steady growth during the last few

142 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

of united opinion on vital matters of foreign policy."
But if the Government was to preserve national unity it must
the country into its confidence.

"The electors must have plain truths in plain language so
that there can be no misunderstanding between us. I have
spoken of the value to Europe of this country's calm. By that
I mean a calm based not upon ignorance of the facts which
might be dangerous, but calm due to a full knowledge and un-
derstanding of the position." Then, after a further appeal that
man should avoid the crude alternatives of dictatorship to the
Right and Left, he referred to the "observance of treaties and
willingness to resort to free negotiation in case of disagree-
ment" as constituting together the only true basis of interna-
tional confidence.

On Spain, Eden admitted that "Non-Intervention has not
worked as well as we could have wished. There have been
leakages, even grave breaches, in the agreement; but that is no
reason for abandoning the principle. Those who advocate its
abandonment must face the alternative, and it is immeasurably
grave. M. Blum has spoken of his conviction that the Non-
intervention initiative saved a European war last August. Is
M. Blum right in that conviction? I for one am certainly not
prepared to disagree with him."

The cumulative effect of these speeches was greatly to en-
hance Eden's reputation in progressive circles and to recapture
the confidence of what is loosely called the floating vote. No
post-war Foreign Secretary had produced so many well-
ordered and comprehensive statements of policy in such quick
succession. In the debate following his first Commons' speech
as Foreign Secretary, which had at once attracted attention for
its first-rate presentation, a Labour speaker had called him "a
foolscap politician" an unconscious tribute to the young man
who had dared transcend party to become an expert in the most
complex of all departments of politics.

Nineteen thirty-six had been a year of tribulations. Eden had

PLATFORM SANCTIONS 143

not emerged unscathed, but in the public Ms youth, Ms

fan-mail appeal, made way for an impression of greater matur-
ity. In spite of the set-backs, the clash of facts and Ideals, the
youthful prodigy was steadily developing into the serious
statesman.

CHAPTER 18

DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS

* 1 DEN opened 1937 with a considered appeal during an
I I important foreign affairs debate for international ap~
JLf peasement, turning in particular to Germany with a plea
that that country should forgo its national exclusiveness and
co-operate amicably with the rest of the world. It was signifi-
cant that only five days later on 24th January Blum echoed
these sentiments in a speech at Lyons; and on the 29th Mr.
Chamberlain Muted to Germany that it was within her power
now to give Europe a sign of peaceful intentions which would
set at rest the uneasy fears of the world.

Eden's speech is well worth pondering today. "We are pre-
pared to co-operate in the common work of political appease-
ment and economic co-operation. If this work is to succeed it
needs the collaboration of all Not only must the world re-
duce its expenditure on armaments, which is lowering the
standard of life, but it has to learn the ways of economic co-
operation so that the standard of life can be raised. . . . We are
willing to help towards a further advance along the line of in-
creased economic opportunity, but this should be, in our view,
on one condition. Economic collaboration and political ap-
peasement must go hand in hand. If economical and financial
accommodation merely result in more armaments and more
political disturbance the cause of peace will be hindered rather
than helped. On the other hand a new and freer economic and
financial collaboration, based upon solid and well-conceived
political undertakings, will be a powerful aid towards the es-
tablishment of a unity of purpose in Europe. . . . We do not
accept that the alternative for Europe lies between dictator-
ships of the Right and the Left. We do not accept that democ-

144

DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS 145

racles are a breeding-ground for Communism. We regard
rather as its antidote. 9 *

The context for these thoughts was a high-sounding Anglo-
Italian declaration concerning freedom of transit through the
Mediterranean. The declaration was still-bom, but it repre-
sented a serious effort on the part of the British and Italian
Governments to bring their policies into line with their respec-
tive national self-interests. Mussolini's commitments in Spain,
while not extensive enough to bring Franco a quick victory,
were too extensive to alow of full understanding with Great
Britain. Eden for his part was not prepared to go farther than
this declaration to help Mussolini out of the dilemma he had so
deliberately prepared for himself. In this firmness were the
seeds of Eden's ultimate resignation. Even during this debate,
Opposition speakers in particular, Sir Archibald Sinclair
drew attention to Eden's isolation in the Cabinet.

Turning to Germany, Eden considered whether the present
regime could lead to stable conditions. It could do so, he
thought, only by taking a full part in the normal life of the
world, by reducing its armaments and by agreeing to recognise
the rule of law in international relationships.

This speech, which was plainly a firm but friendly gesture to
Germany, was received with coldness and with the vituperation
natural to the German Press. There was more talk of out-of-
date democratic ideology and of poison from Moscow. But it
was soon made known that the real answer to these pernicious
democratic notions of friendly co-operation would come from
the Fiihrer himself, and the Press hushed itself in expectancy
for the oracular pronouncement.

It came in the form of the customary address (30th January)
to the Reichstag's "Sieg HeiF members. The speech was really
a reply to Eden, and the answer, at last, to his questions of the
previous May of which no official notice had ever been taken.
It was a final banging of the door, a closing of the frontiers, an
assertion of the unbridgeable gulf that now separated the two
nations.

146 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Hitler made it clear that compromise with the new Germany
was out of the question: a new Mstory founded on blood and
race had begun. He added, however, that Germany was con-
scious of u her European task to co-operate loyally in removing
the problems which affect us and other nations/' Germany did
not feel isolated: as witness the recent alliance with Japan. But
after much vague talk about Germany's efforts to develop
peaceful relations (no mention being made of Russia or Czech-
oslovakia) Hitler replied to Eden's question, "Did Germany
intend to honour any future treaties which she might freely
sign?": "Germany will never sign a treaty in any way incom-
patible with Germany's honour or her vital interests, and which
therefore could not in the long run be kept/' In other words,
Germany would continue to do as she pleased, irrespective of
international law and morality. And as for Eden's offer of a
disarmament agreement, Hitler replied that each country was
alone the judge of what armaments it required.

Eden had proposed economic co-operation. There was, Hit-
ler replied, no need for this; the Four-Year Plan was quite
adequate for the German people, and would eventuaEy be a
blessing for them.

And Eden had said that there was no fixed division of the
world between Fascism and Communism. This, said Hitler,
was not true. A division had actually been created by the
Treaty of Versailles; and now the division was accentuated by
the dissemination of Bolshevist doctrines among all peoples.

Thus Eden was refuted, as a democratically-minded politi-
cian "moving about in worlds not realised/'

On 6th February, he left London for a holiday in the south
of France, leaving Lord Cranborne to answer questions in the
House on the delicate state of Non-intervention in Spain; but
was back again on 2nd March to justify this laborious diplo-
matic fiction. He claimed, as he was later to claim in the
League Assembly, that Non-intervention had prevented the
spread of war outside the Peninsula.

In the same speech he confessed his inability to believe that

DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS 147

the League was "yet entombed"; hoped still for a Euro-
pean round-table conference.

IE a speech at Aberdeen on 8th March, Ms attitude was
hardening against the Dictators. We should co-operate first
with those who are "like-minded" and should then "make every
endeavour to extend the areas of co-operation." He described
in particular, collaboration with the U.S.A. as "another great
stabilising factor the influence and authority of which was of
evident advantage to mankind." Sir Archibald Sinclair once
again did not hesitate to underline the growing divergence be-
tween Ecien and Ms Cabinet colleagues in their public state-
ments at this time. And as if to confirm Ms suspicions no sooner
had Eden stressed the economic causes of war than Neville
Chamberlain was declaring from the fastnesses of the Ex-
chequer that "it is far truer to say that economic difficulties
spring from political causes than the other way about/ 5

The political correspondent of the Westminster Press an
important group of provincial newspapers had already caused
a stir in Whitehall and Fleet Street by describing a campaign
wMch the ambitious Ribbentrop was conducting in London to
influence the Cabinet against Eden. He asserted that the new
German Ambassador had met with no small measure of suc-
cess. Eden's position as Foreign Secretary "has been chal-
lenged." "There is reason to believe that at recent meetings of
the Cabinet proposals presented by Mr. Eden have been ve-
toed, and that the Opposition comes principally from Sir
Samuel Hoare and Sir John Simon."

One reason given for the hostility to Eden was "anxiety on
the part of certain members of the Government, and a larger
number of Conservatives, to prevent any growth of Communist
sympathy or influence in tMs country." In addition, "It is
known that he would have preferred to have taken a much
stronger and more active course in Spain on a number of occa-
sions." Then there was the bitterness of Hitler's references to
Eden in Ms Reichstag speech of 30th January, couched in
terms that were intended to belittle Ms influence. It was noted

148 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

that when Eden referred to the close relation of economic un-
derstanding to political appeasement, the German Press at once
claimed that the Foreign Secretary was not speaking for the
Cabinet.

The article ended by asserting that "Ribbentrop will be
closely watched. . . , For there is a large body of opinion in the
country behind Mr. Eden which would resent any attempt to
tie Ms hands at the price of securing a partial understanding
with Germany to the exclusion of a general settlement of out-
standing international problems."

By May all seemed comparatively well, and the naval patrol
scheme was working. And then occurred a most strange inci-
dentif, indeed, it occurred at all The German cruiser Leip-
zig, on patrol duty, was, so the crew said, struck by a torpedo

four torpedoes, according to Herr Hitler's indignant speech

later. Germany took the affair with a carefully staged solem-
nity, and pompously announced the withdrawal of her fleet
from waters where it was the object of "Red target-practice."
It seemed as though the whole elaborate edifice of control was
about to break down. It was only by the exercise of Eden's
special diplomatic gifts patience and persistence allied to
mastery of essential detail that new British proposals were put
forward, urged upon the reluctant governments., and finally set
out in the British Compromise Plan of 14th July. The formula
was to link the two problems of withdrawal and granting of
belligerent rights in that order. Then in the House of Com-
mons Eden stressed the fact that belligerent rights would be
granted conditionally upon the withdrawal of volunteers.

It was at the end of July that Neville Chamberlain, who had
taken over the Premiership from Baldwin, immediately after
the Coronation and during the Empire Conference, made his
first important excursion into foreign affairs when he sent a
personal letter in his own handwriting to Mussolini. Chamber-
lain thus forcefully expressed his desire to overcome current
misunderstandings between Britain and Italy and his readiness
to undertake more drastic action on the British behalf than had

DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS 149

taken heretofore, Baldwin's retirement the end

of the happy-go-lucky era. A Cabinet that was
from lack of internal and external compulsion now found
under a wholly different command. Ministers to bring daily
reports about their Departments. Clocking-ill replaced rolling-
up.

Discussion of the British plan continued through Jely and
August with no likelihood of agreement; and then the Spanish
problem took a new turn. The increasing attacks on shipping
by submarines that were obviously not Spanish roused France
to suggest an immediate Mediterranean conference. Italy and
Germany might set up a hostile state in Spain across our Im-
perial communications; might defy all rules of law; but when it
came to the point of interference with British trade by sinking
British cargoes it was time to act. And when an Italian torpedo
was fired at the destroyer Havoc, it was time to act quickly.

The history of the Nyon Conference is well-known. It was
not without its humour. The nervous susceptibilities of the
great totalitarian states with regard to Geneva were soothed by
choosing Nyon (a few miles away from the pestilential Palace
of the League) ? as the scene of the conference. Nyon would
have become a repetition of the Non-Intervention Conference
but for the lucky accident that the coarse accusations of Russia
so offended the delicacy of Italy and Germany that they found
it impossible to sit at the same table with Bolshevik representa-
tives. And, strangely enough, in their absence the scheme for
preventing piracy in the Mediterranean was drawn up and
signed in four days. It was signed by nine countries, and it was
immediately effective. The piracy disappeared, and all the sub-
marines that for months had been not only making war on
neutral shipping but breaking the rules of war, vanished sud-
denly, as though Prospero had exercised Ms might and sent
them back to Naples. This is how collective security can work.
It worked because there was a firm intention that it should.

Eden broadcast from Geneva after the conference an ac-

150 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

of the successful agreement and made some very plain
the piratical of that sea which the Ital-

ians call Nostrum. It was a question In efiect of a

"masked highwayman who does not stop short of even murder.
A conference was necessary to mark clearly the horror which
surely be felt by all civilised peoples at the barbarous
employed in these submarine attacks. Moreover, the
size of the Mediterranean and the consequent extent of the
problem made collective deliberation leading to swift collective
action imperative."

He referred to a "gangster terror of the seas" and to the utter
disregard shown by the "unidentified' 9 submarines for the rules
laid down by the Treaty of 1930 and the Protocol of 1936.
Against this, the Conference had "set up in that sea a police
force; and if any submarines attempt again to embark on evil
courses they will, I hope and believe, receive the punishment
they deserve."

The success of Nyon was galling to the Italians, who vented
their annoyance upon Eden himself. "We seem to be back in
the days of Baldwin," remarked one newspaper, "when Eden
was supreme master of foreign policy. As long as Eden Is at
the head of the Foreign Office we must be on our guard."

By October, 1937, Neville Chamberlain was actively domi-
nating the principal offices of State. His amateur interest in
foreign affairs had developed into a keen resolve to short cir-
cuit the laborious negotiations of the Foreign Secretary. Unless
Eden could show to the Premier and Cabinet that the "usual
diplomatic channels" were clear and open to decisive results,
Eden's days were numbered. He was subjected to the sinister
criticism of an inner Cabinet that was forming round the Pre-
mier. Chamberlain's informal advisers were beginning to find
Eden's internationalism inconvenient. European settlement
short term if you will was what was needed to revive our slug-
gish industry.

Chamberlain for his own part was impressed with the me-

DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS 151

cfaanics of dictatorial foreign policy. Their philosophy and
morals might be at fault dictators were often at a disadvan-
tage there but their technique was the democ-
racies could not afford to ignore. The other side of the picture
was Eden's growing resentment at inspired interference in the
daily routine of his office. The events of October helped to in-
tensify these disruptive personal elements. A great speech by
President Roosevelt, widely interpreted as a reversal of the
Monroe Doctrine, was followed by new atrocities and a widen-
ing of the area of hostilities in the Far East. The League Assem-
bly adopted the recommendations of its Far Eastern Advisory
Committee to invite the signatories of the Washington Nine-
Power Conference "to initiate the consultations provided for
under that treaty. 93

Eden used a routine Government speech at Llandudno as a
serious call to the nations. Our belief in Non-intervention
"does not mean that we are prepared to acquiesce in dilatory
tactics. If the Committee is now unable to make progress, as it
was unable to make progress last July, then I fear it is useless
to conceal from ourselves the gravity of the situation. ... I for
one should certainly not be prepared to utter criticism of any
nation which, if such conditions continue, felt compelled to re-
sume its freedom of action. . . . We have said more than once
that we in this country have no concern with the forms of gov-
ernments of foreign states But such toleration must be gen-
eral, and, if we have no intention to seek to make all States in
Europe democratic, so others should not seek to make all
States in Europe either Fascist or Communist."

Then to the particular point, which was aimed perhaps more
directly at his Cabinet colleagues than at Hitler and Mussolini:
"I am as anxious as anybody to remove disagreements with
Germany and Italy, or any other country, but we must make
sure that in trying to improve the situation in one direction it
does not deteriorate in another. In such an event our last state
might be no better or even worse than the former. We are ready
and eager to make new friends, but we will not do that by part-

152 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

ing with old ones. We are In a period of storm and challenge
when the hope Is openly avowed that the variety of interna-
tional anxieties will prevent effective resistance to unlawful
causes in any one sphere. This is dangerous doctrine. No nation
will profit by such practices in the end. There will be a Neme-
sis."

The sentiments of the Llandudno speech were admirable,
but the Mo questions Lloyd George asked were: "First, what
does he mean; and, second, what does he mean to do?" It
would perhaps have been wiser to ask Chamberlain these
questions. As long as Eden could spellbind the Opposition he
served a purpose. But it was Chamberlain who supplied the
answers. He sent Eden to Brussels and in his absence decided
to send Halifax to Berlin. The Brussels Conference was a fiasco
from the outset. After three weeks of humiliating effort, it told
the world that a suspension of hostilities in the Far East would
be in the best interests not only of China and Japan but of all
nations. A proposal by the American delegate to remind Japan
of her undertakings under the Kellogg Pact not to resort to
force provoked "something like a panic in certain delegations
which see in it almost a condemnation of aggression. It had
therefore to be dropped."

There are pictures taken during these barren days of an
Eden dejected and disillusioned. Soon after the Brussels Con-
ference began he retired to bed with a cold, and rumours were
spread abroad at once that the indisposition was diplomatic in
its origin. The disturbance in Europe made a "Save China'*
policy an embarrassment even to consider much less to exe-
cute. For Eden the Conference was from every point of view a
serious personal reverse. In particular it peeled the skin off
Anglo-American collaboration, and Eden was heavily commit-
ted to selling its advantages to the Cabinet It was obvious that
to go to Brussels at all was to court disaster.

One London diplomatic correspondent cabled to New York
that before leaving Eden actually offered Chamberlain his
resignation, and was only after intense pressure persuaded to

DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS 153

retract. It was common knowledge that Eden had great objec-
tions to the projected Hitler-Halifax conversations. It was an
attempt which drew comparison with Haldane's mission of
1912 to come to a general settlement with Germany. Informed
and inspired comment at the time confirmed the unpalatable
truth that the price of such a settlement would be high. Ger-
many would return to the League only if the League was
stripped of the last vestiges of Its political and moral authority.
Britain would have to abandon Austria, recognise Franco and
condone some formula for Czechoslovakia that would give the
Nazis the substance of power over the Sudetenland. In return
for aH this Germany would restore peace to Spain and defer
her claims to colonies for a few years. Such were the harsh im-
plications of appeasement at the end of 1937. Acceptance of
any one of the German demands would mean the deliberate
abandonment of Eden's whole policy. The visit itself in so far
as it encouraged German hopes that the British Government
was in the market for a deal of this character was a blow to Ms
diplomatic prestige. The importance of Halifax at Berchtes-
gaden was the fearful revelation provided of the growing scale
and quickening tempo of Nazi ambition. From now on there
could be no excuse for failing to recognise that Hitler's appetite
grew with what it fed on.

Halifax naturally did not commit himself, and does not in
any case seem to have made a particularly good impression on
Hitler. The ponderous sincerity that met with a response in
Gandhi was not necessarily adapted to evoke enthusiasm in the
sombre psychopath of Berchtesgaden.

Also it would seem that the proposals were more than the
Cabinet could stomach. By the beginning of December Eden's
position with his colleagues was described as being "tremen-
dously strong as the result of Berchtesgaden." There had been
something unsatisfactory about the whole approach. It left an
unpleasant taste in the mouth, and Chamberlain was never able
to explain it or make party capital out of it

154 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Apart from the Halifax mission nothing happened to

In public, nor was he himself responsible for any state-
between December 1937 February 1933 which could
have led uninstructed layman to suspect that he was being
Into a position that would compel him to resign. The
with Eden having briskly rebuffed the Socialist
opposition's futile attempt to discredit the Government for ap-
pointing to General Franco. Eden spoke that night with
the detachment of a Civil Servant obviously relishing the
chance It gave him to confine the Issue to one of technical con-
venience. There was the usual end-of-term debate, and al-
though the Far Eastern situation had gone from bad to worse
Nanking had fallen Eden was able to point to the growth
of a new outlook In the United States disaster and outrage
such as the sinking of the Panay had admittedly helped to pro-
duce It but It was a deeper sentiment than that. Anglo-Ameri-
can collaboration would prevail, and further, we were not
without Mends In Europe.

CHAPTER 19

RESIGNATION

UNTIL a week before Ms fateful decision, Eden
carrying on as though Ms future In the Foreign Office
was assured. The Daily Express and the Daily
were reporting rumours of a Cabinet split involving Eden, but
those who had a reputation for being in closer touch with Cabi-
net circles scouted the suggestion as symptomatic of Yellow
Press inaccuracy. Ronald Cartland, the youngest and most
progressive of the Midland Tory M.P.*s, had organised a vast
demonstration of young Conservatives for Eden in Birming-
ham. Cartland was a man of energy and vision. The large
audience was grouped and seated according to districts. Search-
lights played on them and on the speaker.

Eden was in his best collective-security form. "In any agree-
ments we make today there must be no sacrifice of principles
and no shirking of responsibilities merely to obtain quick re-
sults. ... It is not by seeking to buy goodwill that peace is
made, but on a basis of frank reciprocity with mutual respect."
These brave assertions roused Ms youthful audience to the most
vociferous enthusiasm. Here was the leader of the new Tory
Democrats addressing the devoted rank-and-file of the future.

As for the present, Winston Churchill, commenting on the
speech in the Evening Standard on 17th February, wrote that
"these words may be taken to represent not only the views of
the Foreign Secretary but those of Mr. Neville Chamberlain,
and consequently of His Majesty's Government and the British
Parliament." Eden's visit to Birmingham coincided with
Schuschnigg's to Berchtesgaden. Eden perhaps was encouraged
to be bold, being well aware of the reception the Austrian
Chancellor was receiving.

155

156 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

The world was waiting anxiously for the latest of Hitler's
He was expected to refer not only to the Inner
of the purge, carried out with his custom-

ary and precision at the beginning of the month, but

also to his for the immediate future. The world had to

pay attention to this extraordinary man's neuroses. It was
he was in a difficult and intransigent mood.

Opinion in the Parliamentary lobbies was gloomy. The For-
Affairs Committee of the Conservative Party, which in-
cluded about one hundred Government supporters, had met on
the Thursday evening, and the burden of its opinion was that
the Government should be strongly supported if it decided to
adopt a vigorous attitude in dealing with the situation. No
formal resolution was passed, but the attitude adopted was
conveyed to Ministers. It was reported that private representa-
tions were made in favour of some move which would tend to
counter the alarm created in Europe by the Nazi treatment of
Austria.

On the night of Friday, 18th February, Chamberlain had
been speaking in Birmingham, and Eden in Kenilworth. There
was no hint of schism in the Cabinet. The Times diplomatic
correspondent gave a detailed account of GrandFs visit to
Downing Street on Friday morning when he conferred with the
Prime Minister and Eden. He had brought no reply from the
Italian Government about the control of volunteers. In the
earlier talks it had been emphasised that "the Italian support
on this point would make much easier the discussion of Anglo-
ItaHan relations in general." The correspondent added that "in
the absence of a reply to these particular questions the more
general issue of the Anglo-Italian relations was discussed not
simply Abyssinia, but the whole balance of power in the Medi-
terranean."

On Saturday the Cabinet met, and it sat for nearly three and
a half hours. It then adjourned until 3:00 P.M. on Sunday. The
length of the meeting aroused intense curiosity. "The principal
point at issue," stated the diplomatic correspondent of the Sun-

RESIGNATION 157

day Times, "is of the of the

In anti-British be a

precedent to a full agreement," and

were as to the

they had with Grandi, as to

decide on the subjects to be in the

with Italy, and the order la they were to be

The meeting 6:15 P.M. Eden a

with the Prime Minister, Walter

Elliott and W. S. Morrison. Hoare and Kingsley Wood did not
leave until 7:00 P.M. These groupings were as a fair

symbol of the alignment of forces within the Cabinet.
Hitler was expected to hae finished Ms speech before the Sun-
day Cabinet met "it is unlikely that its terms will be before the
Cabinet."

Eden's departure from the Foreign Office had much the same
dramatic content as the abdication of King Edward VIIL Both
crises were sudden, sharp and unforeseen. In both there was the
sense of personal tragedy and loss, of promise cut off in mid-
career, of intrigue and harsh decision, and of moral issues not
fully understood because not fuly revealed.

Eden's resignation might have remained a suppressed episode
for many years had not Winston Churchill in the first volume
of Ms great war history with its devastating analysis of appease-
ment brought new facts to light. Subsequently Duff-Cooper's
autobiography published just before Ms death, the Ciano Papers
and Keith Felling's biography of Neville Chamberlain have
further lifted the veil. Essentially the conflict sprang from
Chamberlain's resolve to implement Ms policy of appeasement
by acting as Ms own Foreign Secretary without undue refer-
ence to the Foreign Office and over the head of its political
chief. The New Year had seen the cryptic announcement
(covered by a G.C.B. in the Honours List) of the removal of
Vansittart from the post of Permanent Under-Secretary and
Eden's right-hand man to a newly-created position of Govern-

158 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

adviser to problems would be remitted no longer

on a but "as required." Under cover of this "promo-

tion" the way was prepared for the more significant elevation
of Sir Horace Wilson to the unprecedented status of head of
the Civil Service, In which capacity he soon became the chief
instrument of Chamberlain's personal rule.

dispositions were being made and Eden was
a brief holiday In the South of France, Chamber-
lain was suddenly confronted with a major challenge to his
policy from a wholly unexpected quarter.

On llth January, 1938, Mr. Sumner Welles, the American
Under-Secretaiy of State, had called upon the British Ambas-
sador In Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, bearing a secret and
confidential message from President Roosevelt to Mr. Cham-
berlain. The President, "deeply anxious at the deterioration of
the international situation," proposed to take the initiative by
inviting the representatives of certain of the minor Powers to
Washington to try to reach agreement on some political prin-
ciples and seek the support of the major Powers thereafter. He
wished, however, at the outset, to have the British Govern-
ment's view of the plan before he took any definite action, and
he stipulated that no other Government should be informed
either of the nature or even the existence of the proposal. He
asked for a reply by 17th January. It that reply indicated "the
cordial approval and wholehearted support of His Majesty's
Government," he would then approach France, Germany and
Italy. "Here," comments Churchill, "was a formidable and
measureless step." It presented, says Duff-Cooper, an immense
opportunity.*

Sir Ronald Lindsay forwarded this message to London with
a strong recommendation that it should be accepted. In due
course, the British Ambassador's message was received at the
Foreign Office on 12th January, and copies were sent that eve-
ning to the Prime Minister, who was in the country. He returned

* For a full account of this episode see The Second World War, Vol. I
("The Gathering Storm") and Duff-Cooper, Old Men Forget.

RESIGNATION 159

to London and within twenty-four hours, on Ms responsi-
bility and without attempting to contact or in
France, he sent a cabled reply to the White
that while he appreciated Mr. Roosevelt's action, he to
point out that "His Majesty's Government would be prepared,
for their part, if possible with the authority of the League of
Nations, to recognise the de jure occupation of Abyssinia,
if they found that the Italian Government on their side, were
ready to give evidence of their desire to contribute to the
restoration of confidence and friendly relations." The Prime
Minister mentioned these facts, the message continued, so that
the President might consider whether Ms present proposal
might not cut across the British efforts. Would it not therefore
be wiser to postpone the launching of the American plan?
While there is no indication, in Mr. Churchill's narrative, that
Grandi ever knew of this overture from the President of the
United States, Chamberlain's reply seems clearly to indicate
how deeply he was committed to his private negotiations with
the Italian Ambassador.

On 15th January, Eden returned hastily to England. He had
been urged to do so, says Mr. Churchill, "by Ms devoted
officials at the Foreign Office." "Deeply perturbed," he imme-
diately sent a telegram to Sir Ronald Lindsay in Washington in
an attempt to minimise the effects of Chamberlain's "cMIling
answer." On the 18th, a letter arrived from the President ex-
pressing his concern at the British proposal that of de jure
recognition of the Italian position in Abyssinia in no un-
measured terms. That letter was considered by the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, and Eden succeeded in pro-
curing some modification of the previous attitude. After a few
days, further communications went to Washington, pointing
out that while the Prime Minister warmly welcomed the Presi-
dent's initiative, he was not anxious to bear any responsibility
for its failure if the American overtures were badly received.
This was not the "cordial approval and wholehearted support**
that the President had regarded as essential before going any

160 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

further. Moreover, as Duff-Cooper observes, "It was too late,
the great opportunity had been missed." Chamberlain's "douche
of cold water," as Mr. Sumner Welles describes the Prime
Minister's reception of the President's proposal, was no doubt
actuated by Chamberlain's fear that the Dictators would pay
no heed, or would "use this line-up of the Democracies as a
pretext for a break." This Is the suggestion put forward by
Chamberlain's biographer, Keith Felling, who goes on to say
that on Eden's return "it was found that he would rather risk
that calamity than the loss of American goodwill." But that is
to misunderstand the basis of Eden's whole approach to the
international situation at this period, which was all in favour
of collective security and agreement through open discussion,
if possible within the terms of reference of the League, and if
not, within the principles of League diplomacy. For the
Anthony Eden of 1938, it could never have been a question of
"American goodwill" at any price nor ? indeed, has he shown
the slightest inclination to uphold so narrow a view since his
return to the Foreign Office in 1951.

In spite of Eden's dismay at Chamberlain's rejection of the
Roosevelt offer and his efforts to qualify it, he did not give the
impression to his colleagues that he was actually considering
his position in the Government. Churchill sums up the incident
by asserting that "it defined in a decisive manner the difference
of view between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary"; he is
also at pains to point out that "most of the Ministers thought
he was satisfied. He did not make it clear to them that he was
not." Duff-Cooper throws additional light on the Cabinet's
general state of unawareness. He explains that the Defence
Ministers were not members of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Cabinet where these matters of high policy were at that
time discussed. "The Cabinet as a whole," he adds, "learnt of
the President's message only when the whole matter was past
history, nor were we told that there had been any divergence
of opinion" between Eden and Chamberlain.

Duff-Cooper was equally "on the outside looking in" over

RESIGNATION 161

the progress of negotiations with the Italian Ambassador. As
late as the 13th February he noted in his diary, "The Press this
week have got hold of a quite untrue story that there is a pro-
found disagreement between Anthony and the Prime Minister
over friendship with Italy. There is no foundation in it." "In
this case," he adds, "the Press was better informed than the
Cabinet Minister, and when a special meeting of the Cabinet
was announced for Saturday afternoon, 19th February, I had
no idea of the reason for such an unusual procedure." It was
at the eleventh hour therefore that the Cabinet had its first
knowledge of the rift. As it was presented to them during the
prolonged discussion throughout that Saturday afternoon
Chamberlain was insisting on immediate conversations with the
Italians and an early public announcement to that effect. Eden
on the other hand was standing by the thesis that Mussolini
must show some sign of honouring engagements already en-
tered into, especially in regard to Spain, before any new talks
were opened. According to Duff-Cooper, "He believed that
there was some secret agreement between Hitler and Mussolini
and that the latter had received some quid pro quo for his
acquiescence in the assault on Austria. Grandi denied that this
was so. The Prime Minister believed him: the Foreign Secre-
tary did not." Only at the end of the three and a half hour
discussion on the Saturday did Eden make it plain that he
intended to resign. His resolve came as a great shock to many
of his colleagues and it was at once appreciated that such a
decision could easily bring about the Government's downfall.
Sunday, 20th February, was a day of severe tension. The
Hitler speech was long and dull. It lasted three hours, and
settled nothing. According to a cynical German diplomatic
expert, for the first hour it was statistics supplied by Goering;
for the second, invective at the expense of the foreign press by
Ribbentrop; for the third, a peroration by Goebbels. As far as
the events of that Sunday in London were concerned, his furi-
ous attack on Bolshevism, which he coupled with taunts at
British statesmen, and in particular Eden, were to have the

162 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

effect on Ms world audience. Eden he accused
of blind to the menace of Communism, and of poisoning

international relations by permitting press attacks on Germany
Italy.

The Fiihrer condemned the British Foreign Secretary at 2:30
on a Sunday afternoon. By 10:30 P.M. on the same day the
world was informed that the British Foreign Secretary had
resigned. Europe, increasingly alive to the efficacy of black-
mail, drew the inevitable conclusion from this time sequence.

On that Sunday night the crowds gathered. They were silent
and mystified. Photographers were busy. Journalists rushed in
and out of No. 10 with that noticeable lack of ceremony or
dignity which is their peculiar prerogative. "Eden and Cran-
bome so far!" a lobby correspondent whispered to me. He was
evidently disappointed. For the clubs had been full of exciting
rumours. It was expected that at least half a dozen of the
Cabinet would follow Eden into exile (Malcolm MacDonald,
Duff-Cooper and Belisha were mentioned, in addition to the
three established "rebels/' Elliott, Morrison and Stanley).

Rumour was ahead of fact. Duff-Cooper, for instance, on
the data available to him, was far from sympathetic to Eden
over Italy. His attitude was that Anglo-Italian relations had
been sadly mishandled and that Mussolini should not and need
not have been thrown into Germany's arms. He was prepared
to allow Eden discretion as to timing, but if the situation was
really "now or never" his vote was for "now." The afternoon
Cabinet meeting made it clear that all efforts at reconciliation
had failed. The clash was not confined to the holding or han-
dling of the Italian talks. "There was/' says Duff-Cooper, "a
deeper difference of outlook between them that made it difficult
for them to work together." It was in fact "fundamental."

At 7.30 there was the awe-inspiring spectacle of Sir John
Simon playing chess in the National Liberal Club so what
was supposed to be a second Cabinet timed for 7.30 was in
fact a meeting of a small group of Ministers who had under-

RESIGNATION 163

taken to seek a formula for avoiding Eden's actual resignation.
Eden for Ms part had undertaken to give Ms decision to them.

The Cabinet met again at 10:00 P.M. Duff-Cooper was late
in arriving. In Ms diary he noted, "A letter from Anthony had
been read announcing Ms inability to accept any of the com-
promises suggested and Ms determination to resign. Anthony
was not there. The Prime Minister looked very exhausted."

Opposition pundits took fresh hope, and after the seven lean
years began to make fantastic forecasts of the Eden Progres-
sives backed by all the best men sweeping the nation by the
mere quality of their personnel. But from an Opposition point
of view it was idle to expect that Eden would turn a hand to
rescue Socialists or Liberals from their plight. It was enough
for the Opposition to be able to claim that Eden's departure
marked the beginning of the end of National Government.
Henceforth it was Tory on its own terms and unashamed. With
Eden went the Conservative Party's last concession to the
Middle Vote. The logic of facts would henceforth have to
suffice for personal representation. One big reservation I heard
that night. "If only Eden had gone on an issue the people can
understand." Eden's immediate case was too obscure for a
crusade. But one man understood; "Late on the night of 20th
February," he records, "a telephone message reached me as
I sat in my old room at Chartwell (as I often sit now) that
Eden had resigned. I must confess that my heart sank, and for
a while the dark waters of despair overwhelmed me. . . . There
seemed one strong young figure standing up against long, dis-
mal, drawling tides of drift and surrender, of wrong measure-
ments and feeble impulses. My conduct of affairs would have
been different from Ms in various ways; but he seemed to me
at tMs moment to embody the life-hope of the British nation,
the grand old British race that had done so much for men,
and had yet some more to give. Now he was gone I watched
the daylight slowly creep in through the windows, and saw
before me in mental gaze the vision of Death."

CHAPTER 20

REASONS WHY

ON MONDAY morning with the stimulus of banner
headlines excitement mounted. Eden's letter to Cham-
berlain was designed to stress the general as against

the particular grounds of Ms going.

The evidence of the last few days have made plain a dif-
ference between us on a decision of great importance in itself
and far-reaching in its consequences. I cannot recommend
to Parliament a policy with which I am not in agreement.
Apart from this, I have become conscious, as I know you
have also, of a difference of outlook between us in respect
to the international problems of the day, and also as to the
methods by which we should seek to resolve them.

He referred to an "uneasy partnership" that was not "in the
international interest."

The Premier's answer was equally resolute in its effort to see
the controversy through the other end of the telescope:

My dear Anthony,

It is with the most profound regret, shared by all our
colleagues, that I have received your intimation of your
decision to resign the great office which you have adminis-
tered with such distinction ever since you occupied it. The
regret is all the greater because such differences as have
arisen between us in no way concern ultimate ends or the
fundamentals of our policy.

The immediate result of these letters therefore was to in-
tensify the mystery.

164

REASONS WHY 165

The reactions of the world's Press were profuse. Those
papers that were not principal in the dispute and were removed
by oceans from the troubled scene were, for the most part,
pro-Eden. The French Government, people and Press mourned
the loss of a friend. Delbos seriously contemplated resignation
in sympathy, and L'Oeuvre talked of an appeal to Great Britain
through Sir Eric Phipps to keep Eden in the Cabinet.

In Berlin and Rome, of course, there was truculent rejoicing.
Goering's paper talked about changes in world conditions
rather than about changes inside the British Cabinet bringing
about the fall of the Foreign Office fortress. Italy saw the down-
fall of its "bogy man."

As for the British press, Rothermere and Beaverbrook duly
rejoiced. The Times and Telegraph were sombrely pro-Cham-
berlain, and congratulating themselves that there would be no
fundamental change in British aims. The News Chronicle
saluted Eden as the true champion of peace, while the Daily
Herald saw Chamberlain coming out stark and nakedly on the
side of power politics.

For the most part, the foreign and British press that took up
Eden's case, linked his downfall with Hitler's speech and Mus-
solini's policy. Damaging secret instructions were found to
have been given by the Duce to the Italian Press. As early as
20th February, 1937, he was alleged to have given the order.
"Insist on the eventuality of Eden's leaving the Foreign Office.
Have sent from London news of Eden's dismissal." A fortnight
before the resignation the Italian Press was inspired by the
decision and authority of the Italian Government to say that:
"Our opinion will not change until London's foreign policy
ceases to be directed by Mr. Eden. In many speeches and on
many occasions he has shown his poisoned attitude of mind
towards Italy."

On the whole, the world's Press understood the issue at stake,
but there was an underlying implication that Chamberlain's
policy would have to work itself out first before a final reckon-
ing could be made. Further, it was recognised that the general

166 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

situation was riddled with so many dangers that It was not
advisable to linger too long on the personal implications of
Eden's departure.

Few personal explanations to Parliament had been antici-
pated with more widespread anxiety and special attention than
that of Anthony Eden. He had been taken for granted. For the
first time he was not available. For the first time he had decided
to swim against the stream of office and promotion.

During question time in the House of Commons there was
the usual laughter preceding high seriousness which helped to
releve the tension. Sir Philip Sassoon was on his feet when
Eden's arrival brought a burst of cheers which drowned the
reply he was reading. At last, above the tumult. Sir Philip could
be heard declaring: ". . . another model which I hope may
prove more satisfactory."

Eden's statement struck from the beginning a note of re-
straint. "The immediate issue is whether official conversations
should be opened in Rome now. It Is my conviction that the
attitude of the Italian Government to international problems
in general and to this country in particular is not yet such as to
justify this course. The ground has been in no respect prepared.
Propaganda by the Italian Government against this country is
rife throughout the world. I am myself pledged to this House
not to open conversations with Italy until this hostile propa-
ganda ceases."

But Spain was only an example. The successive breaches of
faith on the part of Mussolini were only examples. "We cannot
consider this problem except in relation to the international
situation as a whole. The conditions today are not the same as
they were last July, nor even the same as they were last Janu-
ary. Recent months, recent weeks, recent days have seen the
successive violation of international agreements and attempts
to secure political decisions by forcible means. We are in the
presence of the progressive deterioration of respect for inter-
national obligations. It is quite impossible to judge these things
in a vacuum. In the light my judgment may well be wrong

REASONS WHY 167

of the present international situation this is a moment for this
country to stand firm."

Eden had said what was expected of him. His experience as
well as Ms conviction lay behind his grave warning to the
nation. All that he had worked for was at stake. The vision of
an international system based even on the most elementary
principles of law and justice was being rushed into the back-
ground of world politics and Britain, it seemed, was helping
this retrograde process.

The House, by its very silence, showed how deeply it was
stirred. He did not stand alone* Cranborne, timidly at first,
with all the subordination expected of an Under-Secretary,
followed, but soon was warming to his work with a conviction
that took Members by complete surprise. "It is no question
of delay," he cried, "as to the time at which conversations
should take place, or the method by which they should be
carried on. It is a question of the conditions under which any
negotiations between any countries can be carried on at all
with any useful results."

In the lobbies afterwards many thought Cranborne had made
the better case, while rumour got busy assessing the influence
exerted in the crisis by the house of Cecil. Eden had been doubt-
ful about the final decision; the words of Cranborne and the
will of Viscount Cecil had, it was confidently reported, tipped
the scales in favour of resignation.

The Prime Minister replied in his usual staccato a speech
of limited vision, perfunctory technique, but as an experienced
Parliamentarian put it, "good House of Commons stuff." Win-
ston Churchill speaks to the front bench and to those who have
a taste for epigram; Chamberlain used to talk to the back
benches, where wits are, comparatively speaking, dim, and
"stout, honest homespun" meets a readier response. "The peace
of Europe," said Chamberlain and in the light of the subse-
quent Austrian and Czech crises, the words are worthy of recall
"the peace of Europe must depend upon the four major
Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves. ... If we can

168 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

bring these four nations Into friendly discussion, Into a settling
of their difficulties, we shaE have saved the peace of Europe
for a generation."

In spite of all the drama of the remaining debate, which went
on Its passionate way until the Tuesday night, a political anti-
climax soon set In. The wild rumours of schisms, of middle
parties, gave way to the steady acquiescence of whip-led major-
ities. Chamberlain was able to say on Tuesday: "We must not
delude ourselves. We must not try to delude small and weak
nations into thinking that they will be protected by the League
against aggression." As the words were flashed to the capitals
of Europe, consternation, not to say alarm, was the immediate
reaction, but to the Conservative majority it was mere realism,
a sound sentiment that needed saying; Eden would learn the
truth one day when he had gained more experience, murmured
the elders of the Carlton Club with quiet satisfaction.

Greenwood thundered, Churchill provided Greek tragedy,
Lloyd George with his instinct for the realities of the political
situation involved himself in an affair of honour with the Prime
Minister. There had presumably been some intermediary be-
tween No. 10 Downing Street and the Italian Embassy. Lloyd
George warned Eden not to be "too good a boy," and once
again as father to son made it clear that people were looking
out for a young man of intelligence and ideals to lead them
forward. Lloyd George was convinced that Eden had the gift.

At the height of the personal exchanges between Lloyd
George and Chamberlain, Eden made a quiet intervention. The
specific charge was that a telegram from Grand! arrived on
Sunday morning. There was a Cabinet on Sunday afternoon
and the telegram was not there. What was the explanation?
Chamberlain rose immediately in a tumult of cheers and
counter-cheers. "Unofficially, Count Grandi communicated the
contents of the telegram to me on Sunday, and I communicated
them to the Cabinet." At which, Eden rose to clarify the posi-
tion. The atmosphere was electric. "At the time of my resigna-
tion I had received no official information whatever from the

REASONS WHY 169

Italian Government. It is true the Prime Minister told me he
had received such an intimation. Nothing reached the Foreign
Office while I was Foreign Secretary. If it had, of course, it
would have made no difference to my decision." Eden had
indirectly made his point. Grandi had been negotiating con-
trary to accepted custom over the head of the Department to
which he was accredited.

Neither Lloyd George nor the Cabinet nor even Eden him-
self were aware of the lengths to which Chamberlain had gone
to rid himself of his Foreign Secretary. From what we now
know Eden's decision to resign can only have forestalled by a
matter of hours Chamberlain's obvious resolve to remove him.
For arising from the meeting he and Eden had had with Grandi
on the Friday, Grandi reported to Ciano, the Italian Foreign
Secretary, that Chamberlain was seeking answers to questions,
"which were useful to him as ammunition against Eden."
"Contacts previously established," Grandi's report continues,
"between myself and Chamberlain through his confidential
agent proved to be very valuable. Purely as a matter of histori-
cal interest I inform Your Excellency that yesterday evening
after the Downing Street meeting, Chamberlain secretly sent
his agent to me (we made an appointment in an ordinary pub-
lic taxi) to say that c He sent me cordial greetings, that he appre-
ciated my statement, which had been very useful to him and
that he was confident that everything would go very well next
day.' "

Duff-Cooper's comment on this astonishing report is brief
and to the point, "The Prime Minister was, in fact, deliberately
playing a part throughout the Cabinet discussions. While allow-
ing his colleagues to suppose that he was anxious as any of
them to dissuade the Foreign Secretary from resigning, he had,
in reality, determined to get rid of him, and had secretly in-
formed the Italian Ambassador that he hoped to succeed in
doing so. Had I known this at the time, not only would I have
resigned with Eden, but I should have found it difficult to sit
in Cabinet with Neville Chamberlain again." He might have

170 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

if Lloyd George had known these facts lie would
have applied the coup de grace that he was to deliver under
the shadow of disaster and invasion two years later, when with
irresistible authority he called upon the same Prime Minister
to sacrifice his Seals of Office.

The friends of Eden demanded that he should be given a
further hearing. How far was he the victim of a threat? What
were the implications of an Anglo-Italian understanding? On
the Saturday he spoke to Ms constituents at Leamington. There
was tremendous enthusiasm. When he entered the Winter Hall
with his wife, the whole audience of nearly 2,000 people rose
to its feet and cheered Mm to the echo. A. J. Cummings noted
the majority of those present were young men and young
women. They had been queueing for two hours before the
meeting began, and many hundreds had to remain outside.
First, Eden dealt with the wMspering campaign wMch Sir John
Simon in particular, with smooth inaccuracy, had done much
to encourage, wMch was to the effect he had had to resign
because his health, and therefore Ms judgment, had been im-
paired by the strain of office. "You can judge for yourself
whether I look like a sick man. You shall be my witnesses that
there is no shred of truth in that suggestion." He insisted that
the meaning of the communications received from "a certain
foreign Government" on the previous week was "now or
never," and then came back to his recurring theme it was
with the great democracies that our national affinities lay.

Cummings' interpretation of the speech as a whole was "that
while it yielded nothing on the immediate issue between Mr.
Eden and Mr. Chamberlain, the former Foreign Secretary had
scrupulously refrained from saying anything wMch would seem
to widen the breach or deepen the injuries to the National Par-
ties, and that by Ms omissions he had left open the possibility
of his eventual return to the Cabinet."

CHAPTER 21

FROM MUNICH TO WAR

RESIGNATION is always a form of political death, how-
ever temporary Its consequences. In this sense it may be
said of Anthony Eden, more aptly than of any statesman
of our day, that he was felix opportunitate mortis. He was to
remain out of power for the next eighteen months those
disastrous months which did such grave injury to the political
reputations of so many of his colleagues in Neville Chamber-
lain's Government. Within a few weeks, the Anschluss had
been forcibly achieved, and Austria incorporated in Hitler's
Reich. The spring and summer wore on to the Czechoslovak
crisis and the Munich "settlement." March of the following
year saw the occupation of Prague and the final destruction of
Czechoslovakia, and the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland,
all leading remorselessly to 3rd September, 1939, and the war
which the western democracies entered in so disastrous a state
of unpreparedness, and with their honour, some would main-
tain, already tarnished. In all these events the desperate shifts
and accommodations dictated as much by panic as by that
fervent desire to save the peace which the unprejudiced his-
torian must put to the credit of the "men of Munich" Eden
played no part.

The political rebel must always be under a strong temptation
to justify his rebellion, to shift his attack from Parliament to
platform and Press, to gather supporters and lead them in a
dissident movement, Or if he does not carry his rebellion so
far, he may at least be expected to intervene in Parliamentary
debates on matters touching the department which he formerly
led, and to make his views and the weight of his experience felt.
From all this form of retaliation and self-assertion Eden re-

171

172 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

framed as much, one may believe, from Ms innate sense of
loyally to Ms former colleagues, as from any motive of long-
term policy.

On 28th April, we find Mm writing to Churchill, deploring
the Anglo-Italian agreement signed a few days earlier, wMch
effectively gave Italy a free hand in Abyssinia and Spain:

With regard to the Italian pact, I agree with what you
write. Mussolini gives us notMng more than the repetition of
promises previously made and broken by him, except for the
withdrawal of troops from Libya, troops wMch were prob-
ably originally sent there for their nuisance value. . . . None
the less I equally agree as to the need for caution in any
attitude taken up towards the agreement. After all it is not
* an Agreement yet, and it would be wrong certainly for me
to say anything wMch could be considered as making its
fruition more difficult. After all, tMs is precisely what I
promised I would not do in my resignation speech and at
Leamington.

Two days earlier, he had made Ms first public announcement
since his resignation speeches to Parliament and Ms constitu-
ents. It was an address to the Royal Society of St. George, and
the theme was, fittingly enough, "England." It was a short
speech, but it contained many warnings. He urged Ms audience
not to belittle "the strident challenge of the modern world,"
and he pointed out that though he himself was a convinced
believer in democracy, "yet it would be foolish, perhaps fatal
to the very survival of democracy, to ignore the stupendous
acMevements realised under other forms of government. A truly
immense effort has been made in the last few years by auto-
cratic states for the fulfilment of purposes they have set before
them. Their methods cannot be ours, but we should not fail
to note the passionate fervour with wMch they are being pur-
sued. The lesson is there to read. If we are to uphold our ideals,
our conception of life, both national and international., if we

FROM MUNICH TO WAR 173

are to see them prevail, then a comparable effort must be made
by us and an equal spirit be roused. Can any of us say that this
is true of our country today?"

In June, speaking again in his own constituency, he repeated
these warnings against the background of the mounting Czech
crisis. During the third week of May invasion had appeared
imminent, but the danger, following intense diplomatic activity
in the European capitals somehow passed, nobody quite knew
how. Eden left no doubt as to the moral he drew from these
sombre developments. "Nobody wiU quarrel," he declared,
"with the Government's wish to bring about appeasement in
Europe. Any other intention would be as foolish as it would be
wrong. But if appeasement is to mean what it says, it must not
be at the expense either of our vital interests, or of our national
reputation or of our sense of fair dealing. Appeasement will be
neither real nor lasting at such a price. It would merely make
real appeasement more difficult at a later stage. There must
always be a point at which we, as a nation, must make a stand
and we must clearly make a stand when not to do so would
forfeit our self-respect and the respect of others."

In the same month Eden returned to debate foreign affairs
once more in the Parliamentary arena. His rare public appear-
ances brought significant demonstrations of mass popularity.
When, for example, early in August he attended the Empire
Exhibition at Glasgow he received a tremendous welcome.
Later that month he was holidaymaking in Ireland and took
the opportunity of lunching with De Valera a convinced
disciple of Chamberlain's policy. In September he returned to
watch the war clouds gather over Europe but he was powerless
to influence the course of events. As appeasement was pursued
to its logical end, discerning critics could detect variations of
emphasis in British policy as between Downing Street and the
Foreign Office. On two critical occasions Chamberlain toned
down Foreign Office pronouncements. The strength of British
reactions to Hitler's designs on Czechoslovakia was likely to be
revealed in the degree of support offered to France. For it was

174 EDEN; THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

France and not Britain who had treaty obligations to the
Czechs. As in 1914 therefore a guarantee to France was the
touchstone of our Intentions. On the llth September foreign
journalists summoned to the Foreign Office for "an authorita-
tive statement** on British policy were told, "Great Britain
could not stand aside from a general conflict in which the
integrity of France might be menaced." Chamberlain at the
same time was speaking to the British Press of the "probability
in certain eventualities of this country going to the assistance of
France." That same afternoon Eden had an hour's talk with
Halifax at the Foreign Office and the next day to coincide with
Hitler's frantic Nuremberg speech which heralded the final
showdown a short and sharp letter from Eden was published in
The Times in support of the Foreign Office statement. While
urging settlement by conciliation he re-emphasised that Britain
would be at France's side in any emergency threatening her
security. "It would be the gravest tragedy if from a misunder-
standing of the mind of the British people the world was once
again to be plunged into conflict." Hitler, however, had no mis-
understanding of the democratic leadership confronting him.
Two days later Chamberlain was in Berchtesgaden, the spokes-
man as much of French as of British appeasement. A guarantee
to a France not prepared to fight its own diplomatic battles,
was not calculated to deflect the Fiihrer from his aggressive
designs. Eden did not intervene publicly again until Parlia-
ment's grand inquest on Munich. His contribution to the debate
was awaited with special interest, particularly in the light of
Duff-Cooper's resignation, to see how far he was prepared to
carry his known aversion to Chamberlain's diplomatic prin-
ciples and practices and to act as spokesman for the latest sense
of shame both within and outside Parliament.

He rose to "express his conviction" to the House and the
nation, and "for what it may be worth, to offer such suggestions
for the future."

Although the speech was marked by the deep disquiet which
all responsible people felt at that time, its tone was notably

FROM MUNICH TO WAR 175

moderate. If Eden was privately moved to any passion, whether
of indignation or of humiliation, he did not think it proper to
give vent to such feelings in public. Rather his attitude ap-
peared to be to accept the fait accompli, and to face the impli-
cations for the future. "It does not seem to me," he said, "that
it is so important to consider whether we should praise or blame
those proposals as it is to examine what the conditions were
that caused the British Government to press such proposals on
a friendly nation, and to consider once more what steps we are
to take now to see that we do not have to play so unpleasing
a role again."

He showed grave anxiety about the future of Czechoslovakia,
the national security of which he knew to be imperilled. He
pleaded strongly for more speedy rearmament at home, and for
a united national effort. But on the whole, the speech did
nothing to enhance his influence with the protagonists or oppo-
nents of Munich. It is clear that while his decision to intervene
was based on a right instinct, he was still too much inhibited
by his desire not to embarrass his former colleagues by out-
spoken criticism, and the result was accordingly lacking in
vigour and effectiveness.

He would perhaps have reacted more strongly if he could
have known that a mere ten days after Munich Hitler with
unparalleled arrogance was to make the maintenance of good
relations with Germany conditional upon the continuation in
office of Britain's existing leadership. Should Eden, Churchill
or Duff-Cooper come into power, the result, declared the
Fiihrer, would inevitably be war with the Reich.

A fortnight later at Southampton, Eden enunciated his polit-
ical creed on somewhat broader lines than he had been able to
do when in office or speaking within a Foreign Office context:

"Now when the world outlook is dark," he said, "the nation
is beginning to feel once again the need for unity, comradeship
and a joint national effort such as animated us in the war years.
It is one of the most encouraging features of an otherwise not
very encouraging future. There is a real danger that matters

176 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

may so drift that England may become a nation where one half
does not know how the other half lives. That would be very
bad. There Is a natural tendency to get used to evils that have
been long with us unemployment, for example. We have to
cling tight to our faith, to be clear what are those things we
prize so highly that we wiH not let them go."

After another somewhat inhibited contribution to the debate
on the Anglo-Italian Agreement, in which he made it clear that
just as he could not support that policy in February, so he felt
unable to support it in the lobby at the division, Eden returned
to Ms best form in the debate on the address on 10th Novem-
ber. Underlining the arguments he had used at Southampton,
he called for great sacrifices to meet the dictators' challenge to
democracy, but insisted that we must have a country worth
fighting for a country without distressed areas or an army of
unemployed. Could we meet the challenge, he asked, or must
we go on living from hand to mouth, wasting our substance
without an ordered plan, spending much and achieving little?
The drive for munitions and the drive for housing must go side
by side. "How could the national unity be realised unless made
on behalf of an England that was free and united, an England
of equal opportunity for all, regardless of class or creed, an
England in which comradeship was the spirit of the nation, an
England in which men refuse to rest content while poverty
continues to be the lot of many."

The effect of this speech was immediate and impressive.
Eden did not become an orator overnight, but his manner of
presenting his case, which had tended to be doctrinaire and to
lack robustness, acquired new force. Harold Nicholson com-
mented: "After listening to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of
Commons last night, many of us felt that a new leader had been
born." But there was considerable misunderstanding of his
position. Some professed to believe that he was making a bid
for the leadership of "the progressive forces" that had so far
"failed to act in unity." "There is no reason," observed the
Manchester Guardian, "to imagine anything so heroic," and a

FROM MUNICH TO WAR 177

study of Ms various speeches, "to say nothing of the political
forces out of which such a combination would have to be
formed, should quickly dispose of it." Rather he was engaged
within the framework of the Conservative Party on what fann-
ers sometimes call a policy of double digging. The procedure
was accordingly to stress the need for national unity, for Con-
servatives to produce it, and finally to imply that certain Con-
servatives were standing in the way of it. This argument was, as
can be seen from the examples cited, reinforced by applying a
critical eye not only to the foreign scene but also to the devasta-
tions of the home front. Eden's response to Munich was to
undertake a tour of the special areas, and trading estates. He
was collecting ammunition in order to widen the field of his
operations against complacent and inert policy. "Mr. Eden's
campaign (for it is hardly less)," the Manchester Guardian
commented, "is extremely significant. It is not cast in any party
mould, and Mr. Eden has no wish to change his party. It springs
from the feeling that we have reached a point where the policy
of the Government is an inadequate expression of the national
will, and has lost the power to evoke a national response."

"If, as seems to be disastrously probable, Mr. Chamberlain's
dream of 'appeasement' by his present methods is cruelly dis-
solved, the country will not be without an alternative working
faith which transcends our ineffectual party groupings."

The day before this exercise in speculation appeared in the
News Chronicle (15th November), thirty-four of Mr. Eden's
known supporters had tabled an amendment to the Address
demanding a more vigorous social service policy and implying
criticism of the Government, particularly on rearmament. But
while Labour was perhaps looking with interest towards Eden,
he himself had sedulously refrained from overt criticism of his
old chief, and from any attempt to organise a revolutionary
movement. Perhaps the most impressive demonstration of
Eden's mass popularity at this time was a League of Nations'
rally at the Queen's Hall at which he was the principal speaker.
The demand to hear him was so great that the Queen's Hall was

178 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

out and a large overflow meeting had to be organised.
Eden the assembled multitudes as though delivering

a lecture on some abstruse problem in international law. Politi-
cal and emotional content of the speech was nil and it was left
to Lady Violet Bonham Carter to rouse the people. The over-
whelming impression left by Eden was that whatever his other
public attributes might be, leading crusades or guiding chosen
people through wildernesses were not among them.

In December he visited America, at the invitation of the
National Association of Manufacturers, and addressed the
Annual Congress of American Industry in New York, giving
them "the point of view of the average Englishman upon the
world problems of today." In the course of his speech he de-
fined democracy as "a university in which we learn from one
another. It can never be a barracks, where blind obedience is
the first essential/' and declared that "the art of government
consists in striking a just balance between the claims of the
individual and those of the State to which he owes allegiance."
It was a forthright statement of vigorous beliefs, well suited
to the audience before him.

On his return, he found that the rumours concerning Ms
political future had not died down. Lady Violet Bonham Carter
referred to his "implacable fairness" which, one newspaper
insisted, had prevented Mm from exercising any noticeable
influence on public opinion since his resignaton, and continued,
"I cannot help thinking that what I would prefer to call Ms
tepid impartiality is due to a not unnatural human desire to
leave open the door for a return to office."

There were deeper and more drastic reasons for restraint on
the home front. On 15th March, Hitler's legions marched into
Prague, thereby converting the Munich agreement within six
months of signature into yet another scrap of paper. A week
later they had annexed Memel. On 31st March, Britain had
made the fateful guarantee to Poland. Appeasement had suf-
fered sudden death and in the process there was neither time
nor opportunity for post mortems.

FROM MUNICH TO WAR 179

Nonetheless the darkening scene and the new situation
created by it caused widespread speculation about Eden's re-
turn to office and power. On 27th March, the Evening Standard
reported in revealing and characteristic Beaverbrookese: "The
air is filled with political rumours. Some say that Mr. Chamber-
lain will resign, others that Mr. Eden will be brought back to
the Cabinet. A third prediction is for an immediate General
Election. Mr. Chamberlain will not resign. At his age men hold
on, and this man will certainly do so. Nor will Mr. Eden be
brought back. It would be folly to include him in the Cabinet
until the Italian position has been clarified. For Mr. Eden is
even more distrusted in Italy than he is in Germany. 5 '

Ten days later, "the Italian position" was "clarified" to the
extent that Mussolini had seen fit to invade Albania without
warning or provocation on Good Friday. Whatever the dicta-
tors or Beaverbrook might think there was certainly a consider-
able and growing volume of opinion in this country in favour
of the "folly" of recalling both Eden and Churchill. Eden's
popularity was, indeed, at its zenith. A poll held during April
by the British Institute of Public Opinion showed Eden with
a clear majority over all other possible candidates "if Mr.
Chamberlain retires." He received 38 per cent of the votes, the
nearest being Halifax and Churchill, who each received 7 per
cent.

In the same month, having offered his services to the War
Office in any capacity, Eden was gazetted a major in the
Rangers, a London territorial battalion forming part of the
King's Royal Rifle Corps, the regiment in which he had served
with such distinction in the 1914-1918 war. This was the unit
with which he went to camp in August, and the photographs
which the Press then carried of him, in uniform and under
canvas, served to confirm public confidence in his character
and judgment.

On 10th May, when the Prime Minister reported progress to
the House on negotiations with Russia, Eden re-emphasised his
belief that it was urgent to secure an understanding among

180 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Britain, France and Soviet Russia. Churchill reveals that in the
month Eden volunteered to visit Moscow again
he was, it will be remembered, the only British statesman with
any first-hand knowledge of Stalin and the Kremlin. "A re-
newed effort to come to an arrangement with Soviet Russia/'
writes Mr. Churchill, "was made by the British and French
Governments. It was decided to send a special envoy to Mos-
cow. Mr. Eden, who had made useful contacts with Stalin some
years before, volunteered to go. This generous offer was de-
clined by the Prime Minister. Instead on 12th June, Mr. Strang,
an able official but without any special standing outside the
Foreign Office, was entrusted with this momentous mission."
Eden was now regularly taking part in foreign affairs de-
bates, and appearing at international gatherings. In June, for
instance, he went to Paris for Les Conferences des Ambassa-
deurs, and spoke twice in French, once with M. Paul Reynaud
and once with M. Herriot in the chair. In July he spoke in the
House of Commons on the Far Eastern situation, and referred
again to the hoped-for agreement with Russia: "These negotia-
tions with Russia are always being forecast either in this coun-
try or in Paris as just about to finish but they never seem quite
to reach their end. Indeed in his connection I am reminded of
La Rochefoucauld's definition of love and ghosts everybody
is always talking about it but nobody has ever seen it." A month
later, recalled with Parliament on 24th August from his terri-
torial camp, he spoke on the Emergency Powers Bill. "There
are many things that could be done," he said. "I think there is
another danger, and not having the responsibility of office I do
not see why I should not state it. It is possible that there are
at this moment many people in Germany who believe that in
the event of hostilities with Poland they may in a few short
weeks or months obtain their military objectives in the East,
and that, having done that, they appear to believe that we
should take no further interest in the matter. If there are any
who really think that, they are making the greatest error in
history."

CHAPTER 22

WAR MINISTER

THE RESPONSIBILITY of office," was very soon to be
Eden's once more. On 3rd September with the formal
declaration of war the Government was at once recon-
stituted from the resources of its own official supporters the
Labour and Liberal Parties having decided for the time being
that the national interest was best served by their remaining in
opposition. Accordingly Churchill became First Lord of the
Admiralty, and Eden, Secretary of State for the Dominions
without a seat in the War Cabinet, but with the privilege of
attending it constantly for consultation. On llth September,
the British Expeditionary Force arrived in France, and on the
same evening Eden broadcast to the Empire. In it he returned
to the point which he had made in the House of Commons a
fortnight earlier: "Let there be no mistake about this. Our
determination to see this war through to the end is unshaken.
We must make it clear to the Nazi leaders and, if we can, to the
German people that this country as the Prime Minister said
has not gone to war about the fate of a far-away city in a
foreign land. We have decided to fight to show that aggression
does not pay, and the German people must realise that this
country means to go on fighting until that goal is reached."

It is beyond the scope and purpose of this narrative to re-
capitulate the history of the momentous political and military
events of the Second World War. Eden was from the outset
engaged in the framing and direction of British policy at the
highest level. As the war unfolded so did his influence and
responsibilities expand. The "phony" war or "twilight" war
as Churchill has preferred to christen it lingered on through-
out the winter and early spring of 1939-40. In October, Eden

1S1

182 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

received the Dominion Ministers who had come to London for
a conference, broadcast a message of welcome to them.
Later he accompanied the Ministers on a tour of the British
and French fronts in France.

In the following February he was again overseas, meeting
the Australian and New Zealand troops who had just disem-
barked at Suez, having welcomed the first wave of Canadian
forces to reach Britain. In March, the Manchester Guardian
was writing: "Mr. Anthony Eden is very popular with the
soldiers of the Canadian Army. When he visited the men's
mess of one of the regiments in training he received one of the
greatest ovations ever given to an official visitor to the Canadian
forces. It was electrifying." His work was, of course, of first
importance, but it was not spectacular. When he left the
Dominions Secretaryship in May, 1940, the broad lines of
Commonwealth co-operation had been laid down; military
units from the Dominions had already reached their stations;
in the naval sphere, "each one of the Dominions," as he told
the House of Commons as early as 6th December, 1939, "had
made the whole of its naval resources available to work in
co-operation with the Admiralty," and a ship of the New
Zealand Division, Achilles, had taken part in the battle of the
River Plate; the great Empire Air Training Scheme had been
conceived and was in operation. These are sound achievements,
though it is arguable that a less gifted statesman and adminis-
trator might have been able to show the same results, and that
Chamberlain had not given him a part to play which could
provide scope for his talents and experience.

Meanwhile, on 9th April, Germany occupied Denmark and
invaded Norway. British troops also landed in Norway almost
a week later and the brief campaign began which was to lead to
disaster and as a result the downfall of the Government. Eden
had no occasion to intervene in the dramatic Norway debate
in which Amery quoted Cromwell's ruthless words to the Long
Parliament: "Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In
the name of God go!" And Lloyd George in response to the

WAR MINISTER 183

Prime Minister's appeal to his friends and plea for sacrifice
called upon Chamberlain Mmself to sacrifice Ms Seals of Office.
The Government could not survive attack from so many flanks.

Germany had already swept into Belgium and Holland when
Chamberlain resigned, and Winston Churchill entered on the
great premiership with which his fame will be linked for all
time. He had promised to let the King have, before midnight,
the names of five key ministers, and he "had already made
up Ms mind who they would be." Among them was that of
Anthony Eden, who at the age of forty-five became Secretary
of State for War.

He held this office for a period of rather more than six
months. They were months wMch saw the defeat of France,
and Britain standing alone to defy the Nazi-Fascist threat to
civilisation. They saw also the defeat of Hitler's pre-invasion
onslaught on Britain in the air, and our first successes in what
was to prove the protracted battle of North Africa and the
Mediterranean. Such harassing and anxious moments are
hardly the periods in wMch great reputations are made by War
Ministers indeed, it is doubtful if tMs particular political
appointment has ever led in British history to spectacular dis-
tinction. In particular under Churchill the Service Departments
in fact and in theory were subordinated to the techniques he
applied for controlling the Mgher direction of the war. In Ms
capacity as Minister of Defence without a fully equipped Min-
istry or Department the Service Ministries themselves became
the instruments of Ms co-ordinating will. The system he de-
veloped helped to ensure that there was no repetition of the
military and political clashes wMch so distracted and hampered
Lloyd George's premiersMp in World War I.

The first necessity was to organise home defence against the
imminent threat of invasion. Eden had already persuaded the
War Cabinet of the need to form the Local Defence Volun-
teers, and on 14th May he broadcast an appeal to the nation to
join tMs body. In the end it was ChurcMll himself, with his un-
rivalled instinct for popular psychology, who found the title by

134 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

which the L.D.V. finally came to be known. In July he minuted
to Eden: "I don't think much of the name 'Local Defence Vol-
unteers* for your very large new force. The word local* is
uninspiring. Mr. Herbert Morrison suggested to me today the
title 'Civic Guard/ but I think 'Home Guard' would be better."
And Home Guard they became but the credit for initiating
the force still rests with Eden.

To Churchill himself belongs the stem decision that Calais
had to be held to the last gasp, and not relieved, in order that
the Dunkirk evacuation should have a real chance of success.
Eden with Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
acquiesced in this decision, which on personal grounds was
particularly painful for Mm to accept. As Churchill writes:
* tr The final decision not to relieve the garrison was taken on the
evening of 26th May. Until then the destroyers were held
ready. Eden and Ironside were with me at the Admiralty. We
three came out from dinner and at 9:00 P.M. did the deed. It in-
volved Eden's own regiment, in which he had long served and
fought in the previous struggle. One has to eat and drink in
war, but I could not help feeling physically sick as we after-
wards sat silent at the table."

Another hard and crucial decision was taken in mid- July,
when Eden pressed on the Prime Minister that General Brooke
should be appointed to the command of the Home Forces in
place of Ironside. Churchill was quick to see the justice and
value of this recommendation. In the event General Brooke
was in command of the Home Forces for nearly a year and a
half, and then served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff
throughout the remainder of the war, a post in which he was to
render such signal service to Allied strategy.

The question of the Commandos, which arose in September,
illustrates the kind of difficulty which a War Secretary must
expect to face. There had been much opposition to the estab-
lishment of this special force among high-ranking regular sol-
diers, and in an illuminating minute addressed to Eden, the
Prime Minister wrote on 8th September, 1940: "I hope you will

WAR MINISTER 185

make sure that when you give an order it is obeyed with
promptness. Perhaps you could explain to me what has hap-
pened to prevent your decision being made effective. In my ex-
perience of Service departments, which is a long one, there is
always a danger that anything contrary to Service prejudices
will be obstructed and delayed by officers of the second grade
in the machine. The way to deal with this is to make signal
examples of one or two. When this becomes known you get
better service afterwards." It would be invidious to probe too
deeply into any action that the Secretary of State may have
taken as a result of this minute. The work of the Commandos
in the subsequent history of the war is too well known, and too
well appreciated by all branches of the Service, to require fur-
ther comment.

Eden's biggest tasks and heaviest responsibility during his
time as War Secretary came when in October, 1940, Churchill
decided that he was the man to go to the Middle East and assess
by personal inspection the exact position and potentialities in
Egypt and North Africa generally. The Prime Minister was
particularly worried about the "waste" of regular troops in po-
lice duty; the "general slackness" of the Middle East Command
in concentrating troops for battle; there was also grave concern
about Malta. Being "in such close agreement with the Secre-
tary of State for War," he felt "the need for having our views
put forward on the spot instead of through endless telegrams."
Eden, delighted with the scope of his mission, reached Cairo on
15th October, and immediately held "searching discussions
with both Wavell and Maitland Wilson. He was anxious to es-
tablish what could be done by our forces, supposing that the
anticipated Italian attack did not come off, and it was in reply
to this enquiry that the generals first spoke of their own plans
for an offensive. He was informed, too, of the importance of
infantry tanks ("Matildas") in desert operations, and informed
the Prime Minister of this. Churchill answered: "I have read
all your telegrams with deepest interest and realisation of the
value of your visit. We are considering how to meet your needs.

186 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

continue to master the local situation. Do not hurry
your return. 5 *

On 28th October, the day that Mussolini Invaded Greece,
both Wavell and Eden were in Khartoum, conferring with Gen-
eral Smuts. Two days later, our troops occupied Suda Bay, and
Crete came into the forefront of the picture. The Prime Minis-
ter was of the opinion that "the Greek situation must now be
held to dominate all others;' and had urged Eden to examine
the whole problem with Wavell, and not to hesitate "to make
proposal for action on a large scale (in Crete) at the expense of
other sectors."

The fact was, of course, that Eden was by now in possession
of information that was unknown to the Premier. Churchill and
bis colleagues at home had been left under the Impression that
Wavell and Wilson were wedded to waiting for a defensive
battle at Mersa Matrah. This was due to the secrecy which the
two generals had felt it necessary to impose, and Eden was
begged not to send any telegram on the subject, but to wait till
he could convey his information verbally.

On 1st November, Eden had telegraphed: "We cannot from
Middle East Forces send sufficient air or land reinforcements
to have any decisive influence upon course of fighting in
Greece. To send such forces from here, or to divert reinforce-
ments now on their way or approved, would imperil our whole
position in the Middle East and jeopardise plans for an offen-
sive now being laid in more than one theatre" This message
was certainly a trifle cryptic, and on the 3rd Churchill was
again urging Eden to "grasp the situation firmly," and the
abandonment of "negative and passive policies." The oppor-
tunity, he insisted, must be seized. "Safety first," he character-
istically added, "is the road to ruin in war. Send me your
proposals at earliest or say you have none to make."

During this first week in November, Eden was clamouring to
return, and on 8th November he was back home. "He brought
with Mm," says Mr. Churchill, "the carefully guarded secret
which I wished I had known earlier." It was unfolded to a

WAR MINISTER 187

"select circle/* including the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff and General Ismay, and consisted, as is now common
knowledge, of the famous operation "Compass," planned by
Wilson and Wavell, which envisaged an allied attack on Grazi*
ani's Army (about 80,000 strong), which had crossed the
Egyptian frontier and was spread out on a fifty mile front in a
series of fortified camps, separated by wide distances, not mu-
tually supporting, and with no depth in the system. The plan
involved a serious risk, but the prize Graziani's Army was,
as the event proved, well worth the hazard.

"Here was the deadly secret which the generals had talked
over with their Secretary of State," writes Mr. Churchill. "This
was what they had not wished to telegraph. We were all de-
lighted. I purred like six cats."

The desert attack, the prospect of which had put the Prime
Minister in such a happy mood of feline tranquillity, was
launched on 6th December, and by early in the New Year "the
great Italian Army which had hoped to conquer Egypt scarcely
existed as a military force." But by then Eden had entered upon
his second term of office as Foreign Secretary.

CHAPTER 23

CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN
INSTRUMENT

ON 12th December, 1940, Lord Lothian, British Am-
bassador in Washington, died, and Lord Halifax was
appointed to succeed Mm. "I had no doubt," writes
Churchill, "who should fill the vacancy at the Foreign Office.
On all the great issues of the past four years I had dwelt in close
agreement with Anthony Eden. . . . Together we had abstained
from the vote on Munich. Together we had resisted the party
pressures brought to bear upon us in our constituencies during
the winter of that melancholy year. We had been united in
thought and sentiment at the outbreak of the war and as col-
leagues during its progress.

"The greater part of Eden's public life had been devoted to
the study of foreign affairs. He had held the splendid office of
Foreign Secretary with distinction, and had resigned it when
only forty-two years of age for reasons which are retrospect and
at this time (1949) viewed with the approval of all parties in
the State. He had played a fine part as Secretary of State for
War during this terrific year, and his conduct of Army affairs
had brought us very close together. We thought alike, even
without consultation, on a very great number of practical issues
as they arose from day to day. I looked forward to an agreeable
and harmonious comradeship between the Prime Minister and
Foreign Secretary, and this hope was certainly fulfilled during
the four and a half years of war and policy which lay before us.
Eden was sorry to leave the War Office, in all the stress and
excitements of which he was absorbed; but he returned to the
Foreign Office like a man going home."

This is a very remarkable tribute from the man of all others

188

CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN INSTRUMENT 189

who is most qualified to speak, and whose judgment of men
and affairs carries special weight. It sets a seal upon Eden's
career up to that point, and endorses the part which he was to
play during the next critical years. In writing thus generously
of his colleague, Winston Churchill is writing with the pen of
History. Yet, in all that follows, it will be well to remember
that, inspiring as was the Prime Minister's leadership and vast
as was his experience of public affairs and his reputation over-
seas, he can have been no easy master to serve. The guiding
hand which the Prime Minister liked to keep on the reins of all
departments vital to the war effort was sometimes a heavy one,
and though Eden himself would be the first to deny that
Churchill acted as "Ms own Foreign Secretary," there inevi-
tably came times indeed, the conduct of the war demanded it
when the initiative in the handling of foreign relations passed
across Downing Street from the Foreign Office to No. 10. The
problem would have been much more acute but for that genu-
ine and deep harmony between the two men to which Churchill
himself draws our attention.

The ministerial changes announced at the same time in-
cluded the appointment of David Margesson, formerly Con-
servative Chief Whip, to the War Office, and that of Cranborne,
who still retained the Dominions Secretaryship, as spokesman
for foreign affairs in the House of Lords. Thus was re-estab-
lished the original happy partnership which had only been dis-
rupted by the resignation of both partners in 1938. R. A.
Butler, who had akeady laid the foundations of his consider-
able reputation as Foreign Under-Secretary, retained that post.

But Eden was to carry additional burdens. From 1942 to
1945 he was Leader of the House of Commons. By 1945 he
had paid two war-time visits to Moscow. The first took place in
1941, to lay the groundwork for a twenty-year Russo-British
mutual assistance agreement, and the second to sign the Mos-
cow Three-Power agreement. Throughout he accompanied the
Prime Minister to great conferences which shaped the high
strategy of the war. Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, Teheran and

190 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Yalta. These were momentous missions, the political and mili-
tary implications of which are still being analysed and debated.
Before recounting Eden's part in these historic developments it
is pleasant to recall an intimate personal impression of the For-
eign Secretary provided by that great United States Ambas-
sador and friend of embattled Britain, John G. Winant, in his
short but moving record of those days which he called A
Letter from Grosvenor Square.

"When I reached London in 1941, Anthony Eden, Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, was in the Middle East. I reported
to Washington that I had missed his help. We had much in
common. We had served as soldiers in the last war in the Allied
Armies. Many of our friends fell in France. We had each in our
own country supported the League of Nations from its incep-
tion. We had worked in the pre-war days in the international
field to maintain the rule of law and social justice among na-
tions. When we met in May, Great Britain was fighting for her
life, the Western Front was smashed, and, in the free France of
Lafayette and Foch, the tricolor had been torn down and the
swastika flew over a conquered Europe.

"Eden had been one of the few to understand and resist
Mussolini. . . . The weakness of an appeasement-minded gov-
ernment had allowed Hitler and Mussolini to drive him from
public office. He, Cranborne and Churchill, and a few others
who represented the minority opinion, were swept aside as war-
mongers; warmongers because they had not forgotten the
causes for which men had fought and died in the 1914 war. . . .

"The reputation of a statesman outside his own country is
often limited, nor does it always reflect a true picture of a man's
worth. Many people at home liked Eden because he was good-
looking, well dressed, conservative and a Britisher who frankly
liked the United States. I found him a hard-working, unafraid
Englishman who had spent his life in the service of his country.
He was one of the best trained diplomats I have ever met. He
had no use for shoddy politics whether at home or abroad. His
views and his judgment on public affairs were based on knowl-

CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN INSTRUMENT 191

edge of the voluminous despatches on foreign relations and
military affairs that passed his desk. No one I know carried a
heavier load in the war. ... He used his command of foreign
relations and his leadership in the Commons, with his knowl-
edge of the military situation, to broaden policy, to strengthen
understanding, to effect co-ordination, and to bring about unity
of action.

'The personal relationship between the Prime Minister and
Anthony Eden was as close and real as President Roosevelt's
friendship for Harry Hopkins. Roosevelt and Churchill, each a
great leader singleminded in serving his country, understood
that most men who crossed their doorsteps wanted something.
Eden and Hopkins wanted nothing beyond being useful and
loyal to a cause and a leader. They both had the courage to tell
the truth, whether it was wanted or unwanted, to the men under
whom they served. If this had been all they did the people of
both countries would still owe them a deep debt of gratitude.

"Eden was always on call, both day and night. He worked in
the Foreign Office building. It was a great stone structure,
ornate, with high ceilings, long corridors and with a formal
staircase. Broken windows, which had been filled in with cloth,
as well as imperfect lighting, gave a sense of darkness and
dreariness to the place. It had few of the advantages of a mod-
ern structure and yet, like some old-fashioned concerns, it had
stood the test of time. It was an efficient workshop because it

was staffed with competent people The Foreign Secretary's

personal office was on the north-eastern corner of the building,
looking out on St. James's Park and across on to the new
Admiralty building. It was a spacious room, cold in winter but
light and cheery, well furnished and easily adapted for confer-
ence use. . . .

"Like all other British Ministers, Eden lived on the job. He
and his wife occupied a small apartment which had been an
office on the top floor of the Foreign Office building. Twice it
was blasted by bomb explosion, and the windows blown in.
Luckily there was no one in at either time.

192 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

"We had an odd informal relationship, based not only on
personal friendship but also on our regard for each other's
country and for our own. We both got satisfaction from work-
ing together for measures and actions that were of mutual ad-
vantage to both countries. In doing the day's work we tried to
drop out the non-essentials of the usual diplomatic interchange
and yet we were both exact in preparing formal agreements.

"We used to go down occasionally on a Sunday to his coun-
try house in Sussex. It was not different from London as far as
the work load was concerned, and we had the same long hours
hooked up to a 'scrambler' telephone, but instead of a room
and a desk we used to go out into the garden. I have never
known anyone who cared more about flowers or vegetables or
fruit trees, or wind blowing across wheatfields, or the green
pastures which marked out the Sussex Downs. We used to get
our fun weeding the garden. We would put our despatch boxes
at either end, and when we had completed a row we would do
penance by reading messages and writing the necessary replies.
Then we would start again our menial task, each in some sub-
conscious fashion trying to find a sense of lasting values in the
good earth.

"I liked Eden. I found him simple, truthful, and courageous.
In those years before the United States became engaged in the
war, he had two obsessions which I shared. He was determined,
whatever the cost, not to involve his country in secret treaties,
and never to repeat the British mistake in the last war when
they made concessions to the Arabs which ran counter to their
agreements under the Balfour Declaration. He never did. His
entire foreign policy was based upon a high conception of
moral right."

This is indeed high tribute from a discerning, sensitive eye-
witness. The respect was mutual; for welcoming him as Ambas-
sador Eden declared, "He cares much for his work, little for
Party politics, not at all for himself. Humanity is the key to Mr.
Winanf s lifework."

Two events in the year 1 941 are outstanding in Eden's bud-

CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN INSTRUMENT 193

get of responsibility his visit to the Middle East, and Ms visit
to Moscow. Neither of them can be said to have resulted in un-
qualified success but at this stage of the war Britain was
barely doing more than hold her own; and diplomatic initiative
was directly dependent upon military results and strategic pros-
pects.

When Eden left for his Middle East mission within a couple
of months of becoming Foreign Secretary, he was given wider
discretion on the spot by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. His
principal object was to be the dispatch of speedy succour to
Greece, and for this purpose he was to "initiate any action he
might think necessary" with the Commander in Chief, Middle
East, with the Egyptian Government, and with the Govern-
ments of Greece, Jugoslavia and Turkey. He was accompanied
by Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, who was to
advise on the military aspect. Eden was to "address himself to
the problem of securing the highest form of war economies
throughout the Middle East," and even to advise the Govern-
ment on the selection of commanders for all the different pur-
poses in view. He was, in short, "to gather together all the
threads and propose continuously the best solutions for our
difficulties, and not to be deterred from acting upon his own
authority if the urgency was too great to allow reference
home."

Eden quickly came to the conclusion, after his initial con-
ferences with Dill and the three Commanders in Chief
Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore at Cairo, that help
should be sent to Greece, and the matter was settled after he
had paid a flying visit to the Greek King and his Government
at Athens. Meanwhile he had little success in his negotiations
with the Turks, who pointed out, not unreasonably, that the
forces with which Britain could provide her were insufficient
to make any real difference in a battle. He did, however, obtain
an undertaking that Turkey would in any event enter the war
at some stage. The Chiefs of Staff at home were still doubtful
about the wisdom of intervention in Greece* but Eden had con-

194 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

vinced the Cabinet, and on 14th March, the Prime Minister
telegraphed to him, suggesting that he should remain where he
was for a time: "No one but you can combine and concert the
momentous policy which you have pressed upon us and which
we have adopted."

At the end of March came the bloodless revolution in Jugo-
slavia. Eden was already on his way home when the news of
this event reached London, and again the Prime Minister urged
him to return for the present to Cairo. Thus it happened that he
was still in the Middle East when Rommel launched his attack,
and he had to witness the loss of all that had been gained by the
original British drive in the preparation for which he had
shared during his previous mission. He finally left for home in
early April, after a conference at which it had been decided
that Wavell would attempt to hold Tobruk, if possible. It can-
not have been a very encouraging home-coming either for the
Foreign Secretary or for the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, Yet it is clear that the right decisions had been taken, and
Churchill records that although the Greek adventure ended in
disaster, "there is no doubt that the Mussolini-Hitler crime of
over-running Greece, and our effort to stand against tyranny
and save what we could from its claws, appealed profoundly to
the people of the United States, and above all to the great man
who led them." In global war the sequence of cause and effect
is not always easy to follow and cannot be made manifest to
the principal actors at the time. Resistance to one Axis diver-
sion in the Balkans admittedly ending in local disaster was in-
strumental in directing Hitler from his major strategic purpose.
It seems to have delayed the initial blitzkrieg invasion of Russia
by some six weeks a big enough margin to turn the scales
against the chance of occupying Moscow before the full rigours
of the Russian winter set in. Such are the mighty consequences
that can flow from a single bold decision taken in a minor sec-
tor of the conflict. In submitting to Parliament that support for
Greece was politically and militarily the right decision, Eden
quoted Wolfe's dictum that "War is an option of difficulties,"

CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN INSTRUMENT 195

adding that this was certainly so "until our strength in every
arm, in every theatre is so great that it makes the odds all
even."

At 4:00 A.M. on 22nd June, Ribbentrop delivered a formal
declaration of war to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, and for
the next four years and much longer the major preoccupa-
tions of the British Foreign Secretary were to be governed by
the vast implications of the sudden and forced contacts with
the West into which Russia was thus precipitated. Even that
minimum of understanding and co-operation with Stalin which
was vitally necessary to the joint prosecution of the war seemed
almost impossible to obtain in those early months. Churchill's
memoirs show how firmness and patience eventually triumphed
though at considerable cost and his account of British re-
lations with the Russian leader continuously reveal suspicion,
reluctance and delay on the part of Moscow, alternating with
violent demands for impossible military adventures or political
concessions. It was after contemplating "the almost hysterical
note of Stalin's message about Finland" that the Prime Minister
decided to offer to send Eden to Moscow, accompanied by high
military and other experts, in order to undertake a general re-
view of the war in both its military and general aspects and to
put the alliance, if possible, on a formal and written treaty
basis.

Stalin replied on 23rd November, in a much calmer tone,
warmly welcoming the suggestion, and Eden duly set out from
Scapa Flow. He left on the night of 7th-8th December, perhaps
the most dramatic moment of the war. For as he set out the
news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was actually
breaking on the British Government. At the same time the
German guns had penetrated within twelve miles of Moscow.
The Prime Minister having decided that his "mission was all
the more important in consequence of the new explosion," in-
structed the Foreign Secretary to continue his voyage, and
promised to keep him closely informed of events. "There was,"
he grimly adds, "plenty to tell." Meanwhile Churchill himself

196 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

set out for the United States to meet President Roosevelt, now
no longer the friendly neutral but the mighty Ally commanding
the greatest resources for the achievement of total victory the
world had ever known.

On Ms return, Eden summarised the result of his mission in
a full despatch, dated 5th January, 1942. Significantly enough
the primary theme was not the overwhelming immediate crisis.
"At my first conversation with M. Stalin and M. Molotov on
16th December/* he writes, "M. Stalin set out in some detail
what he considered should be the post-war territorial frontiers
in Europe and in particular Ms ideas regarding the treatment of
Germany. . . .

"In the course of tMs first conversation M. Stalin . . . showed
interest in a post-war military alliance between the 'democratic
countries/ and stated that the Soviet Union had no objection to
certain countries of Europe entering into federal relationsMp,
if they so desired. . . .

"In the second conversation on December 17th ? M. Stalin
pressed for the immediate recognition by His Majesty's Gov-
ernment of the future frontiers of the U.S.S.R. more particu-
larly in regard to the inclusion within the U.S.S.R. of the Baltic
States and the restoration of the Finnish-Soviet frontier. He
made the conclusion of any Anglo-Soviet agreement dependent
on agreement on tMs point. . . ."

Mr. ChurcMll comments: "In the forefront of the Russian
claims was the request that the Baltic States, wMch Russia had
subjugated at the beginning of the war, should be fully incor-
porated in the Soviet Union. There were many other conditions
about Russian imperial expansion, coupled with fierce appeals
for unlimited supplies and impossible military action. As soon
as I read the telegrams I reacted violently against the absorp-
tion of the Baltic States."

TMs question was, indeed, the stumbling-block, and it led
Robert Sherwood to comment, in Ms The White House Papers
of Harry Hopkins, that Eden's mission had been largely fruit-
less. Events were to prove that this was not the case. As evi-

CHURCHILL'S CHOSEN INSTRUMENT 197

dence of Stalin's deep and long term calculations the encounter
was highly revealing; moreover the Foreign Secretary's own
account of the ending of his talks shows a certain hopefulness
for the immediate future: "We took leave of one another in a
very friendly atmosphere. After my explanations M. Stalin
seemed fully to understand our inability to create a second
front in Europe at the present time. He showed considerable
interest in the progress of our Libyan offensive. ... He did not
consider that he was yet strong enough to continue the cam-
paign against Germany and also to provoke hostilities with
Japan. . . ."

The Russian negotiations could not, of course, and did not
end there. In May, 1942, Molotov came to London with a view
to negotiating a treaty of alliance, and Eden was in charge of
the discussions, which began at the Foreign Office on 21st
May. Churchill confesses that his feeling of intransigence on
the question of the Baltic States had undergone a certain modi-
fication during the months which had intervened, since he did
not feel "that this moral position could be physically main-
tained. In a deadly struggle," he continues, "it is not right to
assume more burdens than those who are fighting for a great
cause can bear. My feelings about the Baltic States were, and
are unaltered; but I felt that I could not carry them farther for-
ward at this time."

Happily the issue was not pressed, and it was Eden himself
who found a formula acceptable to the Russians, on the basis
of substituting for a territorial agreement a general and public
treaty of alliance for twenty years, omitting all reference to
frontiers. Molotov showed signs of giving way, and requested
permission from Stalin to negotiate on the basis of Eden's draft.
Two days later the treaty, without any territorial provisions,
was signed. "This was a great relief to me," comments Church-
ill, "and a far better solution than I had dared hope. Eden
showed much skill in the timing of his suggestion."

About this time June, 1942 the Prime Minister decided
to fly to the United States for Ms second visit to Roosevelt. The

198 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Journey was the occasion for a very significant development in
the career of Anthony Eden.

"It is not customary,' 5 writes Churchill, "for a Prime Minis-
ter to advise the Sovereign officially upon Ms successor unless
he is asked to do so. As it was war-time, I sent the King, in
response to a request he had made to me in conversation at our
last weekly interview, the folowing letter:

" In case of my death on this journey I am about to under-
take, I avail myself of Your Majesty's gracious permission to
advise that you should entrust the formation of a new Govern-
ment to Mr. Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, who is in my mind the outstanding Minister in the
largest political party in the House of Commons and in the
National Government over which I have the honour to preside,
and who, I am sure, will be found capable of conducting Your
Majesty's affairs with the resolution, experience and capacity
which these grievous times require. 5 "

Only four months before, Beaverbrook had written to
Churchill, on the subject of Cabinet reconstruction: "The War
Cabinet should consist of Bevin, the strongest man in the pres-
ent Cabinet; Eden, the most popular member of the Cabinet;
and Atflee, the leader of the Socialist Party. The other mem-
bers should be wiped out!"

Eden's future was in fact taking definite shape. In November
he had agreed to assume the leadership of the House of Com-
mons, in addition to the Foreign Office, from Sir Stafford
Cripps, on the latter's departure from the War Cabinet. Cripps
had not proved temperamentally suited to this particular role.
Of an austere nature, and coming rather late in life to the Par-
liamentary scene, he tended to treat members in the fashion of
a schoolmaster dealing with backward pupils; Eden was alto-
gether a better House of Commons man, more sensitive to the
idiom and idiosyncrasies of Westminster.

He was respected and admired at home and abroad. He was
deep in the confidence of the Prime Minister, and for the first
time, Elijah had definitely made a proffer of his mantle.

CHAPTER 24

GRAND ALLIES

THE YEAR 1943 was one of immense activity, not only
for Eden, but for all the Allied leaders indeed, for the
whole Western World. For in that year the tide of war
began to turn against the Axis. While plans for bringing the
war to "total victory" and unconditional surrender were the
first priority, there was also the urgent need to start laying the
foundations for the peace that was to follow. It was, for Eden,
a time of travel and conference. In March he was in America,
holding vital discussions with President Roosevelt. In May he
visited Algiers, helping Churchill to supervise the Sicilian and
Italian landings operations to which Churchill attached high
strategic importance. Later came the Quebec and Moscow
Conferences and the year closed with those of Cairo and Tehe-
ran. This was a phase, therefore, of crushing responsibilities
and far-reaching decision, but at the same time the atmosphere
was one of hope with military victory on the horizon, and the
prospects for the political future no more than slightly dimmed
as yet by the attitude of Russia.

Eden's March visit to Washington was Churchill's idea. The
Prime Minister wished him "to establish intimate personal re-
lations with the President," and Roosevelt cordially agreed to
receive him. Within less than a week of the Foreign Secretary's
arrival, Roosevelt was writing his impressions to Churchill;
"Anthony has spent three evenings with me. He is a grand fel-
low, and we are talking everything from Ruthenia to the pro-
duction of peanuts. It is an interesting fact that we seem to
agree on about 95 per cent of all the subjects not a bad aver-
age. He seems to think that you will manage rather well with
the Leadership [of the House of Commons, which Churchill

199

200 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

had taken over personally during Eden's absence], but both of
us are concerned over what you wiH do with the Foreign Office.
We fear that he will not recognise it when he gets back." The
"intimate personal relations" seem to have been established
without difficulty although that kind of informal badinage
was characteristic of the President. It is perhaps more impor-
tant to study the scope of these discussions, the area over which
the 95 per cent agreement was spread, and the nature of the
remaining 5 per cent. Sherwood, in The White House Papers,
one of the great source books of our time, gives a very full ac-
count of what took place.

According to Winant, who sent a minute to this effect to the
President, Eden's mission was to be "limited to the most effec-
tive method of preparing for meetings between the govern-
ments of all the United Nations to consider questions arising
out of the war." This, as Sherwood comments, would seem to
be an extremely broad limitation, and in fact the President and
the Foreign Secretary's conversations covered "a vast variety of
subjects in the political conduct of the war and in the construc-
tion of the hoped-for post-war world."

Hopkins took extensive notes of the views on post-war geo-
graphical problems expressed by Eden and Roosevelt at a small
dinner-party on 15th March. The most pressing of these con-
cerned Russia's aspirations. Eden gave an outline of what he
thought Russia would demand, beginning with the absorption
of the Baltic States. Roosevelt said that such a demand would
meet with much opposition in both the U.S.A. and Britain, but
agreed that with Russia in actual possession it would be diffi-
cult to do anything about it. He considered that concession
over the Baltic States might be made a bargaining counter for
Russian concessions elsewhere. So far as Poland was con-
cerned, Eden reported that General Sikorsky and his London
Government were being "very difficult about their aspirations,"
in the belief that both Russia and Germany would be worn out
after the war, and that Poland might emerge as the strongest
State in eastern and central Europe. Russia, in his view, wanted

GRAND ALLIES 201

a "strong and independent Poland," provided that "the right
people were running It," and would probably be content to
accept the Curzon Line. He and the President agreed that Po-
land should "probably have East Prussia"; Eden adding that
Russia showed signs of agreeing to this, and the President feel-
ing that arrangements should be made to move the Germans
out of the area en masse. Finland would probably provide the
same sort of problem, especially with regard to Hangoe. Eden
twice stated his view that the Russians did not want to carry
too heavy commitments in Europe at the end of the war, and he
therefore believed that Stalin would want the British and
American armies present in strength on the Continent.

The talks ranged over nearly every major problem in Eu-
rope. They agreed that no real difficulties would arise over
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey or Greece. In dis-
cussing Jugoslavia, Roosevelt stated that the Serbs and Croats
had nothing in common, and there was no point therefore in
prolonging their union. He suggested an independent Serbia,
with the Croats under trustees, but Eden, without undue em-
phasis, made it clear that the British Government were not in
favour of the trusteeship principle. They agreed once more on
the separation of Austria and Hungary, and Eden said that he
thought the Russians would be "pretty arbitrary" about Hun-
gary. Finally they came to Germany, and approved in principle
of the dismemberment of the Reich, preferably by encourag-
ing native separatist movements. Eden, who was naturally in a
position to take the lead when it came to the difficult art of
gauging Stalin's intentions, said that Russia would almost cer-
tainly demand that Germany be broken up.

At the end of the evening Hopkins intervened, telling the
President that it was important that they should have the frank-
est kind of talk with Mr. Eden about potential differences be-
tween the U.S.A. and the U.K. in Europe, of which at the
moment he saw two: (i) the peoples of Serbia and Croatia, and
(ii) the problem of what countries, free and otherwise, should
be disarmed in Europe. He also felt that it would be useful if

202 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Eden would articulate in Ms own mind the differences which
either the U.S.A. or Great Britain, or both, were likely to have
with Russia in Europe. They were to give two more evenings to
these discussions, and then tackle the problems of the South-
West Pacific, the Far East and Africa, exchanging points of
view on such "areas of controversy" as Hong Kong, Malaya
and India. It was a formidable programme. Eden left with
Hopkins, and said that so far he was satisfied with the progress
made, and was much impressed by the President's intimate
knowledge of boundaries in Europe.

Cordell Hull was present at the meeting on 17th March, at
which Hopkins raised the question of the urgency of agreeing
on some policy and some procedure. He said that he thought
there was no understanding between Great Britain, Russia and
the United States as to which armies would be where and what
kind of administration should be developed. Unless they acted
promptly and surely, he believed one of two things would hap-
pen either Germany would go Communist, or an out-and-out
anarchic state would set in; that, indeed, the same situation
might develop in Italy as well, or in any of the countries in
Europe. He said he thought it required some formal agreement
that the State Department should work out the plan with the
British, and whatever was agreed upon between those two
Allies should then be discussed with the Russians. The Presi-
dent agreed that this procedure should be followed.

At a further meeting on 22nd March, there was a significant
discussion on "total surrender." The President insisted that he
wanted no negotiated armistice after the collapse. Hopkins also
notes one of the most interesting and bold approaches made by
Eden in the whole course of the conferences. "Eden raised the
question," he writes, "in a delicate way, as to the President's
constitutional powers, during this interim while we were still
technically at war with Germany, to agree to forming an inde-
pendent Austria, for an example. The President replied that he
thought he did have the power without reference to the United
States Senate at any rate enough power to make the inde-

GRAND ALLIES 203

pendence of Austria stick. It was clear from Eden's reply that
he had some doubt about this. After lunch he told me he
thought it a matter of great importance because England,
China, Russia and the other United Nations wanted to be sure
of the President's power to reach any agreement which would
be binding prior to the actual signing of a peace treaty, which
treaty, of course, would have to go to the Senate for confirma-
tion." Such a diplomatic move, as from a Foreign Minister to
the Head of a State, can only be described as formidable, and
the way in which it was received is the best possible evidence of
Eden's diplomatic gifts, and of his personal acceptability to
Roosevelt.

An outstanding issue within the "5 per cent" of disagreement
was China. The President said that he thought that China
might become a useful power in the Far East to help police
Japan, and that he wanted to strengthen China in every way.
Eden was doubtful whether China could stabilise herself suffi-
ciently for such a role and considered she might well have to go
through a revolution after the war. He said he "did not like the
idea much of the Chinese running up and down the Pacific,"
How grimly prophetic was Eden's attitude of reserve, and how
wide of the mark was Roosevelt's certainty, when he raised the
issue of China, as a member of the future Security Council, that
in any serious conflict of policy with Russia, China "would un-
doubtedly line up on our side!"

The organisation of the United Nations after the war came
in for general review, together with such specific problems as
refugees and in particular the Jews colonies, trusteeships
and mandated territories. Some of the more urgent strategic
questions such as that of shipping were also discussed. There
had certainly been no lack of frankness on either side, and the
intentions expressed by both the President and the Foreign
Secretary were very far-reaching so much so, that Hopkins
with a belated twinge of conscience remarked at one of the last
conferences: "I said I thought it would have a very bad effect,
both in England and the United States, if the world got the

204 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

impression that the United States and England were, together,
planning the future of the world without consulting anyone
else!" Eden agreed, and said the British were conducting direct
conferences on matters that concerned them and Russia, and
he assumed that the United States would do the same thing.

On 29th March, Hopkins wrote Ms final note on the Eden
visit following a dinner given by Cordell Hull at the Carlton
Hotel: "After dinner Eden and I sat up for a couple of hours
reviewing the results of Ms trip. He, obviously, felt that from
Ms point of view it had been altogether worth while, particu-
larly from the point of view of Ms having had a chance to get
well acquainted with the President, and, second, with Hull. He
told me he was going to invite Hull to come to England. WMle
he found Hull a little difficult to talk to, and obsessed with the
problem of the Free French, nevertheless he thought that he
and Hull did see eye to eye on the major world problems. Eden
said he had learned of the importance of Congress, and particu-
larly the Senate, in any post-war discussions, and he had not
fully understood the working arrangement between the Presi-
dent and Congress. He found it pretty difficult to envisage the
wide separation of the powers of the executive and the legis-
lative branches.

"The President had once or twice urged the British to give
up Hong Kong as a gesture of 'good will.' In fact, the President
had suggested a number of similar gestures on the part of the
British, and Eden drily remarked that he had not heard the
President suggest any similar gestures on our own part.

"Eden, obviously, felt he got on extremely well with the
President, and I tMnk tMs is true. The President liked Eden's
frankness and admired Ms wide knowledge of world affairs."

The rest of the "5 per cent" disagreement was concerned, as
the last quotation reveals, with the French. Eden had stated the
British view that they would greatly prefer to deal with one
strong French authority, established in Algiers and represent-
ing all possible elements of French opinion. Roosevelt and
Hull, according to Sherwood, said that they preferred to keep

GRAND ALLIES 205

the position fluid, and to deal with French individuals. Roose-
velt persisted in Ms belief that no single French authority could
be set up by the Allies, and recognised by them, without even-
tually incurring the bitter resentment of metropolitan France
itself.

This was a situation with which Eden was to find himself
dealing at first hand very soon after his return to England. In
May, Churchill was in North Africa supervising the prelimi-
naries to the Sicily and Italy campaign. He telegraphed to Eden
to come out and join him, "so as to make sure we saw eye to
eye on the meeting we had arranged between Giraud and de
Gaulle, and all our other business." He explained the necessity
for Eden's presence in a telegram to the Cabinet dated 29th
May: "It seems to me important that Eden should come here
for a few days. He is much better fitted than I am to be best
man at the Giraud-de Gaulle wedding. He ought to be con-
scious of the atmosphere and in touch with the actors in what
may easily be a serious drama." Eden in fact arrived only in
time to bless these nuptials, the first shy contacts having been
established in the previous January, after an original refusal
by de Gaulle to meet Ms. prospective partner! But Churchill
wanted hfm to advise on the plans for the forthcoming invasion
of Italy, and so Eden was present at the second meeting be-
tween the Allied leaders who included Churchill, Brooke,
Alexander, Cunningham, Tedder and Ismay for the British,
and Eisenhower, Bedell Smith and Marshall for the United
States and was able to give useful advice as to the probable
reactions of Turkey if the United Nations succeeded in getting
Italy out of the war.

It is interesting to note that in his book entitled, My Three
Years with Eisenhower, Captain Harry C. Butcher comments,
under the date 1st June, 1943: "I expressed [the view] that the
British, by the presence of the Prime Minister, Eden, and at
least one other important personage to follow, are consciously
or unconsciously impressing the French and the natives by
their traditional method of pomp and pageantry. So far the

206 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Americans have not met the competition/' It was also Captain
Butcher's view at this time that "de Gaulle is running away with
the show as far as Giraud is concerned." (There is no evidence
whether this was in accord with Eden's intentions as a match-
maker! We may presume that it was not, but at that time the
match itself was the important thing.) Eden flew home with
Churchill via Gibraltar.

The Prime Minister was in Quebec in August when Eden
cabled to him the news of overtures from Marshal Badoglio,
but he was in Quebec himself when the first news of Italy's
forthcoming unconditional surrender was received in 19th Au-
gust. There was very little time for rejoicing, and the French
issue was still causing concern and disagreement between
Great Britain and the United States. On 22nd August, Church-
ill cabled to Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister: "Eden and
Hull are locked in lengthy discussions. Hull remains com-
pletely obdurate about not using the word 'recognition' in
respect of the French Committee. We have therefore agreed
that they shall publish their document, and we ours and the
Canadians theirs, after communicating with Russia and others
concerned. Eden has this matter in hand."

In October, after the surrender of Italy had become an ac-
complished fact, Eden was on his way to Moscow for a Foreign
Secretaries' Conference when the Prime Minister had to warn
him of the receipt of an "offensive" telegram from Stalin, deal-
ing, among other matters, with the convoys which Britain was
sending by the northern route. It was necessary to brief the
Foreign Secretary indeed, to leave the handling of the whole
matter to him personally, since the Prime Minister very prop-
erly proposed to hand Stalin's offensive message to the Russian
Ambassador, informing him that he refused to receive it. It
was not an auspicious moment for Eden to arrive in Moscow.
Churchill sent him a typically warm-hearted greeting: "I feel so
much for you in the bleak Conference, and wish I were with
you. You may have full confidence in the strength of the British
position on all these questions, and I have every hope that you

GRAND ALLIES 207

will make them feel at once our desire for their friendship and
our will-power on essentials. All good luck." In a personal in-
terview with Stalin, Eden explained the position about the
convoys, firmly and with dignity. He said that in the circum-
stances it was not surprising that the Prime Minister had been
hurt by Ms message, and Stalin replied that that had not been
intended. The matter was settled, and the convoys were re-
sumed.

The crux of the conference was the invasion of Northern
France operation "Overlord" for which the Russians were
strongly pressing, without taking any heed of their Allies' diffi-
culties or achievements on other fronts. Again Eden had an
interview with Stalin and again he was successful in using the
tactics of firmness and frankness. "The whole talk," he cabled,
"went off surprisingly well. Stalin seemed in excellent humour,
and at no point in the evening was there any recrimination
about the past or any disposition to ignore real difficulties that
face us" this seems to have been the accustomed strategy of
the late Marshal, on the rare occasions when he consented to
meet his western Allies face to face. "It is clear however that
he expects us to make every effort to stage 'Overlord' at the
earliest possible moment, and the confidence he is placing in
our word is to me most striking." Eden came away with the
impression that the Russians at last seemed genuinely to desire
the friendship and goodwill of Britain and the United States.
"Your gesture in respect of convoys has made a deep impres-
sion," he reported to Churchill. "For the first time in many
years Molotov and a number of his colleagues came to dinner
at this Embassy tonight. Mikoyan, whose task it is to keep these
people informed, was especially eloquent in his tributes to your
personal share in the sailing of these convoys." It is not surpris-
ing that in a statement to the House of Commons after his
return Eden felt able to say "with absolute assurance that the
fifteen days* work had brought a new warmth and new confi-
dence into all their dealings with their Soviet friends."

In November took place the Cairo Conference, followed

208 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

immediately by the more important conference in Teheran.
Eden was present at both, which were primarily concerned with
the political and military strategy of the war in Asia, and al-
though his role was necessarily secondary, Churchill makes it
clear that he placed great confidence in his Foreign Secretary.
i Mr. Eden had now joined us from England/' he wrote,
u whither he had flown after his discussions in Moscow. His
arrival was a great help to me." This was largely because on his
way back from Russia he had met the Turkish Foreign Minis-
ter and other Turks at Cairo, and had once more pressed upon
them the advantages of entering the war on the side of the
United Nations. His efforts were unsuccessful, but he was able
to give the delegates at Cairo an accurate and up-to-date pic-
ture of these talks, and also of the political temperature in
Moscow.

At Teheran we have glimpses of Eden sitting on a sofa with
Churchill and Stalin, exchanging views on the shape of things
to come. On the vexed question of Poland, Churchill tells us,
Eden intervened to say that he had been much struck by Sta-
lin's statement that afternoon that the Poles could go as far
west as the Oder. He saw hope in that and was much encour-
aged. "Stalin asked whether we thought he was going to swal-
low Poland up. Eden said he did not know how much the
Russians were going to eat. How much would they leave un-
digested? Stalin said the Russians did not want anything be-
longing to other people, although they might have a bite at
Germany." Again, we have another glimpse of Eden trying to
soothe the ruffled Prime Minister when he was being baited by
Stalin, Roosevelt and Elliott Roosevelt on the subject of the
post-war shooting of Germans. Finally there is a rather grim
picture of Eden, in conference, asking Stalin if by the 1939
frontiers between Russia and Poland he meant the "Ribben-
trop-Molotov line"? To this Stalin merely replied: "Call it
whatever you like," and Molotov tried to assert that the Curzon
Line was identical with the 1939 line of partition, only to be
disabused by Eden, who showed him the important differences

GRAND ALLIES 209

on the map. The general picture which emerges from the pages
of Mr. Churchill's memoirs is that of a strong man, sure of
himself and of his facts, not afraid to challenge the Heads of
States so formidable (on the one hand) and so sensitive (on
the other) as Stalin and Roosevelt, if he felt that the situation
required blunt speaking.

CHAPTER 25

DILEMMAS OF VICTORY

A THE end of the second conference in Cairo, Churchill
fell seriously ill with pneumonia, and it thus became
Eden's responsibility to give the House of Commons a
resume of the results obtained at both Cairo and Teheran. The
first of these, he said, was that the war would be shortened.
"All is now agreed. Every plan is now agreed, and the timing
is now agreed, and, in due course, the decisions of the Teheran
Conference will be unrolled on the field of battle." Of the pos-
sibility of a new international order after the war he spoke
enthusiastically as at that time he well might. "The founda-
tions do exist, and I am truly confident that there is a possibil-
ity, and more than a possibility, a desire, among the three
Powers for continued co-operation not only during the war,
not only in reshaping Europe when the Armistice comes, but
also, thereafter, in maintaining in the world an orderly progress
and continuing peace. The foundations of that understanding
were laid by us in Moscow. They have been confirmed and
strengthened in Teheran. We three worked together. We have
set our hands to the task, and heavy is our responsibility to
ensure that we do not fail."

This was the mood in which Eden, and the country with him,
greeted the year 1944, which was just opening. It can be di-
vided, so far as Eden's activity is concerned, into a compara-
tively quiet or at least sedentary six months until D-Day (6th
June), and a renewed pressure of diplomatic activity there-
after, including one visit to Canada and another to Paris.

In March Eden made an important speech on moral prin-
ciples and foreign affairs to the Free Church Federal Council.
It was important not only for its significance at the time, but

210

DILEMMAS OF VICTORY 211

also as a guide to Eden's own deepest thoughts on political
ethics. "I agree," he said, "with the words of J. Quincy Adams,
one of the most sagacious of American statesmen: 'The more
of pure moral principle that is carried into the policy of a Gov-
ernment, the wiser and more profound will that policy be. 3 . . .
Just as this moral principle lies at the root of the social struc-
ture within any nation, so must it lie at the root of any work-
able and endurable international system. It is quite true that in
the past efforts to apply it have only been partially successful,
though they have occasionally succeeded for quite long peri-
ods. But this does not mean that such attempts will always fail,
and even if they did fail it would still be necessary to pursue
the ideal of interdependence, for only thus can we escape from
perpetual war and from one nation preying as a wolf upon
another."

The Prime Minister on the 24th May referred in the House
of Commons to the general agreement there had been as to
Eden's "skill and consistency" in the treatment of our foreign
affairs. Eden wound up the Debate, and gave the House some
general ideas on a world organisation that would, he hoped,
come into being at the end of hostilities. The responsibility of
any world organisation must, he said, be related to power, and
consequently it should be constructed on and around the
United States, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union
and China. All other peace-loving States should come and play
their parts in the structure built up on those four. The inclusion
of China would seem to represent some modification of the at-
titude he took up during his global discussions with Roosevelt
and may perhaps be regarded as a conscious concession to the
President's way of thinking. The world organisation should be
flexible; it should grow by practice, and not try straight away
to work to a fixed and rigid code or rule. All the powers in-
cluded in it, great and small, should strive for economic as well
as for political collaboration.

One may turn at this point to consider what had been the
effect of all this departmental and international work on Eden's

212 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

political stock at home. There is no doubt that it stood high in
the year 1944. In October the Manchester Guardian wrote:
"Many of Ms friends want Mr. Eden to take a short holiday.
They point to Ms heavy labours, particularly during the recess.
Certainly of late Mr. Eden had driven himself as hard as any
member of the Government, not excepting the Prime Minister.
Indeed he has had to do so. The foreign problems he has had to
cope with do not wait on anybody's pleasure. They are not
White Papers. And now he has the daily leadersMp of the
House of Commons on his hands again .A strange attempt
was made behind the scenes a month or two ago to get Mr,
Eden to give up the Foreign SecretarysMp and concentrate Ms
talents on leading the House. It is to be hoped the new solici-
tude for his health does not presage a renewal of that pressure/'

At the end of August Eden had been acting as Prime Minis-
ter pending the return of Churchill from Italy. He had taken
charge when Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister, left for Algiers.
This was the first time that both the Prime Minister and the
Deputy Prime Minister had been absent from the country at
the same time. It was therefore the first time that Eden had
been acting Prime Minister, and although he was not called
upon to take any decision of major importance, it is a signifi-
cant enough landmark in his career.

In November the Beaverbrook Press helped to stir up specu-
lation whether Anthony Eden would become the leader of the
Conservatives when the time came for Churchill to lay down
the burdens of office. Under cover of certain remarks by Mal-
colm MacDonald a Sunday Express correspondent wrote: "Mr.
Malcolm MacDonald has been telling the Canadians that he
will; and there is little doubt that most people concur with that
judgment. If these delicate matters were settled by the decision
of the general public, Mr. Eden's elevation would, I think, be
assured." But he continued in the customary Beaverbrook
idiom: "They are not so settled. There are many Conservatives
in a position to influence such a crucial decision, who are not
sure that Mr, Eden is the man they want to take over from the

DILEMMAS OF VICTORY 213

Premier. There is a feeling that he is too remote from the
organised life of the party. It is complained too that he shows
little interest in home affairs. But above aU there is the fear that
he is not quite the immaculate Tory which they feel their next
leader ought to be." Possible alternatives were then paraded:
R. A. Butler already at the head of the list R. S. Hudson,
Oliver Lyttelton and Richard Law.

In December Eden "came of age" politically he had sat
in the House for twenty-one years, and he was forty-seven years
of age. It is interesting to note that Churchill attained his parlia-
mentary majority at exactly the same age, and Lloyd George
at forty-eight.

There was no doubt as to Eden's genuine popularity. It is
useless to speculate how his career might have been affected if
he had been a finer or more original orator. He has, indeed, had
the finest masters. Captain Butcher, in the book already quoted,
gives a pleasant account of Churchill endeavouring to instruct
Eden in the more recondite arts of parliamentary speaking.
(The entry is dated SHAEF: January, 1945): "Hopkins
arrived. After pleasant greetings, he told us of his visit to
London where he had spent three nights with the Prime Minis-
ter. The night before the Prime Minister had given a fatherly
talk to Mr. Eden on the art and science of making a speech in
the House of Commons. Mr. Eden had accepted the lecture as
son from father. In the course of the admonition the Prime
Minister, according to Harry, had told Eden never slyly to
peek at his notes. They should be flagrantly waved in the face
of the M.Ps. each time he made a point. Then he should pro-
ceed to the next. He should obviously study his notes, taking
as much time as necessary 'two or three minutes, if you feel
like it.' He added that the speaker should not lounge or lean
against the 'box', which is the rostrum, but rather should stand
well behind it and pace his remarks with backward or forward
steps. The Prime Minister said he had had special glasses made
which permitted him to see his notes five feet away. He advised
Eden to patronise the same oculist. Neither should the 1>ox' be

214 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

tapped lightly with the hand, as this distracts the attention of
the audience. If the 'box' is to be touched at all, it should be
vigorously pounded with the fist at an appropriate moment.
Added theatrical effect could be obtained if Mr. Eden would
then scowl at the audience."

Meanwhile great events had been taking place. D-Day and
the European invasion, the attempt on Hitler's life, the piercing
of the Gothic line, the Russians at the outskirts of Warsaw,
all pointed to the coming twilight of the Nazi Gods and their
Wagnerian end. The growing productive and military power of
the American alliance began to assert itself.

Eden joined Churchill and Roosevelt for a few days at the
Conference held in Canada, and was preparing to leave with
the Prime Minister once more for Moscow. A week before his
departure, he spoke to the Bristol Conservatives on Conserva-
tive Party Policy a speech of some importance, because he
dealt hardly at all with foreign affairs, but again made incursion
into the field of home policy. Using in the process rather more
vigorous and colourful language than usual, "our faith," he
said, "is a distinct faith. It is not a watered-down edition of any
other faith; it is not a diluted socialism: it is not a red wine
into which we have put a little water. It is as British and dis-
tinctive as beer, with a great deal more body in it than the war-
time beverage!" Of the Beveridge Plan which from the outset
assumed the status of a sacred cow, he said: "There is one
word of warning I think it only honest to utter in relation to
these proposals. The benefits which are received under these
schemes are frequently described as State benefits. I personally
have never much liked this phrase, because it assumes the exist-
ence of a beneficent State outside the community itself from
whose bottomless purse these flowing benefits can be drawn.
This is not in truth and honesty the position. These are in truth
community benefits earned by the community and paid out for
the assistance of those members who most need them. We must
realise that if we are to benefit from these great schemes we

DILEMMAS OF VICTORY 215

have also got to pay for them, and every section of the com-
munity will have to pay for them. . ."

Again, in discussing State control and private enterprise, he
said: "We are now at war with totalitarian states. To fight them
we have had to use some of their own weapons. To defeat
them our people have accepted regimentation and controls to
an extent never before known in our history. But though we use
these weapons we don't love them. Though we employ them
for a specific purpose to defeat our enemy in war, we have no
intention to perpetuate them for their own sake in peace. Such
a course would be too much like canonising the black-out or
standing in a queue for the good of our souls."

On his return from the Moscow Conference, where Churchill
and Eden found themselves forced to promote another of those
bizarre and ill-omened war-time marriages that between
M. Mikolajczyck and the "Lublin Committee" of Poles Eden
paid important visits to Cairo, Athens and Italy. It was only a
month before the outbreak of the civil war in Greece arising
from the Communist inspired E.L.A.S. rebellion. Although in
his report to the House Eden could not forecast future develop-
ments he gave a clear picture of the devastation and economic
ruin left by the retreating Germans, and emphasised the neces-
sity of sending immediate supplies. He also mentioned casually,
but ominously as well, that "our Greek friends are very politi-
cally minded."

Exactly a month later, Eden found himself winding up a
debate once again defending British intervention in Greece,
and stimulated, as ever by violent interruptions from the ex-
treme Left benches, especially from the Communist Mr.
Gallagher his speech was crisp and forthright. "The people of
Greece would have starved," he concluded. "That is why we
intervened, knowing full well the risks and the political disputes
and passions of this war, and also the passions left over from
the Metaxas regime. We knew all this would burst in our faces,
but we thought it right to take the risk and responsibility. . . .
We do not seek to dictate to Greece what her Government shall

216 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

be. ... When arms are laid down It will be for the Greek people
to decide on their Government, and they will do it with our
help and goodwill, and once again, I hope, democracy will
play its part in the land of its birth."

Yet, though the year ended on this sombre and tragic note
the first of the terrible post-war conflicts and disenchantments
there were many and great compensations to recall. On 24th
August Paris had been liberated, and in November Eden
accompanied the Prime Minister there for the celebration of
Armistice Day. He was deeply moved by the welcome they
received, and it is typical that in the report of their visit which
he made to the House of Commons, he stressed the appalling
spiritual and physical conditions under which the common
people of Paris and of France had to carry on their existence.
"It is not surprising/' he said, "that in these conditions France,
which after all these years has suddenly regained her freedom,
should be like a man emerging from a darkened room into a
blaze of light, dazed for a moment and grateful still to his
friends for a measure of understanding and encouragement."

In January, 1945, the Greek crisis ended, after Churchill
and Eden had visited Athens. Archbishop Damaskinos became
Regent and General Plastiras formed a new Government, after
which the E.L.A.S. signed General Scobie's truce terms. At
home, Eden had to wage the last and fiercest of the three battles
on British intervention in Greece in the House of Commons.
He fought it well, and he fought it hard once more against
violent interruption announcing that he had "never known an
issue where he had been more absolutely convinced we are
right"; he out-pointed Aneurin Bevan in a hard interchange;
he demanded from the House a vote of confidence, not as a
favour, or In order to demonstrate British unity, but because he
was profoundly convinced that the Government was entitled to
it. Sincerity and self-confidence rang out in every sentence. He
held and dominated the angry House, and he won a resounding
victory. It was a most impressive performance.

One by one the Axis satellites were dropping away, and

DILEMMAS OF VICTORY 217

Germany and Japan were doomed. But as the war drew to Its
close, the problems of the peace began to multiply. In Febru-
ary the last of the great war-time Conferences was held at Yalta,
in the Crimea, and once more it was attended by Eden as well
as by Churchill. Afterwards, the Prime Minister spoke most
warmly of Eden's work to the House of Commons: "Here is the
moment," he said, "when the House should pay tribute to the
work of Mr. Eden. I can't describe the aid and comfort he has
been to me in all our difficulties. He is second to none among
the Foreign Secretaries of the Grand Alliance."

It was during this speech, too, that Churchill added: "In
all this war I never felt so grave a sense of responsibility as I
did at Yalta. Now we enter into a world of imponderables, and
at every stage self -questioning arises. It is a mistake to look too
far ahead. Only one link in the chain of destiny can be handled
at a time." He might well feel this sense of destiny and of re-
sponsibility. It was at Yalta that agreement was finally reached
with Russia on the Polish question, and although it is undoubt-
edly the fact that it would have been impossible to have insisted
upon any other solution without imperilling the Grand Alliance
at a time when the war was not yet won, many consciences in
many of the Allied countries were uneasy. The Polish Govern-
ment in London announced that they refused to accept the
conditions.

Eden had to wind up the debate in the Commons, and he did
so with tact and feeling. "Let me put the issue broadly," he
said. "I share the feeling which the Prime Minister expressed
yesterday. It is difficult at times not to be oppressed by the
weight of problems which lie upon Europe. They are infinitely
greater than they were after the last war. ... If any life is to be
restored to Europe, if it is to be saved from anarchy and chaos,
it can only be done by the three Powers working together. . . .
The foreign policy of this country has been based for centuries
on the determination that no one country should dominate
Europe. We believe in Europe, we are a part of Europe and
I myself am convinced that no one country is ever gping to

218 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

dominate Europe. It Is too big for one nation to succeed in
doing that. It is because of that instinct of our own that we have
a special position in Europe, and that special measure of con-
fidence is extended to us."

While countering some of the assumptions of the opponents
of the Yalta settlement which were not based on fact, Eden's
plea was conciliatory. He argued, in effect, that politics is the
art of the possible; that it was better for the British Government
to do what they could to adjust an unacceptable situation, than
to take their stand on a principle, and thereby not only let the
situation go forward without mitigation or adjustment, but also
endanger the only basis upon which any settlement at all could
possibly be achieved in the post-war world. He put forward this
plea persuasively, and with tenderness for the sincerity of those
who could not agree with him, and who would in any case go
into the opposite lobby. Honour had been called in question,
and honour, one felt, had been satisfied, owing to the readiness
of the Foreign Secretary to rise to the high level of that argu-
ment.

Cologne fell to the Allied forces on 6th March, and the U.S.
First Army crossed the Rhine. The Russians reached the Baltic,
and, in the East, Mandalay fell to the British Fourteenth Army.
But the price of military victory abroad was almost inevitably
the loss of war-time political unity at home. The Prime Minis-
ter, addressing a Conservative Party Conference, announced,
with regret, that the Labour Party and some Liberals "will feel
themselves bound to resume their full liberty of action and thus
bring this famous Coalition to an end." On the 21st March,
Eden addressed the Scottish Unionists in Glasgow. Once more
he touched on home, as well as on foreign affairs. After point-
ing out the various problems of transition from war to peace,
he made an interesting reference to the role of the British Con-
stitution: "But there is one control which, let me say as a
parliamentarian and a Conservative, I hope that we shall be
most watchful to maintain, that is control by Parliament over
the executive. I have spoken of this in connection with foreign

DILEMMAS OF VICTORY 219

affairs. It is no less significant in relation to domestic affairs.
One hears much in these days of the slowness of the machinery
of Parliament, that this or that particular method requires over-
haul. I would beg of you to proceed in these matters with the
utmost caution. It is on the vigilance of Parliament that the
liberties of our people rest." Here was a sound and useful con-
tribution to the re-opening debate.

CHAPTER 26

OUT OF OFFICE

ON 7TH May Germany signed the unconditional sur-
render of all her forces, and on that day Eden broad-
cast to the peoples of America as well as Britain from
San Francisco where the Conference to establish the frame-
work of the United Nations had already opened under the
shadow of the death on the 12th April of its great champion
President Roosevelt. Turning inevitably from the past to the
future he spoke of what was for him a "bewildering 5 * as well as
a "majestic and triumphant hour." "Our work," he said, "if it
is to be successfully concluded, as I believe it will be, cannot
by itself alone ensure the peace of the world." But progress had
been encouraging. He was confident that they would agree on
a Charter. They were going to set up a Security Council. "But
this problem of security is not our whole task, though no prog-
ress is possible so long as it remains unsolved. The Economic
and Social Council has an immense part to play."

In his speech to the Conference itself, on its second day of
session, 26th April, he had uttered similar warnings. "It is no
exaggeration to say that the work on which we are making a
start here may be the world's last chance." The proposals were
admittedly a compromise. They did not constitute an attempt
on the part of the four Great Powers to dictate to the world.
"Great Powers/' he said later, "can make a two-fold contribu-
tion. They can make it by their support of this organisation.
They can make it also by setting themselves certain standards
in international conduct and by observing those standards
scrupulously in all their dealings with other countries."

Eden was, as always, a tremendous success in the United
States, and his personal popularity must at times have been

220

OUT OF OFFICE 221

more than a little embarrassing to him.. One American colum-
nist told Ms readers that "contrary to all expectations, it was
Eden, not Molotov, who was the strong man of the Confer-
ence"; but it was soon obvious, to the hordes of political
observers haunting the Mark Hopkins and the Fairmont hotels,
that it was more than one strong man could achieve to make
U.N.O. a success from its ill-starred outset of squabbles and
wrangling. It was also quite clear to anyone who met Eden
privately at that time that he felt the weight of responsibility
hanging heavily upon him. Nor was he in the best of health.
On 4th June, 1945, it was announced that he was suffering
from a duodenal ulcer, and he was compelled, on his doctor's
advice, to seek at least two weeks' complete rest.

On 23rd May, the Prime Minister announced the end of the
Coalition Government, following a resolution by the Labour
Party at their Blackpool Conference two days earlier. He also
announced that Parliament would be dissolved on 15th June
and that polling for the General Election would take place on
5th July. Meanwhile the so-called "caretaker Government"
was installed.

Eden was unable to take part in tins disastrous electoral
campaign in which the Conservative hubris was overwhelmed
by the nemesis which it had itself provoked. Mr. Churchill, that
astute and experienced politician, seemed unable to take the
temperature of the country, and was sadly at fault in his broad-
casts and speeches under the influence, some said, of Beaver-
brook and other unofficial advisers. The Party had, after all,
much to offer the nation besides Churchill's war-time leader-
ship. There was Butler's Education Act; there were the White
Papers on Social Insurance and Full Employment; there was
Eden's own reputation in the international field. But to treat
the Liberal and Labour Parties as impertinent interlopers and
worse because they chose to exercise their democratic rights
and appeal to the country for its support of their programmes
was worse than folly it was madness. Eden made one broad-
cast during this period on 27th June, and in it lie did his best

222 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

to raise the controversy from the sludge of political vitupera-
tion into which it had fallen, but he could not from Ms sick bed
and by one wireless appeal reverse the strategy which was
being developed with such fatal gusto by the Conservative
Press and particularly the Beaverbrook Group. The broadcast,
excellent and sound as were the points he made, was pitched
in too low a key. Eden was suffering not only from Ms dispirit-
ing complaint, but also from the tragic news of the death of his
elder son Simon, who had been in the R.A.F. since 1944, and
was reported "missing, believed killed," in Burma.

When the Election results were announced, Eden had re-
covered sufficiently to accompany Churchill and Attlee to Pots-
dam, whence they flew home together. He himself had been
returned at Warwick and Leamington with a handsome major-
ity of 17,634, but the Conservative Party was soundly defeated,
and went into Opposition for the first time since 1929.

Of all the tributes wMch were paid to Eden for his magnifi-
cent handling of the Foreign Office during the war, and for Ms
great personal contribution to the victory of the Grand Alliance,
let us select one that is simple, but moving from the tragic end
which was so soon to overtake its author, Mr. Jan Masaryk, the
Czech Foreign Minister: "Mr. Eden," said Mr. Masaryk in
a broadcast to the Czech people, "has been a firm and loyal
friend of Czechoslovakia. During the Munich crisis Ms attitude
was exemplary, and during the whole war he helped us by word
and deed. As he leaves the Foreign Office, I thank him with
all my heart."

They were words wMch found an echo in the hearts of many
statesmen and individuals in many nations.

After their heavy defeat at the polls in the 1945 election, the
Conservative Party began immediately to take stock. They
came quickly to two conclusions, first the personality of their
leaders that "character" which it used to be the boast of the
public schools to instil was not enough; something much
more definite in the way of policy was necessary if they were
to recapture the confidence of the country. Secondly, the Party's

OUT OF OFFICE 223

organisation and, above all, its propaganda needed an urgent
overhaul. Reforms were put in hand at once. On the very day
of the Party's defeat, Lord Woolton, the great industrialist and
administrative expert who had done such good service during
the war as Food Minister, accepted the position of Chairman
of the Party, with the object of reconditioning Conservative
Central Office. Woolton had hitherto refused to accept a party
label, and his offer to undertake this role was put forward spon-
taneously to Churchill himself, as a gesture of loyalty to his
defeated chief.

Woolton took over an administrative machine, which was
based upon the professional constituency and area agents with
discretion from amateurs both within and outside Parliament,
and aimed at making this as efficient as possible. The element
of voluntary, amateur service had always prevailed in both the
Conservative and Liberal parties, based upon the old and still
tenacious traditions of politics as a field of voluntary effort. But
Lord Woolton, and the Party, felt that a certain measure of
professionalism, both in outlook and in organisation, had be-
come vitally necessary if the Conservative Party machine were
to become able to compete with the already highly professional
Labour machine. He therefore reformed the whole administra-
tive system along sound modern lines.

While all this was taking place in Central Office itself, other
departments within the Party's central organisation were taking
on new blood, and new importance. These were the Parlia-
mentary Secretariat, which gave the leaders of the Opposition
shadow cabinet services of briefing and information similar to
those provided by the Whitehall departments to Ministers in
office; the Research Department, which was responsible for
much of the spade work in the preparation of policy statements;
and the Conservative Political Centre, which directed Party
political "education," by means of booklets and lectures,
"brains trusts," and all the other techniques of the kind which
the BBC and the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA)

224 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

had made so familiar, especially to the returning soldiers being
demobilised from the forces.

These departments were, for the most part, staffed by intelli-
gent young men with Parliamentary ambitions, many of whom
have since laid the foundations of a promising career in Parlia-
ment. Among them, for instance, were Henry Hopkinson,
Reginald Maudling and Cuthbert Alport. It was here that
poMcy was thrashed out. This was the oven which turned out
such brand new confections as the Industrial Charter, the Agri-
cultural Charter and the highly tentative proposals for the
reform of the House of Lords aU of which were so highly
acclaimed at the time of their publication, but about which
little has been heard since the Party returned to power.

All this activity within the Conservative Party had its effect
upon Eden's status, and for a time it must be confessed that his
star appeared to be on the wane. Although he took a prominent
part, as we shall see, in the launching of the Industrial Charter,
he was never very closely associated with the three "backroom"
departments. On the contrary, it began to be known that the
"grey eminence" of the Conservatives' feverish search for a
stable doctrine and for concrete policies was R. A. Butler, It
was not long before the budding geniuses of the Parliamentary
Secretariat, the Research Department and the Conservative
Political Centre began to glory in the title of "Butler's young
men." For the Conservative Party, it was the age of the don,
the economist, the man of outstanding intellectual ability that
whole "double first" mentality which had for so long been
regarded with such intense suspicion and distrust. This was
essentially the atmosphere for the development of Butler's
talents and influence, but it did not suit Eden quite so well.

One final factor must be quoted in this analysis of what was
merely a temporary and partial setback. This was the outstand-
ing success of Ernest Bevin, the first Labour Foreign Secretary
in the new administration. For years certainly since 1938
it had been tacitly assumed, not only in Conservative circles,
but throughout the country, that our foreign affairs could not be

OUT OF OFFICE 225

successfully conducted unless Eden were at the helm. Now there
came to the Foreign Office a man who, whatever his great
personal reputation, had no experience of diplomacy, none of
that background which seemed so essential to dealing on equal
terms with statesmen of other nations and apparently no par-
ticular interest in foreign problems. (In fact, the Foreign Office
had been Bevin's life-long ambition, and he had studied foreign
affairs with minute and eager interest.) It is impossible to point
to any outstanding diplomatic victory by Bevin the climate
was not propitious for British victories in that field yet he gave
the country an eminent degree of confidence and security that
carried his reputation with the public at large higher, perhaps,
than that of any other Minister of the Labour Government. The
obvious corollary to be drawn and there were not lacking
Conservatives to draw it was that Eden did not enjoy that
unchallenged supremacy in foreign affairs which had always
been attributed to him.

All this was very unfair and time has served to dilute many
of these rash and unfounded judgments. It is difficult to esti-
mate how far Eden's reputation in fact suffered from this reces-
sion. It probably did not affect the opinions of his colleagues
on the Opposition front bench and in the Shadow Cabinet. Its
maximum impact was on the Conservative back-benchers, and
on the full-time members of the staff of the Party machine.
From there it filtered down to the constituencies, where it un-
doubtedly caused a temporary doubt and lack of confidence
among a proportion of Conservative supporters. Finally, like a
wave expending its force, it was to a certain extent reflected in
the Press, and thus reached the electorate as a whole. But it
never became, to the country at large, the issue which at one
time it appeared to be about to become in Westminster and
in the quiet purlieus of Queen Anne's Gate where "Butler's
young men" were capably setting the Party to rights.

Opposition left Eden free to develop other interests. He has
never been a wealthy man, and it was not surprising that in
October, 1945, he should have accepted a directorship of the

226 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Westminster Bank, together with his former colleague Lord
Leathers, Minister of Transport in the war-time Government.
His chairman at the Westminster was Mr. Rupert Beckett,
brother of Sir Gervase Beckett, Eden's father-in-law. A year
later it was announced in the Financial Times that he had
joined the board of Rio Tinto. The changes and chances of
Parliamentary life involve, for those who may expect office
when their Party is in power, sudden and bewildering changes
of personal income, and taxation is bidding fair to drive the
wealthy "amateur" out of the field. These were Eden's first
ventures into the commercial field, and provided valuable ex-
perience.

The last six months of 1945 were a time for pausing and
taking stock, and Eden only made one speech of any note. This
was in August, during the Debate on the Address, after the
King had opened the new Parliament. He began, with typical
generosity, by congratulating Ernest Bevin upon the speech
which he had just made. "In its wide sweep, and in its breadth
of judgment and in its forthrightness, it was worthy of my Right
Honourable friend [he had already asked permission to use that
phrase, which is traditionally applied only to members of one's
own party] and worthy of the occasion. I wish him, cordially,
all good fortune in the heavy tasks that now fall to his hands."
His survey was in the same temperate and bi-partisan vein. For
example, about the Greek question, on which he had lately
been so harried by Socialist members, he made the important
point as much on the Government's as the Opposition's behalf:
" Anybody can comment on our elections. Why should we not
occasionally comment on other peoples? . . . With a situation
such as we have in these countries, which the Foreign Secretary
so well described at the beginning of his speech, it will be a gain
to them and to Europe if there is as little as possible political
censorship and as much as possible freedom to speak and criti-
cise." He touched on the vexed questions of the Polish elections,
and the Polish frontiers. He mentioned the assurances given by
Marshal Tito to Churchill's Government, which were made a

OUT OF OFFICE 227

condition of recognition by Great Britain, and which the Mar-
shal had not in Eden's submission carried out. He gave a warn-
ing about the situation in Persia, and a hope that relations
would be cemented with China, concluding with the assurance
that what Bevin had said "represents a foreign policy on behalf
of which he can speak for all parties in this country." It was
a quiet speech, but it was what the occasion required. The time
for polemics was not yet.

CHAPTER 27

OPPOSITION

TUST BEFORE the Christmas of 1945 It was announced
I that Chorchill would be spending three months in the
j United States, for reasons of health, and that during Ms
absence Eden would act as Leader of the Opposition. It was the
signal for some Press assessment of Ms position and prospects.
Quintin Hogg wrote in the Daily Mail: "While Mr. Churchill
peacefully daubs away Ms well-earned rest at Miami, Mr. Eden
at Westminster will begin Ms dummy run as Leader of the
Conservative Party. He brings to Ms task several enormous
assets. After Mr. ChurcMU he is almost the only British states-
man who, apart from Ms official position, commands an inter-
national audience. Among Ms fellow-countrymen he is almost
the only Conservative whose popularity has survived undimin-
Ished by the defeat of Ms party. Among Conservatives Mr.
Eden enjoys one outstanding merit a determination not to let
the party dwindle and fritter itself away as a diminisMng group
of right-wing malcontents." Beaverbrook's commentator in the
Daily Express, after stressing that Churchill could appoint Ms
deputy but not Ms successor, summed up the balance sheet as
follows: "Assets wide popularity, well-recognised sincerity;
long Parliamentary and ministerial experience and attractive,
if not particularly forceful style of speech; a ready and acute,
if not particularly dominating mind. Liabilities health show-
ing signs of a strain at the end of the war, lack of experience
in Home and Empire affairs and in Opposition the latter
weakness shared by all his colleagues." The conclusion was
that "no other Conservative puts himself forward in competi-
tion with Mr. Eden at present."

Eden's first big speech in Ms new role was during the debate

228

OPPOSITION 229

on the Coal Nationalisation Bill. He asked the House to con-
sider "whether the nationalisation that the miners want, or
think they want, is in fact the nationalisation they are going to
get in this Bill," and whether it was sure "that the evils of
monopoly disappear once it comes under the aegis of the
State?" He asked what would be the relation of the Minister to
the Board, and where the responsibility would He? He tackled
the question of incentive, and challenged the Labour assump-
tion that nationalisation would provide "a new psychological
approach, a new feeling in the industry." And in reference to
Consumers' Councils, he produced one of his rare, but effective
bons mots: "[The Minister] is going to appoint those Con-
sumers' Councils, and they are to be entirely responsible to him.
It is horribly reminiscent of the burglar lending the householder
his dog and saying: "There you are. Go and make the best of
that one. 5 " Finally, in dealing with compensation, he involved
Mr. Dalton in the argument by suggesting that even after a fair
price had been agreed, the Exchequer would be in the position
of turning to the former owners and saying: "That is all right,
but of course, you cannot cash your cheque, and we cannot tell
you what interest you will have for your money."

Commenting on this speech on 30th January, the Star wrote:
"Mr. Anthony Eden is disappointing the Tory die-hards. They
had been looking to him for a fighting lead, but he seems to be
showing little enthusiasm for the role of saboteur No. 1 of the
Labour Party's social legislation.

"The plain fact is that Anthony Eden hates a rough-and-
tumble of party warfare, and disdains to score more party
points. He never was a die-hard. He is really a man of the
Centre. In the Coalition Government he supported the framing
of great social reforms which he regarded as a vital part of
peace. It is a safe forecast that if the Right gets future control
of the Tory Party, he will not long remain its leader."

In March, Eden made an important policy statement at Hull,
confirming his faith in the doctrine of the mean. "The funda-
mental political problem that faces us," he said, "is that of the

230 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

relation of the individual to the State. ... It Is essentially a
problem of balance and evolution. The individual can only de-
velop a full and satisfactory life within the context of a com-
munity. That much Is clear. Only by participation in organised
society can the individual develop into the whole man, develop
his talents, his economic ability and his social life, or enjoy his
relaxation. ... I would say that in our industrial policy we will
uphold the same principle as we maintain in considering the
relations of the individual to the State. We will seek to achieve
the proper balance between the organising power of the State
and the drive and force of free enterprise." He made it clear
that the Conservative approach to industrial, as well as to all
the other problems of government, was essentially practical,
and not doctrinaire. Cases had to be considered on their indi-
vidual merits, not forced into an ideological framework.

The controversy between the parties in the House of Com-
mons was gaining momentum. In June, Eden had gone to
Bermuda as a member of the U.K. delegation to the Empire
Parliamentary Association's Conference, and taken the oppor-
tunity of going on to visit the United States and Canada, where
Mr. Mackenzie King referred to him as "No. 1 Goodwill Visi-
tor," Just before Parliament rose for the summer recess, Eden
spoke to a mass meeting organised by the London Conserva-
tives at Walthamstow. He attacked the Government vigorously
for their "repeated failures" in various fields, particularly
housing, food rationing and coal production, and he protested
against the proposals to nationalise iron and steel. This gave
him an occasion to restate the Conservative principle govern-
ing the Party's attitude to industry as a whole: "We accept that
there is a field for State action in relation to our industrial life.
But that certainly does not mean State ownership, for owner-
ship is only one, and usually the worst, form of State interven-
tion in the affairs of industry. We believe that it is essential to
leave the day-to-day operation and management of industry in
the hands of normal industrial and commercial management

OPPOSITION 231

and to confine State control solely to what Is necessary to
protect the interests of the consuming public."

But while domestic issues were occupying so much of his
attention, the failure of the Peace Conference held during the
summer at Paris, and the sharp division of the United Nations
into western and eastern blocs, brought Eden once more into
the field of foreign affairs. Speaking at Watford, on 23rd Sep-
tember, he said: "There is no reason why the two ideologies
should not live together in peace if both will accept not to back
their fancies in every other land. Restraint may be difficult to
practise, but surely this is not too much to ask as the price for
enduring peace. . . . Surely it must be plain to all that we can-
not continue as we are now without consequences which may
be fatal to all." The language of non-involvement was easier to
sustain when the ideological conflict was between the Fascist
and Communist faiths than when Democracy itself was the only
other protagonist. Eden's final plea, therefore, was inevitably
for western co-operation in a regional agreement such as was
specifically provided for in the San Francisco Charter.

The Conservative Party Conference took place at Blackpool
in early October. It was here that Eden made his demand for a
"nation-wide property-owning democracy," in one of the ablest
and most widely acclaimed of all his speeches outside the House.
"There is one principle," he said, "underlying our approach to
all these problems, a principle on which we stand in funda-
mental opposition to Socialism. The objective of Socialism is
state ownership of all the means of production, distribution and
exchange. Our objective is a nation-wide property-owning
democracy. These objectives are fundamentally opposed.
Whereas the Socialist purpose is the concentration of owner-
ship in the hands of the State, ours is the distribution of
ownership over the widest practicable number of individuals.
Both parties believe in a form of capitalism; but, whereas our
opponents believe in State capitalism, we believe in the widest
measure of individual capitalism. I believe this to be a funda-
mental principle of political philosophy. Man should be master

232 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

of Ms environment and not Its slave. That is what freedom
means. It is precisely in the conception of ownership that man
achieves mastery over his environment. Upon the institution of
property depends the fulfilment of individual personality and
the maintenance of Individual liberty."

This objective could be achieved, Eden suggested, first by an
all-out production drive to increase the total national income,
and then by easing of taxation to strengthen individual incomes.
"At the same time; 9 he continued, "I think we should do well
to study the various schemes for co-partnership in industry, for
employee participation in profits, and so on." In fact, the speech
contained all the elements which were later to be embodied in
the Industrial Charter. It is not too much to say that this speech
created a national sensation. It appeared to adopt indeed, it
did adopt the theory of distribution which had hitherto been
preached only by a small and uninfluential minority, and it
caused some alarm among the more orthodox and old-fashioned
Tory supporters, especially in big business and the City. Never-
theless, it heartened the rank and file of the Party, who were
beginning to recover from the depression into which the elec-
tion results had plunged them. This was perhaps as near as
Eden was ever to get to embodying the ideas and following of
the young Conservative planners.

In January of 1947 Eden and his wife went for a holiday to
Barbados and South America. This was to be the close of the
chapter of their married life, for Mrs. Eden, who had from the
first found it difficult to play the part of a politician's wife, was
to leave him, and later he would have to take the difficult and
no doubt painful decision of obtaining a divorce on the grounds
of desertion. These domestic sorrows cannot but have affected
his health at that time. He had, however, the comfort of the
companionship of his surviving son Nicholas, who has always
been on the closest terms of friendship and affection with his
father.

The hard winter of 1946-1947 was marked by the most
serious fuel crisis ever experienced by the country, when in-

OPPOSITION 233

dustry was nearly brought to a standstill and acute domestic
hardship was suffered by the entire population. In a Party po-
litical broadcast delivered on 20th March, Eden attacked the
Government for their failure to plan, or to take adequate pre-
cautions before the fuel crisis developed. "As a nation," he said,
"we possess all the qualities of character needed for our tre-
mendous task. Our democratic institutions are fashioned for
progress and change. We are addicted to the best kind of dis-
cipline, which has been described as organized unselfishness.
It is surely the duty of those who govern to make their policies
not only clearly understood but true to British character and
in accord with tried and valued British institutions. . . . Today
the nation is like a runner who starts, he thinks, to run his half
a mile. He strains every nerve, he almost drops from exhaus-
tion, he reaches the winning post, but, alas, the tape is not
there. Nor can anyone tell him where it will be." The technique
of the party political broadcast is a difficult one, and it cannot
be said that any politician of any party, with the possible ex-
ception of Winston Churchill, can be relied upon to use this
particular medium with consistent success. The matter of
Eden's speech on this occasion was excellent, and it reads
well and forcefully. Yet as a broadcast it did not make the im-
pact it deserved.

In the summer the Industrial Charter was published, and
Eden spoke at mass meetings in the course of the campaign to
launch it. At Cardiff on 17th May more than 20,000 people
turned out to hear him, and he himself said that he was "stag-
gered" by the attendance at the Headingly Cricket Ground,
Leeds, on 4th July. In a personal sketch of Eden appearing in
the Yorkshire Post on that day, the paper's political correspon-
dent wrote, "At the age of 50 Mr. Eden looks back on more
than 23 years' continuous membership of the House of Com-
mons. He has already reached the summits of political achieve-
ment, yet history is more than likely to show that the past two
post-war years in Opposition make only a half-way stage.
These, the contemporary historian divines, may be crucial

234 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

formative years leading from the Foreign Office to No. 10
Downing Street. Mr. Eden has conclusively shown that his
qualities of mind and leadership compass far wider territories
[than foreign affairs]. For more than a year he did not speak
in this Parliament in foreign affairs debates in the House of
Commons. It is significant that it was precisely during this
period that his stature and reputation grew most rapidly, since
he revealed that he had a sure grasp of home as well as foreign
affairs. ... If Eden does not bludgeon his opponents, equally
and this is perhaps more important he avoids antagonising
potential sympathisers. These are qualities which have en-
hanced the respect in which he is held in Parliament. In a
House of Commons often turbulent and quick to scoff, Mr.
Eden's speeches have been followed with an attention which
has been a silent comment on his fairmindedness. He is not a
theorist, but neither does he sacrifice principle to expediency."

CHAPTER 28

TURN OF THE TIDE

THE FUEL crisis of the winter and spring was followed
by the economic blizzard of the summer. The House
remained in session until the middle of August, but
before then debated the Government' s emergency measures,
which included cuts in Defence and in imports resulting in
reduced rations, the abolition of the basic petrol ration, a ban
on foreign travel and a reduction in the housing programme.

Eden wound up the debate for the Opposition. He accused
the Government of "having stumbled undecided, unprepared
and without a plan into a crisis which they had not foreseen."
The main burden of his charge was that the country had not
been given a clear picture, and that the Government's measures
"this present hotch-potch of certain cuts and uncertain
hopes" could not be regarded as a serious remedy for the
nation's ills.

The years 1948 and 1949 were eventful for Eden almost
as eventful as they could be expected to be for anyone out of
office. Early in January, 1948, he arrived back in England
from the Middle East, where he had been paying a visit to the
Anglo-Iranian oilfields which was to stand him in the best of
stead later, when the oil crisis developed at Abadan. While in
the Middle East he also visited King Ibn Saud of Saudi-Arabia,
and was presented by him with a magnificent sword in a gold
sheath, encrusted with pearls. For a time the Customs author-
ities were baffled by this gift on his return; finally they allowed
it through duty-free as a ceremonial presentation from the head
of a State.

In March of 1948, Eden was ill again and decided to go to
a nursing home for the removal of his appendix, this being

235

236 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

followed by three weeks' convalescence in the country. His
health was causing Ms personal friends concern, but in political
circles, not so solicitous, could once again be heard the soft
rumblings of the indefinite whispering campaign about his fit-
ness for the Party Leadership and so, in due course, for No.
10 Downing Street. "Mr. Eden is no longer the 'Boy Wonder, 5 "
reports the Sunday Express of 28th March. "It is not easy to
understand why he ever was. There is no record of anything
profound or original ever said by him. But he has excellent
qualities. He is a good negotiator. At the Foreign Office he
reads every document. He has the rare qualities of writing con-
cise minutes and giving clear decision." But despite Beaver-
brook Eden was showing his recuperative powers. On his
51st birthday he addressed a great rally of 7,000 Young Con-
servatives at the Albert Hall, and on the same day he played
five strenuous sets of tennis at his Sussex home, with R.A.F.
officers from the neighbouring station of Tangmere. This did
not look like the decrepitude of failing powers.

During that summer came the Russian blockade of Berlin,
and Britain's answer the "air lift," inducing dangerous ten-
sions and rumours of war. Speaking with force and dignity in
a debate on 30th June, Eden declared that this was one of the
occasions when the House of Commons should make its point
of view felt.

"It must be made plain to the Soviet Government that sin-
cere as we are, and sincere as we have always been, in desiring
their friendship, we are not prepared to be intimidated by brute
force or by blackmail. If ever there was a time to stand firm, it
is now; if ever there was a cause in which to stand firm, it is
this."

By this time Eden knew well how to interpret the mood of
the House and of the country. By rising to the level of this
grave occasion, he showed both his personal qualities and his
calibre as a Parliamentarian.

There were occasional light moments, although his public
humour is rare, and not particularly rich. To an agricultural

TURN OF THE TIDE 237

audience in the summer he told of the Ministry of Agriculture's
staff having reached a total of 17,765, and still mounting. "Cer-
tainly," he observed, "it takes an awful lot of paper to keep
a pig, and a complete volume to kiH one." Usually, however,
he kept strictly to the pedestrian safety of his brief. The sig-
nificant point is that he was at this time handling with greater
frequency and confidence, domestic issues both inside and out-
side the House.

At the Conservative Party Conference at Llandudno, he was
back in Ms usual harness replying to a resolution on foreign
policy, and had there formulated a clear and distinct doctrine
which captured the imagination of the delegates, and later of
the country. He himself laid great stress on this doctrine he
was to revert to it during the 1950 General Election campaign
which he christened the doctrine of the Three Unities. The
first of these was the unity between the Commonwealth and
Empire, without which no successful foreign policy could be
pursued by this country. Next came unity with Western Europe,
"and this," he explained, "is in itself a concern to the Empire"
as Mr. Menzies, then in Britain, had lately agreed. The third
unity was that across the Atlantic, with the United States.
These were the three objectives which the country should pur-
sue. His mastery of his subject was shown in the emphasis
which he laid on the fact that these three unities were not dis-
parate, not incompatible, but complementary.

Early in 1949, Eden paid a visit to Canada, Australia and
New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Malaya.

This was the year of the historic settlement enabling India
as a Republic to remain inside a monarchical Commonwealth
a formula of great moment for the free world. It was a
timely tour, particularly as affecting his outlook on India and
Pakistan. Eden's attitude to the transfer of power in India had
originally been one of acquiescence rather than of enthusiastic
support. He had not been called upon to declare himself pub-
licly, but his informal reactions to the policy and implementa-
tion were known to be reserved and hedged with some doubt.

238 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

His first visit to independent India albeit brief made a pro-
found impression upon Mm both in regard to the stability of
the regime and the calibre of the leaders. A stay of a few hours
in New Delhi sufficed to bring him in touch with the political
and human factors underlying Indian independence. It also en-
abled him to get to know Nehru, now the Indian Prime Minis-
ter, whose prestige as the upholder of a middle course between
the mighty opposites of Communist Russia and capitalist
America was in the ascendant. He also had his first and last
encounter with Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister
and the strong man of the Congress on the home front. Patel
died shortly afterwards, and with him passed perhaps the
greatest administrative leader among the nationalists of Asia.
Patel, largely unknown outside India, always made a deep
impression on visiting statesmen encountering him for the
first time.

On his return in July, Eden was chairman at a reception at
the Dorchester Hotel, at which Ernest Bevin was the guest of
honour. Instead of giving him the formal title of "Mr. Chair-
man," Bevin said that he proposed to address him as "fellow
trade-unionist." It was, he said, a great pleasure and privilege
to have worked with "my old friend Anthony Eden" all through
the war. About this time, too, Eden celebrated his twenty-fifth
year as a Member of Parliament for the Warwick and Leam-
ington Division, and Churchill sent the Division one of his
typical messages: "Warwick and Leamington," he said, "have
won material distinction by their choice and by their steadfast-
ness. Anthony and I have been colleagues and comrades, hand
and heart, in some of the most formidable events. We now
work together to win for our country the prosperity and
progress that are her due."

In July, too, the Conservative Party published a restatement
of policy entitled "The Right Road for Britain." That evening
Eden delivered a Party political broadcast explaining the broad
lines of the document, and drawing the conclusion that the
country's watchword ought to be "faith, freedom and respon-

TURN OF THE TIDE 239

sibility." This again was not an outstanding broadcast it was
not nearly as good as that on his Commonwealth tour which
he had delivered a few weeks before but it was significant
that Eden had been closely and publicly associated with the
three most important manifestoes issued by the Conservative
Party in their all-out bid for electoral support.

As the Labour tide began during 1950 to recede, and the
impetus that had swept the Party into power five years pre-
viously to slow down, assessment of Conservative leadership
assumed a more pointed meaning. Various estimates of Eden's
qualities and prospects began to appear in the press. Francis
Williams, a former editor of the Daily Herald and adviser on
public relations to Mr. Attlee wrote in the News Chronicle:
'Eden is the most loyal of colleagues. He is reasonable and
conciliatory. If he cannot rise with Mr. Churchill to the very
greatest occasions, neither does he ever fall below them to the
extent that Mr. Churchill sometimes does. He has courage and
charm. As one who, in the brave days when we were seeking to
build a new world at San Francisco, used to meet him not
only late at night but also at breakfast, I can testify that he is
seldom moody. He has his limitations, but I think he will prove
a good Conservative leader. I will go further: I think he will
be a better one than Mr. Churchill."

His overwhelming popularity was a recurring theme for won-
derment and scrutiny. Tlie Observer profile asked the question,
and answered it thus: "How has it come about that Eden is one
of the figures that is held to be representative of the country?
Why is he one of the few men who can get a good hearing from
all classes of the community? There is no simple answer to such
questions, but it seems probable that Anthony Eden's reputa-
tion is based even more on what he is than on what he has
done.

"The figure of Anthony Eden is essentially a likeable one;
it is also one to respect. To achieve fame and remain modest;
to have authority and remain gentle; to contend for power with-
out becoming coarsened and cunning these are major virtues,

240 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

as rare in private life as in politics. Perhaps it is these qualities
that have gained for Capt Eden, the Foreign Secretary who
resigned, that special place in the regard of his countrymen
which makes Mm one of the leading figures of our day."

The Liverpool Post tried to define his popular appeal. "Mr.
Anthony Eden, who is almost certain to succeed Mr. Churchill
as leader of the Conservative Party, is one of the most popular
politicians in Britain, and one of the best known of British poli-
ticians in the outside world.

'Today he can attract an audience of well over 20,000 at an
open-air meeting a quite unusually large number in this coun-
try and when he visited Australia and other Dominions dur-
ing his Commonwealth tour last year, he had an exceptionally
cordial reception everywhere.

'The explanation of this popularity is hard to discover. He
is not an exciting speaker; he is not an originator of lively
phrases or new ideas. . . . But he is the born unifier. He is a
master at producing the greatest measure of agreement from
apparently incompatible elements. Here lies his secret. He is
the man of common opinions but uncommon abilities and
that a hundred years ago was Bagehofs description of the suc-
cessful political leader."

In July, 1950, Eden paid another visit to Canada and the
U.S. A., where the warmth of his reception was repeated. He
was back in England on the 4th September and in the follow-
ing month he presided at the celebrations in honour of the
twenty-first birthday of his son Nicholas.

The General Election was looming. The Socialist Party had
pushed through their Bill providing for the territorial re-distri-
bution of seats. It was a controversial measure only in the sense
that its practical provisions seemed to the Conservative Oppo-
sition, and to some Liberals, unduly to favour Socialist candi-
dates; all parties were agreed that some such measure was long
overdue. In the event, Eden found himself faced with a par-
ticularly difficult decision. His own constituency of Warwick
and Leamington lost the rural, country-town and highly Con-

TURN OF THE TIDE 241

servative district surrounding Stratford-on-Avon, which went
to form the new division of Stratford and South Warwickshire,
taking in a large portion of the rural areas which had previously
formed part of the Rugby division. This became, of course, an
absolutely safe Conservative seat. Warwick and Leamington
itself, on the other hand, had acquired a new, strong industrial
population, and the Lockheed works had grown to large pro-
portions as a result of their important war work. Eden was
given the choice between the two, and chose to stand by War-
wick and Leamington. At the time, this was considered not
only loyal, but courageous. But his loyalty and courage were
amply justified by a five-figure majority. Before the election
campaign, the result might have seemed to be anyone's guess.
The election ended in a deadlock which practically divided
the nation in two a division which was really maintained in
the new election the following year. Of the incidents which
occurred during those uneasy months, the most important, from
the point of view of Eden's career, was the notable failure at
the Foreign Office of Herbert Morrison, who had taken over
after the death of Ernest Bevin. When the results of that elec-
tion were known, and the Conservatives returned to power with
that slim but workable majority that has been of little satisfac-
tion to anyone, the rapid decline of our diplomacy had set the
stage, in a political sense, for a more than usually ardent wel-
come to Eden, who returned to his post with the good wishes of
the whole country.

CHAPTER 29

DIPLOMACY AT LARGE

A THE time of the Conservative defeat in 1945 sudden
assignment to the political wilderness was no doubt
an unpleasant shock for Eden. At first sight it must
have appeared as a major political check to Ms progress, but
on deeper analysis the experience was timely and valuable.
He had been in the harness of office, save for the eighteen
months' break following his resignation which in itself offered
no real respite continuously for some twelve years. Through-
out that anxious time the conduct of British foreign policy had
involved long hours but limited initiative. It was the period of
the midnight watch. The routine had made inroads on his
strength and health. Public identification of Eden had been
with precocity and youth, the new image was blurred but there
was the sense that he was ageing prematurely from overwork.

Opposition therefore meant physical release. It also provided
political escape from the disenchantments of peacemaking. It
is unlikely that if he had been Foreign Secretary between 1945
and 1951 he would have acted far differently from his suc-
cessor Ernest Bevin. Obviously there would have been varia-
tions of tactics and technique in the handling of particular
problems, but strategically Soviet expansionist policy con-
ducted by means of Cominform and cold war left a British
Foreign Secretary with no choice but to accept and grasp the
logic of two worlds. The second world war forced the pace
of history; in 1939 we had reached the quarter finals of inter-
national power politics eight nations could still lay claim to
the status of Great Powers with major war-making potential.
By 1945 it was painfully clear that the world arbiters were re-
duced to two super states. It was perhaps an instinctive aware-

242

DIPLOMACY AT LARGE 243

ness of this sudden and unexpected inheritance that encouraged
Roosevelt and Hopkins in the last tragic months of their lives
to explore a settlement with Russia at the expense even of their
relationship with the English-speaking democracies. At the
same time traditional American suspicions of British imperial-
ism had never been wholly allayed by Churchill and Eden
even at the height of the wartime Entente. If Soviet diplomacy
in 1945 had exploited the Grand Alliance and total victory
by pursuing a strategy of peaceful co-existence, it is quite pos-
sible that in the prevailing mood of demobilization and of
self-doubt in the West the whole of Europe might have seceded
to communism by constitutional process. A Socialist Govern-
ment returned for the first time in British history with an abso-
lute majority and dedicated to the task of achieving a domestic
new deal might have given further encouragement to Stalin to
"try kindness" first. But fortunately for the free world the
Stalinist master minds were neither adaptable nor mature
enough to seize their opportunity. Instead they took the one
course calculated to mobilise the weakening democratic will
and give unity to otherwise divided aims. The Kremlin high
command embarked upon a policy which by 1 947 had more
than anything else provided the stimulus for Gen. Marshall's
Mstoric offer of aid to Europe and Bevin's no less historic ac-
ceptance of it. Not for the first time in European history had a
policy based on the exploitation of fear and force induced re-
sults entirely opposite to those intended by the perpetrators.
The response to Soviet blackmail over Berlin perhaps the
most dangerous single episode in the Soviet drive to the West
had proved the will and capacity of the West to resist.

But a defensive sealing up of the various danger spots around
the periphery of Communist power was not from the outset re-
garded as a politically adequate or strategically secure response
to the challenge facing free Europe. There was an upsurge, the
outcome of a profound instinct for survival, in favour of a closer
political integration than had hitherto been envisaged. Belgium,
Holland and Luxemburg evoked the Benelux partnership. In

244 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

France after the withdrawal of the militant de Gaulle, Schu-
man, the one continning element as Foreign Minister in a
series of shadowy coalition governments, produced the Schu-
man plan, as France's master formula for settling the historic
Franco-German feud. Always underlying these moves towards
closer European integration was the assumption that Britain
would join the partnership. During their period of Opposition
the Conservatives, under Churchill's leadership, gave currency
to just such a hope. In a series of major orations and in par-
ticular at Zurich, Churchill put his immense authority behind
the establishment of a Western Union; and the creation of the
Council of Europe as an experiment in supranationalism was
largely the outcome of his inspiration. British Conservatism was
therefore cast in the role of advocate for more ambitious, if
localised, policies of collective security than Eden had seen fit
to sponsor in pre-war League of Nations days.

At first both Socialists and Conservatives found it hard to
accustom themselves to their new roles of Government and Op-
position. Not all Conservatives were ready to follow Churchill
into the loftier regions of European Unity, and there were
powerful Labour groups unwilling or unable to accept the
harsher realities of Soviet power and purpose. As we have seen,
it fell to Eden and Bevin in themselves almost symbolic proto-
types of Conservative and Socialist Britain to achieve the
necessary equilibrium and to develop a bi-partisan attitude to
British foreign policy which in its own context and influence on
events challenged comparison with the historic relationship
developed between successive Democrat Secretaries of State
and the Republican Senator Vandenberg.

When as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary,
Eden returned to the Foreign Office on 27th October, 1951,
the unsolved problems that he found on his desk were unusu-
ally daunting even for what we have come to regard as the
normal state of international affairs in the post-World War
II world. Fighting had continued fiercely for over fifteen
months in Korea and suggestions for truce talks, in their most

DIPLOMACY AT LARGE 245

embryonic stage, were encountering the usual discouraging
difficulties: the possibilities of peace seemed remote. While the
European Defence Community had been agreed in principle,
there was mounting hostility to its Implementation in France.
The text of a revised British draft resolution calling for a re-
sumption of negotiations between Britain and Persia on the oil
question in accordance with the principles indicated by the
International High Court had been lost on the higher and
bleaker reaches of the Security Council. There seemed no
prospect of an end to the war against the Communist VIetminh
In Indo-CMna which continued to drain formidable propor-
tions of France's military and economic reserves. The barom-
eter of South Asian stability and security pointed to cloudy.
The West was impeded from harvesting the full fruits of Mar-
shal Tito's now three-year-old break with the U.S.S.R. because
of the intractable and dangerous Italo- Jugoslav wrangle over
Trieste. Egypt's quarrel with Britain over the future of the
Sudan and the canal zone made it impossible to do more than
tinker with the political, social and economic problems that
demanded attention throughout the Middle East, a vitally im-
portant strategic area for the whole free world. The Anglo-
Egyptian deadlock also had unfortunate repercussions on
Anglo-American relations, on which more thoughtful observers
were coming to realise the future of world peace depended.

Eden set to work at once and within ten days of his return
to the Foreign Office he was ready to offer the House of Com-
mons a comprehensive survey of British foreign policy. His
clarity of mind and obvious mastery of diplomatic method
were refreshing alike to Parliament and public. On disarma-
ment, he said that the free Western powers aimed to inspire
confidence in a progressive system of "disclosure by verifica-
tion," so that the nations could disarm without fears for their
security. He promised government support for the develop-
ment of the European Defence Community within the Atlantic
community. He re-stated the government's willingness to re-
open negotiations with Persia. He offered terms to Egypt but

246 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

said that in the meantime the British Government would main-
tain its position in the canal zone on the basis of its rights
under the 1936 treaty (originally made by Eden himself). In
a reference to the arrangements made for cease-fire talks in
Korea, he emphasised that a Korean Armistice must provide
for its supervision and for the future of prisoners of war. Six-
teen nations had provided troops to fight under the U.N. ban-
ner, but the American contingent remained by far the greatest.
Already U.S. casualties were over 90,000.

E.D.C. proposals included two basic ideas: (1) joint mili-
tary plans and forces for the defence of Europe, (2) their
political control through supranational European Council, not
directly responsible to the individual governments that com-
posed it. The end of 1951 saw both Churchill and Eden
stressing that Britain was ready to co-operate to the fullest
possible extent in the common European defence force, but
was not ready to join any political union. Elaborating these
points, Eden said that British association with E.D.C. would
include close consultation and, subject to the Supreme Com-
mander's requirements, the linking of British forces on the
Continent with the European defence forces for training, ad-
ministration and supply, and a considerable blending of U.K.
European air forces. He stated categorically that British forces
would remain on the Continent as long as necessary. On the
other hand, he asked the U.S.A. not to press Britain to join a
European Federation, "for Britain's story and her interests lie
far beyond the continent of Europe." He emphasised that in
addition to British forces in Korea, Malaya and the Middle
East, Britain had the largest armoured force on the continent
of Europe of any of the Atlantic powers, and had played a
leading part in the reconstruction of the European economy.

Early in January, 1952, Churchill took Eden and a large
staff to Washington to introduce himself in the new role of
head of a peacetime Conservative Government. He told Ameri-
can newspapermen that the main object of the four talks that
he had had with President Truman was to promote that in-

DIPLOMACY AT LARGE 247

timate understanding between the two powers which had
proved so important during the war. Speaking later in the
House of Commons, Churchill emphasised that neither before
nor during his visit had any formal commitments or decision
teen arrived at concerning the possibility of a Communist
breach of Korean truce. But he was glad to have had an op-
portunity in Washington to make it clear that the English-
speaking world was acting in true loyalty and comradeship in
Korea and was resolved to bring that "local event" into its
proper relationship to the predominating danger in Europe.

At Columbia University Eden was equally emphatic. He did
not believe that the Soviet Union wished to face the destruction
that a third war would bring and he thought that the danger
of war was less than it was one or two years earlier.

On 6th February, King George VI died. Among those who
came to London for the funeral was Dr. Adenauer, who made a
point of having a special interview with Eden on 1 6th Febru-
ary. Doubtless he discussed N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. After tri-
partite talks in London on 17th, 18th and 19th February,
between the British, French and American Foreign Secretaries,
a communique was issued re-affirming the abiding interest of
the American and the British Foreign Secretaries in the estab-
lishment of E.D.C. and the decision of the governments to
maintain their forces in Europe. Consultations would continue.

The Foreign Secretary was obviously exerting every effort to
overcome the endless difficulties in which E.D.C. was bogged,
and to persuade the French that their one hope of living in
security with a rearmed Germany was to accept the plan which
MM. Schuman and Pleven had themselves originated, whereby
Germany's armed forces would be integrated into a European
army in such a way that no single power could retain control
over its individual forces.

At a N.A.T.O. meeting in Lisbon, Eden reported to the
House, there had been agreement over Germany's defence con-
tribution which in itself was a major step in strengthening
Western defence and establishing a new Europe. His constant

248 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

pre-occupatlon at this period, as indeed throughout the next
three years until Ms hopes were realised tant Men que mal in
the European Western Union pacts at the end of 1954, was the
strengthening of European solidarity. To this end he urged, for
example, on 19th March, 1952, the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe to identify itself more closely with the
Schuman plan and the European Defence Community. It had
been suggested that the Council should be remodelled. Eden
thought that it could provide ready-made machinery for the
Schuman plan and E.D.C He warned the ministers that it
would be the greatest mistake if the Council were to develop
in rivalry with anybody, whether the Schuman plan or E.D.C.
On the remodelled lines suggested it might be possible to
arrange for countries like Britain to be associated with the
parliamentary and ministerial institutions of the community
as well as with the executive organs.

But Eden was never given a respite in which to concentrate
on any one problem. His role suggested the expert conjurer
working towards a climax, new balls constantly added to those
which he was expected to keep in the air. He had hardly packed
his bags from the Council of Europe when he was called upon
to meet trouble blowing up in the Commons over recent dis-
orders in Trieste, and Persia.

Over Trieste he remonstrated with Marshal Tito for attack-
ing the administrative arrangements and refused to accept that
there had been any violation of the Italian Peace Treaty. To
Persia early in April he delivered a firm note on the oil dispute.
Government and people were beginning to feel the conse-
quences of Nationalist Prime Minister Mossadegh's policy. He
had to confess that his expectations of being able to sell
5,000,000 tons of oil a year without foreign help had been
mistaken. "We are at the cross-roads," he cried, "if we slight
our own prestige, renounce liberty, and independence, and
our rights, and accept the International Bank's conditions we
shall be approaching hell."

From Persia and oil, to Egypt and water: in the last week

DIPLOMACY AT LARGE 249

of April Eden began talks in London with Sir Ralph Steven-
son, British ambassador to Egypt and Sir Robert Howe, gov-
ernor-general of the Sudan. The canal zone and the relation-
ship of Egypt, the Nile and Sudan, were canvassed in search
of a settlement that must have beneficial repercussions through-
out the Middle East.

Then back again for a new attack on E.D.C Opening a
foreign affairs debate in the Commons on 14th May, Eden dealt
with the Labour Executive's suggestion that fresh elections
should be held in Western Germany before any commitments
were made on a German contribution to E.D.C. To Eden this
seemed "an unusual and improper interference in the internal
affairs of another country," the only effect of which would be
to delay the signature of E.D.C. and the contractual obligation
for more than one year, as elections in West Germany could
not take place before the autumn of 1953. That, in his view,
was to invite if not compel the failure of the whole plan. He
suggested that the Opposition's policy might be based on its
sympathy with the Opposition to the German government, and
he emphasised the danger of basing foreign policy on such
partisan considerations. Eden then warmly defended the whole
E.D.C. conception, and emphasised the safeguards that it
provided against the danger of German rearmament. Care had
been taken to ensure that national contributions were so bal-
anced that no one member could dominate the Community
by force of numbers. The government still intended that the
E.D.C. proposals and German contractual negotiations should
be signed that month, and "Communist threats, now becoming
more violent, ought not to influence our action, except per-
haps to consolidate our purpose." The views of the Govern-
ment in all these matters had been fully set out in the Note of
13th May to the Soviet Government and any Soviet approaches
to a settlement would be carefully examined.

Since E.D.C. was eventually rejected, it may seem of aca-
demic interest to record that the Committee of the Council of
Europe met on 22nd May to discuss and to adopt Eden's plan

250 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

for the remodelling of the Council in such a way that it should
not compete with but should provide a framework for such in-
stitutions as the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (O.EJE.C. originating in the Schuman plan). Since,
however, Britain's refusal to identify herself without qualifica-
tion with E.D.C. has, on occasion, been held to have been a
major factor in its rejection, it is worth bringing out the extent
to which, short of formal identification, Eden, with Churchill's
full approval, was ready to go, and the continuous and extra-
ordinary efforts to reassure Europe's statesmen and to create,
not merely an organisation but even perhaps more important,
an atmosphere in which the European dream could be realised.

Mr. Eden, Mr, Acheson, M. Schuman and Dr. Adenauer
on 26th May signed the complex documents known as the
Bonn Treaty which covered in detail the contractual agree-
ments between West Germany and the Western powers. Schu-
man, on behalf of the three Western powers, said that the
French people as well as their Government subscribed to the
treaties and that they wanted not merely a reconciliation but
co-operation and a new spirit of mutual confidence.

It was tragic that the vote of the French National Assembly
was in 1954 to disprove Schumatfs brave words, for although
the alliance of the free nations of the West was held together
by the successor European Western union pacts, the possibil-
ities of developing a genuine supranational organisation now
seemed remoter than ever.

The next day the French, Belgian, German, Italian, Dutch,
Luxembourg and all the N.A.T.O. states signed the E.D.C.
treaty, its related protocols and agreements (including the tri-
partite declaration on E.D.C. and on Berlin) and the agree-
ments on restriction of German arms production. The deter-
mination to maintain forces as long as required in Berlin was
clearly re-stated.

Eden himself left for Berlin but the Soviet authorities (in
symbolic comment on European defence?) refused to allow

DIPLOMACY AT LARGE 251

British and U.S. patrols to pass along the Autobahn to Helm-
stedt.

In Berlin, Eden gave a firm assurance to the West Berlin
senate that the city would continue to be defended by Allied
troops. Any attack on Berlin would be regarded as an attack on
the Western powers. Berlin would once again be the capital of
a united Germany.

B

CHAPTER 30

DARKNESS AND LIGHT

EFORE the statesmen of Europe had time to flatter them-
selves on what seemed epoch-making signatures in Bonn,
the Far Eastern skies began to lower. In London,
Churchill described the Korean situation as "very grave." The
Communists had used the lull in the fighting to reinforce and
re-equip their armies and they were now "in a position to
launch a major offensive with little warning," In the Lords,
Lord Alexander said that the Communist forces numbered
nearly a million compared with 500,000 in July, 1951. They
were believed to have 500 tanks and self-propelled guns and
1,800 aircraft, of which about 1,000 were jets.

Within a few days of his return Eden was immersed in a new
Korean complication. He revealed to the Commons that the
conditions of the prisoners' camps in Koje Island aroused the
gravest concern. He estimated that 115 prisoners had been
murdered by fellow prisoners. Nor did ideological murders in
prison camps complete the tale of the worries of the U.N.O.'s
hard-pressed representatives in Korea.

For years, Syngman Rhee, the Korean President, had de-
nounced the undemocratic procedure of tyrants. To make
doubly sure that no tyrant could slip in by the back door in his
own country, he began to take precautions of a kind that led
Eden to assert in the Commons that proclamation of martial
law in Pusan on 24th May on the pretext of guerrilla activities
there was not warranted. On 24th June, the British charge
d'affaires in Pusan had informed President Rhee of his govern-
ment's concern at recent political developments in South Korea
and had urged him to abide by the constitution.

"The first prerequisite," said Eden, "is a return to constitu-

252

DARKNESS AND LIGHT 253

tional government by the lifting of martial law and the release
of the arrested members of the Assembly."

The next day Eden was holding the line in an attempt to
explain the Yalu River raid. The heaviest bombing of the
Korean war had occurred without Britain knowing anything
about it. Was some change of policy involved?

Mr. Churchill had already stated that attacks such as the
bombing of Yalu River targets by the Americans did not appear
to "involve any extension of the operations hitherto pursued or
to go beyond the discretionary authority in the United Nations
Supreme Commander. So far as Her Majesty's Government is
concerned there has been no change of policy." Mr. Attlee said
that an explanation was needed as to why Lord Alexander, who
had been on an official visit to Tokyo and Seoul only ten days
before the bombing, had been told nothing of the intention to
make the raid. If the Americans had decided that they must
strike hard to get some decision in the truce negotiations that
represented a change of policy and they should have consulted
their allies. The action had a political as well as military aspect.

Eden assured the House again that there had been no change
of British policy; it was still their purpose to limit the conflict in
Korea, and to do everything to attain an armistice on fair and
reasonable terms. The Suiho plant (which had been bombed)
provided forty per cent of the electric power in North Korea.
Washington approved the attack but Her Majesty's Govern-
ment was not informed or consulted; he regretted this. Exten-
sive bombing had, however, been carried out day and night in
Korea; it was nothing new but had been going on ever since
the talks began. The Communists had also been making heavy
infantry attacks. He spoke of the part played in the build-up
of the enemy's strength by the power stations which were per-
fectly legitimate targets. None was within 1,000 yards of the
frontier. When the Opposition motion came to the vote on
July 1, Churchill read an off-the-record statement made by
Mr. Acheson, who had agreed to its publication, in which he
said that the British Government ought to have been informed

254 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

or consulted about the Yalu River bombing. The Americans
had intended to do so but a misunderstanding among officials
had caused the omission. While Mr. Acheson did not admit
Britain's absolute right to be consulted, he added: "You are a
partner of ours in this operation and we wanted to consult you.
We should have, and we recognise this error."

On 23rd July came the news that General Naguib had car-
ried out a bloodless coup d'etat in Cairo and proclaimed him-
self Commander-in-chief. Eden had taken the precaution in the
previous month of calling a conference of diplomatic repre-
sentatives from eleven different Middle East countries to bring
himself up to date on the unsettled Middle East situation, but
he had hardly time to stress the Government's interest that a
stable and orderly administration should emerge from the
Egyptian crisis, before he was diverted from Anglo-Egyptian
relations to the Bonn and E.D.C. treaties.

Speaking on a Government motion approving these two
treaties and the protocol of the North Atlantic treaty of 27th
May, he urged the danger of delaying ratification and de-
nounced as a profound error the idea that postponement would
make the Russians more amenable. All post-war experience
disproved this and the Russians would only welcome delay as
a triumph for their policies. It was clear from the Soviet notes
what these policies were. They wanted a return to the Potsdam
system (of Allied control) pending a peace settlement, and
they wanted a dictated and not a negotiated peace. They had
persistently evaded any attempt to ensure the setting up of a
freely elected all-German Government before a treaty could be
negotiated. What the Soviets wanted was a Germany "left in
dangerous and irresponsible isolation in the heart of Europe."
The Government was convinced that there would only be some
modification in the Soviet attitude if they proceeded firmly with
their plans.

Eden upheld the position of the previous Government that
the country's over-all defence burden would not be increased by
the new treaties, and he pointed to the help which would be

DARKNESS AND LIGHT 255

derived from German rearmament in the common defence
effort, and added a significant reminder of the formidable
increase in competition in the world market which the United
Kingdom would have to face if Germany were allowed to
devote all her energies to civilian production instead of con-
tributing to her own defence. The treaty offered a new future
for Germany, a new chance for Europe to turn aside from
century-old divisions and disputes and a chance to place
relations between Germany and the Western powers on a basis
of friendship and unity. To those who would now postpone
the issue, Eden declared that it was Britain's duty to give a lead,
and that any delay would damage the cause of peace, encour-
age our enemies and depress our friends.

A reminder that even the most harassed Foreign Secretaries
have private Hves, however rationed, came in August of 1952
with the news of the strengthening of the ties of the families of
the Prime Minister and Prime Minister designate. Eden's en-
gagement to Miss Clarissa Spencer Churchill, a niece of Win-
ston Churchill was announced. Eden had obtained a divorce
from his first wife in 1950. It was no secret that the break up
of his home life arising from the separation and the death of
his son had taken toll both of his health and temperament. He
gave the impression to those working with him at the time of
being tense and lonely. It is not always realised what exacting
demands politics make on private lives. In Clarissa Churchill
Eden was fortunate enough to find a partner with wide cultural
interests, attractive, original and if, at the outset, shy in public,
of firm personal character well capable of supporting her hus-
band in strong decisions. The wedding took place at Caxton
Hall to scenes of enthusiasm usually associated with the care-
fully planned marriages of film stars. This wedding captured
the public imagination and the presence of Churchill as wit-
ness wreathed in cherubic smiles for bride and bridegroom alike
confirmed everyone in the feeling that here indeed was an
appropriate union. It was perhaps to be expected that some
spokesmen of church opinion should allow themselves the

256 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

luxury of producing homilies on divorce and example, but it
is probable that this wedding and its obvious fitness played its
part in making many people re-examine their hearts and minds
on the whole subject of the re-marriage of innocent parties.

Following a reception at 10 Downing Street the Edens went
to Portugal for their honeymoon.

On Ms return Eden was soon back in the vortex of inter-
national affairs. With unremitting energy and no small measure
of political courage, he sought to seize diplomatic initiative
whenever available. In September he explained to the Council
of Europe his proposals for strengthening links between the
Council and the supranational organisations, E.D.C. and the
newly-formed Coal and Steel Community.

Also in September, he took the bold decision to meet Tito in
Belgrade. Diplomatically the contact was both necessary and
overdue. Tito's Jugoslavia ever since the break with Stalin had
transformed the strategic scene in the Mediterranean; but po-
litical doubts remained. There were influential groups both in
Britain and America which were not easily reconciled to
Churchill's original support for Tito, and did not place much
credence on Communist deviations. But general considerations
apart, there was the particular problem of Trieste. Eden wished
to grasp this nettle. From a political settlement here, wider
benefits might accrue. In fact, he was able to have a full and
friendly exchange of views on world problems.

A few days later Eden was in Vienna meeting Dr. Figl, the
Austrian Chancellor, who was still faced with Russia's blank
refusal to sign a peace treaty.

In November he attended the General Assembly of the
United Nations, and rejected out of hand Mr. Vishinsky's
revised proposals for the release of prisoners of war in Korea
because the Soviets insisted on total repatriation irrespective of
the prisoners' personal wishes.

Eden opened 1953 with a compromise broadcast survey. He
explained in clear terms the broad principles of British foreign
policy, but as has often been the case his voice was lacking in

DARKNESS AND LIGHT 257

animation. Fortunately for him and Ms Party he appeared to be
far more successful in presenting himself over the television
medium. In this particular broadcast he began by saying that
Britain's foreign policy had two aims to secure peace which
meant that Britain must be strong to negotiate and to deter
aggression and to develop a healthy and balanced system of
world economy and trade. He warned that the Communist
threat remained and that if the danger of war had receded, it
was only because the free world was getting stronger. He wel-
comed improving relations among Turkey, Greece and Jugo-
slavia, and between Jugoslavia and Austria, and he pledged
co-operation with any country contributing actively to the col-
lective effort for peace, even if he did not agree with its internal
policy.

In the Commons, Eden kept up his campaign for E.D.C
Once more he proclaimed Britain's support for the plan, but
added: "It would be wrong to give any false hope of Britain
joining the E.D.C." President Eisenhower's Secretary of State,
Mr. John Foster Dulles, who had been visiting the West Euro-
pean capitals with Mr. Stassen, Director of the Mutual Security
Agency, said that they were "on the whole encouraged" by
what they had heard from the six E.D.C. countries: they be-
lieved that there was a "responsible determination to bring the
E.D.C. treaty to completion."

While Eden was engaged in talks with Mr. Dulles in Wash-
ington, momentous news came through on 5th March of the
death of Stalin. Mr. Dulles at once told a press conference that
he saw greatly improved prospects for peace in the Communist
dictator's death. "The Eisenhower era begins," he said, "as the
Stalin era ends, 5 ' and he believed that the guiding spirit of the
new era would be liberty, not enslavement.

In April, Eden had been due to visit Italy, Greece and Tur-
key, following up his Jugoslav visit of the previous year, but on
5th April the Foreign Office issued the disturbing announce-
ment that the visits would have to be postponed and that Eden
would have to undergo an operation. Two days later it was

258 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

stated that Churchill would himself take charge of the Foreign
Office. Eden was in fact away from Ms post until the beginning
of October: From the ceremonies and festivities of Coronation
he was of necessity absent. He was in fact a very sick man, the
frequent bouts of pain he was suffering were symptoms of a
serious condition. He underwent two operations but each time
the stitches had hardly been removed before the trouble re-
occurred. It was fortunate that an American surgeon who had
great faith in his specialised treatment of gall-bladder cases
offered to operate. The operation was successful, and there was
no disheartening relapse, but on his return home he looked
extremely fragile and clearly bore the traces of the ordeal he
had undergone.

During Eden's absence one of the most interesting develop-
ments was Churchill's now famous summary of foreign affairs
given to Parliament on llth May in the course of which he
stressed that although Britain was not a member of E.D.C., she
had, since the end of the war, five times guaranteed in the
various N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. agreements to help to defend
France against attack. "We have stationed our largest military
force with the French on the Continent. . . . We have not got a
divisional formation in our own island. No nation has ever run
such risks . . . and no nation has ever received so little recogni-
tion for it." All this was a prelude to the release of a trial
balloon for one of those personal meetings among Olympians
which Churchill had so often and so successfully brought off in
the past. It was a mistake, he told the Commons, to assume that
nothing could be settled with the U.S.S.R. unless everything
were settled simultaneously, and he believed that a conference
at the highest level confined to the smallest number of powers,
should be held without delay.

The wheels were set in motion for a meeting between Prime
Minister and President when Churchill himself was taken ill
and had like his Foreign Secretary to retire for convalescence.
At the same time as this abortive effort to give a new shift to
British diplomacy, a great uprising took place in Eastern Ger-

DARKNESS AND LIGHT 259

many which was only put down by the use of overwhelming
force. Although Churchill was compelled to put his ''talks at
the summit" aside, the undertone of conflict between his per-
sonal and the Foreign Office official approach persisted.

Then in July came the long delayed signature of the Armi-
stice at Panmunjom. Although Eden was still sick at the time,
he was after his return able to intervene constructively on many
occasions in the post-armistice negotiations which were apt to
fall between the stools of Chinese obduracy and American
toughness. Fruitful Commonwealth co-operation was often ap-
parent as, for example, in November, 1952, when Eden, after
suggesting some friendly amendments which were cordially
accepted, supported, against American opposition, India's pro-
posals for the repatriation of prisoners, which were eventually
adopted.

The episode was significant as evidence that the constant and
sincere proclamations by Churchill and Eden that the corner-
stone of British policy was the Anglo-American alliance did
not mean that Britain was an American satellite, but retained
the self-confidence, born of long experience In international
affairs, to back her own judgment, in a constructive, friendly
and firm manner. Inevitably such independence was bound to
cause some Anglo-American friction.

Such friction had, for many reasons, gathered force from the
outbreak of the Korean war. It was natural that the U.S.A.,
which carried by far the heaviest burden, should expect to take
the lead in policy, but the divergent authorities, ranging from
the President and the Secretary of State, through a multitude of
congressional committees and spokesmen, to generals with
views as pronounced as their chins, led to confusion and irrita-
tion which grew as the international situation, particularly in
South-East Asia, deteriorated.

CHAPTER 3 1

GENEVA AND S.E.A.T.O,

NINETEEN-FIFTY-FOUR was one of the most dra-
matic periods in post-war international relations and
at the year's end Eden's reputation had never stood
higher. As one commentator said, Eden may not have an orig-
inal mind but it is singularly unblurred; his mastery of the most
complicated issues, Ms grasp of essentials, his power of exposi-
tion, his firm and constructive steering of international com-
mittees, and not least his refusal to be discouraged or rattled
by criticism that was often as uninformed as it was bitter, were
recognised by colleagues as widely separated in their view-
points as Mr. Dulles, Pandit Nehru, M. Mendes-France, and
M. Molotov.

Nowhere was Eden's resourceful diplomatic technique better
illustrated than in the conference that met in Geneva from
29th April to 21st July, 1954, in an endeavour to settle the
futures of Korea and Indo-China. Although the Four-Power
Conference held in Berlin in January, 1954, revealed that the
U.S.S.R. was not ready to accept any German or Austrian
peace treaty which would entail the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from their forward positions in those countries, the results did
at least also suggest that the U.S.S.R. had no desire to disturb
the peace of Europe in the visible future or to warm up the cold
war. The conference served therefore to ease East- West ten-
sion. Its last act was to agree to hold a meeting on Korea at
Geneva in April.

The Geneva Conference was to strain Anglo-U.S. relations
almost to the breaking point. The root cause of the friction was
that whereas Eden hoped that the detente over Europe created
by the Berlin Conference could be spread to Korea, Indo-

260

GENEVA AND S.E.A.T.O. 261

China and Asia generally, the Americans were fearful at what
they regarded as the potentially appalling repercussions of sit-
ting down at the same table with Communist China. Whereas a
meeting with Chou En-lai seemed to Eden a normal opportu-
nity of taking soundings of peace, it struck the Americans, if
not as a form of abnormal vice, at any rate as an unholy com-
munion with the Devil. Britain, in common with many other
states, considered the banishment of Communist China from
U.N.O. to be disadvantageous, although Churchill and Eden
were agreed that the question of her admission could not be
raised until the Korean and Indo-Chinese conflicts were settled.

To the U.S. Congress, Communist China's admission to
grace was anathema, and they feared that the Geneva Confer-
ence might produce some document the signature of which
would amount to recognition and ease China into U.N.O. by a
side door. Simultaneously, their attitude seemed to be that any
encounter with Communist diplomats was bound to result in a
game of strip-tease poker in which the non-Communists would
lose the shirts off their backs and the stripes off their pants, and
that it was therefore safer to "praise the Lord and pass the
ammunition" since the only language that the Communists
understood was force or the threat of it. The Americans were
also sure that the Communists would spin out the Geneva Con-
ference in order to delay any joint international action to save
the French, whose position was becoming more desperate from
day to day, and thus enable the Chinese to overrun Indo-China.

The Americans therefore felt that the real problem was to
find means to scare off the Vietminh commander from advanc-
ing his forces further. On 12th January, 1954, Mr. Dulles gave
U.S. strategy a "new look." He explained that it was now con-
sidered to be too costly to meet local aggression by direct local
resistance and that a new and basic decision had therefore been
taken to depend on America's "great capacity to retaliate in-
stantly by means and at places of our choosing."

Unresponsive to criticisms of this speech by Canada's For-
eign Minister, Mr. Lester Pearson, and by others, Mr. Dulles

262 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

on 29th March spoke of the imposition of Communism on
South-East Asia as a threat to the free world which could not
be "passively accepted and should be met by united action"
that might involve "risks."

Nobody disputed that a Communist victory in Indo-China
would transform the East- West strategic situation in South-
East Asia, with grave repercussions on the balance of power
throughout Asia: the difficulty was not the diagnosis but the
treatment. In Korea, the issue had been simple; the aggressor
could be identified at a glance: the Communist North Koreans
had invaded the South. In Indo-CMna the issue was clouded.
Most Asians, however anti-Communist, regarded the Vietminh
as patriots who were trying to liberate their country from
French imperialism. The case that could be stated against this
was too complicated for most Asians to grasp. In any event, it
was now years too late to try to put the case for armed U.N.O.
defence of Indo-CMna on the basis of Communist aggression.
The only way out seemed to Mr. Dulles to be a South-East
Treaty Organisation along N.A.T.O. lines that would contain
the Communists against overflowing the borders of Indo-China.
He flew to London to discuss this with Eden on llth April.
Exactly what was said at this meeting is not known, but the
evidence suggests that while Eden accepted the broad idea, he
argued that a S.E.A.T.O. pact would be dangerous unless it
had the full support of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon
the Colombo powers. It was precisely because the main burden
of any military operation would necessarily fall on the U.S.A.,
Britain, Australia and New Zealand, that the agreement of the
Colombo powers was vital, for without it any military opera-
tion would arouse Asian antagonism by appearing to be an
old-fashioned imperialist war by Western powers on behalf of
French, British or Dutch colonial interest. On 13th April, a
communique was issued which after recounting and deploring
the activities of the Communist forces in Indo-China con-
cluded: "Accordingly we are ready to take part, with the other
countries principally concerned, in an examination of the pos-

GENEVA AND S.E.A.T.O. 263

sibility of establishing a collective defence, within the frame-
work of the charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace,
security, and freedom of South-East Asia and the Western
Pacific. It is our hope that the Geneva Conference will lead to
the restoration of peace in Indo-CMna. We believe that the
prospect of establishing a unity of defensive purpose through-
out South-East Asia and the Western Pacific will contribute to
an honourable peace in Indo-CMna."

This communique caused a major Anglo-American mis-
understanding. To Eden, it seems to have meant that he was
prepared to take part in an examination of the possibility of
establishing a S.E.A.T.O. agreement. But it was vitally impor-
tant in his view that the South-East Asian powers should be
fuEy represented.

On the other hand, to Americans, "South-East Asia" means
primarily Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, The
term "Colombo powers" is even resented by some Americans
as implying a group of doubtful status and loyalty, not imme-
diately amenable to U.S. leadership. It seemed important to
Mr. Dulles to present Geneva with S.E.A.T.O. as a stem
accomplished fact before the conference met, so that the tricky
Communist negotiators would know what was coming to them
if they refused reasonable terms in Indo-China.

The different assumptions underlying the British and Ameri-
can interpretations of the communique of 13th April appar-
ently emerged for the first time when Eden learned that Mr.
Dulles had summoned the "South-East Asian powers" (as de-
fined in America) to meet in Washington on 20th April. He
was alarmed and dismayed. All the evidence suggested (and
subsequent events were to confirm) that India, as the most
influential of the Colombo powers, would consider the best
hope for South-East Asian peace to lie in a freely negotiated
settlement at Geneva, and that to rush through a S.E.A.T.O.
line-up beforehand would look like blackmail. Whatever the
merits of this viewpoint, the fact remained that to respect it
offered the only hope of enlisting the support of the Colombo

264 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

powers to uphold any Indo-Chinese settlement reached at Ge-
neva. In daring to warn Mr. Dulles that he was In effect putting
the S.E.A.T.O. cart before the Geneva horse, Eden must have
realised that he was risking a first-class diplomatic incident.
Moreover, the number and variety of authorities whose feelings
can be outraged in Washington and the vigour with which
American senators and columnists rush to avenge any affront
to the nation, causes such incidents to assume "bigger and bet-
ter" proportions, with which the more inhibited champions of
other affronted nations do not begin to compete.

Eden did not quail. He cabled his views to Mr. Dulles, who,
although apparently boiling at what he regarded as treachery,
felt compelled to transform the Washington meeting into one
of the Korean war powers. Alistair Cooke reported in the
Manchester Guardian of 26th June: "It is no secret that Mr.
Eden and Mr. Dulles at this point had in common only the
conviction that each was the injured party, and while Mr.
Eden's long diplomatic experience enabled him to preserve a
tense public silence, Mr. Dulles did not exhaust his chagrin
until he had worked it off in a speech at Los Angeles." Ameri-
can Press comment about the British "Municheers" at Geneva
became pointed and personal. But Anglo-American relations
had not yet touched bottom.

Negotiations at Geneva were protracted, difficult and at
moments acrimonious, and seemed to bear out American fears
that the Chinese intended them merely as a series of delaying
actions to cover the absorption of Indo-China. But Eden kept
the conference together by masterly steering.

For Eden, the Indo-Chinese negotiations were in effect a
salvage operation in which the Soviets and the Chinese held
most of the cards. At home, the French Government was obvi-
ously unstable and actually fell when, halfway through the
conference, M. Laniel was defeated and was replaced by Mr.
Mendes-France. In Indo-China, French troops were in retreat.
What the Chinese had to estimate was the extent to which they
could stall in Geneva and batter the French in Indo-China

GENEVA AND S.E.A.T.O. 265

without exasperating American public opinion into armed in-
tervention which might touch off a war whose consequences
would be incalculable. A united Western front would have
enabled the free world to extract a better bargain but the con-
stantly increasing estrangement between the U.S.A. and Europe
in general, and Britain in particular, impeded this.

During a critical pause in the conference in June when the
outcome was in the balance, Eden, reporting to the Commons,
used an expression which at the time seemed unwittingly to
have struck at the roots of the whole post-war Anglo-American
alliance. He reiterated the view that there could be no real
security in South-East Asia without the goodwill and support
of the free Asian countries. He hoped that there would be
agreement on an international guarantee of any Indo-Chinese
settlement and some system of South-East Asian defence,
which might be a reciprocal arrangement in which both sides
took part, such as Locarno, or it might be like N.A.T.O.

This apparently innocuous statement, made a few hours be-
fore the departure of Churchill and Eden by air for talks with
the President and Mr. Dulles in Washington, caused the State
Department to blench to its gills and senators to tear off then-
braces and declare a holy war against Britain. What was upper-
most in Eden's -mind in referring to Locarno was probably the
new spirit in Franco-German relations which it had been hoped
that treaty would herald, but all that the Americans remem-
bered was that it had been torn up by Hitler with impunity.
And, again, the suggestion seemed another insidious British
attempt to secure recognition of the Peking regime. Some time
before, Mr. Dulles had instructed the State Department to
draw up a catalogue of Anglo-U.S. differences with the sugges-
tion that America and Britain should continue to co-operate
where they were in agreement, as, for example, over E.D.C. in
Europe, but that consultations as between allies should no
longer be regarded as normal in the vast areas where their
views were apparently opposed, as in China, Japan, India,
Indo-CMna, Burma, Persia, Iraq, Israel, and Egypt, and that

266 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

the U.S.A. should be free to reap the goodwill from her tradi-
tional "anti-colonial" policies where it suited her. These ideas
were now widely canvassed in the U.S. press with no holds
barred.

In such a poisoned atmosphere, the success of the White
House talks was all the more remarkable and, in the eyes of
any thoughtful observers left, enhanced the stature of the four
statesmen concerned, as men of frankness and vision. It is true
that the gaps between U.S. and British policy were not closed,
but they were narrowed to manageable proportions, and the
differences were often found to be more of emphasis or timing
than of objective. The Locarno fiasco was cleared up when
Mr. Dulles explained that his basic objection was that it would
consecrate Communist control of East Europe (including parts
of Germany and Austria) and of North Korea. It would end
the hopes of captive peoples, such as the East Germans, and
might in certain circumstances require the U.S.A. to use armed
force against them. Eden had no difficulty in assuring him that
nothing was further from his thoughts. All that he sought was
a means to ensure that the Colombo powers underwrote what-
ever Indo-Chinese settlement could be reached in Geneva. On
South-East Asian policy, the well-informed Washington com-
mentator, Ernest Lindley, reported after the talks that despite
some differences, Washington "does not doubt that Britain
under its present Government, would fight if the Communists
should again resort to clear-cut military aggression as they did
in Korea. And of course, the British are bound by treaty to
fight against any Communist aggression in the N.A.T.O. area.
But British policy tends to be more flexible than ours, to seek
adjustments by negotiation, to be wary of action which might
lead to a war with China or the U.S.S.R."

From these talks there emerged the Potomac Charter, the
sort of sonorously worded document that Churchill was adept
at drafting. In addition to a reaffirmation of loyalty to U.N.O.,
the signatories "upheld the principle of self-government and
would strive by peaceful means to secure independence for all

GENEVA AND S.E.A.T.O. 267

countries desirous and capable of sustaining an independent
existence," which was prophylactic, in the American view,
against any British relapse into Locamo-ism, and, in the British
view against any upsurge of American "anti-colonial" exuber-
ance.

Although Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles felt reassured by
their talks with Churchill and Eden, there remained consider-
able differences between the administration and a substantial
number of congressmen. As Churchill said in the Commons on
12th July, a gulf separated those who wanted peaceful co-
existence with the Communist and non-Communist nations,
and those who wished to extirpate the Communist fallacy. He
applauded Mr. Eisenhower's declaration that the hope of the
world lay in peaceful co-existence combined with vigilance,
but, as the Manchester Guardian pointed out, what Churchill
did not say was that this was precisely the gulf that separated
Senator Knowland from Mr. Eisenhower, and that it was the
Senator who was setting the pace of U.S. policy. He was trying
to push the American people into approving a policy that
would root the Communists out of China. Churchill told the
House that he was "astonished" at the storm raised by Senator
Knowland over China's possible admission to the U.N.O., be-
cause this was not an immediate issue and had not been prom-
inent in his talks with the President. Churchill could hardly tell
the Commons that this had occupied more attention in the
U.S.A. than any other item on the agenda simply because
Senator Knowland saw in it a way of forcing the President and
Mr, Dulles to issue strong statements declaring their unalter-
able opposition to China's admission, but this seemed to be
the truth.

At this moment, when M. Mendes-France had just become
French Premier and was about to face Chou En-lai at Geneva
under his own "settlement within a month or resign" terms,
the solidarity of the representatives of the free world under the
natural leadership of the U.S.A. seemed more than ever vital,
but the uproar created by Senator Knowland and the congres-

268 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

sional anti-Communist extremists made Mr. Dulles feel that it
would be politically unwise even to meet M. Mendes-France.,
let alone attend the Geneva conference. Not content to sulk in
Ms tent, the American Achilles felt impelled to parade his wrath
ostentatiously. It was only under the greatest personal pressure
from M. Mendes-France, and Eden that Mr. Dulles was per-
suaded to offer M. Mendes-France a hasty last-minute splash
of moral support by flying over to see him in Paris, and by con-
ceding that Mr. Bedell Smith should return to Geneva as an
observer, and that if an agreement which the U.S.A. could re-
spect were reached, the U.S.A. would refrain from upsetting it
and would regard any violation of it as a matter of grave con-
cern.

The upshot was that the conference reached a cease-fire
agreement within minutes of M. Mendes-France's 20th July
deadline. Perhaps the best comment on the conference, and
the most succinct, came from Mr. Eisenhower, who told news-
paper men that if he were asked for an alternative to the Geneva
agreements he had no better plan and he was therefore not
going to criticise.

It was generally held that the Geneva conference had failed
to produce a Korean settlement, but had succeeded in Indo-
CMna. This view is at least open to question. In Korea, as the
Economist pointed out, the Western powers were not com-
pelled to accept the Communist terms for fear of suffering
imminent military disaster; hence they resolutely maintained
their position that Korea should be unified only after free elec-
tions under U.N. supervision the same formula that, for the
same reasons, they had maintained over the re-unification of
Germany. The refusal of the Communists to agree meant in
both cases that a stable existing position was maintained, since
both sides knew that any serious trespass across the boundary
meant war. The relatively confident feeling that prevailed about
Korea arose from the belief that the Communists would not
think it expedient to launch a new aggression there.

But in Indo-China the main reason why the Communists

GENEVA AND S.E.A.T.O. 269

refrained from driving the French into the sea was perhaps less
the fear of U.S. intervention than confidence that they could
achieve their aims less expensively by peaceful means, for in
Indo-Cbina the Western powers were in no position to insist
on free, U.N. supervised elections. "The essential/* said the
Economist, "was to extricate a beaten army from a disastrous
entanglement and to relieve the French people of a war which
they no longer had the will to fight." With elections supervised
only by a three-nation commission with one Communist mem-
ber and an Indian chairman, conducted by the existing admin-
istrations, in a country divided in such a way that the majority
of the population was under Vietminh control or influence, the
result of the election due in 1956 seemed easy to forecast.

Were, then, the Americans right in attacking Eden as a
"Municheer"? It is true that Eden's hope that the Colombo
powers would join in a post-Genevan S.E.A.T.O. to resist any
further attempt to overflow the frontiers of Vietnam was not
realised, and that the toothless and truncated S.E.A.T.O. even-
tually signed at Manila on 8th September, 1954, aroused the
passive antipathy of the Colombo powers, but if Eden had
agreed to Mr. Dulles' plan of rushing any S.E.A.T.O, through
to present Geneva with a threatening accomplished fact, it is
arguable that the Colombo passive antipathy would have be-
come active antagonism and that the Communists would have
interpreted this as encouragement to take calculated risks
which would have ended either in immediate and indiscriminate
absorption of vast areas of South-East Asia, or in provoking
that massive retaliation threatened by Mr. Dulles that would
have sparked a major conflagration.

The conclusion seems that the diplomat may on occasion best
promote his ultimate objects by choosing the lesser of two evils
rather than by striking an attitude and exclaiming fiat justitia,
ruat coeluml

CHAPTER 32

SALVAGE AND SETTLEMENT

THE RESULT of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on
the Suez Canal base signed on 19th October, 1954,
confounded the gloomy prophecies of the small section
of the Conservative Party whose criticisms contributed to em-
bittering and delaying the settlement by confusing and need-
lessly antagonising Egyptian public opinion. To consolidate
their regime the military junta which rescued Egypt from chaos
in July, 1952, needed to hasten the evacuation of the canal
zone; the longer that the British remained, the more insecure
the government. Those Conservatives who denounced the
"scuttle from Egypt" argued that the loss of the canal zone
would be a blow at the security of the Commonwealth and that
it would fatally undermine British prestige throughout the
Middle East. Replying to the first point, Mr. Head, Secretary for
War, told the Commons on 29th July, that the hydrogen bomb
and nuclear weapons had revolutionised the strategic situation,
rendering conceptions which were well-founded a year ago
obsolete today. "Utterly obsolete," he repeated. Mr. Attlee ex-
tracted the maximum enjoyment for himself and his party by
apt quotations from previous Labour and Tory speeches which
suggested that the Tories had scorned all the arguments for
evacuation that they now cited when the same arguments had
been submitted to the House by the Labour Government and
he claimed that the Tories had stupidly resisted a better agree-
ment which might have been made with Egypt by the Labour
Government.

Mr. Attlee's pungent phrases and telling irony scored a
great Parliamentary success. It remained for Eden, without
oratorical flourish, to show once again that he could marshal

270

SALVAGE AND SETTLEMENT 271

the facts of Ms own brief, and detect the weak spots In his
opponents', with impressive ease and authority. He reminded
Mr. Attlee that his government had failed to get an agreement
with Egypt and had had to raise the number of British troops
to 80,000. That was the present government's heritage. Mr.
Attlee had argued that the British departure would leave a
vacuum in the Middle East. Eden replied that, on the con-
trary, the liberation of 80,000 men from the base would end
the vacuum because they would form a strategic reserve avail-
able for use where needed. He underlined that bases on foreign
soil are no longer tolerated and that what matters is mobility;
this agreement would increase the mobility of our forces and
add to their strength. Pithily he summed up the case against
the Conservative rebels by saying "What we need is a working
base, not a beleaguered garrison/ 5 Eden's speech clearly con-
vinced the majority of his party which cheered him with greater
enthusiasm than they had shown at any other time during this
controversy, and it was also notable that the Opposition joined
in the cheers.

The march of events was to disprove the loss-of-prestige
argument. The canal agreement took the sting out of anti-
British propaganda. The reactions of the Arab world suggested
that by her realistic appreciation of changed conditions, Britain
had shown the adaptability of her power and had enhanced
rather than diminished her prestige. And it was a relief to those
responsible for British interests and influence in the several
Arab countries that the canal problem, which had always
confused Anglo-Arab relations, was out of the way. It enabled
Egypt at long last to co-operate freely on strategic matters with
the West, with which her policies showed that her interests
lay. Not least, the end of the Anglo-Egyptian quarrel made for
stable conditions in Egypt by enabling the government to
devote its energies to social needs.

The settlement on 5th October, 1954, of the dispute over
Trieste was not only important in removing a major obstacle
in Italo- Jugoslav co-operation for peace in. the Mediterranean,

272 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

but was a slgnficant example of Eden's diplomatic technique.
In the course of long drawn negotiations, both Italy and Jugo-
slavia had had to yield points. On the other hand, neither was
manoeuvred into yielding more than its own public opinion
would accept. In the course of his speech at the Conservative
Party conference on 7th October, Eden congratulated the two
countries on the end of their quarrel and said: "It is interesting
to notice that this settlement was an example of a method of
diplomacy which I prefer. This is in effect an open covenant,
secretly arrived at [applause]. That is the way diplomacy
should be done, and it is also an example of the closest possible
Anglo-American co-operation. For eight months our Foreign
Office representative and his American colleagues have worked
almost daily with the Italian and Jugoslav ambassadors, and
for at least six of those months no one knew anything about
them [applause]. To all four of them the highest tributes are
due."

In August, 1954, the languishing E.D.C. drama suddenly
sprang into life and raced into a frenetic climax. Thrice in-
vaded since 1870, France shivered in fear of a sovereign, re-
armed Germany, while America insisted that West Germany,
which in any case could not be kept disarmed and occupied
by Allied forces indefinitely, must contribute to the defence of
Western Europe. M. Rene Pleven sought to square the circle
of German power and French weakness by a plan to create a
common European army under the supranational control of a
European Council. In other words, the proposal was that
France must forgo some part of her own sovereignty and con-
trol over her own armed forces in order to render Germany
innocuous by ensuring that she did the same. Britain made it
clear that she was ready to give a European army the fullest
possible support short of entering a European union. Although
M. Pleven's scheme was warmly supported by an influential
minority in France, opinion in the country as a whole was
strongly divided, so that as time passed and a military threat

SALVAGE AND SETTLEMENT 273

from the U.S.S.R. seemed less imminent, France began to look
M. Pleven's gift horse more and more in the mouth. She asked
for a series of reassurances to cover gaps in the practical work-
ing of the plan. But every time fresh assurances were given,
the French brought new gaps to light, while further delays
were caused by the instability of French ministries. At length,
France found in M. Mendes-France a Premier with sufficient
moral courage and political savoir faire to compel France to
take seriously her responsibilities towards Europe and to
compel Europe to realise that E.D.C., unless substantially
modified, had no hope of acceptance by French public opinion.
He explained this to a meeting of the six E.D.C. powers in
Brussels on 19th August, 1954, and said that if E.D.C, was
submitted to the French National Assembly in its present form
it would be defeated, his government would fall, and would
probably be followed by a Popular Front ministry (i.e., one
including Communists). This, he said, would mean a crisis in
the North Atlantic Defence System and a great success for the
Communists with nothing to set against it. The E.D.C. powers
made an effort to meet M. Mendes-France's proposals, which
would in effect have refurbished French sovereignty at the ex-
pense of German, but were unable to satisfy him, for to have
done so would have involved them in a virtual reversal of their
own policies and would have compromised their parliamentary
positions.

M. Mendes-France then faced the French National Assembly
with its own responsibilities by allowing a free vote on the
E.D.C. treaty which was rejected on 29th August by 319 to
264, with 43 abstentions.

The international crisis thus precipitated was the gravest that
Europe, and indeed the free world, had faced since the end of
the war. The basic problem was to overcome the traditional
mutual suspicion of France and Germany in order that they,
the two strongest continental powers outside the Iron Curtain,
should be free to co-operate with Britain and the U.S.A., and
the rest of Europe, in containing the U.S.S.R. and its satellites.

274 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

In deciding to enMst Western Germany wholeheartedly on the
side of free Europe, Dr. Adenauer's difficulty had been to offer
Ms fellow-countrymen a policy which would allay their fears
that alliance with the West meant the permanent partition of
Germany. He had "sold" E.D.C. to his own people as the
answer to Germany's problems. The E.D.C. treaty was not only
a constellation of security pacts and mutual guarantees which
wove the policies of the six signatories into a common pattern
with those of Britain and America, but was also a European
mystique which would find its apotheosis in a genuine Euro-
pean federation. The immediate result of France's rejection of
E.D.C. was to create both a political and an ideological
vacuum. Overnight, the all-European policy of the six Euro-
pean powers, Britain and the U.S. A., carefully built up over
the years, lay in ruins, and ideologically there seemed nothing
to take its place. The danger was that the general disillusion-
ment with the idea of West European unity, as the answer to
the U.S.S.R. and Communism, would be exploited by all the
forces of the political oppositions in France, Italy, Germany,
the Netherlands and elsewhere. It should not be forgotten that
in several of these countries there were solid blocks of Com-
munist votes. The danger was, further, that the present ma-
jority in the ILS.A. that valued European freedom and co-
operation would, in the confusion and disillusionment of U.S.
public opinion, yield ground to that section which had always
been impatient with, and distrustful of, Europe's traditional
divisions and animosities.

Mr. Dulles's reverberating warning of 14th December, 1953,
that if E.D.C. were not ratified the U.S.A. might be forced to
make an "agonising reappraisal" had failed to achieve the
desired result. It was notable that every American attempt to
galvanise the French National Assembly into some kind of
action by threat had in fact only paralysed it with resentment
After France's rejection of E.D.C., the obvious next step was
a conference of the powers primarily affected to see what
alternatives might be possible. At first the State Department

SALVAGE AND SETTLEMENT 275

thought of an emergency meeting of the N.A.T.O. council un-
til they remembered that it would be M. Mendes-France's turn
to be chairman. Thereupon, so angry were they at what they
seem to have regarded as Ms treachery, that they let the pro-
posal drop, nor did a suggestion received from Eden that a
nine-power conference be held at once in London find im-
mediate favour. The State Department, hoist with its own
petard, was as paralysed by its own agonies of reappraisal as
the French Assembly had been.

Statesmanship, it has been said, is not merely the pursuit of
the ideal within the bounds of the practicable, it is also the
constant effort to extend those bounds. Up to 30th August, the
pursuit of the ideal had, for Eden, been to promote the French
ratification of E.D.C., but from the moment of the National
Assembly's rejection, Eden saw that it was immediately neces-
sary a matter not of weeks but of days to extend the bounds
of the practicable to find a substitute for E.D.C. Since Wash-
ington was apparently too emotional to face an immediate con-
ference, Eden decided that, as drift would be fatal, he must
take the initiative himself by soundings in the E.D.C. chancel-
leries. He thought that he saw the germ of a possible substitute
for E.D.C. in the dormant Consultative Council for common
defence embodied in the Brussels treaty (among Britain,
France and the Benelux countries) of March, 1948, to which
could be added the admission of Germany to N.A.T.O., which
contained a European army within its framework.

No one could have been more conscious than Eden that Ms
formula would probably be torn to pieces it was full of gaps
and unresolved difficulties. Germany could not be admitted to
the Brussels treaty or to N.A.T.O. without French consent.
Would the French Assembly intransigently insist that a re-
armed Germany must be subject to control? Neither treaty
would wholly cover that. Without E.D.C. the only hope was
for Germany to accept some form of voluntary restriction on
the size of her army and on the types of its weapons and for
France to accept her pledged word. What a hope! These

276 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

treaties would not satisfy Germany's primary demand for
equality of treatment and France's for security for reassur-
ance that, Britain and the U.S.A. having withdrawn their
troops from Europe, France would not be left along with a
sovereign, rearmed and almighty Germany. Eden's formula
did not effectively revive and uphold the European mystique,
and it left out Scandinavian participation. No one knew better
than Eden that every one of the ideas that he was turning over
in his mind would risk scorn or rejection by as many nations
as would accept them. Was he then to throw up his hand and
do nothing? Or was he to make yet another effort to re-sort
the existing possibilities so that they might be transformed into
an extension of the boundaries of the practicable? In deciding
on his course, Eden must have reckoned that he had one im-
portant imponderable factor in his favour: the E.D.C. coun-
tries had received such a shock from its rejection, and the out-
look was so full of tremendous and awful possibilities, that
they would probably be only too wining to jump at almost
any alternative put before them and his experience must
have told him that it was vital to exploit their sense of shock
while it lasted. Within a short time it would be too late to get
back into some semblance of their former positions the pieces
that had been upset when the French Assembly jolted the
chessboard.

Eden cabled his ideas to Washington and without waiting
for a reply flew off to Brussels (llth September), and Bonn
(13th September), Rome (14th September), leaving the most
difficult interview to the last Paris (15-1 6th September).

As the reactions to Eden talks began coming in from the
European capitals, American public opinion was favourably
impressed and, in the State Department, which was becoming
more and more anxious over the signs that Dr. Adenauer's op-
ponents were rallying their forces, there was "unconcealed
gratitude" for Eden's initiative. By 14th September, Mr. Dulles
himself felt that it was time that he took a hand in Eden's con-

SALVAGE AND SETTLEMENT 277

sultations and thus bring American influence to bear in sup-
port of Eden's substitute for E.D.C. Eden welcomed the idea,
but he must have been taken aback when he learnt that Mr.
Dulles intended to confer only with Mm and Dr. Adenauer. To
fly especially across the Atlantic at a few hours* notice, for con-
sultations of the highest importance and not to see M. Mendes-
France was to administer one of the most public diplomatic
affronts ever offered to the nation without whose goodwill no
"European" solution was possible. But Mr. Dulles was still
obsessed with "shot-gun" methods whereby "lessons' 9 were
taught to recalcitrants. Mr. Dulles's tactics received a uni-
versally bad press in Europe, of which the Manchester Guard-
ian's comment was typical: "Mr. Eden's task has been made a
great deal more difficult by the sudden visit to Europe of Mr.
Dulles who is going to Bonn but not to Paris. Whatever his
intention, the omission of Paris looks like a studied insult to
France. If he has time for Bonn, why not Paris? The French
may conclude that Mr. Dulles has come to ask his good friend
Dr. Adenauer whether the Eden proposals are entirely satis-
factory to Germany, but that he cares nothing for French
opinion. Coming after his boycott of the Geneva conference,
it cannot help."

However, after these wobbly moments, the upshot of Eden's
tour, and Mr. Dulles's tour de force, was the summoning on
28th September of a conference in London of the foreign
ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Lux-
embourg, the U.S.A., Canada and Britain. The conference
began by the obvious step of electing as its chairman the man
who had made its meeting possible, Eden. And Eden, pursuing
his own variety of shock tactics, chose the right moment to
make the dramatic announcement that Britain would continue
to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength
of the U.K. forces currently assigned to the Stipreme Allied
Commander in Europe, four divisions and a tactical air force,
or whatever the Supreme Commander regarded as equivalent.

278 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

Britain undertook not to withdraw these forces against the
wishes of the majority of the Brussels treaty powers, subject
only to the understanding that an acute oversea emergency
migkt oblige withdrawal without prior consultation.

"What I have announced," said Eden, "is, for us, a for-
midable step. You all know that ours is an island story . . .
whatever the facts of modern weapons and strategy may
compel."

For once, the newspaper reporters' cliche could be ac-
curately applied: Eden's offer created a sensation. The other
foreign ministers sat round the conference table dumb with
amazement for a moment. M. Spaak was the first to grasp the
full significance of Britain's new effort to remove France's
fear of isolation in the face of a rearmed Germany. The silence
of the conference was broken by his stentorian whisper to M.
Mendes-France: "Vous avez gagne"

The real reasons for Britain's reluctance to take this step,
the Observer pointed out, were not military. Those responsible
for Britain's defence had long known that, as long as Britain's
allies felt themselves seriously threatened, it was unrealistic to
envisage the withdrawal of British forces from the continent.
Nor was it true that the other members of the Commonwealth
objected to closer ties with Europe. The real objection had
arisen from Britain's relations with the U.S.A. It was felt that
the world-wide Anglo-American partnership was of unique
value and that any step that tied Britain more closely to Europe
than the Americans were ready to tie themselves would weaken
this unique position of mutual influence and trust. But the
history of the years since Korea suggested that it was a mistake
to believe that British influence in America depended on British
aloofness from Europe. They suggested rather that Britain
would be listened to in America if she could speak not only
(as at Geneva) as the friend of India but also (as at the Lon-
don conference) as the initiator in shaping the policies of
Europe.

In effect, the London Nine-Power Conference announced

SALVAGE AND SETTLEMENT 279

(1) the intention of Britain, France and the U.S.A. to end the
occupation of Western Germany, (2) the decision of the
Brussels treaty powers (Britain, France, Belgium, Holland,
Luxembourg) to admit Germany and Italy to a greatly devel-
oped Brussels system; (3) agreement by the eight N.A.T.O.
powers that Germany should join them; and (4) Germany's
declaration she would voluntarily limit her arms production.
Other outstanding points that emerged were that whereas
under the old N.A.T.O./E.D.C. pacts Britain was associated
with the six Western European powers but not institutionally
bound to them, now she became a full member of a supra-
national military system alongside the six. Britain's status now
differed for the first time from that of Canada and the U.S.A.
Secondly, whereas under E.D.C. Germany was a "self-in-
tegrating member of an embryonic continental federation," she
now became a conventional sovereign state in an alliance.
Thirdly, France, who had hitherto agreed only that there should
be joint E.D.C./N.A.T.O. meetings, now made the entirely
new concession that Germany should join the N.A.T.O. club.
Even the most advanced French "Europeans," it was pointed
out, had hitherto hesitated to propose immediate German
N.A.T.O. membership. In the complex of agreements, called
Western European Union (a wishful title since the whole
was in reality an old-fashioned alliance of powers), Britain
would share until 1998 in a continental military organisation
which set up supranational controls over the manufacture and
stocks of arms, and in which a resurrected national German
army and General Staff responsible to the German government
would have its sovereign place. It was also agreed by the Nine
Powers that forces placed under the Supreme Commander
"shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy."

Summing up the lessons of the London conference the Ob-
server said: 'The British Government's declaration of its
willingness permanently to commit the bulk of our home de-
fences to the defence of Europe will rank as one of the great

280 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

decisions by which British policy aligned itself with the facts
of the twentieth century. If the conference succeeds, the calling
and steering of it will prove the greatest among Mr. Eden's
many achievements of this year the outstanding year of his
career. 9 *

CHAPTER 33

ASCENT OF THE SUMMIT

SEX DAYS after the London conference, the Conservative
Party received Eden at its annual conference with one of
the greatest acclamations ever accorded one of its leaders.
Eden replied to debates on foreign policy, defence and Ger-
many,

"For Mr. Eden personally it was a momentous debate,"
said the Manchester Guardian. "He cannot have had the
slightest interest in the arguments advanced in praise of the
Government, but he must have valued the chorus of praise as a
sign of his power. Mr. Eden has in recent months been con-
sidering the proposal that he should give up the Foreign Office
for more domestic duties leadership of the House and the
tenancy of a sinecure but it would be astonishing if he sur-
rendered the authority he now exercises over the Conservative
Party as a Foreign Secretary for anything less than the highest
post. To enter into yet another probationary period of no fixed
length as a domestic minister would be to expose himself to
dangerous political hazards, with no compensating gain."

In their reviews of the year 1954, virtually every journal and
commentator paid handsome tributes to Eden whose hand was
seen in every major diplomatic event and The Times soberly
summed up the general consensus in saying, "All this could not
have been accomplished without Eden's adroit diplomacy, and
when in October he was created a Knight of the Garter it was
an honour truly earned."

It was certainly a mark of high Royal favour as well as of
Royal awareness of a great achievement that this famous Order
of Chivalry should be accorded to her Secretary erf State for
Foreign Affairs while he was still in mid-careen Normally

281

282 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

and even then very rarely it was conferred on elder statesmen
at the end of their labours. Perhaps the nearest analogy was the
Garter for Austen Chamberlain after Locarno. It could be said
that the London agreement twenty-eight years later was but a
variation on the same theme how to bring back Germany into
the comity of Europe.

Thanks to Eden's skill and resourcefulness, we had seen a
renaissance of classical diplomacy. This is not to imply that the
millennium was at hand. The professional diplomatist, as op-
posed to the impatient amateur, is undaunted by problems
because he does not expect ever to have finished with them. He
assumes that the solution of one set of difficulties must of itself
create new problems. His aim is to keep international relations
in a constantly changing equilibrium like the slowly evolving
pattern of a kaleidoscope. The statesman, as opposed to the
professional politician, provides the idealism and the belief in
the possibility of progress which uses diplomacy as a means to
an end: it is the constant effort to extend the bounds of the
practicable in the pursuit of the ideal, which is Eden's greatest
claim to statesmanship.

Just when it seemed that Europe had risen from the abyss,
France faltered again. In spite of Mendes-France's sombre
warning that if the agreements were rejected France would no
longer have any weight in the Atlantic Alliance, the National
Assembly on Christmas Eve threw out by 280 votes to 25 9,
the first clause of the ratification bill relating to the setting up
of the Western European Union. Apart from its impact on the
free world, this decision apparently came as a severe shock to
the Assembly itself. The Deputies had been under the impres-
sion that the matter was duly fixed and that Mendes-France
would get a majority, although a small one, to enable him to
carry on but at the same time recognise that he was in office
on probation. In face of this pitiful chicanery, Eden did not
hesitate. Without waiting upon the reactions of Allies or
Cabinet colleagues, he authorised the Foreign Office to issue
the following dramatic Christmas Eve message: 'The Paris

ASCENT OF THE SUMMIT 283

treaties are still under discussion in the French Chamber, and
there is to be a further vote on Monday. It is clear that what
is at stake is the unity of the western allies. The rejection of the
Paris agreements would not mean that German rearmament
would not take place. The issue is not whether the German
Federal Republic will rearm, but how. The United Kingdom
commitment offered at the London Conference to maintain
British forces on the Continent of Europe depends on the
ratification of the Paris agreements by all parties."

This represents perhaps the toughest warning he was ever to
deliver to a friendly government in time of peace. President
Eisenhower also issued a statement expressing grave concern,
but it was in somewhat softer tone. Some critics felt that Eden's
reaction was hasty and that he had allowed his temper to over-
ride his judgment. The anti-European elements in the French
Assembly could be relied upon to denounce British interfer-
ence, ingratitude or discourtesy. But however much he might
be hurting Gallic feelings, his experience clearly told him that
the moment had arrived to discourage, once and for all, any
hopes their vote might arouse among the Deputies of squeezing
out some further concessions for France whether in the Saar,
with armament guarantees or by some other means.

On the German side, Adenaufer's position was dangerously
compromised by the vote. A blood-transfusion was needed for
him. The statement left the Deputies with nothing but stark
reality; they would now have to consult their consciences and
France's interests in the knowledge beyond equivocation of
where Britain stood.

A week later on the 30th December, the Assembly found
ways and means of changing its mind and passing the vote of
confidence in the Bill approving Western Union by a majority
of 27 votes. Technically and indeed, politically, the battle was
still not over. Mendes-France, the most formidable leader
thrown up by the fourth Republic, was running into ever in-
creasing difficulties with the party groups comprising his coali-
tion, and with the Assembly as a whole. They were suspicious

284 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

of Ms "new broom" methods, his popularity and appeals to the
people over the heads of Parliament. His very adroitness in
leaving the Assembly and not the Government to take the
decision about E.D.C. had aroused enmity and exposed Mm to
vengeance. Experts judged that the days of the Government
were numbered. They were right. On the 5th February Ms
Government fell on a vote of confidence on its North Africa
policy. The deed was done by a coalition of interests ranging
from Communists to Gaullists and including twenty members
of Mendes-France's own party who either voted against or
abstained.

Once again the European agreement was in jeopardy. Nearly
three weeks passed while would-be Prime Ministers in search
of followers failed to find majorities or form governments.
Finally the Radical Socialist, Edgar Faure, Mendes-France's
Foreign Minister, broke the deadlock, but it was not until
another month of fierce debating, concession-mongering and
hard bargaining had gone by that the four treaties embodying
the European agreement were, on the 27th March, uncondi-
tionally approved. Faure was only able to conjure up agree-
ment by elaborating a five-point declaration of the policy wMch
the Faure government would follow after ratification.

One of these points was to arrange, as soon as possible, an
East/West conference on all problems <4 wMch it seems possible
to resolve/'

It will be recalled that Churchill's initial support for such a
meeting "at the summit" had been in some measure identified
with the impression that Malenkov, as Stalin's successor, was
in a mood or position to give a "new look" to Soviet foreign
policy. The fall of Beria, the Police CMef, within six months
of Stalin's death, gave rise to wide-spread speculation that a
war of succession within the Kremlin could now be expected.
After just on two years of apparent supremacy came the no
less sudden and dramatic announcement of Malenkov's resig-
nation and confession of inadequacy, together with his replace-
ment by Bulganin as Prime Minister. It also became clear that

ASCENT OF THE SUMMIT 285

Krushchev, the Communist Party Secretary, had emerged as
the real master.

It was generally conceded that this development was un-
favourable for the prospects of peaceful co-existence, and there
were not wanting critics who attributed the real reason for the
changes in Russia to the policy of German rearmament and in-
clusion in N.A.T.O.

On the 1st March, Churchill in a massive oration, declared
that Britain must have an effective "defence by deterrent"
policy, which meant nuclear weapons of the highest quality and
on an appreciable scale with the means of delivery. In the light
of this declaration and in advance of the French decision on the
Paris agreement, the Labour Party a fortnight later called for
immediate talks between the heads of the three major Powers.
Churchill was able to reject this proposal on the grounds that
the Soviet Government would clearly not agree except on the
basis of a further postponement of treaty ratification, which
was out of the question. After revealing an abortive suggestion
he had made to Molotov in the summer of 1954 for a friendly
high-level Anglo-Soviet meeting, he ended with the warning
that to have such a conference "at an ill-chosen moment or in
unfavourable circumstances would raise false hopes and prob-
ably finish by leaving things far worse than before." Time was
in fact everything, and it was felt that on this whole subject
the rest would be silence.

Ever since his illness which caused the postponement of the
Bermuda Conference in 1953, it was widely felt that Churchill
was only holding on to the Premiership out of the hope that he
could render a final consummating service to mankind, and by
personal encounter with the American President and the Soviet
Prime Minister, seek to put aside the use of the H-bomb and
thereby help to ease the world's fears and tensions.

Against the background of these momentous developments
in Europe Eden left for what was generally conceded might
weE be his final Grand Tour as Foreign Secretary. It was in
every respect timely and enabled him to make invaluable first-

286 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

hand appreciations IE half a dozen countries in the Middle and
Far East all of which were in varying degree affected by the
pressures of the cold war. The primary purpose of the tour was
to take part in Bangkok in a meeting of the signatory Powers
of S.E.A.T.O. The Indo-CMna settlement was still precarious.
Now a new danger not officially on the conference agenda
threatened to flare up beyond local control Formosa. On 24th
January, President Eisenhower appreciating that there was an
early risk of a major assault by the Chinese Communists sought,
and on the next day decisively obtained, authority for measures
**wMch would contemplate the use of the armed forces if
necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pesca-
dores." Regarded as a show of strength, the President's move
was to raise as many questions and doubts as it settled. How
far would America go to defend the islands off the Chinese
mainland which were occupied by the Chinese Nationalists?
How far were these islands strategically and politically de-
fensible? And how far, again, was action envisaged under
United Nations auspices? Attlee, who had recently visited China
on a Labour Party delegation, hastened to assert in the House
of Commons on 26th January that it was quite clear that
"intervention in a civil war" was involved. Eden in reply said
he could not agree that the position of the coastal islands was
in any way comparable to that of Formosa, and pointed out
that Formosa had not been a part of China for over half a
century, whereas the islands had at all times been recognised
as belonging to the mainland. Politically, morally and juridi-
cally it was a tangled situation, made more so by the preten-
sions of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, and the in-
fluential pressures of the so-called "China Lobby" in America
itself. Eden told Parliament frankly that he recognised the
Formosa problem as being "one of the most difficult he had
ever seen in the international situation.'*

On 4th February, in a written statement, he set out the
British attitude to the tangled position of Formosa itself and
the clearer legal position of the off-shore islands. Although the

ASCENT OF THE SUMMIT 287

latter "undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's
Republic of China," any attempt by that Government "to assert
its authority over those islands by force would, in the circum-
stances at present peculiar to the case, give rise to a situation
endangering peace and security, which is properly a matter of
international concern." Under cover of the President's message
to Congress and the guns of the American Seventh Fleet, Na-
tionalist forces were evacuated from the Tachen Islands. More
immediately dangerous, however, was their continued occu-
pation of Quemoy and Matsu, which directly covered Amoy
and Foochow, possible ports of concentration for attack on
Formosa. The SJE.A.T.O. meeting enabled Eden to have a full
informal review with Commonwealth ministers concerned as
well as with Mr. Dulles, who was always more amenable and
coherent in private than he seemed to be in some of his public
performances. Formosa could not fail to bring out the different
perspectives in which Britain and America saw the Asian situ-
ation. Following an important conference in Singapore with
British diplomats in the area, Eden put the position clearly.
Broadcasting from Kuala Lumpur he stressed that the basis of
British policy in Asia was recognition of the changes which
had taken place and acceptance of the Asian countries' wish
to develop their lives in their own way. While the object of the
Bangkok meeting was to attempt to draw certain clear de-
fensive lines f or which Britain could not be blamed after her
experiences she was equally anxious to work with nations
who did not share her views on such security arrangements.

On 8th March, he was able to put to Parliament a progress
report of his manifold efforts for peace and security. He said
that in the Middle East he had found a general acceptance of
need "to organise a safe shield against aggression from with-
out" and it was particularly satisfactory that he had been able
to discuss with the Premier of Iraq possible British accession to
the Iraq-Turkish Pact. Almost his last act as Foreign Secretary
was to announce on the 30th March a new agreement with Iraq
and adherence the next day to the Iraq-Turkish Pact In answer

288 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

to a question about the position of Israel, Eden was able to
underline the diplomatic achievement involved it was "a
truly desirable development because that is the first time an
Arab State is looking In directions other than simply towards
Israel"

In the second week of March rumours spread, touched off
in the Beaverbrook Press usually an inspired source for
ChurcMUian gossip that the great decision had been taken that
Churchill would in a matter of days resign, and Eden at last
succeed him.

The British National Press had no sooner delivered them-
selves of this intelligence than they ceased to be delivered. One
of the greatest news stories of our time took place to an accom-
paniment of muffled drums and muted trumpets. At first it was
suggested that Churchill, the most Press-conscious of Prime
Ministers, would wait until the newspapers were on the streets
again before leaving Downing Street. Then this was denied as
being a wholly unworthy suggestion. Then followed a strange
and disquieting Parliamentary incident described in the Man-
chester Guardian's headlines as "Differences about Four Power
talks should they be at summit or lower levels? Sir Win-
ston's views." In answer to a Parliamentary question Churchill
simply re-stated his belief in a meeting at the highest level with-
out an agenda before meetings at lower levels "there might
be a better chance of success if the initiative came from the
summit." "Unless," commented the Manchester Guardian, "he
was speaking as an individual which is hardly possible for the
Prime Minister his statement implied a continuing difference
with the United States." But of more immediate speculative
interest was its direct conflict with Eden's reply to a Parlia-
mentary question the day before in which he said that the
Government was consulting with its allies as to the methods
by which Four Power talks might be held once the Paris agree-
ments were ratified. The procedure the Government proposed
to follow would include meetings "maybe in the first instance on

ASCENT OF THE SUMMIT 289

the official level, and then at the Foreign Ministers* level, and
then probably other levels also if al goes well."

There was to be no opportunity to pursue this riddle further.
The sense remained, however, that Churchill ever since the
death of Stalin, had reached some broad conclusion on the
timing and treatment of Anglo-Soviet negotiations which left
him in splendid isolation from most of his colleagues and ad-
visers on the subject. This was a situation both in office and
out of it to which Churchill was well accustomed. As coalition
leader in wartime he had taken the measure of dissenting col-
leagues. Now, having expressed his true thoughts on high
policy, he was ready to depart.

There followed in quick succession the famous Royal Dinner
Party at No. 10 with Churchill and Eden, both resplendent in
knee breeches and the Order of the Garter; the Tuesday audi-
ence; the brief announcement of resignation from Buckingham
Palace and the feeling it brought of the passing of grandeur
from our lives the lack of newspapers seemed if anything to
heighten the sense of world drama and personal loss.

A crowd gathered outside the Foreign Office waiting for
Eden to be summoned that night, but it was not until the next
morning Wednesday, 6th April that in top hat and morning
coat, he drove to the Audience at which the Queen, exercising
her Royal prerogative, offered him the post of Prime Minister
and First Lord of the Treasury. "The Right Honourable Sir
Anthony Eden accepted Her Majesty's offer and kissed hands
upon his appointment."

In the same afternoon he made Ms first appearance in the
House of Commons as Prime Minister. The tribute he paid to
Churchill and the greetings he himself received were warm and
spontaneous. Walter Elliot gave perhaps the deepest pleasure
by claiming that if the House had lost one of the greatest front
benchers in all its history, the back benchers had gained the
greatest back bencher of all time. Eden's first words as Prime
Minister were in praise of QmrcMU. He saw him still as tih>e
dominant figure. Referring to his great passion, political life,

290 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

he said he brought to It the most complete vision. No man that
he had known could make one understand at the same time the
range of a problem and come straight to Its core. He believed
this attribute would be placed first among Ms many gifts. There
was a pleasant exchange of wit between Attlee and Eden
evidence of the club atmosphere of Parliament which the
rigours of the modern party system cannot wholly dissipate.
<4 We shall all wish him health and strength/' remarked Attlee,
"but on this side, of course, we cannot wish him a long tenure.
It was the Opposition's duty, as soon as opportunity offered,
to try and give Sir Anthony a period of rest. But, as a Mr.
Young said to Lord Melbourne when that statesman was hesi-
tating to accept the Premiership, 'Why, damn it all, such a
position was not held by any Greek or Roman, and if it only
lasts three months it will have been worth while to have been
Prime Minister of England.' "

"I enjoyed very much," Eden retorted, "the Melbourne re-
flection. The Right Honourable gentleman will not, however,
I think, have forgotten that Melbourne though always talking
of leaving office continued to stay there a very long time indeed."

Linked with speculation over a change of Prime Minister
were guesses about the date of a General Election and the
nature of a Cabinet reshuffle. The Beaverbrook Press rashly
asserted that the former would be in June, and the latter strictly
limited, with Eden doubling up in the Foreign Secretaryship.
The Cabinet changes released some 48 hours after Eden had
taken office were, in fact, on a larger scale than anticipated, but,
with one exception, they were probable appointments. Mac-
millan as Foreign Secretary in succession to Eden, Selwyn
Lloyd as Minister of Defence and Reginald Maudling as Min-
ister of Supply were all men who might expect to have a grow-
ing role to play in an Eden regime. The surprise selection was
Lord Home for Commonwealth Relations. As Lord Dunglass,
he had acted as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Neville
Chamberlain, holding that post at the time of Eden's resigna-
tion. Perhaps it is that Home is regarded as well equipped for

ASCENT OF THE SUMMIT 291

high-level liaison work and that Munich is now fading from
the Conservative memory.

Churchill's administrations were flanked by a strong con-
tingent of friends and relations. They were not necessarily the
worse for that; but there had also been a change in the political
status of some of the offices of State. The ChanceEor of the
Exchequer and the three Service Ministers, for example, had
lost some of their pre-war ranking, while the old sinecure posts
of Lord Privy Seal and President of the Council, free of depart-
mental responsibility, were raised up either as coordinators or
members of the inner ring.

Given a full term of office Eden may be expected perhaps to
return to more orthodox procedures and delegate more author-
ity to his senior specialist ministers. Of these, three stand out
In political stature: R. A. Butler, Harold Macmillan and Lord
Salisbury. Closest to him perhaps is Salisbury, who, as Lord
Cranbome and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
had resigned alongside Eden with such powerful effect in 1938.
Neither Butler, an outstandingly able second-in-command, nor
Macmillan have quite the same close personal or political
affinities. The situation in terms of balance of power is perhaps
more closely comparable with Attlee's Labour than Churchill's
Conservative administration, and recalls the position of the
triumvirate of Cripps, Morrison and Bevin. Any one of these
three was big enough to be in Ms Chiefs position, but could not
exercise enough authority to take over without support of the
other two. Such support, however, owing to various stresses
and loyalties was never in fact forthcoming. The very strength
of these subordinates helped to reinforce Attlee's own position.
The same situation could conceivably apply to Eden. It was
from the outset a source of power to Bonar Law, who, on be-
coming Leader of the Conservative Party, once confessed to a
friend, "If they want me to go, they always know that I will"
a declaration of intention that constituted a sufficient threat to
keep him in harness until the end of his life!

It was at first thought that Eden's Cabinet reshuffle might

292 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

mean a decision to defer a General Election. The Government's

five-year term is not complete until October, 1956, but a con-
vention of the constitution seems to have grown up which
argues that the five-year term must be reduced to four to avoid
a prolonged pre-election atmosphere. Whatever the merits of
this trend, Eden's decision in favour of an immediate appeal
was characteristically clear cut. The balance of national,
Party and personal advantage could fairly be said to rest in
seeking a fresh mandate and larger majority for the tasks ahead.

EPILOGUE

IT WAS no easy task to follow ChurcMll whether as Prime
Minister or Leader of the Opposition or of the Conservative
Party. It is important to realise, however, that Eden's endur-
ing popularity is not of Churchillian origin. Even before the
war opinion polls gave Eden a majority over all other competi-
tors put together Churchill included as the man whom the
country most wanted to succeed Neville Chamberlain as Prime
Minister. It is of course true to say that as Churchill's nom-
inated deputy Eden's status and reputation have enjoyed spe-
cial protection. But at the same time Churchill's towering
leadership has so comprehensively dominated the scene that
too protracted an apprenticeship under so formidable a person-
ality could have ended in stifling the apprentice. It is probable
therefore that the succession reverted to Eden only just in time
before Ms ambition was blunted and his will to lead sapped.
Eden has had to fight a real handicap in reaching the top too
soon and then being the heir apparent too long. In both cases
he has been at one remove from effective power. During the
pre-war period he was sacrificed to Baldwin's double thinking
and to Chamberlain's single aim. Under Churchill there was
for several years no power to wield; his role of Foreign Secre-
tary during the war was really that of a Minister of State to
Churchill, who was decisively in charge of all policy affecting
the war, particularly in regard to Germany. To Eden was
assigned all other foreign policy. He dealt with Turkey for
example until Turkey actually joining the Allies became an
issue of direct concern to Churchill. In the latter stages of the
war at the great conferences and at meetings with Roosevelt

294 EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN

and Stalin, Eden's views began to cany independent weight,
but with victory lie was swept from office.

While Eden and Churchill are now inextricably linked in
history the influence of Baldwin, who laid the foundations of
Ms career, should not be overlooked. Baldwin is still a con-
troversial name and awaits the verdict of history, but in two
respects his leadership sets precedents which Eden may feel by
temperament and training inclined to follow. In the first place
Baldwin was a conciliator and he endeavoured to keep British
politics out of totalitarian conflicts abroad and class compart-
ments at home. "I am anti-socialist," he once declared, "but I
face left in my anti-socialism," This seems a role which Eden
may be able to play with perhaps deeper conviction than either
Churchill or Chamberlain before him. Secondly, Baldwin was
all along conscious of the need to be close to mass opinion. He
carried that doctrine too far, until like the Duke of Plaza Toro
he led the regiment from behind. Eden, it seems, is equally
aware of the importance of frequent feeling of the public pulse.

His attitude to politics is essentially empirical. His belief
in the League of Nations before the war and support for
regional internationalism after it has never been starry-eyed
idealism, but based on practical and expert considerations.

Throughout his career he has been a good House of Com-
mons man, an acute debater, and a master of his brief. Apart
from Churchill himself he is by far the most experienced Con-
servative statesman. He has enjoyed high-level relations with
every leading European figure over the past 25 years. He has
been in the front rank of world diplomacy even longer than
Molotov, who significantly broke through the Iron Curtain to
congratulate him on his elevation.

His oratory lacks distinction of style and delivery. There are
no Churchillian echoes or undertones; it is penny-plain speak-
ing. This, however, is not a criticism; a lucid expression of the
commonplace is a most important contribution to political life,
and is not to be confused with the delivery of platitudes.

In the last analysis it is the resources of character that uphold

EPILOGUE 295

men bearing great burdens. Here Eden has stood the test.
There is general testimony to the charm of his personality; bet
he is also tough. Lord Winterton has spoken of Ms choleric
disposition. Others have picked upon his capacity to keep an
undoubtedly strong temper under control. Parliament acknowl-
edges a fighter and admires him if he is belligerent on things
that matter. One Member of Parliament put it to me that on
the principle that out of evil cometh good, Eden's illness may
have come at the right time. For it served as a great warning
to him in middle age with his relentless and self-dedicating
energy to give himself time to turn round, to think and to relax.

The size of a man is often to be measured by his capacity
to delegate. If this master of the techniques of skilled diplomacy
can now share out power and responsibility among colleagues
and rise above his own expertise he will indeed have fulfilled
himself. His own Party have no doubts about him, judged by
the enthusiastic reception accorded to him, when he entered
Church House on 22nd April, 1955, there to receive the accla-
mation of over a thousand Conservative Peers, Members of
Parliament, candidates and officials on being elected Leader
of the Party.

In the words of R. A. Butler, who seconded the resolution
for his adoption, "I have had the honour of working with him
for 25 years. ... I am perfectly clear that he has three great
qualities for leadership. The first is courage, the second is
integrity and the third is flair."

INDEX

Abadan, 235

Abdication crisis, 141

Abyssinia, 42, 98, 100, 107-108, 109,

111, 112, 133-134, 139, 172
appeal to League, 100
arms embargo, 1 19
Italians in, 43-44
Acheson, Dean, 249, 253
Achilles, 182
Adams, J. Quiacy, 211
Adenauer, Dr. Konrad, 247, 250,

274, 276, 283

Air Defence, resolution on, 18
Airlift, Berlin, 236, 243
Albania, 51

invasion of, 179

Alexander, King of Jugoslavia, assas-
sination of, 95, 96, 100
Alexander of Tunis, Field Marshal

Earl, 205, 252, 253
Algiers, 199, 204, 212
Alois!, Baron, 91, 94, 113, 115, 134
Alport, Oithbert, 224
America, United States of (see

United States of America)
American Revolution, 2
Amery, L. S. 33, 182
Angell, Sir Norman, 66
Anglo-American relations, 84, 152-
153, 154, 245, 246-247, 258-
259

catalogue of differences, 265
E.D.C., 273-279
Geneva Conference (1954), 260-

269

naval ratios, 58
naval talks, 66
naval treaty, 48
trade, 53
Anglo-Egyptian relations, 137, 245,

254, 270, 271
Anglo-French, relations, 24, 44, 55-

60, 131

guarantee to Poland, 171
Anglo-German relations, Naval Pact,

108-109, 111

Anglo-Iranian oilfields, 235, 245
Anglo-Italian relations:
agreement, 172, 176
concerning Abyssinia, 43-45
Anglo-Soviet relations, 24-27, 46, 48,
65-66, 104-106, 189, 195,
196-197, 206-209, 289
Treaty of Alliance, 197
Annual Register, 39

Anschluss, 101, 171

Appeasement, 152-153, 157, 173-

175, 177

Arabs, 192, 271, 288
Arcos House raid, 48
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 27
Astor, Lady Violet, 67
Atlantic Alliance, 282
Attlee, Clement, 132, 198, 206, 212,

215, 222, 239, 253, 270-271,

286, 290, 291
Auckland, Lord, 2
Australia, 182, 237, 262
Austria, 84, 89, 139, 152, 153, 155,

161, 201, 202-203, 256
Anschluss, 101, 171

Badoglio, Marshal, 206

Baldwin, Stanley, 13, 16, 17, 27-28,
30, 33, 34, 36, 49, 61, 63, 68,
69, 71, 73, 82, 85, 92, 94, 102,
112, 114, 121, 122, 123, 127,
135, 148, 150, 293, 294
and Press Barons, 35
Prime Minister, 110

Balfour, Arthur J., 27

Balfour Declaration, 62, 192

Balkans, 51-52, 58, 194

Baltic States, 196, 200

Bangkok, 286

Barthou, Louis, 92-94, 98, 100

Beaverbrook, Lord (and Press), 35,
37, 68, 86, 101, 165, 179, 198,
212, 221, 222, 236, 288, 290

Beck, Colonel, 94, 106, 115, 132, 140

Beck, Madame, 106

Beckett, Beatrice (Mrs. Anthony
Eden), 16-17

Beckett, Sir Gervase, 16, 226

Beckett, Rupert, 226

Beerbohm, Max, 30

Belgium, 66, 129, 132, 183, 243, 250,
275, 276, 279

Benelux partnership, 243, 275, 279

Benes, President Eduard, 94, 106,
118

Berchtesgaden, 153, 155, 174

Beria, Lavrenti, 284

Berlin:

blockade and airlift, 236, 243
Conferences, 260-261

Berlin-Rome axis, 139

Bermuda Conference, 285

Bevan, Aneurin, 216

Beveridge Plan, 214
296

INDEX

297

Bevin, Ernest, 198, 224-225, 226,
227, 238, 241, 242, 243, 244,
291

Birkenhead, Lord, 27
Black Sea, 137
Blocs, formation of, 140
Blomberg, Field Marshal von, 89
Blum, Leon, 138, 139, 142, 144
Bonn Treaty, 250, 252
Bono, Marshal de, 92
Boris, King of Bulgaria, 125
Borsen-Zeitung, 132
Brenner Pass, 100, 139
Briand, Aristide, 38, 45, 48, 57
Bridgeman, Mr., 49
British Empire, 29-30, 52, 55

Air Training Scheme, 182

Commitments in Europe, 79-80

Commonwealth, 140, 182, 211,
237, 240, 258-259, 270, 278

Compromise Plan, 148

Dominions and Colonies, 29-30,
55-56, 182, 287

Empire Exhibition, 173

Empire Parliamentary Association,
230

Empire Settlement Act, 47-48, 53

Free Trade, 29, 68

Navy, 104

White Paper on Defence, 102
British Institute of Public Opinion,

179

Brooke, General, 184, 205
Bruening, Heinrich, 80
Brussels:

Conference, 152

Line, 33

treaty, 275

treaty powers, 279
Buchan, John, 69
Bulganin, N.A., 284
Bulgaria, 51, 201
Burma, 262, 265
Butcher, Captain Harry C., 205-206,

213
Butler, R. A., 189, 213, 224, 225,

291, 295

Butler's Education Act, 221
Buxton, Noel, 51-52

Cairo Conference, 189, 193, 207,

210, 215
Calais, 184
Calvert, Caroline, 2
Campbell case, 25-27
Canada, 182, 199, 206, 210, 214,

230, 237, 240, 261, 277, 279
"Caretaker Government," 221
Carton Club coup* 13, 17

Carol, King of Rumania, 125
Carter, Lady Violet Bantam, 178
Cartland, Ronald, 155
Casablanca Conference, 189
Cecil, Lord Hugh, 40
Cecil, Lord Robert (Viscount Cecil
of Chelwood), 49, 50, 51, 53,
77, 112, 167
Ceylon, 262

Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 27, 33, 37-
39, 41, 42-45, 46-47, 49-50,
53, 55, 56, 60, 65, 104, 118,
135, 282

Chamberlain, Neville, 51, 72, 75, 86,
118, 135, 144, 147, 148, 150-
163, 165, 167-171, 173, 177-
179, 183, 293
Chiang Kai-shek, 286
Chilston, Lord, 105
China, 74, 152, 203, 211, 227, 265
Communist, 259, 261-269, 286-287
Nationalist movement, 45-46
Nationalists, 286-287
off-shore islands, 286-287
and Russia, 65-66
United States attitude toward, 260-

269

China Lobby, 286
Chou En-lai, 261, 267
Christ Church, Oxford, 8, 13
Christian minorities, 21-22, 36
Christmas Eve Message, 282-283
Churchill, Clarissa Spencer (Lady

Eden), 255-256
Churchill, Sir Winston, 23, 61, 157,

181, 228
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 27,

62, 67

Eden in opposition to, 82-83
in the Wilderness, 82-83, 99, 111-
112, 155, 158-160, 163, 167,
172, 175, 179, 180
First Lord of the Admiralty, 181
Prime Minister, 183-189, 190, 191,
194-198, 199, 205-210, 211-
217, 221-222
in Opposition, 222, 233, 238, 239,

240

Prime Minister again, 244, 246-

247, 250, 252, 253, 256, 258-

259, 261, 265-267, 284-285,

288-291

on science of speech-making, 213-

214

summary of foreign affairs, 258
suggestion for **talks at the sum-
mit," 258-259, 284
retirement of, 289, 293-294
Ciano, Count, 115-116, 169
Clano Papers, 157

298

INDEX

Cliveden, 118
dynes, J. R., 25, 26, 47
Coal and Steel Community, 256
Coal Nationalisation Bill, 229
Collective security, 32, 114, 126,
149-150, 155, 160, 243-244
Cologne, 218

Colombo Powers, 262-264, 266, 269
Columbia University, 247
Cominform, 242
Commandos, 184-185
Communism, 145, 146, 147, 162,

273-274

Communist Party, British, 25
"Compass," operation, 187
Conservatives:

administration machine, 222-224

Blackpool Conference, 231

Central Office, 223

defeat of, 14, 222

foreign policy, 49-50

Mandate for protection, 16-17

overhaul of, 222-224
Consumers 9 Councils, 229
Convoys, 207
Conway, Sir Martin, 68
Cooke, Alistair, 264
Cranborne, Lord (Lord Salisbury),

146, 162, 167, 189, 291
Crete, 186

Cripps, Sir Stafford, 121, 198, 291
Croats, 95, 96, 201
Cummings, A. J., 170
Cunningham of Hyndhope, Admiral

Viscount, 193, 205
Currency, Three Power Declaration,

140

Curzon, Lord, 34
Curzon Line, 201, 208
Cushendun, Lord, 56-58
Czechoslovakia, 95, 133, 153, 171,
173-174, 175, 178, 201, 222

Daily Express, 36, 155, 228

Daily Herald, 166, 239

Daily Mail, 25, 35, 136, 155, 228

Daily Telegraph, 165

Daladier, Eduard, 83, 84, 89

Dalton, Hugh, 229

Damaskinos, Archbishop, 216

Dardanelles, 137

Davis, Norman, 84

D-Day, 210, 214

De Gaulle, General Charles, 205,

206, 244

De Kanya, M., 125
Delbos, M., 165
Democracy, 216

nation-wide property-owning, 231-

232

Denmark, 95

occupation of, 182
De Valera, Eamon, 173
Dewhurst, R. Paget, 13
Dictatorships, 141, 147, 151
Dili, Sir John, 193
Dingley, Captain Walter, 64
Disarmament, 18, 48-51, 71, 79-85,

245

Commission, 51

Conference, 57, 75-78, 84-85, 94
Convention, 8 1
Memorandum on, 88
universal, proposal for, 53
Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, 101
Doilfuss, President Engelbert, 89,

100
Doumergue, President Gaston, 48,

89, 92

Dovgalevski, M., 66
Duff-Cooper, Alfred (Lord Nor-
wich), 57, 69, 73, 130-131,
157, 158, 160-163, 169, 174,
175
DuUes, John Foster, 257, 260-269,

274, 276-277, 287

Dunglass, Lord (Lord Home), 290
Dunkirk evacuation, 184
Durham Chronicle, 14

East Fulham by-election, 86

East India Company, 2

Eckhardt, M,, 96

Economist, 268, 269

Ecuador, 114

Eden, Anthony (see Eden, Robert
Anthony)

Eden, Beatrice Beckett (Mrs. An-
thony Eden), 16-17, 232

Eden, Caroline Calvert, 2

Eden, Elfrida Marjorie, 7

Eden, Emily, 3-4

Eden, Major the Hon. Evelyn, M. C.,
16

Eden, Sir Frederick Morton, 2

Eden, John, 7

Eden, Sir John, 2

Eden, Nicholas (son of Anthony
Eden), 42, 67, 232, 240

Eden, Robert, 1

Eden, Sir Robert, 2

Eden, Sir Robert Anthony:

character assessment by others:
Godfrey Locker-Lampson, 43
James Johnson, 70
Spectator profile, 110
Viscount Snowden, 120
Churchill, 163, 188
John G. Winant, 190-192
President Roosevelt, 199-200

INDEX

299

Eden, Sir Robert Anthony (conL):
Jan Masaryk, 222
Quintin Hogg, 228
Yorkshire Post, 233
Francis Williams, 239
Observer profile, 239-240
Liverpool Post, 240
childhood, youth, education:
birth of, 7
Sandrpyd School, 8
Divinity Prize, 9
athletic prowess, oarsman, 9
Christ Church, Oxford, 1919,

12-13

Oriental Languages School, 13
first-class honours, 13
domestic life:

marriage to Beatrice Beckett,

16-17

house in Chelsea, 17
birth of son Simon Gascoign, 28
birth of son Nicholas, 67
country house, gardening, 169
flat at Foreign Office, 191
death of son Simon, 222
divorce on grounds of desertion,

232
close bonds with son Nicholas,

232
marriage to Clarissa Spencer

Churchill, 255-256
health:

exhaustion through travel, or-
dered complete rest, 107
duodenal ulcer, 221
appendectomy, 235-236
recuperative powers, 236
gall bladder operation, 257-258
honours:

Military Cross, 10
Freedom of Leamington, 120
D.C.L. from Durham Univer-
sity, 132

Knight of the Garter, 281
letters:

to Chamberlain, 164
to Churchill, 172
opinions on larger issues:

individual and community, 229-

230

Party political warfare, 229-231
Nationalisation, 230-231
political philosophy, 229-231
property-owning democracy,

231

Doctrine of Three Unities, 237
European Federation, 246
Parliamentary record and appoint-
ments:
elected to Parliament, 17

Eden, Sir Robert Anthony (conL):
Parliamentary Private Secretary

to Locker-Lampson, 28
first Government spokesman, 34
transfer to Foreign Affairs, 36
Aide to Sir Austen Chamber-
lain, 42-54
back bencher, 51
Under-Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs, 71, 73
Lord Privy Seal, 88
Minister for League of Nations

Affairs, 110
resignation, 155-163
Secretary of State for Domin-
ions, 181

Secretary of State for War, 183
Foreign Secretary again, 188
Leader of House of Commons,

189
named as Churchill's successor,

198

Acting Prime Minister, 212
into Opposition, 222-227
directorship of Westminster

Bank, 225-226

joins Board of Rio Tinto, 226
Acting Leader of Opposition,

228

return to Foreign Office, 241
Deputy Prime Minister and For-
eign Secretary, 244
Prime Minister, 289
Leader of Conservative Party,

295

relations with colleagues:
Locker-Lampson, 28, 42-43
Austen Chamberlain, 42, 43
Stanley Baldwin, 71-72
Sir John Simon, 75, 76-77, 93-

94
Churchill, 83, 163, 188-198,

213-214, 215, 246, 255, 289
Neville Chamberlain, 135-136,

150-154, 168-170
Lloyd George, 136, 152, 169
schism in Cabinet, 146-154,

155-163

Lord Cranbome, 167
Duff-Cooper, 169
relations with Press:

hostility of Press Barons for

Baldwin reflected on Eden, 35
letters to The Times, 61, 69, 174
attack on Lord Beaverbrook,

101
attitude toward hostile Press*

136
Press reactions to resignation,

165-166

300

INDEX

Eden, Sir Robert Anthony (cont.):

Beaverbrook Press on Eden's fu-
ture, 212-213

assessment of Eden as Acting

Leader of Opposition, 228
speeches broadcast :

from Geneva, 94

Sept. 11, 1939, 181

broadcast from sick bed, 221-
222

Party political speeches, 233,
238

compromise survey (1953), 256

from Kuala Lumpur, 287
speeches public and in Parlia-
ment:

general election (1922), 14

on air defence, 18-20

on Turkey, 20-22

on Armed Services, 23

on Campbell prosecution, 26-27

on unemployment, 28-30

on Iraq, 33-37

on European settlement, 39-40

on Socialist militant pacifism, 47

on local Locarnos, 52

on migration, 53

on American trade, 53-54

on Anglo-American understand-
ing, 60

on Balfour Declaration, 62-63

at Leamington, 63

on peace, 66-67

on Anglo-Soviet relations, 65

at Skipton, 86

at Llandudno, 151

on democracy, 178, 216, 231

at Leamington, 140

at Bradford, 141

at Birmingham, 155

to Royal Society of St. George,
172-173

at Southampton, 175-176

to League of Nations Union,
Queen's Hall, 177-178

on Emergency Powers Bill, 180

to Free Church Federal Coun-
cil, 210-211

on Conservative Party Policy,
Bristol, 214-215

on British intervention in
Greece, 215-216

to House of Commons on Fu-
ture of Europe, 217-218

to Scottish Unionists at Glas-
gow, 218-219

at San Francisco Conference,
220

during Debate on the Address,
226

Eden, Sir Robert Anthony (con/.):

on Coal Nationalisation Bill,
229

policy statement at Hull, 229-
230

on State ownership, 230

to London Conservatives at
Walthamstow, 230-231

on nation-wide property-owning
democracy, 231-232

survey of British foreign policy,
245-246

on Suez Agreement, 271

on diplomatic methods, 272
tastes, talents, personality:

appreciation of Proust, 138

arbitration technique, 96-97, 130

early political leanings, 7-8

humour, 236-237

leadership qualities revealed by
war, 9-10

love for soil, 192

love of travel, 3 1

painting talent, 8

Parliamentary debating accom-
plishments, 46, 71

personality, 41

study of Oriental languages, 13

temper, 41

writings (see Eden: writings)
travels, international conferences:

first League of Nations experi-
ence, 57

Disarmament Conference
(1932), 75-78

Geneva, 75-78, 260-269

first grand tour, 88

Berlin, 88, 89-91, 103

Rome, 88, 91-92

Paris, 89, 92-93

Sweden, 95

Denmark, 95

Moscow, 104-106, 189, 214-215

Warsaw, 106

Prague, 106

Washington, 178, 199-206, 230,
240, 246-247, 256-257

North Africa, 185, 212

Middle East, 185, 235

fronts in France, 182

inspects Dominion troops at
Suez, 182

Algiers, 212

Canada, 214, 237, 240

Greece, 216

Yalta, 217

Cairo, Athens, Italy, 215

San Francisco, 220-221

Potsdam, 222

Bermuda, U. S., Canada, 230

INDEX

301

Eden, Sir Robert Anthony (can/.):
Canada, Australia, New Zeal-
and, India, Pakistan, Malaya,
237

Jugoslavia, 256
Austria, 256
Geneva Conference (1954),

260-269
Brussels, Bonn, Rome, Paris

(re E.D.C.), 276
London Nine Power Confer-
ence, 277-280
Middle and Far East, 286
war service:

King's Royal Rifle Corps, 9, 179
Temporary Lieutenant, 9
First World War, 9-11
awarded Military Cross, 10
opposite Corporal Hitler, 10, 90-

91

Captain, 11
Brigade Major, 11
Major in the Rangers, 179
writings:

introduction to The Semi-de-
tached House, 4
as "Back Bencher** for York-
shire Post, 3 1
journalism, 31
Places in the Sun, 31, 32
Eden, Sir Robert Johnson, 1
Eden, Simon Gascoign, 28

death of, 222

Eden, Lady Sybil Gray, 4, 6, 7, 12
Eden, Sir Timothy Calvert, 1, 7, 11
Eden, William (first Lord Auck-
land), 2

Eden, Sir William, 4-6, 7, 8, 41
Eden, William Nicholas, 7
Eden baronetcy, 1
Edward Vni, King, 141, 157
Egypt, 55, 137, 185, 187, 193, 245-

246, 248-249, 265, 270-271
Egyptian Nile Society, 120
Eisenhower, President Dwight D.,
205, 267, 268, 283, 285, 286,
287

Elizabeth H, Queen, 289
Elliott, Walter, 73, 157, 162, 289
Employment, full, 221
Entente Cordiale, 48, 128
Little Entente, 133
New Entente, 56
Estonia, 114
Ethiopia (see Abyssinia)
Eton College, 8-9
Europe:

Council of, 244-246, 249-250, 256,

272
Federation of, 274

Europe (cont.):

invasion of, 207, 214
Western, unity with, 237
Western Air Pact, 101, 104, 127
Western Union, 244, 248, 250,

279, 282, 283

European Army, 246, 247 , 272
European Defence Community, 245-
251, 254, 256-258, 265, 272-
277, 279
Evening Standard, 155, 179

Far East, 45, 77, 151, 152, 286

Soviet influence in, 46
Fascism, 89, 146
Faure, Edgar, 284
Feiling, Keith, 6, 157, 160
Feversfaam, Earl of, 28
Figl, Dr., 256
Financial Times, 226
Finland, 195, 196, 201
Flandin, Pierre, 100, 107, 117, 125,

126, 127, 128, 132, 133, 138
"Flapper vote," 64
Formosa, 286-287
Four Power Pact, 77, 81, 83
France, 37-38, 55, 56, 62, 65, 88,

89, 92-93, 96, 101-102, 113,

149, 173-174, 204-206, 250,

261, 264, 265, 272-279
defeat of, 183
Northern, invasion of, 207, 210,

214
Franco, General Francisco, 145, 153,

154

Franco- American talks, 84
Franco-German relations, 37-38, 77,

97-98
Franco-Italian relations, 84, 100-101,

126
Franco-Soviet Pact, 131

Gallagher, William, 215

Gallipoli, British war graves at, 137

Garton, G. C., 64

Gathering Storm, The, 158

General Elections, 13-17, 24-27, 61-
64, 75, 120, 221-222, 240-241.
292

General Strike, 29, 41

Geneva Conference on Indo-China
and Korea, 260-269, 286

Geneva Protocol, 32

George V, King, 71, 104, 124, 127

George VI, King, 183, 198, 226,
death of, 247

Germany, 24, 37-38, 39-40, 60, 66,
76, 77, 79, 80, 85-87, 88, 89-
91, 92, 93, 125, 129-133, 134,
144, 153, 182-183, 201-202,

302

INDEX

Germany (cont.):

208, 217, 249-251, 272, 273-
279

admitted to League, 44
Air Force, 102
alliance with Japan, 146
Eastern, 258-259
Four-Year Plan, 146
rearmament of, 84-87, 91, 92-93,

99

reparations, 58

Western, 249, 250, 274, 276-279
withdraws from Disarmament
Conference and League, 77,
83, 85

Gibson, Hugh, 49
Giraud, General, 205, 206
Globe Insurance Company, 3
Goebbels, Dr. Josef, 84, 86, 90
Goering, Hermann, 161, 165
Gothic Line, 214
Grand Alliance, 32
Grandi, Count, 138, 156, 157, 161,

168-169

Graziani, Marshal, 187
Greece, 193-194, 201, 215-216, 226,

257

Communist inspired E. L. A. S. re-
bellion, 215, 216

frontier dispute with Bulgaria, 52
invasion of, 186
Greenwood, Arthur, 168
Gretton, Colonel, 102
Grey, Lady Sybil (Lady Eden), 4, 5
Grey, Lord, 38
Grey, Sir William, 6

Hague International High Court,

131, 245
Haiti, 118
Halifax, Lord, 127, 136, 152, 153,

179, 188
Hankow, 45

Hastings, Sir Patrick, 25
Havoc, 149
Hawariate, Tecle, 113
Head, A. H., 270
Henderson, Arthur, 65, 66, 67, 86

Disarmament pilgrimage, 84
Herriot, Edouard, 24, 77, 180
Hess, Rudolph, 90
Hindenburg, Paul von, 80, 91
Hitler, Adolf, 80, 81, 84, 85-86, 93,
97, 98, 101-102, 103, 106,
116, 126-130, 137, 138-139,
140, 145-146, 147-148, 153,
156, 161-162, 175, 183
meeting with Eden, 10, 90-91
Nuremberg speech, 174
"Peace Plan," 132, 133, 134

Hoare, Sir Samuel, 18, 110, 112, 114,

116, 120, 121-122, 147, 157
Hoare-Laval Peace Plan, 121-123,

135

Hoesch, von, 127
Hogg, Quintin, 228
Holland, 94, 183, 243, 250
Hollywood, 136
Home, Lord, 290
Home Defence Air Force, 18
Home Guard, 184
Hong Kong, 202, 204
Hoover, President Herbert, 66, 76
Hopkins, Harry, 191, 196, 200-204,

213, 243

Hopkinson, Henry, 224
Hore-BeHsha, Leslie, 162
Howe, Sir Robert, 249
Hudson, R. S., 213
Hull, Cordell, 204, 206
Hundred Commoners, A, 70
Hungary, 58, 95-97, 139, 201
"Hungry sheep" correspondence, 69-

70
Hydrogen bomb, 285

Ibn Saud, King, 235
Ideologies, and international rela-
tionships, 140-141, 146, 231
Hchester, Countess of, 28
Imperial Press Conference, 31
India, 3, 237-238, 259, 262, 263, 265,

278
Indo-CMna, 96, 245, 260-265, 268-

269, 286

Industrial Charter, 233
Insanity Fair, 104
International, Third, 53, 65
International Affairs, The Survey of,

97, 105, 111, 116, 119
Iran (see Persia)
Iraq, 32, 33, 35, 36, 265, 287
Ireland, 25

Ironside, Field Marshal Lord, 184
Ismay, General Lord, 187, 205
Isola Bella, 106
Israel, 265, 288

Italy, 38, 44-45, 81-82, 84-85, 96,
113, 119, 121, 132, 138-139,
156, 165, 166, 167, 205, 215,
250, 271-272
and Albania, 51
AUied landings in, 199, 205
debt, 62

Peace Treaty, 248
resigns from League, 134
surrender of, 206
troops in Spain, 157
Italo-Ethiopian dispute, 107-108,
113-123, Somaliland, 100

INDEX

303

Japan, 74, 76, 80, 94, 152, 197, 203,

217, 265

alliance with Germany, 146
Pearl Harbor, 195
Jeze, M., 115
Johnston, James, 70
Joynson-Hicks, Sir William, 28
Jugoslavia, 51, 95-97, 193, 194, 256,
257, 271-272

Kellogg, Frank B., 55, 56

Kellogg Pact, 55, 56, 58, 152

Kemal, Mustapha, 20

Kindersley, L. N., 8

King, W. L. Mackenzie, 230

King's Royal Rffle Corps, 9, 179

Kipling, Rudyard, 36

Knowland, Senator, 267

Knox, Mr., 98, 99

Koje Island, 252

Korean conflict, 244-245, 246-247,

252-254, 259-262, 266, 268,

278

Kresinsky, M., 105
Krushchev, N. S., 285
Kuala Lumpur, 287

Labour, 14-15, 17, 33-34, 50
Blackpool Conference, 221
and China, 46
and Communists, 24-27
first government, 17, 18, 24
second government, 64, 65-70, 73
Laniel, M., 264
Lansbury, George, 102
Lausanne, Treaty of, 20, 23
Lausanne Conference, 36
Laval, Pierre, 98-101, 107, 109, 113,
115, 116, 117, 121-122, 126,
138

Law, Andrew Bonar, 13, 14, 291
Law, Richard, 213
League of Nations, 32, 44, 82, 83,
98, 100-101, 104-105, 113-
115, 117-120, 126, 128-129,
132-134, 136-137, 139, 141,
146, 151, 159, 177, 190, 244,
294
Committee of Eighteen, 118, 119,

121

Committee of Six, 118
Co-ordination Committee, 118
Council meeting in London, 128
Covenant of, 34, 67
Germany resigns from, 83, 85
health services, 57
Italy resigns from, 134
Permanent Council, admissions to,

37-40
Union, 50, 112

Leamington Chronicle, 15

Leathers, Lord, 226

Leger, M., 128

Leipzig affair, 148

Letter from Grosvenor Square,

190-192

Liberalism, Lloyd Georgian, 72-73
Liberal Party, 13-14
Libya, 197
Lindley, Ernest, 266
Lindsay, Sir Ronald, 158, 159
Lithuania, 103
Little Entente, 133
Litvinov, Maxim, 104, 105, 114,
Liverpool Post, 240
Lloyd, Seiwyn, 290
Lloyd George, David, 13, 20, 27, 39,

40, 50, 58, 60, 61, 136, 152,
168, 169, 170, 182, 183,
213

Lloyd Georgian Liberalism, 72-73
Local Defence Volunteers, 183-184
Locarno, 37, 38, 39, 46, 50, 60, 67,
79, 86, 126, 265, 266

Agreement, 39, 52

Eastern, 103, 106

local Locarnos, 52

Locarno-ism, 267

Powers, 127-132, 139

Treaty, 32-34, 37
Locker-Lampson, Godfrey, 28, 37,

42-43, 57

Londonderry, Marquess of, 14
London Nine Power Conference,

275, 277-280, 282
Longmore, Air Chief Marshal Sir

Arthur, 193
Lothian, Lord, 188
Low, David, 121
Lublin Committee of Poles, 215
Lumley, L. R., 42
Luxembourg, 243, 275, 279
Lyttelton, Oliver, 213

McDonald, J. Ramsay, 22, 24-26, 40-

41, 51, 63, 72, 77, 83, 92,
107, 110, 127

meeting with Mussolini, 81-82
visit to United States, 66

MacDonald, Malcolm, 162, 212

Macmiflan, Harold, 291

Madariaga, Salvador de, 94, 115

Maisky, Ivan M., 104, 105, 138

Malaya, 237

Malenkov, Georgi, 284

Malta, 185

Manchester Guardian, 176, 182, 212,
264, 267, 277, 281, 288

Manchuria, 74-75, 80

Mandated territories, 203

304

INDEX

Margesson, David, 189

Marseilles, 95

Marshall, General George C., 205,

243

Marshall Plan, 243
Masaryk, Jan, 222
Masaryk, President Thomas, 106
Masterman, Charles, 27
Matsu, 287

Maudiing, Reginald, 224, 290
Maxton, James, 102
Mediterranean, 140, 145, 149-150,

156, 183, 271
Melbourne, Lord, 290
Memel, annexation of, 178
Mendes-France, Pierre, 260, 264,

267-268, 273, 275, 277, 278,

282, 283-284

Menzies, Robert Gordon, 237
Middle East, 185, 193, 235
Mikolajczyck, M., 215
Mikoyan, A. L, 207
Molotov, V. M., 105, 196, 197, 207,

208, 221, 260, 285, 294
Monroe Doctrine, 151
Montreux Conference, 137
Morrison, Herbert, 184, 241, 291
Morrison, W. S., 157, 162
Moscow, Eden's visits to, 104-106,

189, 193, 195, 196-197, 199,

206-207, 214-215
Moscow Conference, 199, 206, 214-

215

Mossadegh, Mohammed, 248
Mosul policy, 33, 37
Mukden, 74
Muller, Herr, 57
Munich, 82, 174-175, 177, 188

agreement, 171, 178
Mussolini, Benito, 44-45, 77, 81, 100-

101, 107-108, 109-110, 111-

112, 113, 123, 132, 133, 138,

145, 148, 161, 162, 166, 172,

179, 190

invades Greece, 186
mass mobilisation order, 116
on Mediterranean, 140
meeting with Eden, 91-92
at Stresa Conference, 107
My Three Years With Eisenhower,

205

Naguib, General, 254

National Farmers* Union, 64

National Government, 71, 73-76

Nationalisation, 229-232

National Socialism, 89

Nazis, 86, 89, 91, 98, 100, 126-127,

128, 129-132, 153, 155, 181
Nehru, Pandit, 238, 260

Neurath, Baron von, 84, 89, 90, 125

130

News Chronicle, 165, 177, 239
New York Times, The, 4
New Zealand, 182, 237, 262
Nicholls, George, 15, 17, 26, 64
Nicholson, Sir Harold, 176
North Africa, 183, 185, 204-205

284
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

247, 250, 254, 258, 262, 265'

266, 273, 275, 279, 285
Norway, invasion of, 182
Nyon Conference, 149-150

Observer, 239, 278, 279
Qeuvre, V, 165
Ogaden, 109
Old Men Forget, 158
Organisation for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation, 250
Osborne, Lord William Godolphin, 3
"Overlord," Operation, 207
Oxford University, 12-13

Pacelli, Cardinal, 92
Pakistan, 237, 262
Panay, sinking of, 154
Panmunjom, 259
Papen, Franz von, 80
Paris, liberation of, 216
Paris Peace Conference, 231
Parmoor, Lord, 50
Patel, VaUabhbhai, 238
Paul-Boncour, Joseph, 84, 128
Peace Ballot, 112
Peace Bill, 20
Pearl Harbor, 195
Pearson, Lester, 261
Persia, 227, 245, 248, 265
Pescadores, 286
Peterson, Mr., 122
Philippines, 263
Phipps, Sir Eric, 89, 165
Pilsudsky, Marshal, 90, 106
Pitt, William, 2, 3
Places in the Sun, 31, 32
Plastiras, General, 216
Pleven, Rene, 247, 272-273
Plumer, Lord, 11
Poison gas, use of, 133
Poland, 38, 44, 132, 178, 200-201,
208, 226

Anglo-French guarantee to, 171.
178

Government in London, 217

Lublin Committee, 215

pact with Germany, 90
Pollock, Sir Ernest, 15
Pope, the, 92

INDEX

305

Portugal, 94
Potomac Charter, 266
Potsdam, 222, 254
Prague, 171
Pravda, 65
Press barons, 35
Preston estate of Edens, 1
Private enterprise, 215
Proust, Marcel, 138
Prussia, East, 201

Quebec Conferences, 189, 199, 206
Quemoy, 287

Reading, Lord, 73, 74, 75
Red Sea, 101

Reed, Douglas, 104, 105-106
Refugee problem, 203
Reparations Conference, 66
Reynaud, M. Paul, 180
Rnee, Syngman, 252
RMneland, 99, 125, 127-129, 132

agreement on control of, 66

evacuation of, 45, 57, 61, 65
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 93, 130-
132, 138, 147, 148, 161, 195
Ribbentrop-Molotov line, 208
"Right Road for Britain, The," 238
Rio Tinto, 226
Rommel, Field Marshal, 194
Roosevelt, Elliott, 208
Roosevelt, President Franklin D.,
151, 158-159, 191, 196, 197,
199-205, 208, 209, 211, 214,
293

death of, 220

and Soviet Union, 243
Rothermere, Lord, 68, 165
Ruhr, 133

French troops withdrawn from, 24
Rumania, 201
Russia (see Soviet Russia)

Saar, 97-99, 100, 10}, 283
Salisbury, Lord (Lord Cranborne),

146, 162, 167, 189, 291
Sanctions, 113, 116, 118, 120, 121,

128, 134, 135
Sandroyd School, 8
San Francisco Conference, 220
Sassoon, Sir Philip, 133, 166
Saudi-Arabia, 235
Scandinavian countries, 95
Scarbrough, Earl of, 42, 67
Schleicher, General von, 80
Schuman, Robert, 244, 247, 250
Schuman Plan, 244, 247, 248
Schuschnlgg, Dr., 138, 155
Seobie, General, 216
Second World War, 181
end o^ 218-219

Second World War, The, Vol. 1,

"The Gathering Storm," 158
Security Council, 203, 220, 245
Seely, Major-General, 19
Segrave, Henry, 8
Selassie, Haile, 100

flight from Addis Ababa, 134
Semi-attached Couple, The, 4
Semi-detached House, The, 4
Serbs, 201
Shanghai, 45, 80

Japanese bombardment of, 76
Sherwood, Robert, 196, 200, 204
Sicily, 199, 205
Sikorsky, General, 200
Simon, Sir John, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83,

84, 85, 88, 92, 93-94, 101,

102, 103, 104, 107, 109, 118,

147, 162, 170
Simpson, Mrs. Wallis, 141
Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 46, 145
Singapore, conference in, 287
Smith, Bedell, 205, 268
Smuts, Field Marshal Jan Christian,

186
Snowden, Philip, Viscount, 62-63,

66, 67, 72, 75, 120
Social insurance, 221
Socialism, 27, 47, 230-232
Socialists, 15, 75, 240
South-East Asia Treaty Organisation,

262-264, 269, 286-287
Soviet Russia, 24-27, 48, 65-66, 76,

77, 179-180, 200-202, 206-

208, 211, 254

agreements with Britain, 189
and China, 65-66
entry to League, 94
influence in Far East, 46
pact with France, 131
proposal for universal disarma-
ment, 53
and Turkey, 36
Spaak, Paul-Henri, 278
Spain, 130, 145, 153, 161, 166, 172
Spanish Civil War, 99, 137, 157
Non-intervention, 138, 142, 146,

149, 151
Spectator, 110
Spender, J. A., 24, 29
Stalin, Joseph, 105, 107, 180, 195,

196, 197, 206-209
death of, 257
Stanley, Oliver, 73, 162
Star, 229

Starhemberg, Prince, 125
Stassen, Harold, 257
State control and benefits, Eden on,

214-215, 230-232
State of the Poor, The, 2

306

INDEX

Stavisky, scandal, 89

Stevenson, Sir Ralph, 249

Straits, the, 33

Straug, Sir William, 105, 180

Stresa Conference, 106-108

Stresemann, Gustav, 45

Suda Bay, 186

Sudan, 249

Sudetenland, 153

Suez Canal, 109, 116, 133, 137, 182,

270

Sunday Express, 236
Survey of International Affairs, 97,

105, 111, 116, 119
Suvicb, Signer, 84, 92, 93
Sweden, 38, 40, 95
Switzerland, 94

Tachen. Islands, 287

Tedder, Marshal of the R.A.F., Lord,

205
Teheran Conference, 189, 199, 208-

209, 210
Tevere, 108

Thoiry conversations, 45
Three-Power Conference, 113-114
Three-Power Currency Declaration,

140
Times, The, 20, 32, 35, 39, 42, 48,

51, 68, 69, 88, 90, 91, 92,

104, 105, 112, 114, 125, 129,

131, 133, 135, 156, 157, 174,

281
Tito, Marshal, 226-227, 245, 248,

256

Titulescu, M., 125
Tobruk, 194
Trade unionism, 14
Trieste, 245, 248, 256, 271
Truman, President Harry S., 246
Trusteeships, 201, 203
Turkey, 20-22, 33, 35, 43-44, 137,

193, 201, 205, 208, 257, 287
Soviet Russia and, 36

Unemployment, 63, 176

debate, 29
Unionist Party, 14
United Nations, 200, 203, 205, 208,

253

eastern and western blocs, 231
Economic and Social Council, 220
organisation, 203-204, 220, 262,

266-267, 286

Security Council, 203, 220, 245

United States of America, 58, 60, 62,

119, 147, 154, 158, 178, 190,

191, 194, 197-198, 199, 201*

205, 210, 214, 220-221, 230,

United States of America (cant.) :

237, 240, 243, 246, 253-254,
257, 258, 261-269, 272-279,
285-286, 287
Kellogg Pact, 55, 58, 152

Vandenberg, Senator Arthur, 244
Vansittart, Sir Robert (Lord), 74

157

Van Zeeland, Paul, 125
Vasconcellos, Senhor, 119
Versailles, Treaty of, 34, 77, 79 S 99,

146

Vienna, 89
Vietminh, 245, 262
Vishinsky, Andrei, 256

Wakefield, Bishop of, 16

Walwal incident, 115

War Cabinet, 183, 198

Warwick, Countess of, 15, 17, 26,
28, 64

Warwick and Leamington Constitu-
ency, 64, 222, 238

Washington Nine-Power Conference.
151

Wavell, Field Marshal Lord, 185,
186, 187, 193, 194

Welles, Sunnier, 158, 160

Western European Union, 244, 248,
250, 279, 282, 283

Westminster Bank, 226

Westminster Press, 147

Whig dynasties, 6

Whistler, James Abbott McNeill, 6

White House Papers of Harry Hop-
kins, The, 196, 200

White Paper:

Anglo-French negotiations, 58
British, on Defence, 102

Williams, Francis, 239

Wilson, Sir Henry Maitland (Field
Marshal Lord), 185, 186,
187

Wilson, Sir Horace, 158

Winant, John G., 190-192, 200

Windlestone Hall, 1, 6

Winterton, Lord, 295

Wood, Kingsley, 73, 157

Woolton, Lord, 223

Wrangel, General, 24

Yalta Conference, 190, 217, 218

Yalu River raid, 253-254

York, Archbishop of, 16

Yorkshire Post, 31, 135, 233

Young, Hilton, 57

Zeila, 109

Zinoviev letter, 25-26

Zurich, 244

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